JUDGMENT Randhir Singh, J. - The suit which has given rise to these two cross-appeals was instituted by the Plaintiff for the recovery of Rs. 9,000/- on the basis of a pronote, dated the 18th February, 1947, for Rs. 11,000/-. The pronote carried interest at 12 per cent and it was admitted by the Plaintiff in the plaint that a sum of Rs. 5700/- had been received towards the debt. The balance of the principal and interest amounting to Rs. 9,000/- was claimed by the Plaintiff. 2. The Defendant admitted the execution of the pronote and the receipt of consideration but he alleged that a sum of Rs. 2,000/-which had been paid to the Plaintiff out of the consideration of a sale deed of a certain plot of land had not been credited by the Plaintiff. It was also contended that the Defendant was an agriculturist and as the Plaintiff had not complied with the provisions of Section 39 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act he was not entitled to interest and as the Plaintiff was a creditor he was also not entitled to costs. 3. The lower court found that Rs. 2,000/- had been received by the Plaintiff out of the sale consideration of the plot sold by the Defendant and ought to be credited. It also found that the Plaintiff had not complied with the proviso as of Section 39 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and was, therefore, not entitled to interest. The claim for the remaining principal sum of Rs. 3,300/- was decreed by the lover court. 4. Both parties have now come up in appeal. The appeal instituted by the Defendant is confined to the question of future interest allowed by the court and to the grant of instalments. The other appeal which has been instituted by the Plaintiff is in respect of the dismissal of a part of the claim by the lower court. 5. It would be convenient first to deal with the points arising out of the appeal instituted by the Plaintiff. Only two points have been pressed in arguments on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant. It has been contended that the finding of the lower court that Rs. 2,000/- ought to be credited towards the loan was not correct. 5. It would be convenient first to deal with the points arising out of the appeal instituted by the Plaintiff. Only two points have been pressed in arguments on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant. It has been contended that the finding of the lower court that Rs. 2,000/- ought to be credited towards the loan was not correct. It appears that on very date on which the loan was taken on the basis of the pronote a contract for the sale of a plot of land was made by the Defendant and out of the sale consideration of the proposed sale a sum of Rs. 1,000/- was paid as earnest money and the remaining sum of Rs. 3,000/- was to be paid. The Defendant, however, did not execute the sale deed and a suit for specific performance of the contract of sale was instituted by the Plaintiff. This suit was resisted by the Defendant on the ground that the actual sale consideration was Rs. 6,000/- but only Rs. 4,000/- were mentioned in the agreement in order to save stamp duty. The suit was, however, compromised and it was agreed that the sum of Rs. 2,000/- together with interest would be credited towards the pronote debt if the payment was made by the end of January, 1950. The payment of the pronote was not made and the Plaintiff refused to give credit of Rs. 2, 000/. 6. It was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant that the Plaintiff had agreed to give credit for Rs. 2,000/- as a matter of concession to the Defendant and that it was not in the nature of a penalty that if the payment of the pronote was not made by a certain date the sum of Rs. 2,000/- shall not be credited. The lower court on considering the circumstances of the case has come to the conclusion that it was not as a matter of concession that the Plaintiff had agreed to give credit for Rs. 2,000 but that the amount was due and the clause that "credit would be given for this sum only if the entire pronote debt was repaid by the end of January, 1950" was in the nature of a penalty clause and could not be given effect to. 2,000 but that the amount was due and the clause that "credit would be given for this sum only if the entire pronote debt was repaid by the end of January, 1950" was in the nature of a penalty clause and could not be given effect to. The relevant part of the compromise made by the parties was as follows: If the Defendant shall pay up the remaining amount due under the aforesaid, pronote upto 31-1-1950, then the Plaintiff shall make a set off of Rs. 2,000 besides interest at 1 per cent per month and in cas3 of default the Defendant shall not be entitled to the deduction. 7. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellant that it was not open to the Defendant to plead that the consideration of the sale deed was more than Rs. 4,0J0 after he had executed an agreement in which the sale consideration was mentioned as Rs. 4,000. This point, however, is not at all material in view of the subsequent compromise made by the parties. It is this compromise which has, therefore, to be interpreted. Whatever may have been the original agreement between the parties with regard to the sale, a perusal of the relevant part of the compromise which has been cited above, however, shows; that the intention of the parties was that Rs. 2,000 should be credited towards the pronote debt out of the sale consideration. If it had been only a matter of concession there was no good ground for mentioning that interest at 1 per cent per month on this sum of Rs. 2,000 will also be given credit for. The learned Civil Judge has given good reasons for coming to the conclusion that the credit for Rs. 2,000 was not by way of concession but on account of something due by the Plaintiff to he Defendant out of the sale consideration. We are therefore not disposed to disagree with the view taken by the lower court on this point. 8. The only other point pressed on behalf of the Appellant is that the lower court's finding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to interest was not correct. 9. We are therefore not disposed to disagree with the view taken by the lower court on this point. 8. The only other point pressed on behalf of the Appellant is that the lower court's finding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to interest was not correct. 9. Section 29 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act stands repealed by Section 27 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940, except in its application to advances made before the first day of June, 1940, not being loans as defined in the Debt Redemption Act. The loan in dispute in this case was admittedly advanced in 1947 and S, 29, therefore, stands repealed so far as this debt was concerned. The relevant part of Section 39 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act is as follows-- (1) Every loan given after the date on which this Act comes into force shall be evidenced by a written document, of which a copy shall be given to the debtor. (2) In the case of unsecured loans, an entry shall be made in every such document specifying the date by which repayment must be made in order to earn the benefit of Section 29 and the rate of interest which shall prevail if repayment is made by such date. (3) No interest shall accrue on any loan until a copy of a written document prepared according to the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) has been supplied to the debtor as required by Sub-section (1). 10. Section 39 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act has not been repealed and it has been argued on behalf of the Defendant-Respondent that although Section 29 has been repealed Section 39 should be given effect to. Section 29 which stands repealed provided that a creditor was entitled to recover interest only at the rate of interest provided for secured loans if the payment of the debt was made within two years of the date of the taking of the loan unless the loan was for a fixed period. Section 29 having been repealed no such concession in the rate of interest as was provided for in Section 29 could be claimed by the debtor after the repeal of the section and no entry could be made in the document itself for this concessional rate of interest. Section 29 having been repealed no such concession in the rate of interest as was provided for in Section 29 could be claimed by the debtor after the repeal of the section and no entry could be made in the document itself for this concessional rate of interest. Section 39(2), therefore, became redundant after the repeal of Section 29 of the UP Agriculturists' Relief Act. There is evidence on the record that a copy of the pronote was given to the Defendant and there is an endorsement of the Defendant of the receipt of this copy on the document itself. It would thus appear that Section 39(1) which alone could be complied with after the repeal of Section 29 had been complied with. The Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to interest and the view of the lower court that the Plaintiff was not entitled to interest does not appear to us to be correct. The court has already allowed costs and the question as to whether the Plaintiff was or was not a creditor was not pressed in arguments. 11. As regards the other appeal instituted by the Defendant the court has allowed future interest at 6 per cent, which appears to us to be excessive and should be reduced to 3 1/4 per cent. 12. The other point raised by the Defendant Appellant in respect of grant of instalments has no force left now. The case was decided in 1950 and the Defendant has already had six years but no payment has been made by him towards the debt. He is not entitled to any further concession in the matter of grant of instalments. 13. As a result the appeal of the Plaintiff is allowed to this extent that the Plaintiff will be entitled to interest at the contractual rate till the date of the institution of the suit and thereafter he will get pending and future interest at 3 1/4 per cent. The sum of Rs. 2,000 will be deemed to have been paid to the Plaintiff on 6-4-1949, when the compromise was entered into for the purposes of the calculation of interest. The appeal instituted by the Defendant is allowed to this extent that the Plaintiff will be entitled to pending future interest at 3 1/4 per cent. In other respects the decree passed by the lower court is upheld. The appeal instituted by the Defendant is allowed to this extent that the Plaintiff will be entitled to pending future interest at 3 1/4 per cent. In other respects the decree passed by the lower court is upheld. The Plaintiff Appellant shall get a half of the costs of his appeal and the Defendant-Appellant will also get a half of the costs of his appeal. The Defendant-Respondent shall bear his own costs in appeal No. 64 of 1950 and the Plaintiff-Respondent shall bear his own costs in Appeal No. 65 of 1950.