PADMANABHIAH J. ( 1 ) THESE are two connected petitions filed by the respective petitioners-under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of Certiorari or other suitable writs, orderg or directions for quashing the Notification No. H. A. 5074-85/pol. 201-54-6, dated 22nd December 1954, issued by the first respondent-State Government, and also section 5 (4) of the mysore Cinemas (Regulation) Act (Act XXXI of 1952) under which the said Notification is issued, as unconstitutional and illegal, and writs of prohibition preventing respondents or their subordintes from enforcing the said Notification. Though the petitioners are different in these two cases, yet the points involved in both of them are identical and therefore these two cases will be covered by a single order. ( 2 ) THE facts that have given rise to these two petitions are briefly as follows : the petitioner in W. P. 82 of 1955 is the proprietor of the central Talkies and the petitioner in W. P. 212 of 1955 the proprietor of the Paramount Talkies in Bangalore. The 1st respondent is the State Government, and the 2nd the District magistrate, Bangalore. Both the petitioners are holders of licences issued by the 2nd respondent (District Magistrate) to run their cinemas. The first two directions incorporated in the said notification run as under:" (1) The licensee shall so regulate the exhibition of cinematograph films that, at every performance open to the public, approved films are exhibited, the approved films to be exhibited in relation to other films at every such performance being in the same proportion as one is to five or the nearest lower or higher approximation thereto. (2) Only such films produced in India as are certified by the Central government with the previous approval of the Film Advisory board, Bombay, to be scientific films, films intended for ednca tional purposes, films dealing with news and current events or documentary films shall be deemed to be approved films for the purposes of these directions. " ( 3 ) THE contention urged on the side of the petitioners is that these directions in the notification are unconstitutional and illegal inasmuch as they interfere with their fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, averred that the Notification and also section 5 (4) of the Mysore cinemas (Regulation) Act arc both liable to be quashed as being unconstitutional and illegal. It is, therefore, averred that the Notification and also section 5 (4) of the Mysore cinemas (Regulation) Act arc both liable to be quashed as being unconstitutional and illegal. ( 4 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, it is contended that neither the Notification nor section 5 (4) of the mysore Cinemas (Regulation) Act under which it is issued is ultra vires the Constitution, that they do not in any way infringe any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under the constitution, that the conditions in the licence are quite reasonable and necessary in the interests of the general public and that the petitions are liable to be dismissed. ( 5 ) IN Writ Petition 82 of 1955 Sri B. S. Pranesha Rao appeared for the petitioner, and Sri B. Venkata Rao in W. P. 212 of 1955. These two cases were mainly argued by Sri R. M. Seshadri for the counsel for the petitioners. He argued not only on the points raised in the two petitions but also on certain points not raised in them. Usually this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction will confine itself only to the points raised in the petition or the affidavit attached to it, but in view of the importance of the points of law urged by the learned counsel, we thought it fit to allow him to canvass those points, and we would like to deal with them in the course of this order. ( 6 ) THE first contention urged by the learned counsel is that the notification issued by the 1st respondent-Government is beyond the scope of section 5 (4) of the Mysore Cinemas (Regulation) Act. According to the petitioners, section 5 (4) empowers the State government to regulate the exhibition of main films as regards footage, time limit and allied matters, the exhibition of approved films is an enabling provision purely within the discretion of the exhibitors and they may or may not exhibit the approved films. ( 7 ) THIS argument does not appear to be quite sound. Government's competence to regulate the exhibition of films is extended to any film or class of films as can be seen from the clear wording of sub-section 4 of section 5. ( 7 ) THIS argument does not appear to be quite sound. Government's competence to regulate the exhibition of films is extended to any film or class of films as can be seen from the clear wording of sub-section 4 of section 5. The section further provides that where such directions have been issued, they shall be deemed to be additional conditions and restrictions subject to which the licence has been granted. Thus it is seen that there is no substance in the contention that section 5 (4) is purely an enabling provision or that the section merely empowers the Government to regulate the exhibition of main films. ( 8 ) ANOTHER argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that it is the District Magistrate that is empowerd to grant the licence, that the Government have, therefore, no power to issue such a notification and that the power of the district Magistrate the licensing authority has been usurped by the State Government. Even in this contention, I see no substance. It is no doubt, true that under section 4 of the mysore Cinemas (Regulation) Act it is the District Magistrate that has power to grant licences. But section 4 has to be read with section 5 (2) which provides that the licensing authority is subject to the provision of the Act and the control of Government regarding granting of licence. Therfore it is futile to contend that the government have no hand, and cannot have any, with respect to the granting of licences under the Act. Another argument advanced was that rules can be made and Notifications issued only for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the act and that there is no provision in the Act relating to the kind of film to be exhibited much less for the exhibition of any educative films. This contention has to be repelled inasmuch as the power under section 9 to make rules is sufficiently wide and therefore it cannot be contended that no rule can be made relating to the kind of film to be exhibited. Any Eule or Notification providing for the kind of films to be shown or prohibited from being shown must be taken as a rule validly made in exercise of the power conferred by section 9. Any Eule or Notification providing for the kind of films to be shown or prohibited from being shown must be taken as a rule validly made in exercise of the power conferred by section 9. ( 9 ) ANOTHER important contention urged by Sri R. M. Seshadri was that section 5 (4) of the Mysore Cinemas (Eegulation) Act is beyond the competence of the State Legislature, that the State legislature has no power or authority to pass any legislation asking exhibitors of films to exhibit such and such a films and that such a power is not covered by Entry 33 of the State list (List II of the constitution), that the said power falls under Entry 60 of List I, that it is therefore, the Central Legislature that has power to make such legislation and that therefore section 5 (4)is ultra vires the State Legislature. In other words, the argument advanced was that Entry 33 of List II only regulates the places where the cinemas are run and that the said entry empowers the State in licensing the place or location of the cinemas and not as to the kind or nature of films to be exhibited which, in theo pinion of the learned counsel, falls under Entry 60. Even in this contention, i do not see much merit. ( 10 ) ENTRY 60 of List I provides for sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition. There can be no dispute that this power is the exclusive power of the Central Legislature. Entry 33 of List II runs thus : "theatres and dramatic performances, cinemas subject to the provision of Entry 60 of List I, sports, entertainments and amusements. " ( 11 ) EXCEPT what is covered under Entry 60, the rest of the matters relating to the cinemas comes under Entry 33 of List II. In my opinion, Entry 60 of List I deals mainly with one subject, and that is sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition. In other words, it deals with the subject of censorship, i. e. , the right to dictate as to what films should be shown and what ought not to be shown. What section 5 (4) says is that it empowers the State Government to issue directions to a licensee for the purpose of regulating the exhibition of films intended for educational purposes, etc. What section 5 (4) says is that it empowers the State Government to issue directions to a licensee for the purpose of regulating the exhibition of films intended for educational purposes, etc. It does not precsribe the films to be shown or exhibited. In this case also, it is the Central Government that have to determine what films are "approved films". The direction given by the State Government under the Notification in question is that films approved by the Central Government should be exhibited. In my opinion, the State Legislature has not arrogated to itself the role of the Central Legislature and has not exceeded its competence. Therefore section 5 (4) is not ultra vires the State Legislature. ( 12 ) IT was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Notification in question conflicts with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the constitution. The contention advanced is four-fold : firstly, that it is an interference with the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art (19) 1 (a) of the Constitution ; secondly, that it is an interf rence with the right to hold and dispose of one's property guaranteed under Art (19) 1 (f) ; thirdly, that is an inteiference with one's right to carry on one's business guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g); and lastly, that it offends the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as this Notification has singled out this particular industry, i. e. , the film industry, to be discriminated against. ( 13 ) I would like to deal with these contentions one by one. The first point to be considered is whether the Notification infringes the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a ). This leads us to the important question whether the right of speech and expression extends to the screen and, if so, whether an exhibitor of films can claim the said right. This important question is not free from difficulty. So far as this country is concerned, there does not appear to he any case law on the point. Therefore it will be permissible for us to seek aid in this behalf from other countries, and particularly the united States of America, which has inspired the framers of our constitution in drafting the chapter dealing with fundamental rights. So far as this country is concerned, there does not appear to he any case law on the point. Therefore it will be permissible for us to seek aid in this behalf from other countries, and particularly the united States of America, which has inspired the framers of our constitution in drafting the chapter dealing with fundamental rights. The trend of opinion in America at present is that the right of freedom of speech and expression extends to the screen though previously upto the year 1947 they had held a contrary view. In Mutual Film, Corporation v. the Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, the Court held that "exhibition of moving pictures was a business pure and simple originated and conducted for profit" and was not to be regarded "as part of the press of the country or organs of public opinion. " But in later cases, the Supreme court of the United States of America found that the proposition as enunciated above was not sound inasmuch as freedom of speech and expression could not be taken away by the fact that the medium of expression is conducted for private profit or its object is to entertain and not merely to inform. At any rate, it is now well settled in America that the freedom of moving pictures, newspapers and radio is included in the freedom of speech which is guaranteed by the first amendment ; Vide United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, Joseph burstyn, INC v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 and Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960. In the absence of a decision of our Supreme Court on the subject and also inasmuch as the law as enunciated above does not in any way run contrary to the provisions of our own Constitution, i think we can safely follow the principle laid down by the courts in America on the subject in question. Thus it can safely be laid down that the freedom of speech and expression extends to the screen also. ( 14 ) THE other'question that has to be considered is whether an exhibitor of films can claim the said right. "freedom of speech and expression" should not be taken to mean only a right to express one's convictions by word of mouth. ( 14 ) THE other'question that has to be considered is whether an exhibitor of films can claim the said right. "freedom of speech and expression" should not be taken to mean only a right to express one's convictions by word of mouth. That would be a very restricted meaning that we will be attaching to that expression. Freedom of speech and expression must also include the right to express one's conviction or opinion freely by writing, printing, pictures or in any other manner addressed to the eyes or ears. That expression must be deemed to include freedom to hold opinions, to seek, to receive and impart information and ideas either orally or through written or printed matter or by legally operated visual or auditory devices such as radio, cinematograph, gramophone, loud speaker, etc. It includes not only freedom of the press but also the publication. In this connection, i may refer to a case of the Supreme Court. Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, 1950 S. C. R. 594. There, their Lordships have held that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas and that freedom is secured by freedom of circulation, that liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication, and that without circulation, the publication will be of little value. This propagation of ideas may be made in various ways, one of these being through motion pictures. Motion pictures are exactly like newspapers. When a publisher of a book can have the right of freedom of speech and expression, I do not see any reason why the exhibitor of a film should be deprived of that freedom. Idea of propagation should necessarily apply to exhibition of films also. There is also no substance in the contention that freedom of speech and expression can extend only to one's own speech or expression and that the same cannot extend to a person who borrows others' expression or speech. I do not think that this is a correot proposition of law. In this connection, I would like to refer to a case of the Madras High Court Srinivasa bhat v. the State of Madras, A. I. R. 1951 Mad. 70. I do not think that this is a correot proposition of law. In this connection, I would like to refer to a case of the Madras High Court Srinivasa bhat v. the State of Madras, A. I. R. 1951 Mad. 70. Their Lordships there have held that freedom of speech and expression would include the liberty of propaganda, not only of one's own views but also the right to print matters which are not one's own but have either been borrowed from some one else or are printed under the direction of that person. If it were not so, the freedom of expression would not have been included as one of the fundamental rights in the Constitution. ( 15 ) THE next question to be considered is whether the Notification infringes any of the rights guaranteed to the petitioners under art. 19 of the Constitution. Their contentions are three-fold in this respect ; (1) that their right of freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution has been infringed ; (2) that their right to hold and dispose of property guaranteed under art. 19 (1) (f) has been violated ; and (3) that their right to carry on their trade in the way they like guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) has been taken away. So far as their first contention is concerned, I see no substance in it. It is conceded that the petitioners are allowed to exhibit their film or films in full before they are asked to screen the approved films. When that is so, there is no substance in saying that their freedom of speech and expression has been curtailed. No portion of the time occupied in screening the regular films at the option of the petitioners is taken away by the State for screening approved films. Full opportunity is given to the exhibitors to exhibit their own films and it is only either at the beginning or at the end that they are required to exhibit approved films. Therefore I am of opinion that the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a) has not been infringed. ( 16 ) THE second ground urged is that the Notification interferes with the right to hold and dispose of property guaranteed under art. 19 (1) (f ). Therefore I am of opinion that the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (a) has not been infringed. ( 16 ) THE second ground urged is that the Notification interferes with the right to hold and dispose of property guaranteed under art. 19 (1) (f ). The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the time occupied in screening approved films is his own property, that he has been deprived of that property temporarily, that his auditorium, lights, management and staff and other equipment which are his properties have been made use of by the State against his will and that this amounts to deprivation of his fundamental right vouchsafed under Art. 19 (1) (f ). The learned Attorney-General contended that the time occupied by screening approved films is no property at all in the strict sense of that word, and not being a tangible property it dees not come within the meaning of the word 'property' in Art. 19 (1) (g) of the constitution. In this connection, it is necessary to understand what is meant by 'property'. ( 17 ) WHATEVER a man produces by the labour of his hand or his brain, whatever he obtains in exchange for something of His own and whatever is given to him, may be taken as 'property'. The law is expected to protect him in the use, enjoyment and disposal of that property. The word 'property' includes all kinds of property, i. e. , all that a person may have dominion over and every possible interest over it. This is the kind of property that is contemplated in our Constitution. In Mahbub Begam v. Hyderabad State, A. . I. R. 1951 Hyd. 1 even a right to institute a suit in a Court of law regarding one's claim to property is held to be a 'property'. ( 18 ) BY leasing out their auditorium and other equipments for the period occupied by the screening of approved films, petitioners would certainly earn something by way of rent or they may even make use of that time in exhibiting other films of their choice and earn more money. By directing them to run approved films for a particular period against their will, the State will be interfering with or imposing a restriction on their right to hold or dispose of property. By directing them to run approved films for a particular period against their will, the State will be interfering with or imposing a restriction on their right to hold or dispose of property. ( 19 ) I have also to concede the other contention that the Notification interferes with the freedom of trade guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. By directing the petitioners to screen films, the State will be depriving them of their right to screen any other films they like during that period. Whether the petitioners like it or not, they are bound to screen the approved films and the petitioner can refuse to accept those films only at the risk of their losing the licences issued to them. It cannot be doubted that this is a restriction in the way of the petitioners carrying on their business in the way they like. The point to be considered is whether this is a reasonable restriction saved by the exception to Art. 19. ( 20 ) THE other important point that arises for consideration is whether the rights guaranteed under Art. 19 are absolute or whether they are subject to any kind of limitation in the exercise of these rights. There cannot be anything like absolute or uncontrolled freedom; for, that would lead to anarchy and disorder. None of the rights enumerated in Art. 19 can be taken as an absolute right Each of them is liable to be curtailed by law made or to be made by the State to the extent mentioned in the several clauses, viz. , 2 to 6. If any of the restrictions placed on the rights guaranteed under Art. 19 can be supported under clauses 2 to 6, that restriction can be upheld. ( 21 ) THE right guaranteed under Art. 19 1 (a) is controlled by Art. 19 (2 ). As stated already, the freedom of speech and expression of the petitioners has not been infringed and therefore, there is no necessity for us to go into the exception provided under Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution. The freedom to hold and dispose of property guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (f) is controlled by Art. 19 (5) and the freedom of trade guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) is controlled by Art. 19 (6 ). Cl. The freedom to hold and dispose of property guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (f) is controlled by Art. 19 (5) and the freedom of trade guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) is controlled by Art. 19 (6 ). Cl. 5 of Art. 19 runs thus:"nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the state from making any law if imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled tribe. " ( 22 ) CL. 6 runs thus :"nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the sard sub-clause, and in particular nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it prescribes or empowers any authority to prescribe, or prevent the State from making any law prescribing or empowering any authority to prescribe, the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business. " ( 23 ) THE restrictions or limitations provided under clauses 2 to 6 of Art. 19 may either be positive or negative in their nature and the only question that will arise for consideration is whether the restrictions are reasonable in which case only they can be upheld under one or the other clauses, viz , 2 to 6 of Art. 19. This leads us to the question as to what are reasonable restrictions. What are reasonable restrictions has been explained in some of the decisions of the Supreme Court. In Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Bharat, A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 118, their Lordships have held that the phrase 'reasonable restrictions' in 19 (6) connotes that the limitations imposed on a person in enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of the public [vide also The State of madras v. V. G. Row, AI. R. 1952 S. C. 196]. R. 1952 S. C. 196]. As observed in the case reported in santhanakrishna v. Vaithilingam, A. I. R. 1954 Mad. 51, in judging the reasonableness of an enactment two points are to be kept in mind : firstly, whether the object of the legislation is for the benefit of the general public, and secondly, the means they adopt to secure that end. It cannot be disputed that the purpose of the notification is to educate the public by screening approved films, i. e. , films dealing with scientific and educational subjects and films relating to news and current events or documentary films. The majority of the people of this country being illiterate, they require certain amount of education and instruction in matters of cultural and scientific importance. The need for these people to know or acquaint themselves with news relating to various countries in the world cannot be ignored. Even in countries which are more advanced in education and scientific knowledge, exhibition of such films is found necessary and they supplement the normal items of entertainment by documentary films, news reels and educational films. It need hardly be stated that the need for such films is much greater in this country than in any other country. The provision for exhibition of such films of educative and cultural value can safely be said to be in the interest of the general public and for the common good and, therefore, I am of opinion that the restrictions placed by notification curtailing the rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) are quite reasonable and have to be supported. ( 24 ) IN this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioners, sri E. M. Seshadri, drew our attention to a case reported in r. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore, 1955 (1) S. C. E. 686, and contended that similar provisions in the notification or rule made by the madras State have been held to be void. The facts in that case can clearly be distinguished from the facts of the present case. The learned counsel who argued these cases, i. e. , Sri R. M. Seshadri, was himself the petitioner in that case. The facts in that case can clearly be distinguished from the facts of the present case. The learned counsel who argued these cases, i. e. , Sri R. M. Seshadri, was himself the petitioner in that case. The licence issued in his favour contained two clauses : one was that the licensee shall exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such length of time as the provincial Government or the central Government by general or special order may direct. The other condition was that the licensee should exhibit at the commencement of each performance not less than 2,000 feet of one or more of the approved films. It is these conditions that their Lordships of the Supreme Court held void on the ground that they were unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioner to carry on his business and that the same infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed to him under Art. 19 (1) (g ). In that case, their Lordships found that the notification did not specify either the length of the film or the period of time for which it should be shown. On that basis, their Lordships held that the government was vested with an unregulated discretion to compel a licensee to exhibit a film of any length at its discretion which may consume the whole or greater part of the time for which each performance is given. The conditions being couched in such wide language, their Lordships found that there was no principle to guide the licensing authority. The conditions imposed in that case did not also mention that the approved films must be of educational or instructional character meant for the purpose of social or public welfare. Such conditions are not to be found in the present case. The particulars which were absent in the Madras case are available here and therefore the Notification cannot be struck down on that ground. ( 25 ) IT was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the distribution of films is the sole monopoly of the Government of India and that the petitioners cannot obtain these approved films from any other source. There is no substance in this contention. ( 25 ) IT was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the distribution of films is the sole monopoly of the Government of India and that the petitioners cannot obtain these approved films from any other source. There is no substance in this contention. The counter-affidavit filed by the respondents goes to show that even private persons are allowed to produce the films of this nature and that some films have actually been produced by private persons. These allegations made in the counter-affidavit are not seriously disputed. Therefore I cannot concede the contention that the distribution of these approved films is the sole monopoly of the Government of India. Another contention was that the rates of these films are fixed without reference to the petitioners and that they have no choice in the selection of pictures also. It is conceded that the price that the petitioners are paying for these approved films and news reels is very much lower than the price they are paying for the foreign films and news reels. Therefore the fact that the prices are fixed without reference to the petitioners is not of much consequence. There is also no substance in the contention that the petitioners have no choice in the selection of pictures. The truth appears to be otherwise. ( 26 ) ANOTHER argument advanced was that the Notification offends the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In this connection, it has to be pointed out that this objection is not taken in the petition and this being a matter involving both questions of fact and law cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage as contended by the learned Attorney-General. Even otherwise, the grievance of the petitioners that this film industry has been singled out for the purpose of exhibiting these approved films and that they have been discriminated against cannot stand. It is evident that no other industry is more suited for imparting such education as this except the film industry. Exhibition of films of such educative value is a powerful instrument in educating the masses. The need for such method of instruction cannot sufficiently be emphasised, particularly in a country like India as at present. In my opinion, Art. 14 of the Constitution has not been contravened. Exhibition of films of such educative value is a powerful instrument in educating the masses. The need for such method of instruction cannot sufficiently be emphasised, particularly in a country like India as at present. In my opinion, Art. 14 of the Constitution has not been contravened. ( 27 ) IT was further contended that the Advisory Board which selects the films for being exhibited is not a statutory body, that the Central Government has been invested with arbitrary powers in this behalf and that the Centre may appoint any one they like and of any rank without reference to the interests of the public. ( 28 ) THESE apprehensions are, in my opinion, more imaginary than real. It is not disputed that the Advisory Board is composed of representatives of various interests in the country connected with the film industry. The Board is appointed by means of resolutions passed by the Central Government. Ample safeguards have been taken by the Centre for making the Board sufficiently democratic. When a contingency as apprehended by the petitioners' counsel arises, which I am sure will never arise, they have got enough means to protect themselves. However, this was a matter in which the petitioners should have fully cooperated with the authorities in realising the laudable object underlying the Notification. Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that these petitions are liable to be dismissed. ( 29 ) IN the result, these two writ petitions (W. Ps. 82 and 212 of 1955) both stand dismissed with one set of costs. Advocate's fee rs. 100. I agree. --- *** --- .