Judgement KIDWAI, J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother and I entirely concur. I would, however, like to add a few words as to the meaning to be given to the words "error, apparent on the face of the record". I conceive! that in the English cases from which this expression has been borrowed the emphasis is not upon the word "error" but upon the words "apparent on the face of the record", that is to say that error must be such as can be ascertained from the record as it exists or should exist. 2. In Walsall Overseers v. London and North Western Rly. Co., 1878-4 AC 30 (A), Lord Cairns, Lord Chancellor, stated, at page 39 : "If there was upon the face of the order of the Court of Quarter Sessions anything which showed that that order was erroneous, the Court of Queens Bench might be asked to have the order brought into it, and to look at the order, and view it upon the face of it, and if the Court found error upon the face of it, to put an end to its existence by quashing it." 3. In - Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, 1922-2 AC 128 (B), Lord Sumner stated, at page 155 of the Report : "The key of the question is the amount of material stated or to be stated on the record returned and brought into the superior Court. If justices state more than they are bound to state, it may, so to speak, be used against them, and out of their own mouths they may be condemned, but there is no suggestion that, apart from questions of jurisdiction, a party may state further matters to the Court, either by new affidavits or by producing anything that is not on or part of the record." Again, at page 159 of the Report, Lord Sumner added : "When the Summary Jurisdiction Act provided, as the sufficient record of all summary convictions, a common form, which did not include any statement of the evidence for the conviction, it did not stint the jurisdiction of the QueensBench, or alter the actual law of certiorari. What it did was to disarm its exercise. The effect was not to make that which had been error, error no longer but to remove nearly all opportunity for its detection. What it did was to disarm its exercise. The effect was not to make that which had been error, error no longer but to remove nearly all opportunity for its detection. The face of the record "spoke" no longer; it was the inscrutable face of a sphinx." The same point is clearly brought out in - Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 1952-1 KB 338 (C), Lord Justice Denning states at page 349 of the Report : "The record had to contain everything necessary to show that the Justices had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and it had to set out their adjudication; but it was not necessary to set out either the evidence or the reasons. If a point of law arose, however, on which either party desired the ruling of the Kings Bench, he could ask the justices to make a speaking order, that is, to make a special entry upon the record of the reasons for their judgment. The justices were not bound to do this, but they usually did so if they entertained a doubt about the point. When their reasons thus appeared on the record, the Court of Kings Bench would on certiorari inquire into their correctness, and, if the reasons were wrong, would quash the decision." 4. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in - T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, 1954 SC 440 (AIR V 41) (D), in a passage quoted at length by my learned brother that the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting writs in English law are applicable to India. 5. If any position as to the scope of certiorari other than that laid in the English decisions were adopted, it might well be that the High Court, having discovered an error on the record, would be bound to allow that error to subsist because it was not one of sufficient gravity to justify interference. Such a position has been negatived by this Court in - Kishan Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, 1955 All 557 ((S) AIR V 42) (E), and by the Supreme Court in - Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, 1955 SC 425 ((S) AIR V 42) (F), in passages which my learned brother has quoted and which it is not necessary for me to repeat. 6. 6. In the present case, therefore, it is open to us to examine the order of the Chancellor which is a "speaking order" to consider the interpretation which he places on the statute and the reasons therefor which lie gives and on finding that he misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the statute, to quash his order in the exercise of our power of certiorari. MEHROTRA, J. : 7. This is an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court against a judgment of a Single Judge of this Court allowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent, Dr. Ishwari Prasad. 8. Briefly, the facts, which gave rise to the petition, are that the respondent, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, was a Professor in the University of Allahabad, appellant 2, and the Head of the Department of Political Science until 13-3-1954, the date on which he retired from the service of the University. He was also a member of the Academic Council of the, University and as such was an ex officio member of the Court under head (vi) of S. 17 of the Allahabad University Act, 1921. The Court is the supreme governing body of the University under the Act and the executive body of the University is the Executive Council. The constitution of the Executive Council is laid down in the Statutes which are to be found in Chapter II of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations made under the Act. The Executive Council consists of twenty members of whom six are members of the Court elected by the Court at its annual meeting. In the annual meeting of the Court held in November, 1952, the respondent was elected to the Executive Council. One of the limitations placed by the Statutes on the powers of the Court to elect six of its members to the Executive Council is that two of the persons so elected must be members who themselves were elected as members of the Court by the registered graduates. Out of the six persons elected by the Court to the membership of the Executive Council, four were persons who had been elected to the Court by the registered graduates but the respondent was not one of those four persons. 9. Out of the six persons elected by the Court to the membership of the Executive Council, four were persons who had been elected to the Court by the registered graduates but the respondent was not one of those four persons. 9. Under head (xviii) of S. 17 of the Act read with clause (2) of the first Statute relating to the Court, the Chancellor of the University is empowered to appoint not more than 15 persons Jo be members of the Court and by a letter dated 8-3-19,54, the Chancellor, in the exercise of the powers so vested in him, appointed the respondent to be a member of the University Court in place of Sri K.L. Misra. The express words in the letter of appointment which are relevant for the consideration of the petition are "With effect from the date of the formers retirement (that is, the retirement of the respondent) from the post of Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science of the Allahabad University, viz. March 12, 1954, for the residue of the term of office of Sri K.L. Misra, viz. up to December 14, 1955." It is admitted by the parties that in this letter reference to March 12 is a mistake for March 13. The respondent admittedly retired from the University with effect from 13-3-1954 and consequently his nomination to the membership of the Court commenced with effect from his retirement and was to last till December, 14, 1955. 10. The question which arose before the University authorities was whether the respondent continued to be a member of the Executive Council after 13-3-1954 in view of the provisions of the Statute. 10. The question which arose before the University authorities was whether the respondent continued to be a member of the Executive Council after 13-3-1954 in view of the provisions of the Statute. Clause (2) of the first Statute relating to the Executive Council provides that the members of the Council other than ex officio members shall hold office for a period of three-years, but there is a proviso appended to this clause which reads as follows : "Provided that a member appointed or elected as a member of a particular body or as the holder of a particular post shall hold office so long only within that period as he continues to be a member of that body or the holder of that post, as the case may be." The question having arisen as to whether the case of the respondent fell within the ambit of this proviso, the Vice-Chancellor referred the matter for decision to the Chancellor under the provisions of S. 42 of the Act. On 20-8-1954, the Chancellor, by an order of that date, decided that the respondent was not entitled to continue to be a member of the Executive Council. Thereupon a petition was filed in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash that decision and also for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the appellants not to interfere with the attendance of the respondent at meetings of the Executive Council and in the performance of his functions as such member. In the petition, the Registrar University of Allahabad, the University of Allahabad through the Vice-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad as holding the office of Vice-Chancellor and the Chancellor of the University of Allahabad were impleaded as opposite-parties. The petition was contested on behalf of all the opposite-parties and the learned Single Judge of this Court, by his order dated 29-10-1954, upheld the contentions raised by the petitioner-respondent and allowed the petition. A writ of certiorari was issued quashing the order of the Chancellor dated 20-8-1954. The prayer for a writ of mandamus, however, was refused in the circumstances of the case. The order of the learned Single Judge has now been challenged in this appeal. 11. A writ of certiorari was issued quashing the order of the Chancellor dated 20-8-1954. The prayer for a writ of mandamus, however, was refused in the circumstances of the case. The order of the learned Single Judge has now been challenged in this appeal. 11. The first point to be considered is whether the Chancellor, acting under S. 42 of the Allahabad University Act, constituted a quasi-judicial tribunal and any decision by him under the said section was, therefore, subject to the superintendence of this Court or he was acting only administratively. 12. The question whether a power is judicial or quasi-judicial or it is merely administrative has to be decided upon the language of the Statute, upon the nature of the power and the consequences of its exercise upon the rights of others and the exigencies of the situation. The main thing to be considered is whether the authority concerned has to decide a dispute between two parties or it has merely to take note of the dispute to inform its mind before it exercises the power conferred upon it in its discretion. In the former case it acts judicially or quasi-judicially but in the latter case it acts administratively. The principle on which it can be determined whether an authority has acted judicially, quasi-judicially or administratively has been considered in the case of Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, 1950 SC 222. (AIR V 37) (G). In order to decide this question it is necessary to refer to the provisions of S. 42 of the Act which reads as follows :- "If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision thereon shall be final." The Chancellor has not only to exercise his discretion but he has to take a decision thereon which necessarily implies that, in determining the dispute referred to him, he had to act judicially. The question, which can be referred to him under S. 42, is also whether any person has been duly elected or appointed, which necessarily implies that the Chancellor has not to consider the question whether in his opinion a person has been elected or appointed but has to determine whether he has been duly elected, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. It has therefore, been rightly conceded by the Advocate General that the Chancellor constituted a tribunal the decision of which is subject to the superintendence of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 13. The point, which was strongly urged before the Single Judge, was that this Court had no authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash, by a writ of certiorari, an order made by a tribunal subject to the superintendence of this Court on the ground that it is, on the face of it, erroneous in law; file jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with orders passed by subordinate tribunals under Art. 226 of the Constitution is limited to the cases where a tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted against the principles of natural justice in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction; there is no power in this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases where the decision by a subordinate tribunal is erroneous in law on the face of the record. In view of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, the learned Advocate General has conceded that it is open to this Court to quash the decision of an inferior tribunal if it is erroneous in law on the face of the record. 14. Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in very wide terms. It gives power to the Indian High Courts to interfere, under its supervisory jurisdiction, with the orders of inferior tribunals somewhat in the same manner as the court of Kings Bench in England. Whatever restrictions there are, they have been placed by the courts themselves having regard to the fact that the Article gives a discretion to superior courts which is to be exercised on well-known judicial principles. Whatever restrictions there are, they have been placed by the courts themselves having regard to the fact that the Article gives a discretion to superior courts which is to be exercised on well-known judicial principles. The scope of the High Courts to interfere with decisions of inferior tribunals by issuing a writ of certiorari has now been finally determined by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 SC 233 ((S) AIR V 42) (H). Their Lordships, after considering all the Indian authorities as well as the authorities of the English Courts, have laid down that "It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record." In this very case, their Lordships have approved of the principle laid down by the court of appeal in England in the case of 1952-1 All ER 122 (C). In an earlier case of 1954 SC 440 (AIR V 41) (D) it was observed by their Lordships as follows : "In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorariin all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law." It was also held by this Court in 1955 All 557 ((S) AIR V 42) (E) that Judgement KIDWAI, J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother and I entirely concur. I would, however, like to add a few words as to the meaning to be given to the words "error, apparent on the face of the record". I conceive! I would, however, like to add a few words as to the meaning to be given to the words "error, apparent on the face of the record". I conceive! that in the English cases from which this expression has been borrowed the emphasis is not upon the word "error" but upon the words "apparent on the face of the record", that is to say that error must be such as can be ascertained from the record as it exists or should exist. 2. In Walsall Overseers v. London and North Western Rly. Co., 1878-4 AC 30 (A), Lord Cairns, Lord Chancellor, stated, at page 39 : "If there was upon the face of the order of the Court of Quarter Sessions anything which showed that that order was erroneous, the Court of Queens Bench might be asked to have the order brought into it, and to look at the order, and view it upon the face of it, and if the Court found error upon the face of it, to put an end to its existence by quashing it." 3. In - Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, 1922-2 AC 128 (B), Lord Sumner stated, at page 155 of the Report : "The key of the question is the amount of material stated or to be stated on the record returned and brought into the superior Court. If justices state more than they are bound to state, it may, so to speak, be used against them, and out of their own mouths they may be condemned, but there is no suggestion that, apart from questions of jurisdiction, a party may state further matters to the Court, either by new affidavits or by producing anything that is not on or part of the record." Again, at page 159 of the Report, Lord Sumner added : "When the Summary Jurisdiction Act provided, as the sufficient record of all summary convictions, a common form, which did not include any statement of the evidence for the conviction, it did not stint the jurisdiction of the QueensBench, or alter the actual law of certiorari. What it did was to disarm its exercise. The effect was not to make that which had been error, error no longer but to remove nearly all opportunity for its detection. What it did was to disarm its exercise. The effect was not to make that which had been error, error no longer but to remove nearly all opportunity for its detection. The face of the record "spoke" no longer; it was the inscrutable face of a sphinx." The same point is clearly brought out in - Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 1952-1 KB 338 (C), Lord Justice Denning states at page 349 of the Report : "The record had to contain everything necessary to show that the Justices had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and it had to set out their adjudication; but it was not necessary to set out either the evidence or the reasons. If a point of law arose, however, on which either party desired the ruling of the Kings Bench, he could ask the justices to make a speaking order, that is, to make a special entry upon the record of the reasons for their judgment. The justices were not bound to do this, but they usually did so if they entertained a doubt about the point. When their reasons thus appeared on the record, the Court of Kings Bench would on certiorari inquire into their correctness, and, if the reasons were wrong, would quash the decision." 4. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in - T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, 1954 SC 440 (AIR V 41) (D), in a passage quoted at length by my learned brother that the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting writs in English law are applicable to India. 5. If any position as to the scope of certiorari other than that laid in the English decisions were adopted, it might well be that the High Court, having discovered an error on the record, would be bound to allow that error to subsist because it was not one of sufficient gravity to justify interference. Such a position has been negatived by this Court in - Kishan Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, 1955 All 557 ((S) AIR V 42) (E), and by the Supreme Court in - Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, 1955 SC 425 ((S) AIR V 42) (F), in passages which my learned brother has quoted and which it is not necessary for me to repeat. 6. 6. In the present case, therefore, it is open to us to examine the order of the Chancellor which is a "speaking order" to consider the interpretation which he places on the statute and the reasons therefor which lie gives and on finding that he misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the statute, to quash his order in the exercise of our power of certiorari. MEHROTRA, J. : 7. This is an appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court against a judgment of a Single Judge of this Court allowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent, Dr. Ishwari Prasad. 8. Briefly, the facts, which gave rise to the petition, are that the respondent, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, was a Professor in the University of Allahabad, appellant 2, and the Head of the Department of Political Science until 13-3-1954, the date on which he retired from the service of the University. He was also a member of the Academic Council of the, University and as such was an ex officio member of the Court under head (vi) of S. 17 of the Allahabad University Act, 1921. The Court is the supreme governing body of the University under the Act and the executive body of the University is the Executive Council. The constitution of the Executive Council is laid down in the Statutes which are to be found in Chapter II of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations made under the Act. The Executive Council consists of twenty members of whom six are members of the Court elected by the Court at its annual meeting. In the annual meeting of the Court held in November, 1952, the respondent was elected to the Executive Council. One of the limitations placed by the Statutes on the powers of the Court to elect six of its members to the Executive Council is that two of the persons so elected must be members who themselves were elected as members of the Court by the registered graduates. Out of the six persons elected by the Court to the membership of the Executive Council, four were persons who had been elected to the Court by the registered graduates but the respondent was not one of those four persons. 9. Out of the six persons elected by the Court to the membership of the Executive Council, four were persons who had been elected to the Court by the registered graduates but the respondent was not one of those four persons. 9. Under head (xviii) of S. 17 of the Act read with clause (2) of the first Statute relating to the Court, the Chancellor of the University is empowered to appoint not more than 15 persons Jo be members of the Court and by a letter dated 8-3-19,54, the Chancellor, in the exercise of the powers so vested in him, appointed the respondent to be a member of the University Court in place of Sri K.L. Misra. The express words in the letter of appointment which are relevant for the consideration of the petition are "With effect from the date of the formers retirement (that is, the retirement of the respondent) from the post of Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science of the Allahabad University, viz. March 12, 1954, for the residue of the term of office of Sri K.L. Misra, viz. up to December 14, 1955." It is admitted by the parties that in this letter reference to March 12 is a mistake for March 13. The respondent admittedly retired from the University with effect from 13-3-1954 and consequently his nomination to the membership of the Court commenced with effect from his retirement and was to last till December, 14, 1955. 10. The question which arose before the University authorities was whether the respondent continued to be a member of the Executive Council after 13-3-1954 in view of the provisions of the Statute. 10. The question which arose before the University authorities was whether the respondent continued to be a member of the Executive Council after 13-3-1954 in view of the provisions of the Statute. Clause (2) of the first Statute relating to the Executive Council provides that the members of the Council other than ex officio members shall hold office for a period of three-years, but there is a proviso appended to this clause which reads as follows : "Provided that a member appointed or elected as a member of a particular body or as the holder of a particular post shall hold office so long only within that period as he continues to be a member of that body or the holder of that post, as the case may be." The question having arisen as to whether the case of the respondent fell within the ambit of this proviso, the Vice-Chancellor referred the matter for decision to the Chancellor under the provisions of S. 42 of the Act. On 20-8-1954, the Chancellor, by an order of that date, decided that the respondent was not entitled to continue to be a member of the Executive Council. Thereupon a petition was filed in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash that decision and also for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the appellants not to interfere with the attendance of the respondent at meetings of the Executive Council and in the performance of his functions as such member. In the petition, the Registrar University of Allahabad, the University of Allahabad through the Vice-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad as holding the office of Vice-Chancellor and the Chancellor of the University of Allahabad were impleaded as opposite-parties. The petition was contested on behalf of all the opposite-parties and the learned Single Judge of this Court, by his order dated 29-10-1954, upheld the contentions raised by the petitioner-respondent and allowed the petition. A writ of certiorari was issued quashing the order of the Chancellor dated 20-8-1954. The prayer for a writ of mandamus, however, was refused in the circumstances of the case. The order of the learned Single Judge has now been challenged in this appeal. 11. A writ of certiorari was issued quashing the order of the Chancellor dated 20-8-1954. The prayer for a writ of mandamus, however, was refused in the circumstances of the case. The order of the learned Single Judge has now been challenged in this appeal. 11. The first point to be considered is whether the Chancellor, acting under S. 42 of the Allahabad University Act, constituted a quasi-judicial tribunal and any decision by him under the said section was, therefore, subject to the superintendence of this Court or he was acting only administratively. 12. The question whether a power is judicial or quasi-judicial or it is merely administrative has to be decided upon the language of the Statute, upon the nature of the power and the consequences of its exercise upon the rights of others and the exigencies of the situation. The main thing to be considered is whether the authority concerned has to decide a dispute between two parties or it has merely to take note of the dispute to inform its mind before it exercises the power conferred upon it in its discretion. In the former case it acts judicially or quasi-judicially but in the latter case it acts administratively. The principle on which it can be determined whether an authority has acted judicially, quasi-judicially or administratively has been considered in the case of Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, 1950 SC 222. (AIR V 37) (G). In order to decide this question it is necessary to refer to the provisions of S. 42 of the Act which reads as follows :- "If any question arises whether any person has been duly elected or appointed as, or is entitled to be, a member of any authority or other body of the University, the matter shall be referred to the Chancellor, whose decision thereon shall be final." The Chancellor has not only to exercise his discretion but he has to take a decision thereon which necessarily implies that, in determining the dispute referred to him, he had to act judicially. The question, which can be referred to him under S. 42, is also whether any person has been duly elected or appointed, which necessarily implies that the Chancellor has not to consider the question whether in his opinion a person has been elected or appointed but has to determine whether he has been duly elected, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. It has therefore, been rightly conceded by the Advocate General that the Chancellor constituted a tribunal the decision of which is subject to the superintendence of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 13. The point, which was strongly urged before the Single Judge, was that this Court had no authority under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash, by a writ of certiorari, an order made by a tribunal subject to the superintendence of this Court on the ground that it is, on the face of it, erroneous in law; file jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with orders passed by subordinate tribunals under Art. 226 of the Constitution is limited to the cases where a tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted against the principles of natural justice in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction; there is no power in this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases where the decision by a subordinate tribunal is erroneous in law on the face of the record. In view of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, the learned Advocate General has conceded that it is open to this Court to quash the decision of an inferior tribunal if it is erroneous in law on the face of the record. 14. Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in very wide terms. It gives power to the Indian High Courts to interfere, under its supervisory jurisdiction, with the orders of inferior tribunals somewhat in the same manner as the court of Kings Bench in England. Whatever restrictions there are, they have been placed by the courts themselves having regard to the fact that the Article gives a discretion to superior courts which is to be exercised on well-known judicial principles. Whatever restrictions there are, they have been placed by the courts themselves having regard to the fact that the Article gives a discretion to superior courts which is to be exercised on well-known judicial principles. The scope of the High Courts to interfere with decisions of inferior tribunals by issuing a writ of certiorari has now been finally determined by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 SC 233 ((S) AIR V 42) (H). Their Lordships, after considering all the Indian authorities as well as the authorities of the English Courts, have laid down that "It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record." In this very case, their Lordships have approved of the principle laid down by the court of appeal in England in the case of 1952-1 All ER 122 (C). In an earlier case of 1954 SC 440 (AIR V 41) (D) it was observed by their Lordships as follows : "In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of certiorariin all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law." It was also held by this Court in 1955 All 557 ((S) AIR V 42) (E) that