District Board v. Noor Mohammad — 1956 DIGILAW 195 (ALL)

JUDGMENT A.N. Mulla, J. - The District Board Muzaffarnagar prosecuted Noor Mohammad and eight others u/s 175 of the District Boards Act, 1920, for breach of Rule 7 of the bye-laws framed u/s 174(1) and Section 106 of the District Boards Act. These bye-laws were published in the UP Gazette of 23-1-1954, Part III at page 36. 2. Bye-law No. 7 reads as follows: No person shall work or run a sugar factory within the rural area of the district unless and until he has been granted on payment of the requisite fee a licence for the same by the District Board and possess such a licence for the relevant period. 3. The word 'factory' defined in these bye-laws includes a flour mill, a cane crusher and other kinds of machineries. The charge against the opposite parties was that they were running factories in Jalalabad town which is a rural area appertaining to the District Board, Muzaffarnagar, in the year 1953-54 without taking out the required licences. 4. Two of the opposite parties Phul Chand and Bhullan Singh were prosecuted in the same case. In all eight complaints were filed. 5. The opposite parties admitted that they were running factories, but they contended that the factories were situate in Town Area Jalalabad and it was the Town Area committee of Jalalabad alone which could frame bye-laws demanding licensing fees from them. They further contended that bye-law No. 7 quoted above was void as u/s 93(3) District Boards Act, the District Board was not entitled to exercise any authority within the Town Area of Jalalabad. 6. The trial court came to the conclusion that Section 93(3) District Boards Act has divested the District Board of this authority which now vests in the Town Area Committee of Jalalabad in view of Section 26(a) of the UP Town Areas Act (Act II of 1914). It further held that the types of factories which the opposite parties were running came under the heading 'offensive trade' and the regulation of such offensive callings or trades was entirely within the control of the Town Area Committee. It, therefore, dismissed all the eight complaints of the District Board and acquitted the opposite parties. 7. The District Board went up in revision against these orders of acquittal and the Addl. District Magistrate who heard these revisions agreed with the view taken by the trial court and dismissed them. It, therefore, dismissed all the eight complaints of the District Board and acquitted the opposite parties. 7. The District Board went up in revision against these orders of acquittal and the Addl. District Magistrate who heard these revisions agreed with the view taken by the trial court and dismissed them. The District Board has now come up in revision before this Court and as the same points of law are involved in all these eight cases, this decision will govern all of them. 8. Three questions arise for determination in these cases. They are: 1. Is running of a flour mill etc. an offensive trade? 2. Does the word 'regulation' used in Section 26(a) UP Town Areas Act include the power of issuing a licence? 3. Does Section 93(3) of the District Boards Act amount to a divestmeit of authority of the District Board in favour of the Town Area Committee? 9. Question No. 1: The counsel for the District Board contended that running a flour mill and other factories which is the subject of charge in these cases is not an offensive trade, but a dangerous trade. In the alternative it was contended that it was born offensive and dangerous. Laying stress on the difference in the language of Section 26(a) of the UP Town Area Act, 1914 and Section 174(2)(k) of the District Boards Act, it was argued that the Town Area Committee can only regulate offensive trades and not those trades which are either dangerous or both offensive and dangerous, while the District Board can regulate dangerous and obnoxious trades also. It was also stressed that the bye-laws framed by the District Board were u/s 174(1) and Section 106 of the District Boards Act and not u/s 174(2)(k). I have not been impressed by these contentions. It is difficult to imagine a trade which is dangerous and obnoxious, but not offensive. No illustration of such a trade was given to me. Once a trade is found to be offensive, the power to regulate it is vested in the Town Area Committee u/s 26(a) of the UP Town Areas Act. It is irrelevant if this trade can also be described as dangerous or obnoxious. No illustration of such a trade was given to me. Once a trade is found to be offensive, the power to regulate it is vested in the Town Area Committee u/s 26(a) of the UP Town Areas Act. It is irrelevant if this trade can also be described as dangerous or obnoxious. The powers given to the Town Area Committee under the rule cited above over-rides the powers of the District Boards within the limits of the Town Area, and a dual control for the same purpose cannot be accepted. I am, therefore, inclined to the view that running factories of the type which are the subject of this case is an offensive trade. This was the view taken by a Bench of this Court in Municipal Board Hathras v. Bohrey Narain Dutt and Anr. 1947 A.W.R. (H.C.) 238. The same view was taken in an unreparted decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Hafiz Syed Rafiq Alam v. State through District Board, Mirzapur Cr. Ref. No. 432 of 1962 decided on 5-4-1954. The Bench decision was again followed in Roop Kishore Brahman v. The State 1955 A.L.J. 179. It is, however, not necessary for me to decide this point in this case. 10. Question No. 2--The relevant part of Section 26 UP Town Areas Act, 1914, runs as follows: The committee may by general or special order in writing provide, and if so advised by the prescribed authority or if none is appointed the District Magistrate shall provide for all or any of the following matters within the town are a, namely: (a) the regulation of offensive callings or trades;... 11. It is contended on behalf of the District Board that no power of granting a licence is given under this section. The only power given is to regulate the offensive trades and not to issue licences for starting these trades. It is further contended that the power to grant a licence is given to the District Board u/s 105 of the District Boards Act, 1922. Section 106 of the District Boards Act runs as follows: The Board may charge a fee to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which it is entitled or required to grant by or under this Act. 12. Section 106 of the District Boards Act runs as follows: The Board may charge a fee to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which it is entitled or required to grant by or under this Act. 12. It is contended chat this power was not transferred to the Town Area Committees and these Committees could only regulate offensive trades, but not grant licences for them. On the other hand the counsel for the opposite parties contended that the power to issue a licence is implied in the word 'regulation'. I have anxiously considered the point and I have come to the conclusion that the contention of the District Board must be upheld as it is not possible to interpret the word 'regulation' as including the power to issue a licence. 13. I will now give my reasons for coming to this conclusion (1) It is an accepted principle of interpreting the words of a statute that their natural and ordinary meaning should be given to them. The dictionary meaning of the word 'regulate' given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is as follows: Regulate--Control by rule, subject to restrictions, moderate, adapt to requirements; adjust so that it may work accurately. The only meaning which can by some stretch of imagination be said to include the issuing of a licence is ''subject to restrictions." It was contended that issuing licence for a trade amounts to subjecting it to restrictions and, therefore the word 'regulate' should be interpreted to mean that a right to issue a licence is also included. In my opinion even the word 'restriction' cannot be held to be a synonym for 'prohibition' or 'deprivation'. The use of the word 'restriction' in the phrase 'subject to restrictions' does not contain the sense of prohibition or deprivation. The ordinary meaning of the word 'regulate' presupposes the continued existence of that which is to be regulated. A licence on the other hand gives inception to a trade and regulation does not mean a power to start a trade. (2) Even the word 'restriction' was not held to be a synonym of deprivation by the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1955 A.W.R. (H.C.) 23. A licence on the other hand gives inception to a trade and regulation does not mean a power to start a trade. (2) Even the word 'restriction' was not held to be a synonym of deprivation by the Supreme Court in Saghir Ahmad and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1955 A.W.R. (H.C.) 23. In this case the observations of Lord Davoy in Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo 1896 A.C. 88 at p. 93 F were quoted with approval. Lord Davoy observed in that case: No doubt the regulation and governance of a trade may involve the imposition of restrictions on its exercise...where such restrictions are in the opinion of the public authority necessary to prevent a nuisance or for the maintenance of order. But Their Lordships think that there is a marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed. Similarly Patanjali Sastri, J. expressed his views in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1956 S.R. 27 in the following words: The use of the word 'restrictions' in the various sub-clauses seems to imply in the context, that the rights guaranteed by the Article are still capable of being exercised.... Another decision which was referred to in Saghir Ahmad's case was Lokanath Misra Vs. State of Orissa and Another, AIR 1952 Ori 42 . In this decision a distinction was drawn between the word 'restriction' and the word 'regulation'. The learned Judges of the Orissa High Court observed: The first question for consideration therefore is whether the expression 'restriction' in Clause (6) of Article 19 implies mere regulation and does not include, absolute prohibition. It is true that it was held in Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgoto 1896 A.C. 88 93 F, that 'a power regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed.' But the word used in the Article is 'restriction' and not 'regulation'. It is true that it was held in Municipal Corporation of City of Toronto v. Virgoto 1896 A.C. 88 93 F, that 'a power regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed.' But the word used in the Article is 'restriction' and not 'regulation'. That the framers of the Constitution were aware of the distinction between the power to regulate and the power to restrict will be apparent from a scrutiny of Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of Article 25 where the words 'regulating' and 'restricting' occur in juxtaposition thereby indicating unmistakably that the framers of the Constitution intended to convey two different meanings by the two words. The extract quoted above indicates that 'regulation' is not synonymous with 'restriction', but connotes a degree of check which does not amount to total deprivation or prohibition. The majority of the Judges in A.K. Gopalan's case cited above also drew a distinction between 'negation' or deprivation' of a right and a restriction upon it and although it was said that restriction may reach a point where it might amount to deprivation, yet restrictions would normally presuppose the continued existence--no matter even in a very thin and attenuated form of the thing upon which the restrictions were imposed. In the end, however, the learned Judges observed in Saghir Ahmad's case that the "normal use of the word 'restriction' was in the sense of 'limitation' and not 'extinction'." They, however, did not prefer to express any final opinion on the point. That there is a difference between 'prohibition' and 'regulation' also appears from the observations of the learned Judges in Cooverjee B. Bharucha Vs. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Others, AIR 1954 SC 220 . The following paragraph occurs at page 223 in that decision: Laws prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous goods or trafficking in women cannot be held to be illegal as enacting a prohibition and not a mere regulation. In view of these authorities, mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the word 'regulation' can neither mean extinction' nor 'inception'. This fact also emerges from these decisions that the word 'restriction' is closer to 'extinction than the word 'regulation', but even restriction' is different from 'extinction'. In view of these authorities, mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the word 'regulation' can neither mean extinction' nor 'inception'. This fact also emerges from these decisions that the word 'restriction' is closer to 'extinction than the word 'regulation', but even restriction' is different from 'extinction'. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties, however, relied on some decisions of this Court to contend that the word 'regulation' includes the power to g'ant a licence. Reliance was placed on Municipal Board Hathras v. Bohrey Narain Dutt and Anr. 1947 A.W.R. (H.C.) 238 in which a Bench of this Court observed as follows: The power to require the obtaining of licences is, and has to be, incidental to the power of regulation and inspection. Further on the learned Judges observed: 'We are clearly of the opinion that the word "regulation" in Clause (d) quoted above must include the power to make by-laws and to require the taking out of licenses for the establishment or continuance of the things and businesses mentioned in that clause. This Bench decision was followed by a recent decision of our Court in Roop Kishore Brahman v. The State 1955 A.L.J. 179. The learned judge accepted this Bench decision unhesitatingly and did not give his own reasons for accepting that view, with due respect to the learned judges who gave these decisions I am of the opinion that the word 'regulation' cannot be interpreted to include the power of granting a licence. The learned Judges over-ruled an earlier decision of this Court in Asa Ram v. Emperor 1933 A.W.R. (H.C.) 518 where it was held that the power to make bye-laws for 'regulation' and 'inspection' did not give the Municipal Board the power of levying licence fees. I find myself in agreement with the view expressed in this case. The learned Judges who gave the Bench decision ignored the provisions of Section 294 of the U.P Municipalities Act, 1916, and stretched the meaning of the word 'regulation' to come to the conclusion that the Municipal Board had a right to issue licences for running an offensive trade. Section 294 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, runs as follows: The board may charge a fee to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which it is entitled or required to grant by or under this Act. Section 294 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, runs as follows: The board may charge a fee to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which it is entitled or required to grant by or under this Act. In my opinion the board drew its powers to issue licences under this section and not under the provisions of Clause (d) of head F as held by learned Judge. Sitting singly, with this Bench decision against my view, I would have referred this case to a Bench, if the observations of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court were not clear on the point. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the word 'regulation' does not include the power to issue a licence. (3) Careful reading of Section 26 of the U.P. Town Areas Act shows that the legislature knew the difference between the meaning of the words 'regulation' and 'prohibition'. There are eight sub-clauses in Section 26 and the word 'prohibition' occurs in two of them, namely (d) and (g). It also shows that both the words 'regulation' and 'prohibition' used in Sub-clause (e). Sub-clause (e) of Section 26 reads as follows: the regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic. The fact that both the words are used in juxtaposition clearly indicates that they (sic) different meanings. It cannot be held that the word 'prohibition' is a surplus age in this sub-clause. I have already referred to a decision of the Orissa High Court in which the learned Judges have drawn attention to the use of the words 'regulating' and 'restricting' in juxtaposition in Article 95(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. When two words are used in such a manner, they must be taken to convey separate meanings. Similarly in Section 174(2) of the District Boards Act, which deals with its specific powers, both thee words regulating and prohibiting are used. Regulating is used in Sub-sections (a), (b), (c), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1) and (m). The word 'prohibiting' is used in subsections (e), (f), (n) and (v) and both the words are used in juxtaposition in Sub-sections (q) and (r). This again indicates that the two words a 'e used to convey different meaning. These two words also occur in Section 133 Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with public nuisance. The word 'prohibiting' is used in subsections (e), (f), (n) and (v) and both the words are used in juxtaposition in Sub-sections (q) and (r). This again indicates that the two words a 'e used to convey different meaning. These two words also occur in Section 133 Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with public nuisance. The relevant port on of Section 133 Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows: That the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the health of physical comfort of the community, and that in consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated.... It is, therefore, clear that the words 'prohibition' and 'regulation' stand for different concepts an ideas and do not mean the same thing. It was open to the legislature to give the power to issue licences to the U.P. Town Area Committees in express and unambiguous language, but this was not done. Where power which exists in a person or a corporate body is taken away from that body and is conferred on another person or body, it is absolutely indispensable that it should be expressed in clear language. At page 107 in Craies on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, the following paragraph occurs: Express and unambiguous language appears to be absolutely indispensable in statutes passed for the following purposes...(2) Conferring or taking away legal rights, whether public or private.... It cannot be disputed that no such express (sic) ambiguous language has been used to transfer this right. In Re. Cuno. Mansfiled v. Mansfield 1889 43 Ch. Dn. 12 at p. 17 Bowen, L.J. observed: ...in the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed, unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there was no transference of the power to issue a licence u/s 26 (a) of the U.P. Town Areas, Act. (4) u/s 106 of the District Board Act, 1922, specific power for imposing licensing fees is given to the District Boards. No notification has been shown to me that this power was vested in the U.P. Town Areas. The Supreme Court in Mohammad Yasin Vs. (4) u/s 106 of the District Board Act, 1922, specific power for imposing licensing fees is given to the District Boards. No notification has been shown to me that this power was vested in the U.P. Town Areas. The Supreme Court in Mohammad Yasin Vs. The Town Area Committee, Jalalabad and Another, AIR 1952 SC 115 observed: We have not been referred to any notification whereby Section 294 U.P. Municipalities Act was extended to the Respondent committee. Section 294 of the U.P. Municipalities Act is word for word the same Section 106 of the District Boards Act. In the absence of any specific notification which ves'.ed this power of granting licences to the U.P. Town Areas Committees, it cannot be held that the District Board was divested of this power. In Cooverjee B. Bharucha Vs. The Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Others, AIR 1954 SC 220 quoted above, it was observed: 'By the provisions of Section 24, duties can be imposed on the manufacture, import, export and transport of liquor and other excisable articles. Revenue is also collected by the grant of contracts to carry on trade in liquors and these contracts are sold by auction. The grantee is given a licence on payment of the auction price. The regulation specifically authorises this. It is not a fee levied without authority of law as was the situation in Rashid Ahmed Vs. The Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 . It would thus appear that before this power of issuing licences can be exercised by the Town Areas Committers, it must be proved that this power was given to them by some specific provision. No such provision exists in the UP Town Areas Act and it is not possible to imply this authorization in interpreting the word 'regulation' used in Section 26(a). (5) The counsel for the opposite parties contended that where a certain power is conferred upon a person it naturally follows that all such incidental and auxiliary powers are also granted to him which would facilitate the execution of the rights given to him. In support of this contention reliance was placed on M.S. Gopalaswami Chettiar Vs. The Secretary of State for India in Council, AIR 1933 Mad 748 . My attention was also drawn to passage in Craies on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, at page 229. In support of this contention reliance was placed on M.S. Gopalaswami Chettiar Vs. The Secretary of State for India in Council, AIR 1933 Mad 748 . My attention was also drawn to passage in Craies on Statute Law, Fourth Edition, at page 229. It runs as follows: One of the first principles of law with regard to the effect of an enabling Act is that if the legislature enables some-thing to be done, it gives power at the same time, by necessary implication, to do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purpose in view. It was argued that when the power of regulation of offensive trades was given to the Town Area Committees, it naturally follows that at the same time a power to issue licences was given to them because it is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purpose in view. Similarly a passage in Maxwell on Statutes, Tenth Edition, was cited. This passage is at page 361. It reads: Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Further in the next page, it is mentioned: An act which authorises the making of bye-laws, impliedly authorizes the annexation of a reasonable pecuniary penalty for their infringement, recoverable (in the absence of other provision by action or distress. I have carefully considered this contention, but I am of the opinion that it is not well-founded. Such a transfer of power in an implied manner can only be accepted where the right transferred cannot be exercised at all without conferring the implied power also. It cannot be said in the present case that if the Town Area Committee is not permitted to issue licences, it cannot regulate offensive trades. For the purposes of health and sanitation the Town Area Committee can exercise a control over these trades irrespective of the licence which is granted to them by the District Board for running these offensive trades. I, therefore, find that the phrase "regulation of offensive trades" does not include a power to issue a licence by implication. 14. For the purposes of health and sanitation the Town Area Committee can exercise a control over these trades irrespective of the licence which is granted to them by the District Board for running these offensive trades. I, therefore, find that the phrase "regulation of offensive trades" does not include a power to issue a licence by implication. 14. Question No. 3: Section 93(3) of the District Boards Act, 1922, runs as follows: Nothing in this Act shall: (3) entitle a board to exercise within the limits of any municipality, notified area, cantonment or town area any authority which is vested in the municipal board, notified area committee, cantonment committee, district magistrate, town magistrate or town panchayat, as the case may be.... 15. A reading of the Sub-section indicates that the District Board is barred from exercising any authority in a Town Area which is vested in one of the bodies mentioned in Sub-section (3). It does not divest the Municipal Board of those powers which are not vested in any of these bodies. In view of my decision on Question No. 2, the District Board was not divested of the powers which it possesses u/s 106 of the District Boards Act. Only the power of regulating offensive trades was given to the Town Area Committee, but the power of issuing a licence was not given to it. A reading of this Sub-section also shows that the Town Area Committee is not mentioned amongst the bodies named in this Sub-section. The UP Town Area Act was enacted in 1914 and the District Boards Act was enacted in 1922. At the time when the District Boards Act was enacted there was no such body as the Town Area Committee. At that time there were Town Panchayats and not Town Area Committees. It was in 1934 that the UP Town Areas (Second Amendment Act) was enacted and by Section 4 of this Act the word 'Panchayat' occurring in the principal Act was substituted by the word 'Committee'. It was necessary that after making this amendment in the Town Area Act a similar amendment should have been made in Section 93 of the District Boards Act to bring it in line with the amendment made in the UP Town Areas Act. This was, however, not done and the provisions of Sub-Section 3 of Section 93 remained as they were. This was, however, not done and the provisions of Sub-Section 3 of Section 93 remained as they were. Section 93(3) as it stands does not show that any divestment was made in favour of the Town Area Committee. It was contended on behalf of the District Board that in view of this omission an instance of casus omissus had occurred and it is not permissible to a court of law to substitute "Town Area Committee" in place of "Town Panchayat". In interpreting Section 93(3) it was vehemently stressed that if I were to do so, it would amount to an alternation and not a construction of the words of the Act. Reliance was placed on several English decisions where it has been held that even if the court finds that the omission is due to an over-sight, still the court cannot construct the words in such a manner as to cure the defect. The following authorities were cited before me: 1. Thomas Christopher Cowper Essex v. The Local Board for the District of Action in The County of Middlesex 1889 14 AC 153. 2 Privy Council in Robert Wigram Crawford v. Richard Spooner 1846, 4 Moore's I. App. 179. 3. Lame and Anr. v. Bonnet 150 E.R. Exc. 350. 16. Lastly a decision of the Supreme Court in Shrimati Hira Devi and Others Vs. District Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1952 SC 362 was also cited and my attention was drawn to the following observations: It was unfortunate that when the Legislature came to amend the old Section 71 of the Act if forgot to amend Section 90 in conformity with the amendment of Section 71 but this lacuna cannot be supplied by any such liberal construction as the High Court sought to put upon the expression, 'orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary'. No doubt it is the duty of the court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. 17. I have given my anxious consideration to this contention, but in my opinion the failure to amend Section 93(3) of the District Boards Act does not take away the rights of the Town Area Committees. 17. I have given my anxious consideration to this contention, but in my opinion the failure to amend Section 93(3) of the District Boards Act does not take away the rights of the Town Area Committees. The act of divestment had occurred in favour of the Town Panchayats in 1922. When the Town Area Committees succeeded the Town Panchayats in 1934, they stepped into their shoes and acquired at the rights which were vested in the Town Panchayats. The right to regulate offensive trades in Town Areas was taken away from the District Boards in 1914. This right was vested in the Town Panchayats and after 1934 it could not come back to the District Boards for they had already parted with this right. It became vested in the Town Area Committees. The omission to amend Section 93(3) is, therefore, not material as no divestment of power in favour of the Town Panchayats was made after 1934. The Town Area Committees acquired this right not from the District Boards, but from the Town Panchayats whom they succeeded and which were already exercising this right. The Town Area Committees have been exercising this right unchallenged since 1934 i.e. for a period of about 22 years and the District Boards cannot challenge it now on the basis of such an omission. 18. At p. 405 of Maxwell on Statutes, Tenth Edition', the following passage occurs: When the Interpretation Act, 1889, or any Act passed after its commencement, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provisions of a former Act, references in any other Act to the provisions so repealed are, unless the contrary intention appears, to be construed references to the provisions so re-enacted. 19. In my opinion in the circumstances of this case a reference to 'Town Panchayats' in Section 93(3) must be construed as a reference to Town Area Committees. 20. As observed in the Supreme Court decision, it is the duty of the court to try and harmonise the various provisions and where there can be no doubt about the intention of the legislature, such a harmonization must be done. I, therefore, hold that the right to regulate offensive trades was vested in the Town Area Committees in 1934 and did not come back to the District Boards when the Town Panchayats were abolished and replaced by the Town Area Committees. 21. I, therefore, hold that the right to regulate offensive trades was vested in the Town Area Committees in 1934 and did not come back to the District Boards when the Town Panchayats were abolished and replaced by the Town Area Committees. 21. As a result of my conclusions on the second question mentioned above, I am of the opinion that these applications of revision must be allowed. I could have changed the order of acquittal into an order of conviction but as these cases were decided on a preliminary point of law, it is possible that the opposite parties might be prejudiced by passing any final order at this stage. It would be fair to give them a chance to meet the prosecution case on the facts alleged against them. 22. I, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed in these cases and remand all the cases for re-trial. 23. When I heard these-revisions, the counsel for both sides made a prayer that in case my "decision went against them, I should certify these cases as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. Under the new Rules, such an application should be presented within thirty days of the pronouncement of the judgment but as I am at Lucknow and these revisions were heard at Allahabad, it would be delaying the proceedings unnecessarily specially when I have made up my mind to certify these cases as fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. They involve important questions of law which are of public importance and which may have far reaching consequences. The prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is, therefore, granted to the opposite parties.