Wanchoo, C.J.—The following question has been referred to this Bench or our decision— "Whether, if an application under sec. 10 of the Act is rejected on the ground that the applicant is not a displaced person, the ad valorem court-fee is to be paid as required by Art. 1, Schedule I of the Court Fees Act on the memorandum of appeal?" 2. The facts, which have led to this reference are these— The appellant namely the Punjab National Bank Ltd., filed an application before the Civil Judge, Alwar, acting as the Tribunal under sec. 10 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act (No. LXX) of 1951 (hereinafter called the Act). Notice was issued to the debtor, namely firm Isardas Kaluram, and it was objected by the debtor that the creditor was not a displaced person, and therefore not entitled to make an application under Sec. 10 of the Act. This objection prevailed, and the application of the creditor was dismissed. The creditor filed an appeal to the High Court under sec. 40 of the Act. An objection was then raised by the debtor respondent on the authority of Kishandas vs. Parasram(l) that the appellant should pay full court-fee on the amount of Rs. 94,321/6/3. The appellant, however, contended that the case was covered by Schedule II, Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act, and therefore, the court-fees already paid was sufficient. 3. The Division Bench, which heard the appeal, was of the view that the point raised was of considerable importance, and, therefore, referred the question, which we have already set out, to a Full Bench for decision, particula-rly in view of the decision in Kishandas case(l). 4. The Act contemplates three kinds of applications. Firstly, applications are made by displaced debtors for adjustment of debts under sec. 5. These applications are disposed of in the manner provided in the following sections, and if not rejected are heard under sec. 9, and Kishan-dass case(l) deals specifically with an application under sec. 5 which is heard under sec. 9. Secondly, an application may be made under sec. 10 of the Act by displaced creditor against displaced debtor. The procedure for dealing with this application is provided under sec. 11. Sub-sec. (1) of that section provides for notice to the debtor, Sub-sec. (2) lays down that if upon notice the debtor makes an application in accordance with sec. 9. Secondly, an application may be made under sec. 10 of the Act by displaced creditor against displaced debtor. The procedure for dealing with this application is provided under sec. 11. Sub-sec. (1) of that section provides for notice to the debtor, Sub-sec. (2) lays down that if upon notice the debtor makes an application in accordance with sec. 5, the Tribunal shall proceed further in the matter as if it had commenced with an application by the displaced debtor under sec. 5. The present, however, is not a case of that kind. Sub-sec. (2) also provides that where the debtor does not make an application in accordance with the provision of sec. 5 the Tribunal shall, after considering such evidence, if any, as may be produced before it, determine the claim, and pass such decree in relation there to as it thinks fit. It is this provision in sec. 11 (2) which, falls for consideration before us. The third kind of application is made under sec. 13 by displaced creditors against persons who are not displaced debtors. That application is disposed of in the manner provided by sec. 14. 5. The question that arose in Kishandas case (l) was amount of court-fee to be paid in appeal in a case decided under sec. 9 on an application under sec. 5. It was there held that Schedule II, Art. 11 or Schedule II, Art. 17 did not apply to a case of the kind, and that the only Article that applied was Schedule I, Art. 1 which provided for ad valorem court-fee. That decision was based on the words of sec. 9(1) of the Act which definitely provided for decrees by the Tribunal. Sec. 9 envisages a decree in three circumstances viz.,— (1) when there is a dispute as to whether the applicant is a displaced person or not, (2) when there is a dispute as to the existence or the amount of the debt, (3) when there is a dispute as to the assets of any displaced debtor. We have looked up the record in Kishandass case (1) and find that that particular case was with reference to the existence or the amount of the debt. We have looked up the record in Kishandass case (1) and find that that particular case was with reference to the existence or the amount of the debt. Strictly speaking, therefore, that case is a direct authority only for those cases where the existence or the amount of the debt is in dispute, and a decree is passed after contest on that point. It is said that sec. 9 of the Act contemplates a decree, and where, therefore, the application is dismissed the order dismissing the application must be taken as a decree or, at any rate, an order having the force of a decree. It is, however, clear that only those decisions, which would be clearly covered by the words of sec. 9 of the Act, would amount to decrees. If the dispute was not one of the three kinds which we have pointed out above, the decision would not, in our opinion, amount to a decree, even though it may finally determine the matter between the parties. What effect sec. 12 of the Act would have on a decision under sec. 19 relating to the assets is a muter which did not directly arise in Kishandass case, and might have to be considered when such a case actually arises. 6. Let us now turn to sec. II, and see what exactly is the decree envisaged by sec. 11(2) where the debtor does not make an application in accordance with the provisions of sec. 5. The relevant words of sec. 11(2) are these— "but, if the displaced debtor does not choose to make any such application, the Tribunal shall, after considering such evidence, if any, as may be produced before it, determine the claim and pass such decree in relation thereto as it thinks fit." These words, in our opinion, refer to the determination of the claim of the creditor, and may be taken to be analogous to the decision of a dispute as to the existence or the amount of the debt due to the creditors which we find in sec. 9(1). It is only, in our opinion, when the court considers the claim, and decides as to the existence or the amount of the debt due to the creditor that the decision given by it amounts to a decree under sec. 11(2). 9(1). It is only, in our opinion, when the court considers the claim, and decides as to the existence or the amount of the debt due to the creditor that the decision given by it amounts to a decree under sec. 11(2). This decision as to the existence or the amount of the debt may be made on any ground, say for example limitation, res judicata or on the merits. But where the court does not proceed to determine the existence or the amount of the debt of the creditor, it cannot, in our opinion be said that the court was determining the claim of the creditor. Where, therefore, the tribunal dismisses the application of the creditor on any ground other than one relating to the existence or the amount of the debt, it is not, in our opinion, determining the claim of the creditor within the meaning of those words in sec. 11(2). In the present case, the Tribunal did not go into the question of the existence or the amount of the debt at all. It merely dismissed the application on the ground that the creditor not being a displaced person could not make an application under sec. 10. There was thus never a determination of the claim made by the creditor within the meaning of those words in sec. 11(2). Therefore, the final order passed by the court cannot amount to a decree, for it is only when the final order is strictly in accordance with what is provided in sec. 11(2) that it can amount to a decree. We are, therefore, of opinion that the order passed in this case, though it finally determined the application of the appellant, was not a decree, because it did not determine the claim which, in the circumstances in which that word has been used in sec. 11(2) must relate to the existence or the amount of the debt due to the creditor. The creditor, therefore, if he has a right of appeal, has to pay court-fee under Schdl. II, Art. 11 which mentions appeals which are not preferred from a decree or an order having the force of a decree. Here the order, though it finally determined the application under sec. 10, was not a decree : nor did it have the force of a decree for it is not strictly in accordance with the terms of sec. 11(2). Here the order, though it finally determined the application under sec. 10, was not a decree : nor did it have the force of a decree for it is not strictly in accordance with the terms of sec. 11(2). 7. It may be mentioned that the dispute whether the applicant is a displaced person or not is not specifically mentioned in sec. 11, and, therefore, any order passed with respect to it cannot strictly be called a decree. The reason for that may be that if an application is dismissed under sec. 10 on the ground that the applicant is not a displaced creditor, the right of the applicant to sue under the ordinary law is not taken away by any provision in the Act. 8. Let us now notice the case cited by learned counsel in this connection. 9. The first case is Sita Ram vs. Moolchand (2). That was a case relating to an application under sec. 13, which was dealt under sec. 14(3). The learned Judge held that the order passed under this sub-section would be a decree. With all respect, we wish to point our that an order passed under sub-sec. (3) would be a decree if it is passed after considering matters which are mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14. But if it was passed without considering those matters, it would not, in our opinion, amount to a decree. We feel that this Act is an ameliorative measure for the benefit of displaced persons. It should be strictly interpreted, and only those orders should be considered decrees, which come strictly within the terms of secs. 9, 11(2) and 14(2). Where, however, the order does not come strictly within the terms of those provisions, it should not be treated as a decree, but only as an order determining the application. In Sita Rams case(l) none of the points specifically mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 was considered, and the application was dismissed on another ground altogether. In such a case, we would not be prepared to call the order a decree even though it was passed under sec. 14(4). The decree under sec. 14(3) should, in our opinion, be governed by the same considerations which apply to sec. 14(2) even though there may be no contest. 10. The next case is taxing Officer, High Court Appellate Side vs. Jamnadas Dharamdas(3). 14(4). The decree under sec. 14(3) should, in our opinion, be governed by the same considerations which apply to sec. 14(2) even though there may be no contest. 10. The next case is taxing Officer, High Court Appellate Side vs. Jamnadas Dharamdas(3). In that case, the learned Judge pointed out that the word decree was not defined in the Court Fees Act. He also pointed out that the expression decree as used in the Court Fees Act appeared to have the same meaning as that expression had in the Code of Civil Procedure. But he held that though the Act used the word decree in secs. 9, 11 and 14, it was not a decree within the meaning of the Court Fees Act. With all respect we fail to understand why, when the word decree is used in the Court Fees Act as well as in the Act, and when there is no definition of that word either in the Act or in the Court Fees Act, the word decree should not have the same meaning in the Act as well as in the Court Fees Act. 11. The last case, to which reference may be made, is S. Sohan Singh vs. Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. Ltd., Calcutta(4). In that case, the learned Judge held that ad valorem court-fee would not have to be paid in an appeal under the Act, and the reasoning given is that it was never anybodys intention that displaced persons whether debtors or creditors should have to pay ad valorem court-fee on appeals against orders dismissing their applications. With all respect, we can only say that if this was the intention of the legislature, it should have been made clear in the Act. In the absence of any such clear provision, the law relating to court-fees must apply to appeals under the Act, and the legislature could not have been ignorant of the fact that there was such a thing as the Court Fees Act on the statute book. 12. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us is that where an application under sec. 12. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us is that where an application under sec. 10 is rejected on the ground that the applicant is not a displaced person, the order does not amount to a decree, and ad valorem court fee is not to be paid, and the appeal can be filed with the court fee provided in Schedule II, Art. 11 of the Court Fees Act.