ORDER : This is a revision application by Abdul Gafoor, defendant, against the order dated 23-7-1955. passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court, Bhopal restoring the suit No. 265 of 1954, which was dismissed with costs on 17-2-1955 when the plaintiff failed to prove his claim. 2. On 17-2-1955 the plaintiff was not personally present but was represented by his counsel. The counsel made a request for adjournment, but it was refused. The defendant was personally present but as he did not file any written statement, proceedings were taken ex parte against him. The order-sheet is, however, silent as to the further conduct of the plaintiff's counsel whether he withdrew from the case or continued to be present to represent his client. From this omission and also from the nature of the order passed, it will have to be inferred that the plaintiff's counsel had not withdrawn from the case, nor did he make a statement that he had no further instructions from the plaintiff. In these circumstances the order of dismissal could not be deemed to be in default but would, in the eye of law, be on merits. 3. In this connection a reference be made to Rules 1 and 4 of O. 3, Civil P.C. Rule 1 permits an appearance or act on behalf of a party to be made or done by his pleader appearing or acting for him. Thus, for so long as the pleader has the authority to appear or to act for his client, the appearance of the former would be deemed to be for the party. Rule 4 provides how a pleader can act for any person in a Court. This can be done only if he has been appointed by a document in writing, signed by such person or by his recognised agent, etc. Such an appointment shall be deemed to be in force unless determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be. Thus, ordinarily a pleader would be deemed to act for his client for so long as the Vakalatnama filed in the case is not determined by another document in writing. In certain cases an oral statement by the pleader can be regarded to be sufficient for the determination of the authority given to him to appear, apply or act for the client. In certain cases an oral statement by the pleader can be regarded to be sufficient for the determination of the authority given to him to appear, apply or act for the client. In other words, therefore, a correct interpretation of O. 3, C.P.C., would be that appearance of a counsel would be deemed to be an appearance on behalf of the party unless the pleader refuses to appear for his client or reports no instructions or his instructions are only to apply for an adjournment, on the refusal of which he withdraws from the case. But if without reporting no instructions he simply requests for an adjournment on the ground that he is not prepared for the case, it cannot be said that there is appearance on behalf of the party. A similar view was taken in Trimbak v. Krishna Rao, AIR 1929 Nag 89 (A), Ramchandra Pandurang v. Madhav Purshottam, 16 Bom 23 (B), Mohammad Hussain v. Mt. Chandra, AIR 1937 All 284 (C), Chiranjilal v. Kundanlal, 20 All 294 (D) and Patin-hare Tarakatt Rama Mannadi v. Vellur Krishnan Menon, 26 Mad 267 (E). 4. The lower court had relied upon the case of Mammatha Nath v. Jaimini Nath, AIR 1926 Cal 246 (F) but this is a case where the parties pleader had stated that he had no further instructions. 5. To sum up, in the order-sheet dated 17-2-1955 there is no note to suggest that after making a request for an adjournment, the counsel for the plaintiff had refused to act for the plaintiff or had withdrawn from the case. On the other hand from the words "in the absence of any evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim" and "as he has failed to prove his claim," it will have to be inferred that the lower court was treating the presence of the counsel as an appearance for the plaintiff and had dismissed the suit on merits. Thus the learned Judge did not have the power to restore the suit after it was dismissed on merits. But the present is not a case in which this Court should interfere with the final order of restoration passed by the lower court. 6. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act runs as below : "25. Thus the learned Judge did not have the power to restore the suit after it was dismissed on merits. But the present is not a case in which this Court should interfere with the final order of restoration passed by the lower court. 6. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act runs as below : "25. The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit". The use of the word "may" suggests that even if the decree or order made in a case is not according to law, the High Court can refuse to interfere With that decree or order, specially when no injustice had been done to any party. In the present case the plaintiff had filed an affidavit and also a medical certificate along with his application for restoration wherein he gave out the reasons for his non-appearance on the date fixed. Even though the defendant opposed the restoration application, he did not file any counter-affidavit. In these circumstances a finding in favour of the plaintiff will have to be given namely that he had reasonable cause for non-appearance on the dates fixed. In case the order under revision is set aside, the plaintiff will have to come up before this Court by making a revision application for setting aside the order of dismissal and for the remand of the case for a fresh bearing, and the revision application would be one which would be allowed. The only result of the setting aside of the order under revision would therefore be that the work already done by the trial court after the restoration of the suit and the expenses to which the parties had already been put, will become fruitless and in addition the parties would be put to unnecessary expenses. There would also be considerable delay in the disposal of the suit. There would also be considerable delay in the disposal of the suit. When it appears to the High Court that interference u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act will not be beneficial to any of the parties and will simply put them to extra expenses and inconvenience and will also cause delay in the disposal of the suit, it is but proper that the High Court should refuse to interfere with the order. In Sher Khan v. Gokalchand, AIR 1915 Lah 209 (G) the High Court had refused to interfere, even though there was wrong decision on a point of limitation, for the reason that substantial justice had been done. This case is in one way similar to the present one. Another case in Which the High Court did not interfere has come to my notice. In Mohanlal v. Sohanlal, AIR 1939 All 77 (H) compliance of Section 17 had not been made and in this connection it was observed as below :- "...... .There can be little doubt in this case that this mandatory provision was not complied with, and I would therefore concede that the learned Small Cause Court Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made by the opposite party on 27th November, 1937" - "The question however remains whether this Court is bound to interfere with the order passed by the learned Small Cause Court Judge simply because it was beyond his jurisdiction. The power of interference which this Court has under S. 25, Small Cause Courts Act, is purely discretionary and I do not think that the mere fact that an order passed by a Small Cause Court is either illegal or without jurisdiction necessarily justifies interference by this Court, The real test is whether any substantial injustice has been done by the order complaint against". The above observations are of a general nature and can be applied to the present case also, though the order passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court, in the above case, could not be regarded to be illegal if the restoration application and the security given were considered from a different aspect. Although the restoration application had been moved without furnishing the security, the security was furnished subsequently and was accepted by the trial court before the period of limitation for moving the restoration application had expired. Although the restoration application had been moved without furnishing the security, the security was furnished subsequently and was accepted by the trial court before the period of limitation for moving the restoration application had expired. In these circumstances it could be said that even though the restoration application was moved without furnishing security as laid down in S. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the restoration application had been made on the day the security had been furnished to the satisfaction of the Court, The order of the trial Court will not thus be illegal and without jurisdiction and on this ground the objection raised by Syed Mohammad Hussain in AIR 1939 All 77 (H) could be disallowed. However, the observations made in this Allahabad case (H) and also the Lahore Case (G) already referred to above, can be used in favour of the plaintiff. 7. For reasons given above, I am of opinion that the order under revision was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial Court but the facts of the present case are not such that the High Court should exercise its discretion under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act in favour of the applicant by setting aside the order. The revision application! has thus no force and is hereby dismissed. Costs on the parties. Revision dismissed.