Modi, J.—This is a complaint by one Ramratan Maheshwari, resident of village Deshnok, Tehsil Bikaner, for professional misconduct against Shri Shridhar Kalla, an advocate of this Court. Shri Kalla has been practising in Jaipur for the last three or four years but was regularly practising in the courts at Jodhpur up to 1952. 2. The allegations made by the petitioner in his petition dated the 28th October, 1953, may be briefly summarised as follows. The petitioners case is that he had engaged Shri Kalla in three cases from 1948 onwards. In the first place, he had engaged Shri Kalla to file a suit against Tarachand and Leelchand sons of Khivraj of Barmer for Rs. 1098/4/6-in the court of the Munsiff, Jodhpur City, and that he had paid him a sum of Rs. 125/- on account of his professional fees and expenses (Rs. 50/-by way of remuneration and Rs. 75/- for court-fees, and certain incidental expenses) in connection with this suit on or about the 11th March, 1948. Ramratans case further is that immediately after this engagement he had personally given all the original documents to Shri Kalla to be filed with the plaint and that a plaint had also been prepared by the latter and that he had signed that and a Vakalatnama as well, and gave all these papers to Shri Kalla for presenting them in court. The petitioners complaint is that Shri Kalla filed this suit (No. 255 of 1951) as late as the 2nd July, 1951 (as a matter of fact the suit was filed on the 2nd June, 1951, which was the last working day before the summer vacation in 1951, and that the plaint was filed on a court-fee of Rs. 5/- only and without the original documents or even a list of documents and further that the plaint which was actually presented in court in 1951 by Shri Kalla did not bear the petitioners signature nor did the power of attorney filed with the plaint bear his signature. 5/- only and without the original documents or even a list of documents and further that the plaint which was actually presented in court in 1951 by Shri Kalla did not bear the petitioners signature nor did the power of attorney filed with the plaint bear his signature. The petitioners case is that Shri Kalla had not filed the suit for a long time for some reason best known to him, and that as the petitioner was not satisfied with the answers given by Shri Kalla to his verbal and other inquiries made by him from time to time, he arranged to serve Shri Kalla with a registered notice through another counsel Shri Nandlal Advocate of Bikaner, which was received by Shri Kalla on the 3rd June, 1950 (vide postal acknowledgment Ex. 4), and that he further gave a registered letter (vide its copy Ex. 8) on the 7th March, 1951, which was also received by Shri Kalla on the 11th March, 1951 (vide postal acknowledgment Ex. 9) and that later when he came to Jodhpur and inspected the file on the 26th October, 1953, he came to know of the gross-negligence, misappropriation and misconduct committed by Shri Kalla in connection with this case in the above mentioned respects. The petitioner further stated that Shri Kalla had never returned the original documents to him nor were they available on the court record. In the second place, the petitioners complaint was that he had engaged Shri Kalla to file a suit against Hiralal Bhanwarlal and certain other persons (suit No. 25 of 1948-49), in the court of District Judge, Jodhpur, also early in 1948, and that in connection with that suit he had paid Shri Kalla a sum of Rs. 101/8/- to defray witness expenses, apart from the latters fees and other incidental costs. His grievance is that as he had brought all his witnesses and paid for them himself, this money remained with Shri Kalla and that he did not return the same. The last allegation is that the petitioner had also engaged Shri Kalla to file a suit against the firm Magumal Dholandas (Suit No. 408 of 1950) in the court of the Munsiff, Jodhpur City. The suit was filed against Sindhi Jiwandas proprietor of the said firm and was for a sum of Rs. 1280/- and was actually instituted on the 3rd July, 1950. The suit was filed against Sindhi Jiwandas proprietor of the said firm and was for a sum of Rs. 1280/- and was actually instituted on the 3rd July, 1950. The petitioners grievance is that in addition to the sum of Rs. 101/8/- which remained with Shri Kalla, as already stated in connection with the second case above, he further gave a sum Rs. 50/- to Shri Kalla in connection with this suit but the latter retained this monies (i.e., 151/8/-) and did not file any suit against Magumal Dholandas. The petitioner, therefore, complained to this Court that Shri Kalla had improperly retained the formers monies and that he had displayed utter negligence in conducting his cases and was further guilty of gross-professional misconduct, and prayed for appropriate action against him. 3. As the allegations made against Shri Kalla were prima facie serious, the matter was referred to a tribunal of the Bar Council for inquiry and report. The tribunal has conducted the inquiry and submitted its report dated the 16th December, 1955. 4. The findings of the tribunal, briefly put, are that the allegations made by the petitioner with respect to the second and third cases referred to above are false and baseless and deserve to be dismissed. On the remaining charge, their finding is that Shri Kalla was not to blame for not filing the plaint till the 2nd of June, 1951, in suit No. 251 of 1951 (Tarachands case), nor was it proved that the signatures of the petitioner Ramratan on the plaint and the Vakalatnama therein were not genuine, and that it was also not proved that the petitioner had entrusted the original documents of this case to Shri Kalla. The tribunal is, however, definitely of the opinion that the plaint in this case was presented in the court of the Munsiff on a court fee stamp of Rs. 5/- only and not of Rs. The tribunal is, however, definitely of the opinion that the plaint in this case was presented in the court of the Munsiff on a court fee stamp of Rs. 5/- only and not of Rs. 75/- as alleged by Shri Kalla, but their final conclusion is that since there was no evidence for holding that Shri Kalla had himself misappropriated the money meant for defraying the court-fees and it was as well likely that his Munshi Banshidhar might have mis appropriated this money, Shri Kalla is "certainly guilty of negligence in discharging his professional duties towards his client on account of his Munshis fault and particularly when he failed to make sure before the plaint was presented that the necessary stamps were also being filed along with it." 5. We might state straightaway that the findings of the tribunal have not been questioned before us in so far as they relate to the petitioners cases against (1) Hiralal and (2) the firm Magumal Dholandas. We consider it enough to state that we entirely concur in the conclusion of the tribunal on this part of the case and hold that the petitioners allegations to this extent are quite baseless, and must be dismissed. We shall, therefore, concentrate our attention upon the remaining charge relating to Tarachands case only in our judgment. 6. Shri Kallas reply before the tribunal with regard to this charge was, we should like to say at the very outset, not as full or straight forward as we should have liked it to be. All he stated in his reply, dated the 17th June, 1954, in this connection was that the allegations made against him were false. Shri Kalla then admitted that instructions to file a suit against Tarachand and Leelchand had been in the first instance received by him from the petitioner Ramratan in 1950, but further pleaded that his fees had not been paid and it was also represented to him that the parties were trying to settle the dispute amicably. Shri Kallas reply further is that when he had been paid his fees (the precise date thereof is not disclosed) a fair copy of the plaint and the Vakalatnama were given to the petitioners son Bajranglal for getting them signed by his father, and as soon as these had been received, the suit was filed on full court-fee in June, 1951. According to Shri Kalla, the case was still pending (at the date of his reply) in the court of the Munsiff, Jodhpur City, and was fixed for the plaintiffs evidence and that in spite of repeated reminders, the petitioner, was not at all helpful in conducting this case. We cannot help mentioning here that Shri Kalla does not mention a word in his reply as to whether Ram Ratan had given him any documents in original and if so whether he had put them in court, or if not why not. He has also failed to state fully or clearly how and why the plaint came to be presented as late as the 2nd June, 1951. He has also not cared to reply as to the alleged notices sent by the petitioner regarding the progress of this case in 1950 and 1952. We may also point out an important circumstance at this stage that Shri Babalal Advocate, brief holder for Shri Kalla on being required by the Munsiff to make good the deficiency of court-fee which had been apparently brought to his notice (the exact date of his knowledge is not ascertainable but it must have been on or about the 11th Nov., 1953 vide order-sheet of that date) deposited court-fee stamps of the value of Rs. 75/- on the 2nd December, 1953. It may also be mentioned that this suit was later dismissed for default of the plaintiff or his counsel on the 8th July, 1954, and that thereafter Shri Kalla made an application for restoration on the 6th August, 1954, and this is still pending disposal in the court of the Munsiff. 7. Before proceeding further, we consider it pertinent to reamark that Shri Kalla failed to put in appearance before us at the time of the hearing in this Court and this, to our mind, is all the more regrettable as the case had been adjourned on an earlier occasion at his request vide order-sheet, dated the 7th August, 1956. Be that as it may, we have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sumerchand Bhandari, standing Government counsel on behalf of the State and Mr. Hastimal Secretary Bar Council at length, and we have ourselves perused the record of the case with care to avoid possible injustice to Shri Kalla as a result of his lack of appearance before us. 8. Sumerchand Bhandari, standing Government counsel on behalf of the State and Mr. Hastimal Secretary Bar Council at length, and we have ourselves perused the record of the case with care to avoid possible injustice to Shri Kalla as a result of his lack of appearance before us. 8. On behalf of the petitioner it was strenuously pressed before us that the findinges of the tribunal do not go the whole length they should have gone, and it was fully established on the record that Shri Kalla had not only failed to file the plaint in the relevant suit on a court fee stamp of Rs. 75/- in due time but that he had deliberately withheld the money paid to him in that behalf by the petitioner for a long time and that it was further proved that Shri Kalla was also grossly negligent is not filing the documents which had been given to him by the petitioner in court and that the plaint itself had been filed in the court of the Munsiff Jodhpur City after a very great delay with the result that even limitation had gone out, and lastly that Shri Kalla had put in a plaint and a Vakalatnama purporting to bear the petitioners signatures but which were not his, and for all these acts of omission and commissinor, Shri Kalla should be held guilty, not merely of negligence as opined by the tribunal, but of gross professional misconduct. 9. We think it right to state at the very outset that the learned members of the tribunal were rather unfavorable impressed with the testimony of the petitioner Ramratan inasmuch as he had included certain allegations in his complaint which were entirely baseless and, therefore, the learned members were strongly disinclined to believe Ramratan where the case against Shri Kalla,> according to them, rested for its proof upon his oral testimony only. Ramratan clearly stated in his deposition before the tribunal that he had no complaint against Shri Kalla in the matter of Hiralals case. Ramratan clearly stated in his deposition before the tribunal that he had no complaint against Shri Kalla in the matter of Hiralals case. Nor indeed could he have any because when he actually come to make his complaint in the High Court on the 28th October, 1953, we find that Ramratans suit against Heeralal and other had been dismissed by the Civil Judge on the 29th September, 195 , and his appeal before the District Judge, Jodhpur, had also been dismissed on the 26th September, 1952, and his second appeal also stood dismissed by a Bench of this Court on the 26th March, 1953. Ramratan had made no demand on Shri Kalla to return any monies alleged to have been paid to the latter in connection with his case. It may also be mentioned that Ramratans complaint, so for as case against the firm Magumal Dholandas was concerned, was also baseless inasmuch as he was compelled to admit in his cross-examination that one Verumal had intervened is this dispute and the same has been compromised and that Ramratan had himself passed a receipt, dated the 7th December, 1950 (See Ex-A-1 for the amount for which the compromise had been effected) to Verumal and that all this had happened three years before the present complaint was filed. Verumal was examined as a defence witness and has proved this receipt, and Ramratan has himself admitted this receipt to be in his handwriting. This clearly shows that the petitioner has not hesitated to bring false charges against Shri Kalla so far as these two cases are concerned. All this, however, properly suggests that we |should be extremely cautious in scrutinising the complaint of the petitioner with respect to the remaining charge-but, at the same time, we desire to say that if, on a careful scrutiny of the evidence produced by the petitioner Ramratan with respect to this charge, taken with the surrounding circumstances of the case, we are clearly led to a positive conclusion that Shri Kalla was undoubtedly guilty of professional misconduct in one or more of the respects alleged against him, then in our opinion, we should not hesitate to say so and in that event we would not be justified in absolving Shri Kalla of blame altogether or holding him blameworthy for mere negligence. 10. 10. Let up then turn to the essential features of this part of the complaint in the light of the evidence produced in the case, and the available checks that must needs be applied to it. 11. According to the petitioner, he had engaged Shri Kalla in Tara-chands case some time on or about the 11th Mar., 1948. Ramratan has sought to support this by an entry, dated the 13th March, 1943, which is said to have been made on the petitioners return to Deshnok and at his instance by him son Bajranglal in his cash book (Ex. 1 ). This entry relates to the alleged payment of Rs 125/- to Shri Kalla. It has been proved by Bajranglal, Ramratans son, to have been made by him at the instance of his father on the 13th March, 1948. It is true that this entry does not mention Shri Kallas name as such. That cannot, in our opinion, be a matter for adverse criticism because Shri Kalla himself has not disputed the receipt of money for purchase of court-fee stamps and on account of his remuneration for this case. In fact Shri Kalia has himself admitted the receipt of Rs. 53/- as remuneration and the balance by way of court-fees and other expenses, although according to Shri Kalla, the entire sum of Rs. 125/- was paid to him some in May, 1951, and not earlier. Nothing has been brought out in the cross-examination of Bajranglal to lead us to disbelieve this entry. It is true that the suit in Tarachands case was filed on the 2nd June, 1951, but even Shri Kalla has admitted in his reply that instructions to file the suit in question had been given to him in the first instance in 1950. Shri Kailas version, however, is that his fees had not been paid and that the payment thereof was being put off by Ramratan or his son on the pretext that the parties were trying to come to compromise. Shri Kailas version, however, is that his fees had not been paid and that the payment thereof was being put off by Ramratan or his son on the pretext that the parties were trying to come to compromise. Shri Kalla, however, does not say in his reply when final instructions to him to file the suit had been given or his fees had been paid and all he says roundly is that on payment of his fees, a fair copy of the plaint and a Vakalatnama were given to Ramratans son for signatures and at soon as they were received the suit was filed "on a full court-fee." Shri Kailas version, according to his deposition, however, is that Bajranglal had conveyed instructions to him in May, 1951, from Ramratan that the plaint be prepared and filed in court. Thereupon Shri Kalla drafted the plaint (Ex. 5) and handed it over along with blank Vakalatnama (Ex. 7) for being signed by Ramratan and then Bajranglal brought them back and also Rs. 125/-. This necessarily presupposes that all talk of any suit against Tarachand having been filed before May or June, 1951, would be entirely impossible. Now Ramratan and Bajranglal have entirely denied Shri Kailas version, and if the matter was merely a choice as to belief between these two versions, our task in coming to a certain conclusion would have been attended with unusual difficulty, as Ramratan has not hesitated to tell lies in his complaint against Shri Kalla. But there is one vital circumstance which, in our opinion, throws a flood of light on the realities of this sorry affairs. This is that the petitioner got a notice sent to Shri Kalla through Shri Nandlal, Advocate, round about the beginning of June, 1950. The postal acknowledgment Ex. 4, in respect of this registered notice, alleged to have been signed by Shri Kalla, although the latter denies it, is dated the 3rd June, 1950. Shri Nandlal has himself come into the witness box on the side of the petitioner, and from the manner of his testimony, we feel that he was not inclined to be unduly favourable to the side calling him, but he could not help stating that the postal acknowledgment which was sent with the registered letter dated the 3rd June, 1950 had been filled in by him and that when he got back the postal acknowledgment (Ex. 4) in token of receipt of the letter by Shri Kalla, he handed it over to the petitioner Ramratan. Shri Nandlal further deposed that at the instance of Ramratan, he had enquired from Shri Kalla about the dates of hearing in three cases and that in that letter Shri Kalla "might have been asked to inform the progress of this case also", that is, the case against Tarachand. We have no doubt, therefore, that it must be definitely sometime before June, 1950, if not long before it, that Shri Kalla should have received instructions from the petitioner to file the suit against Tarachand. Shri Nand-Lal was asked to produce a copy of the notice but he evaded doing so saying that he had asked the petitioner to retain a copy of the same. In any case Shri Nandlal has clearly stated that he had sent a registered letter to Shri Kalla to enquire as to the dates of hearing in all the three case, and, undoubtedly one of these case was Tarachands case. Shri Kalla had no fourth case from Ramratan. It seems to us, therefore, that the petitioner must have been given to understand by Sari Kalla before the 3rd June, 1950, that the suit against Tarachand had been filed whereas it actually came to be filed as late as the 2nd June, 1951. This, to our mind, satisfactorily explains why and how the petitioner came to send a notice through Shri Nandlal and takes the bottom out of Shri Kailas story that he had received instructions as well as his remuneration to file the suit against Tarachand in May, 1951, and not earlier. Shri Kailas explanation for instituting the suit in June, 1951, thus turns out to be not a little mysterious and completely unsatisfactory. The story of the parties trying to resolve the dispute between themselves by a compromise, if it has any truth in it, must have ended long before June, 1950. Another significant factor which we cannot ignore in this connection is that limitation for a suit for damages for breach of a contract, as in this case, was only three years even under Art. 115 of the Limitation Act of the former State of Jodhpur (from which part of Rajasthan this case gomes) and according to Shri Kalla himself the cause of action had arisen on the 4th February. i948. i948. We consider it extremely unlikely that the petitioner should have delayed, or Shri Kalla should have suffered him to delay without written protest, the giving of instructions in the case until May, 1951, and face difficulties arising out of the bar of limitation for the simple reason that it would be ruinous to his suit to permit all this. We would leave this aspect of the case here do not wish to say anything positive about this, as the litigation is still subjudice, but we point this out merely to show that the counter version advanced by Shri Kalla is not worthy of serious belief. Again Shri Kalla has clearly admitted in his cross-examination that he keeps accounts of fees paid to him by his clients but, strange enough, he has failed to produce these accounts at the inquiry. This omission on the part of Shri Kalla has naturally produced a most unfavourable impression upon our minds. If Shri Kalla had produced his accounts, we would have known when his engagement in the first instance took place and when he received his full fees, and these accounts would have also thrown light on some other features of the case to which we shall have occasion to refer later. Shri Kalla has also failed to produce the original notice which was presumably received by him from Shri Nandlal Advocate. He has simply denied to have received this notice in his deposition but we refuse to believe this denial, as Shri Kalla said not a word as to this in his written statement. In these circumstances we hold that Shri Kalla was certainly engaged by the petitioner long before June, 1950, to file a suit against Tarachand and Leelchand and that he delayed the filing of this suit until the 2nd June, 1951, and thereby seriously jeopardised the interests of the petitioner. 12. The next point is whether the plaint in this suit was filed on a court fee of Rs. 5/- only. It is admitted that the plaint was written out by Shri Kalla himself and that in the para relating to court-fees—the exact amount of court fees payable was not filled and left blank—it is indeed curious that the plaint was presented and even accepted in court in this incomplete form. 5/- only. It is admitted that the plaint was written out by Shri Kalla himself and that in the para relating to court-fees—the exact amount of court fees payable was not filled and left blank—it is indeed curious that the plaint was presented and even accepted in court in this incomplete form. Shri Kallas case, however, is that the plaint had been filed on full court-fee stamps of the value of Rs. 75/- and that he had said the same amount to his clerk Bansidhar for purchasing stamps, and Bansidhar had informed him that he had affixed the full court-fee thereon, and the evidence of Bansidhar further is that he had purchased the stamps probably from the stamp-vendor Shri Roopraj, since deceased, although the court-fee stamp of Rs. 5/ had been purchased by him from another person. It admits of no question at all that the plaint was filed on a court-fee of Rs. 5/- only although the valuation of the suit was Rs. 1098/4/6. The finding of the tribunal is clearly adverse to Shri Kalla on this point. It has never been the case of Shri Kalla that the court-fee stamps beyond the value of Rs. 5/- disappeared from the record in the Court. It is further significant that the deficiency in this respect was brought to the notice of the trial court after the present complaint was filed by the petitioner in this court on the 28th October, 1953. The Munsiff said in his order-sheet dated the 11th November, 1953, that a court-fee stamp of Rs. 5/- only had been paid on behalf of the plaintiff in this case and, therefore, ordered that the deficiency be made good. Then we find that on the 2nd of December, 1953, Shri Babalal brief-holder for Shri Kalla deposited a further court-fee stamp of Rs. 75/- in court. Not the slightest protest was raised on behalf of Shri Kalla in reply to courts order that full court-fee had been paid earlier. We have no doubt whatever that if full court fee had been paid in the first instance by Shri Kalla or by his Munshi Bansidhar, this fact should have certainly been made the subject matter of a protest. The matter does not rest at that. There is no proof worth the name on the record to show that court-fee stamps worth Rs. The matter does not rest at that. There is no proof worth the name on the record to show that court-fee stamps worth Rs. 75/- had at all been purchased by or on behalf of the petitioner or from the office of Shri Kalla on or about the 2nd June, 1951, as Shri Kalla should have us believed. The stamp-vendor Shri Roopraj from whom the court-fee stamps are said to have been probably purchased by Banshidhar was not produced. Probably he had already died. Even assuming that he was dead at the time of the inquiry, the learned members of the tribunal have themselves stated that they sent for the registers of the licensed stamp vendors appointed for the city of Jodhpur at the relevant time, that is, in June, 1951 but they were not able to trace any such purchase in those registers. The registers included the register of Roopraj also (See order-sheet on the tribunals file dated the 6th August, 1955). Our conclusion is that the story of the purchase of stamps of the value of Rs. 75/- is quite false. It only remains in this connection to deal with the evidence of Chhaganlal who was the clerk concerned in the office of the Munsiff, Jodhpur City in June, 1951. His evidence is that the plaint had been presented in court on a court-fee stamp of Rs. 5/- only. The plaint bears the report of this clerk. This report was originally to the effect that full court fee had been paid but thereafter the word "iwjh" (full) before "court-fee" was scored out and it was stated that a court-fee of only Rs. 5/- had been paid. Chhaganlals evidence is that the 2nd June, 1951, on which the plaint Ex. P-5 was presented by Shri Kalla was the last working day preceding the summer vacation for 1951. Shri Kalla represented to him that he would be just producing the balance of the court-fee and that Chhaganlal should report that the court-fee was sufficient. According to the witness, he relied on Shri Kalla and he, therefore, made a report that the court-fee was full. On this report having been made, the case was ordered to be registered in the ordinary course and summonses against the defendants were directed to go. According to the witness, he relied on Shri Kalla and he, therefore, made a report that the court-fee was full. On this report having been made, the case was ordered to be registered in the ordinary course and summonses against the defendants were directed to go. It is clear that this would not have been possible at all if an office report as to payment of full court-fee had not been made. Chhaganlal further says, however, that as Shri Kalla did not produce the balance of the court-fee, he cut out the word "iwjh" i.e., full, before court-fees" in his report and put in the amount of Rs. 5/- in place of it which only had been paid. It is difficult to say whether the alleged correction had been made on that very day or afterwards. In any case, Chhaganlals further version is that he had only shown the court-fee paid as Rs. 5/- in the register of institution of suits. Ex. 6 is a copy of the relevant entry in the register. We have carefully considered the situation arising from Chhaganlals report and his evidence and we agree with the tribunal that the version of the clerk to the extent that the court-fee paid on the plaint in this case was only Rs. 5/- as indicated by the register is correct. We desire to say that the clerk in making the report that the court-fee paid was full, even though Shri Kalla had assured him that he would immediately make it up, had acted most improperly. But even so, that does not and cannot lead us to the conclusion that the court-fee paid in the case was the full court-fee in the circumstances already narrated above. We, therefore, find it impossible to believe Shri Kallas version that the plaint was filed in this case with full court-fee. 13. Shri Kalla has, however, sought to escape responsibility for this by saying that he had paid the amount Rs. 75/- to his Munshi Banshidhar and that Banshidhar had purchased the stamps and that Banshidhar had informed him that full court-fee stamps had been put on the plaint and that the plaint bearing such full court-fee had been handed over to the court by Banshidhar on his behalf although Shri Kalla significantly adds that he was present in the court premises at the time of the presentation thereof. The learned members of the tribunal have thought fit to state in their report that counsel of standing many a time act through Munshies and that jobs like the purchasing of stamps and putting the plaints in order are left to their care, and they further proceed to say that they could not hold affirmatively that Shri Kalla himself had kept the court-fee with him and that either it remained with him or the amount was misappropriated by his Munshi and that as both these possibilities were there, in their opinion Shri Kalla was entitled to the benefit of doubt so far as the question of misappropriation is concerned, and that, all that could be said was that Shri Kalla was negligent in discharging his professional duties towards his client when he did not take reasonable care to see that the court-fee stamps were being filed along with the plaint. We have examined this finding with the care which it deserves ; but we are constrained to say that we do not see our way to accept it. In the first place it is the duty of counsel himself engaged in a case to present a plaint where the party is not present in court in person and the endorsement on the plaint in this case also is that it was presented by Shri Kalla. The testimony of Chhaganlal is that Shri Kalla himself had told him while presenting the plaint that he would immediately fulfil the deficiency and that meanwhile as the time was short and the next day was the commencement of the vacation he (Chhaganlal) should make a report that the court-fee was full, and relying on that, Chhaganlal states to have made a report that the court-fee paid was sufficient. This also shows that it was probably Mr. Kalla who had presented the plaint himself in court. Shri Kalla has also admitted that he himself was in the court premises. Be that as it may, we have no doubt that the plaint was undoubtedly shown by Banshidhar to Mr. Kalla after court-fee stamps of whatever denomination they were, had been purchased in connection with this case and before it was ready for presentation in court. Shri Kalla has also admitted that he himself was in the court premises. Be that as it may, we have no doubt that the plaint was undoubtedly shown by Banshidhar to Mr. Kalla after court-fee stamps of whatever denomination they were, had been purchased in connection with this case and before it was ready for presentation in court. Before we proceed to state our reasons for this conclusion, we take the opportunity of pointing out that in no case it is the business of the Munshi to do things like presenting plaints or memoranda of appeal in court and that if there was any practice prevalent to the contrary, we cannot possibly countenance it and it must stop. But that apart, we have a very important admission by Shri Kalla himself in this case that the endorsement as to the title of the case on the stamp of the value of Rs. 5/- presented along with the plaint is in his own handwriting. This clearly shows that if further stamps had been purchased to the extent of the full court-fee payable on this plaint, Shri Kalla should have also put his endorsement on them and in that case there could be no manner of doubt that the stamps must have been purchased. The inquiry made shows, however, that no stamps of the value of Rs. 75/- were purchased at all and, therefore, the story that the sum of Rs. 75/- had, by that time, been spent for the purchase of court-fee stamps collapses to the ground. If no stamps had been purchased, it is entirely wrong to say lor Shri Kalla that the plaint had been put in on full court-fee stamps. It is equally wrong to say that Rs. 75/- were given by Shri Kalla to his clerk for the purpose of purchasing court fee stamps. We would again refer in this connection to Shri Kallas reply dated the 17th June, 1954, where the ease raised by him is not that he had paid Rs. 75/- to his clerk Banshidhar and that the latter had misappropriated the money but Shri Kallas simple answer was that the plaint had been presented on full court-fee stamps. 14. We would again refer in this connection to Shri Kallas reply dated the 17th June, 1954, where the ease raised by him is not that he had paid Rs. 75/- to his clerk Banshidhar and that the latter had misappropriated the money but Shri Kallas simple answer was that the plaint had been presented on full court-fee stamps. 14. It has also been brought to our notice that at the time this plaint was sought to be put in, in 1951, the Rajasthan Court Fees Act (Adaptation) Ordinance (No. LX) of 1950 had already come into force on the 24th January, 1950, and according to the provisions of this Ordinance, the court fee payable on a suit over the valuation of Rs. 1000/- and not exceeding Rs. 1100/- was Rs. 80/-and not Rs. 75/-. In fact Shri Babalal, brief holder for Shri Kalla, while making up the deficiency had also put in court-fee stamps of the value of Rs. 75/- in addition to the stamp of Rs. 5/- already paid. This also goes a long way to show that the explanation of Shri Kalla that he had given Rs. 75/- in all to his Munshi Banshidhar for purchasing court-fee stamps in connection with this case is ill-founded and that it cannot carry conviction in our minds. We may also point out in this connection that if the plaint were to be filed under the Marwar Court Fees Act of 1941 which was in force up to the 7th of March 1949 (and it was to be so filed if the engagement was complete in 1948) the court-fee payable on the plaint in this case would have been Rs, 69/- and in that case the payment of Rs. 75/- by way of court-fee and certain other incidental expenses would be quite in order. Again, under the Marwar Court Fees (Amendment) Act (No.XIV) of 1949, the court-fees payable on a suit of the relevant valuation would again have been Rs. 82/- and not Rs. 75/-. In our opinion, this aspect of the case again reinforces the conclusion at which we have arrived above that Shri Kalla had been engaged by the petitioner in 1948 and his fees and expenses for filing the suit had been paid to him some where there and not as late as 191 as Shri Kalla alleges. 75/-. In our opinion, this aspect of the case again reinforces the conclusion at which we have arrived above that Shri Kalla had been engaged by the petitioner in 1948 and his fees and expenses for filing the suit had been paid to him some where there and not as late as 191 as Shri Kalla alleges. We also desire to say once again that if Shri Kalla had produced his account-books, we should have had a good deal of light thrown on this aspect of the case also. He has failed to produce them with the result that a possible check which should have been available to us in ascertaining the true position of things is completely denied to us. 15. Having regard to this state of circumstances, we feel constrained to come to the conclusion that on a careful analysis of the direct and circumstantial evidence produced in this case, the correct conclusion is that the plaint was presented on a court-fee stamp of Rs. 5/- only and that the balance of Rs. 70/- paid by the petitioner to Shri Kalla for defraying the court-fees was improperly retained by him until the 2nd December, 1953, when the deficiency was made good by putting in an additional court-fee Rs. 75/- and that this was done by Shri Babalal brief-holder for Shri Kalla obviously at the latters instance and after the present complaint was filed in this Court on the 28th October, 1953. 16. We next return to the question whether the documents which were to be filed along with the plaint had been given by the petitioner Ramratan to Shri Kalla and, if so, what happened to them and why they were not filed along with the plaint. The finding of the tribunal on this aspect of the case, if we may say so, without any disrespect, is rather laconic. The learned members have said that they have only the bald statement of Ramratan and his son Bajranglal before them and that as Ramratan had obviously indulged in lies in respect of other two allegations against Shri Kalla, they were not prepared to accept the petitioners version in the absence of any independent evidence. The learned members have said that they have only the bald statement of Ramratan and his son Bajranglal before them and that as Ramratan had obviously indulged in lies in respect of other two allegations against Shri Kalla, they were not prepared to accept the petitioners version in the absence of any independent evidence. Now, we should like to say, in the first instance, that it is not proper to look for the so-called independent evidence in a matter like this which rests primarily between a client and his counsel. In the second place, it seems to us that the matter requires fuller examination than it has received at the hands of the tribunal. In this connection, we consider it right to draw attention to the contents of the plaint itself which was filed by Shri Kalla in 1951. The suit was for compensation for breach of contract to supply 250 bags of Kapas at the stipulated rate of Rs. 7/4/- per maund. In para 2 of the plaint, it was stated that a copy of the Beejuck Ex. P-l was being annexed with the plaint. Then in para 4 of the plaint it was alleged that the plaintiff had to pay demurrage to the extent of Rs. 154/12/- and that the receipt obtained by the plaintiff from the Railway department for the same was Ex. P-2. In para 7, it was further alleged that the plaintiff had addressed certain letters including a notice to the defendants to send a representative at once before whom the goods could be weighed but the defendants did not send anybody whatever and sent a reply that they were not responsible for any shortage, demurrage or for bardana. The defendants reply was referred to in the plaint as Ex. P-3. It is clear, therefore, that this plaint would not be complete when the documents mentioned therein were not filed along with it. It is remarkable that according to Shri Kalla, he had written out the plaint in his own handwriting and yet he is unable to say whether any list of documents was prepared and filed with the plaint Ex. 5. It is remarkable that according to Shri Kalla, he had written out the plaint in his own handwriting and yet he is unable to say whether any list of documents was prepared and filed with the plaint Ex. 5. Shri Kalla has further said that as it was intended to produce certain documents in original (leaving aside the Beejuck of which only a copy was intended to be filed) along with the plaint, it was not mentioned in respect of the demurrage receipt and the reply notice that copies were being produced with the plaint. Earlier in his examination-in-chief Shri Kalla has stated that Ramratan always kept the original documents in his custody and never intrusted them to him although they were made available for the preparation of copies and for comparison and verification. Banshidhars testimony on the other hand on this aspect of the case is that copies of the documents referred to in the plaint had been produced with the plaint and that they had been produced by him for verification and comparison with the originals. This witness was unable to say whether a list of the documents was prepared and filed with the plaint. He further says that no original documents were produced with the plaint. When this witness was shown the file of the case he was compelled to state that he did not find the copies of the documents in it. The testimoney of the petitioner Ramratan is that while engaging Shri Kalla he had entrusted four documents in original to him for being produced in court in support of the claim and these were (1) the original Beejuck of the dealer (2) a receipt from the railway regarding demurrage and (3) and (4) were two original letters received from the defendants. The petitioners case is that he had handed over these documents to Shri Kalla in March, 1948, and that a plaint was prepared in his presence and he had signed it but when he took inspection of the file in 1955 he discovered among other things that neither the list nor the documents or even their copies were on the file. No cross-examination was directed on behalf of Shri Kalla on this part of his (Ramratanss) testimony. No cross-examination was directed on behalf of Shri Kalla on this part of his (Ramratanss) testimony. Now, according to D. W. Banshidhar copies of the relevant documents had been put in court along with the plaint and that they had also been got compared with the originals. This would indicate that the originals had been left by the petitioner with Sari Kalla. Then where have the originals of the suit documents disappeared ? Again, how is it that even the copies of the documents or not on the record ? It is not the case of Shri Kalla that the documents had been received by him and were under his custody for some time and later they were returned to the petitioner- It is also not this case that any of the documents whether in original or copies thereof or the list of documents had disappeared from the record. Shri Kallas version is that it was intended to produce the demurrage receipt and the reply notice in original along with the plaint. If this version is correct, then at least these document must have been left in his charge by Ramratan. This also does not fit in with Shri Kallas suggestion that Ramratan always kept the original documents with himself and never allowed them to remain in Shri Kallas office. Besides, it is very difficult for us to believe, according to the normal course of human events, that the documents in this case should not have been handed over by the client to his counsel. Assuming, however, that the documents were not with him or in his office, how could Shri Kalla hope to conduct the case without the documents being available with him if and when required, particularly when the client lived in Deshnok at a considerable distance from Jodhpur ? Again, it is not Mr. Kallas case that at the time the plaint was filed in June, 1951 the petitioner was himself in Jodhpur or that at any time since then until the suit went on till July, 1954, (when it came to be dismissed for default) Shri Kalla had ever addressed a single letter to the petitioners to let him have the documents or to send them to him along with any responsible person. Last but not least, Shri Kalla did not choose to say a word in his reply to this part of the charge in Tarachands case, and this is also notwithout significance Under these circumstances we find it extremely difficult to accept Shri Kallas version that the petitioner had not made over the suit documents to remain in his charge or that the petitioner was so sceptical as to keep the said documents with himself all the time, and had merely expressed his willingness to produce them if and when required. It may be, although it is obviously not possible for us to say this with any certainty, that the original documents were probably lost in the office of Shri Kalla owing to some mischance and this has given rise to much of the difficulty and the complication which have been occasioned in this case. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we are convinced that Shri Kalla has acted with grave impropriety in not filing a list of the documents along with the plaint nor the originals or even the copies of the documents referred to in the plaint in court and that we are satisfied that these documents had been in all probability handed over to him in connection with this case and that they are now not traceable. 17. We next proceed to consider whether the allegation of the petitioner that the plaint (Ex. 5) filed by Shri Kalla in 1951, did not bear his signature, and likewise the Vakalatnama filed along with the plaint also did not bear his signature. In this connection the petitioners case is that a plaint had been prepared by Shri Kalla in 1948 in his presence and that he had signed it and also signed a Vakalatnama but these had not been presented in court, and another plaint (Ex. 5) accompanied by a Vakalatnama (Ex. 7) has been filed which purport to have been signed by him but do not bear his signatures at all. The finding of the tribunal is against the petitioner. The learned members have stated that no expert had been produced to assist them in comparing the disputed signatures of the petitioner with his admitted signatures and that they themselves were unable to form any opinion on the point unaided by any expert testimony. The finding of the tribunal is against the petitioner. The learned members have stated that no expert had been produced to assist them in comparing the disputed signatures of the petitioner with his admitted signatures and that they themselves were unable to form any opinion on the point unaided by any expert testimony. Our attention however was drawn on behalf of the petitioner to the signature of Ramratan on the plaint Ex. 5 in Tarachands case and also on the Vakalatnama Ex. 7 filed in that case. To us, these two signatures appear to be of the same pattern and they clearly appear to us to have been made by the same person. When we compare these signatures with the admitted signatures of Ramratan on Ex. A-2 which is a Vakalatnama in suit No. 408 of 1950 against Jeewandas (proprietor of the firm Magumal Dholandas) and his signatures on the plaint (Ex. P-5) dated the 14th February, 1948, in the case against Heeralal and the Vakalatnama Ex. A-6 in the latter case, we are undoubtedly struck by the dissimilarity of these signatures from those on Exs. 5 and 7 being the plaint and the Vakalatnama in the case in question. It thus appears to us that the writer of these two signatures is most probably not one and the same. It also appears to us to be improbable that in view of what had already transpired between Shri Kalla and the petitioner, he was likely to sign any plaint over again in 1951. This is of course on the assumption, which we have already examined, and which we are disposed to believe for the reasons stated above, that the engagement of Shri Kalla by the petitioner to file a suit in Tarachands case had taken place certainly earlier than June, 1950. If the suit had not been filed earlier when it had to be filed, then in that even the petitioners signature would be necessary on the new plaint and that would have to be obtained somehow or the other. We also cannot fail to take note of the fact that in saying that the plaint Ex. 5 and the Vakalatnama Ex. We also cannot fail to take note of the fact that in saying that the plaint Ex. 5 and the Vakalatnama Ex. 7 in Tarachands case does not bear his signatures, the petitioner is taking a great risk for the simple reason that on his own showing his suit against Tarachand is bound to be dismissed and we do not expect a person in his normal senses to make such an admission against his own interests. There is, however, one other circumstance in this connection which makes the matter rather intriguing and that is that the signatures of Ramratan on the plaint in the case against Jeewandas (suit No. 408 of 1950) Ex. A-l seem to us to bear some resemblance with the signatures on the plaint (Ex. 5) in Ramratans case against Tarachand. It is again worthy of notice that this signature of Ramratan on Ex. A-l does not at all tally with his admitted signature on the Vakalatnama in that very case Ex. A-2 and the signature on Ex. A-2 largely tallies with the admitted signatures already referred to above. When Ramratan was confronted with his signature on Ex. A-l, he categorically denied the signature in question to be his. Having regard to all these circumstances, we are disposed to say, for ourselves that the signatures of Ramratan in the plaint and the Vakalatnama (Exs. 5 and 7) in Tarachands case are attended with a very grave suspicion. Still we would not be prepared to come to a positive finding on this aspect of the case to the effect that the signatures in dispute are not of Ramratan and we would leave the matter at that. As held by us in Kr. Amar Singh of Sabalpore vs. Madanmohan Lal(1), however grave the suspicion as regards the genuineness of these signatures may be, we feel that we should not base our finding on mere suspicion only and we hold accordingly, so far as this part of the charge is concerned. 18. As held by us in Kr. Amar Singh of Sabalpore vs. Madanmohan Lal(1), however grave the suspicion as regards the genuineness of these signatures may be, we feel that we should not base our finding on mere suspicion only and we hold accordingly, so far as this part of the charge is concerned. 18. We consider it necessary to point out at this juncture that where a litigant engages a member of the legal profession to conduct a case, broadly speaking, a relationship is brought about between them according to which the litigant legitimately expects in return for the remuneration paid that the lawyer whom he has so engaged, would carry out his duties and obligations in connection with the case with the utmost of good faith and with all due and reasonable diligence. We do recognise that in performing certain routine duties a lawyer has to depend upon the services of his own staff such as his clerk or clerks but we cannot too emphatically point out that it is the bounden duty of the lawyer to see that only such functions are assigned to his clerks as may legally be entrusted to them and no further ; and secondly, that even in those matters which have to be so entrusted to his clerks, he must exercise due care so that the interests of his client are duly safeguarded. Where, however, the lawyer neglects to perform his lawful obligations himself and allows his clerk to overstep the due limits, or where owing to lack of due care and supervision in the management of his staff, the interests of his client are jeopardised, it can furnish no answer to the member of a monopolist profession like that of a lawyer, to say that he had entrusted a particular task to his clerk and, therefore, he cannot be held personally responsible for professional misconduct in any particular matter arising out of such neglect. Any other view, in our opinion, would generally speaking, be productive of consequences of the gravest character. Any other view, in our opinion, would generally speaking, be productive of consequences of the gravest character. We particularly feel that in the matter of the monies entrusted by a litigant to his counsel, it is the latters special duty to see that such money is duly spent for the object for which it is given, and all expenditure incurred by him for and on behalf of his client out of such monies must be duly accounted for and we have no manner of doubt that the withholding of such monies or their misapplication would clearly amount to professional misconduct, the extent and severity to which must of course depend upon the circumstances of each case. In all such matters we desire it to be clearly understood that a lawyer must act in an honest, upright and straightforward manner, and in the ultimate analysis, it is his personal responsibility so to act and he can disregard the performance of such duty only at his own peril. 19. Applying the above principles to this case before us, we are clearly of the opinion, for the reasons mentioned by us in the foregoing part of our judgment, that Shri Kalla, in acting in the manner in which he has done, namely,—that he kept the case of the petitioner in cold-storage with him for an unreasonably long time after his engagement, and thereafter filed the plaint on deficient court-fee although he had been put in full funds, and that he improperly retained or allowed to be retained in his office money which was required to be spent for purchase of court-fee stamps until the 2nd December, 1953, to the serious detriment of the petitioner, and that he failed to produce with the plaint originals or even copies of the documents referred to in the plaint and 10 all intents and purposes such documents are lost to the petitioner, is guilty not merely of simple negligence but of highly objectionable conduct amounting to professional misconduct. 20. The next question is what action we should direct to be taken against Shri Kalla. 20. The next question is what action we should direct to be taken against Shri Kalla. We know Shri Kalla is a lawyer of a long standing, and it is, therefore, the more regrettable that he should have allowed things to happen which cannot but reflect considerable discredit and which are subversive of all sound and correct traditions of the honble profession to which he has had the privilege to belong. We have no hesitation in saying, however that the interests of the litigating public as well as the interests of the profession demand that such practices wherever found must be dealt with in an appropriate manner, and we consider having regard to all the relevant considerations and the standing of Shri Kalla, that he should be suspended from practice for a period of two years from this date. We order accordingly. 21. Before closing we must also advert to an application filed by Shri Kalla on the 4th September, 1956, for a rehearing of this case on the ground that he is a patient of chronic asthma and his condition became acute on the 27th August, and therefore, he could not attend the hearing on the 28th August. We regret we are unable to accede to this request. As already stated, this case was adjourned at Mr. Kallas request from the 8th August to the 28th August. We feel that it was Mr. Kallas duty to have arranged for a proper representation on his behalf at the hearing before us in good time before the 28th, but he obviously failed to realise this duty ; and even the present application for rehearing was put in on the 4th September, after the judgment had already been dictated and was ready. We cannot help remarking that Shri Kalla has acted in a wholly irresponsible manner, and that we are not at all satisfied that even taking it for granted that an adjournment was unavoidably necessary as to the hearing on the 28th August, Shri Kalla or somebody duly representing him could not have made a request to us for an adjournment at the hearing on the 28th August. Consequently, we see no adequate justification to re open the case and hear it over again as sought by Shri Kalla and proceed to pronounce this judgment.