JUDGMENT Agarwala, J. - This is an application u/s 115 of the CPC arising out of an application made u/s 12 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act. The property in dispute consists of six agricultural plots which were at one time usufructuarily mortgaged by one Abdul Ghafoor to one Nanhu Shah for a sum of Rs. 600/-. This was done on 5-5-1932. On 26-9-1936 Abdul Ghafoor sold the mortgaged property to one Azam Khan. Abdul Ghafoor died leaving opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 as his legal representatives. Azam Khan the transferee from Abdul Ghafoor mortgagor then applied for redemption of the mortgage u/s 12 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act. He impleaded not only Nanhu Shah as an opposite party but also impleaded Bhaggan applicant as a transferee from Nanhu Shah who claimed to be entitled to possession but who was also liable to deliver possession to Azam Khan the original applicant in the application made u/s 12 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act. The mortgagee contested the suit but we are not concerned, with his defence. Bhaggan defended the suit on the ground that as he was a hereditary tenant of the plots in suit having been admitted to tenancy by Nanhu Shah, and as such was not liable to be ejected. The trial court framed an issue whether Defendant No. 2, that is Bhaggan (applicant) was a hereditary tenant of the plots in suit as alleged and sent the issue to the revenue court for decision. The revenue court returned the finding that Bhaggan was not the tenant of the plots in dispute. The civil court thereupon passed a preliminary decree for redemption in favour of Azam Khan not only against the mortgagee but also against Bhaggan applicant on payment of Rs. 600/- the mortgage money. The mortgagee appears to have submitted to the decree but Bhaggan filed an appeal. He headed the appeal as one u/s 96 of the CPC and valued it as Rs. 9/- which was the annual rent and paid ad valorem court fee on that amount. 600/- the mortgage money. The mortgagee appears to have submitted to the decree but Bhaggan filed an appeal. He headed the appeal as one u/s 96 of the CPC and valued it as Rs. 9/- which was the annual rent and paid ad valorem court fee on that amount. The learned Civil Judge, before whom the appeal came up for decision, dismissed the appeal on the technical ground that the appeal should have been u/s 23 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act and not one u/s 96 of the CPC and that court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was deficient and ad valorem court fee should have been paid on the mortgage money Under Article I of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. He did not give the applicant any opportunity to make good the deficiency. Against this decree Bhaggan has applied to this Court for revision of the order of the court below. 2. The first point that has to be decided is whether the court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was insufficient. It is undoubtedly true that an appeal against the decree passed by the trial court lay u/s 23 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act and should not have been headed as an appeal u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But this was a mere clerical error which could have been very easily allowed to be corrected by the court. All that was required to be done was that Section 23 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act was to be substituted in place of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The main question, however, \was whether the court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was sufficient or insufficient. The court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal filed u/s 23 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act is provided for Under Article 2B of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. 3. The main question, however, \was whether the court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was sufficient or insufficient. The court fee payable on a memorandum of appeal filed u/s 23 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act is provided for Under Article 2B of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. This Article lays down that the same fee is payable as would be leviable on a memorandum of appeal Under Article I. Article I lays down that the court fee payable on a plaint, written statement, pleading a set off or counter-claim or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) presented to any Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned in Section 3 shall be, when the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute does not exceed Rs. 5 annas eight and also when such amount or value exceeds five rupees, for every five rupees, or part there of, in excess of five rupees, up to one hundred rupees annas eight. 4. In applying this Article one has to find out the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute. The amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute is normally determined in accordance with the provisions of the Court Fees Act. Section 7 of the Act provides for various kinds of suits and lays down how the value of the subject matter of those suits shall be calculated. Clause (ix) of that section relates to suits against a mortgagee for the recovery of the property mortgaged. The value is to be determined according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the instrument of mortgage. This clause refers to ''suits". By virtue of the definition of that word as given in Section 2 of the Act, a suit includes a first or second appeal from a decree in a suit. So Clause (ix) of Section 7 would read thus ''in suits (and also first appeals or second appeals from a decree in such suits) against a mortgagee for the recovery of the property mortgaged." 5. So if there were an appeal by the mortgagee against a decree in a suit by the mortgagor for redemption, the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal would be the recovery of the property mortgaged or the amount of the mortgage money. So if there were an appeal by the mortgagee against a decree in a suit by the mortgagor for redemption, the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal would be the recovery of the property mortgaged or the amount of the mortgage money. If it were the amount of the mortgage, court fee would be payable according to the amount in dispute in the appeal and not necessarily on the whole of the mortgage amount. 6. Where, however, as in the present case, one of the Defendants is a third person who is not a mortgagee but who is impleaded as a transferee of the mortgagee liable to deliver possession and the third party claims tenancy rights in the property, the subject-matter of the dispute in the appeal of such a party is his tenancy rights in the property mortgaged. Such a person does not object to the redemption of the mortgage or to the recovery of proprietary rights in the mortgaged property. He merely defends his own tenancy rights and claims that he has right to be in possession thereof. This being the subject-matter in dispute in appeal Clause (ix) of Section 7 does not render assistance to determine the value of such subject-matter. 7. There is another aspect from which the matter can be looked at, Clause (ix) refers to suits. In Pokhan Singh and Another Vs. Radhey Lal and Others, AIR 1953 All 240 a Division Bench of this Court did not apply Clause (ix) of Section 7 to appeals arising out of decrees passed for redemption u/s 12 of the Agriculturists Relief Act mainly on the ground that an application u/s 12 of the said Act is not a "suit" and the appeal u/s 23 of the said Act does not arise out of a decree passed in a suit. In any view of the matter, so far as the present appeal is concerned, Clause (ix) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act does not furnish any guide for ascertaining the value of the subject-matter in the appeal. There is no other provision of the Court Fees Act which directly applies to the present case. 8. How then was the value of the subject-matter of the appeal filed in the court below to be determined? The nearest approach to this matter appears to me to be in Clause (xi)(e) of Section 7. There is no other provision of the Court Fees Act which directly applies to the present case. 8. How then was the value of the subject-matter of the appeal filed in the court below to be determined? The nearest approach to this matter appears to me to be in Clause (xi)(e) of Section 7. This clause refers to a suit between a landlord and a tenant to recover the occupancy of immovable property from which the tenant has been illegally ejected by the landlord and the value of the subject-matter is to be determined according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers payable for the year next before this date of presenting the plaint. The dispute in the present case was about the recovery of the occupancy of the immovable property and in the appeal the tenant's case was that he was being illegally ejected by the landlord from his hereditary tenancy holding. This clause lays down the method of determining the value of the subject-matter of a dispute between a landlord and a tenant who is being ejected from his holding. I think that the valuation of the appeal could be made on the anology of the principle laid down in Clause xi(e) of Section 7. 9. The applicant valued the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal in the court below at the annual rental value of the holdings which was Rs. 9 and on that amount he paid ad valorem court fee Under Article 1 of the First Schedule to the Court Fees Act. I think that the court fee paid by him was sufficient. The view taken by the court below that the memorandum of appeal was deficiently stamped was erroneous. 10. The next question, therefore, is whether the trial court was entitled to go into the question whether the applicant Bhaggan was or was not a tenant of the plots in dispute. The lower appellate court did not go into this question at all because is dismissed the appeal on a preliminary point. Having regard to the fact that the controversy is already more than four years old I consider that in the interest of justice it is better to decide it now than to remand the revision to the court below for deciding the controversy. Having regard to the fact that the controversy is already more than four years old I consider that in the interest of justice it is better to decide it now than to remand the revision to the court below for deciding the controversy. On the point under discussion there has been divergence of opinion in the past. In Ram Kirpal Misir v. Bhagwati Saran Misir 1949 A.W.R. (H.C.) 214 P.L. Bhargava, J. expressed the opinion that where a mortgagor in an application u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act is entided to possession, he may implead a third person who has been fictitiously recorded in village records as a tenant of the mortgaged property to deprive the mortgagor of his right to obtain possession and that the court can go into the question whether the third person's name has been put down fictitiously as a tenant and if it finds that the mortgagor's allegations were true it could order the delivery of possession as against such person. This view was dissented from by Seth, J. in Jaggarnath Sahu v. Srikant Dube 1949 A.W.R. (H.C.) 205 where the learned Judge held that "where an applicant u/s 12 of the Agriculturists Relief Act impleads as opposite parties not only the mortgagee but also a third person on the allegation that his name has been fictitiously recorded as a tenant over a portion of the mortgaged property but the third person pleads that he has no connection with the mortgagee and is in possession as tenant and not as a mortgagee, the claim of the third person is adverse both to the mortgagor and the mortgagee and the determination of such adverse claim to the tenancy is outside the scope of the proceedings u/s 12." The learned Judge relied upon two principles. Firstly that a suit to enforce a mortgage in which the adverse claims of persons not privy to the mortgage and setting up a title paramount to that of the mortgagor and the mortgagee, are sought to be investigated, is open to objection on the ground of misjoinder and multifariousness and secondly that if adverse claims be allowed to be litigated in a mortgage suit, such claims may obviously be determined by a Court which would have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for their determination, if properly framed. 11. 11. It will be noticed that the learned Judge was considering the point from a consideration of the claim of the third party to be adverse not only to the mortgagor but also to the mortgagee. In the present case the third party, that is Bhaggan applicant before us does not claim any title adverse either to the mortgagor or to the mortgagee. He does not claim any paramount title. He claims to be a tenant of the mortgagee having derived his title after the creation of the mortgage and claims that he remains a tenant of the mortgagor after the redemption of the mortgage. A title which is derived from the mortgagee is a title which is eminently suitable for decision in a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property. This decision of Seth, J. was followed by Ghulam Hasan, J. in the case of Ram Datt Singh and Another Vs. Ajodhia Singh and Others, AIR 1952 All 446 but was commented upon in two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Smt. Ram Piari v. Ram Adhin 1953 A.W R. (H.C.) 407 and Jaddu Koeri Vs. Deep Chand Koeri and Another . 12. In Smt. Ram Piari v. Ram Adhin 1954 A.W.R. (H.C.) 415 it was pointed out that Section 12 of the Agriculturist's Relief Act was not introduced with a view to make any substantive charge in the law relating to redemption. The section merely provides a speedy and efficacious remedy for redemption of usufructuary mortgages in a certain class of cases. 13. In Jaddu Koeri v. Deep Chand AIR 1955 All. 172 the decision in Jaggarnath Singh v. Srikant Dube 1949 A.W.R. (H.C.) 205 was again dissented from and it was held that a court can in an application u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act go into the question whether the person who is alleged to be merely a benamidar for the mortgagee is in fact such a person or not. In the Full Bench decision in Nabu Baksh v. Chaubey Puttu Lal 1954 A.W.R. (H.C.) 415 the point under consideration was not considered. 14. In the Full Bench decision in Nabu Baksh v. Chaubey Puttu Lal 1954 A.W.R. (H.C.) 415 the point under consideration was not considered. 14. It appears to me that when the mortgagor alleges that a third person other than the mortgagee has derived his title from the mortgagee and was, therefore, liable to deliver possession to mortgagor on redemption and the third party without pleading any paramount title pleads that although he derives his title font the mortgagee he is entitled to retain possession, the claim of such person ought to be investigated in the proceedings u/s 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. When a person seeks redemption of the property mortgaged, he claims to get back possession of the very same property which, he had mortgaged in the same condition as far as may be as it was when he mortgaged it. Ordinarily titles created by the mortgage: in the property subsequent to the mortgage come to an end when the mortgage is redeemed but in a case where a tenancy has been created by the mortgagee the Tenancy Act comes into operation and a person admitted to the tenancy of agricultural land may acquire possessory rights which do not extinguish after the redemption of the mortgage provided that the tenancy rights are real and genuine and not fictitious. If they are fictitious, the device of the mortgagee to frustrate the claim of the mortgagor to obtain possession on redemption will not prevail. The dispute in such a case relates to the rights in the property as it existed when the property was mortgaged and are a fit subject of decision in proceedings for redemption of the mortgage. 15. I, therefore, allow this application, set aside the decree of the court below and remand the case to that court to decide the case upon its merits. Cost hereto and hitherto will abide the result.