JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - An original suit No. 430 of 1947 was filed ir the court of the Munsif Haveli, Banaras. On the date fixed for hearing, the Plaintiff did not produce any evidence. The Defendant gave evidence. The learned Munsif then examined the case on merits and dismissed the suit with costs. This order was passed on the 13th of July, 1948. An application for restoration was made on the 16th of July, 1948. This application was dismissed on the 23rd of October, 1948. After obtaining a copy of the judgment of the Munsif an appeal was filed by the Plaintiff on the 22nd of November, 1948. An application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act was also made for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. That application was (sic) and the appeal was also rejected by the same order. Against that order of rejection the second appeal has been filed. 2. The court below has slated as follows: The affidavit (meaning thereby of the Plaintiff) does not disclose he precise nature of the circumstances under which the application (meaning thereby the application for restoration) was filed nor does it show why, how and what circumstances there has been a delay of seven days in filing the present appeal after obtaining the certified copies. 3. The court below was, therefore, of the view that as the delay in filing the appeal had not been explained the protection of Section 5, Limitation Act was not available. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has drawn my attention to the case of Brij Indar Singh v. Lala Kansh Ram and Ors. AIR 1947 (P.C.) 156. 5. In that case, it was held that: If a party bona fide presents an application for review of judgment within the ordinary period limited or appealing, the same occupied by the Court in disposing of such application will not be reckoned among the days limited for appealing, but will be added thereto, and a memorandum of appeal represented within such extended period will be received as presented within time. 5. 5. In our own Court in the case of Parbhu Dayal v. Murlidhar 1944 A.L.J.R. 365, relying upon the Privy council case, it has been ruled that the time spent in prosecuting with due diligence a proper application for review of judgment can be deducted, in Plaintiffs favour, and the fact of the Plaintiff having made a mistake of law does not necessarily preclude him from obtaining the benefit of that section. It would, therefore, appear, upon these ruling that if a review application is wrongly filed under a mistaken view of law but bonafide prosecuted, then the period taken in prosecuting that review application has to be added to the ordinary period of limitation for the filing of the appeal. 6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has pressed upon me that there is no difference in principal between a review application having been filed under a mistaken view of law and a restoration application having been filed under a mistaken view of law. I am myself unable to see that there is any real difference in this regard between a review application and a restoration application. Therefore, in my view, the rule which has been made applicable in the case of an application for review should equally be applicable in the case of an application for restoration. Applying that rule to the present case, I find that the appeal, in this case, was filed in the lower court within one-month of the dismissal of the restoration application and that the restoration application itself was filed on the very next day after the suit had been dismissed. Therefore, if the period taken by the restoration application is added to the period allowed for the filing of an appeal in the District Court, then the appeal to the District Court was within time. Since the above-stated rule, as applied in the case of reviews, seems to be almost of an automatic character, provided the review application is bona fide, it seems to me that the court below was wrong in the present case also in taking into account the fact that the appeal could have been presented on the 10th of November, 1948 because the certified copy of the judgment of the learned Munsif was available to the Appellant on the 9th November, 1948. In my view, in as much as the appeal was preferred within one month of the date of the order on the restoration application, it would not matter that it could have been presented earlier on the 10th. of November, 1948 instead of having been presented on the 22nd of November, 1948. 7. So far as the reasons for delay, in filing the restoration application was concerned, it was explained that the legal adviser had bona fide filed the restoration application. If the legal adviser made a mistake of law, the Appellant could not be blamed for it. 8. I, therefore, allow the application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and direct that the appeal in the court below be restored to its original number proceeded with according to law. The costs of this second appeal will be borne by the parties. When dispensing of the appeal, the learned District Judge will make the Appellant liable for the Defendant's costs irrespective of success or failure.