ORDER This is an application for obtaining leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court dated 20-2-1956, in Civil Misc. (Writ) Appln. No. 1 of 1956. 2. It appears that Sarangthem Nadiachand Singh, (respondent) was the Jailor of the Imphal Jail and it was alleged that he committed criminal breach of trust in respect of huge quantities of mustard seeds which he sold away and he received the sale proceeds, but did not credit the amount to the Government and he caused false and fictitious entries to be made in the Jail Stock Books and so he was placed under suspension and was tried by the Additional District Magistrate under Ss. 409/477, I. P. C. but was discharged. In pursuance of the discharge order he was reinstated in Government service and was appointed to the post of the Additional Inspector of Excise and he joined the new post. It was further alleged that on scrutiny of the jail record apart from the facts appearing in the police investigation in respect of which he was prosecuted in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, he sold to himself 200 maunds of oil cake for Rs. 800/- and 50 maunds of mustard oil for Rs. 5,000/- without any authorisation and he issued 2 bills against himself, but he did not pay any amount. Instead he issued a note to the Assistant Jailor stating that he had purchased on credit authorising the recovery of Rs. 50/- per month from his pay and only a sum of Rs. 130/- was in all recovered from his pay bill as against Rs. 5,800/-entered as due according to the bills. As this was a gross misconduct on the part of the Jailor as a Government servant, because he defrauded the Government of huge amount, departmental proceedings were started against him and after he was found guilty he was dismissed. As against that order of dismissal, the respondent brought Civil Misc. Appln. No. 1 of 1956 for quashing the departmental proceedings and order of dismissal and for order of his re-instatement as Jailor. This petition was allowed by this Court on 20-2-1956 and the respondent has been re-instated as Jailor. As against that order of dismissal, the respondent brought Civil Misc. Appln. No. 1 of 1956 for quashing the departmental proceedings and order of dismissal and for order of his re-instatement as Jailor. This petition was allowed by this Court on 20-2-1956 and the respondent has been re-instated as Jailor. Now the present petitioners seek for leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court on the grounds that the case involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and so it is a fit case for leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court under Arts. 132 and 133 (c) of the Constitution. 3. According to the petitioners, the appointment of the respondent as Additional Inspector of Excise did not amount to "reduction in rank". Another point on which leave is sought is that the Chief Commissioner was the lowest authority within the meaning of Art. 311(1) of the Constitution who could proceed with the departmental proceedings and so the order of dismissal was not illegal. The third point which has been urged is that as the written reply of Dr. Kappor denying having passed any order for destruction of mustard oil or mustard cake and fixing liability on the Jailor was communicated to the respondent, the oral examination of Dr. Kapoor would have been of no avail and the mere fact that the respondent got no opportunity of cross-examining Dr. Kapoor did not prejudice the respondents case. Lastly, it has been urged that the consultation with the Union Public Service Commission was not necessary in this case under Art. 320 (3) (c) of the Constitution, in view of the notification of the Home Department No. F.322/11/35-Ests. dated New Delhi, 1-4-1937 as amended upto 1-7-1954, which had been promulgated under sub-s. (3) of S. 266, Government of India Act, 1935. 4. At the outset it may be mentioned that Art. 133 of the Constitution has no application to the present case and this case will be governed by Art. 132, which provides : "132(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.......... Explanation-For the purpose of this Article, the expression final order includes an order deciding an issue which, if decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the final disposal of the case." 5. Under this Article a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of a High Court is given in cases where the High Court grants a certificate that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. It is thus necessary that (i) the case must involve a question of law; (ii) it must be a substantial question of law; (iii) it must be a question of law, not of fact and (iv) it must be a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution and not of any other law. 6. As has already been pointed out above, the contention of the present petitioner is that the respondent was not reduced in rank when he was appointed to the post of an Additional Inspector of Excise. I have already pointed out in my judgment dated 20-2-1956 that the post of the Jailor was throughout the respondents substantive appointment and this post was of a gazetted rank and probably class II post, while the post of the Additional Inspector of Excise was not of Gazetted rank. It is further clear that as Jailor, the respondent was getting Rs. 104/- per mensem as pay plus Rs. 17/- as dearness allowance apart from the jail allowance, kit allowance, etc., and as Additional Inspector of Excise his emoluments were to be restricted to the presumptive pay of the substantive post. There was no doubt that the scale of pay for the post of Additional Inspector of Excise was Rs. 100-10-120 (con)-10-200 (EB) -10-250-(EB)-10-300/-, but the respondents pay was restricted to the presumptive pay of the substantive appointment by means of the order dated 1-9-1955 and so the respondent was a loser both financially as well as in rank as he was deprived of allowances when he was made to work on the new post. No authority has been cited before me which would show that under circumstances mentioned above the respondent would not be deemed to have been reduced in rank and so Art. 311(2) was clearly applicable to his case. No authority has been cited before me which would show that under circumstances mentioned above the respondent would not be deemed to have been reduced in rank and so Art. 311(2) was clearly applicable to his case. I am, therefore, of opinion that there is no substantial question of law involved in this case relating to the interpretation of the Constitution so far as this point is concerned. 7. "Substantial question of law" means that (i) the question involved must be one of law, and (ii) it must be Appellant substantial question. Where the question raised is devoid of any merit and is without substance, a certificate cannot be granted under this article, vide Ram Bhau v. Raj Bhan Singh, AIR 1951 Vin-Pra 38 (A). The question of law, to be substantial must be one in regard to which there is difference of opinion between the different High Courts, but as there is no difference of opinion on this question, I am definitely of opinion that this is not a substantial question of law involved in this case relating to the interpretation of the Constitution. 8. The next question raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the order of dismissal passed by the Chief Commissioner, Manipur, as a result of departmental proceeding was regular under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. I have already pointed out in my judgment dated 20-2-1956 that S. 4 Chapter 8 of the Assam Jail Manual, which is applicable to the State provided for punishment of Jail Officers. Rule 111 provides that for the following offences a prosecution shall be instituted unless the Inspector General otherwise orders, in which case the offender shall be punished departmentally : (1) Wilfully or negligently permitting an escape, (2) Committing any offence punishable under S. 42, Prisons Act, 1894, (3) Immoral conduct with regard to any prisoner, (4) Any offence punishable under Chapter 9, Penal Code. 9. Under Notification No. DD/HJ/10/55, dated 4-6-1955, the Deputy Commissioner of Manipur exercises the functions of the Inspector General of Prisons for the State of Manipur as provided by the Prisons Act and the Assam Jail Manual. If the District Magistrate had conducted departmental proceeding against the respondent, the latter would have got a right of appeal to the Chief Commissioner. By the procedure which was adopted in this case that right of appeal was taken. If the District Magistrate had conducted departmental proceeding against the respondent, the latter would have got a right of appeal to the Chief Commissioner. By the procedure which was adopted in this case that right of appeal was taken. If the respondent had been prosecuted in a Court of law on these charges also as was done on a previous occasion, he would have got his right of appeal. 10. Again, during the course of departmental proceedings as the most important witness Dr. A.C. Kapoor, was not produced and a report submitted by him was taken into consideration without the respondent being given any opportunity of cross-examining him, it was held by me in the Writ Petition No. 1 of 1956 that this procedure was against the fundamental principle of natural justice and so the departmental proceedings were vitiated. As no authority has been produced before me showing that under such circumstances the departmental proceedings can be held to be valid and according to law, I think, no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution can be deemed to have been involved in the case on this account also. 11. The last contention of the petitioners is that it was not necessary to consult the Union Public Service Commission before passing the order of dismissal and Art. 320 of the Constitution was not applicable to this case. I find from the Judgment dated 20-2-1956 that the writ petition was not decided on this issue and it was merely observed that this was a serious defect. When the case was decided on other points involved it cannot be said that the case really involved this point, vide Narasingha Rao v. Surayyaraju, AIR 1947 Mad 151 (B) and Sudhir Kumar Dutt v. The King, AIR 1949 FC 6 (C), in which it has been clearly held that if the question raised does not arise on the finding of the Court, certificate cannot be granted. (21) Article 320 of the Constitution is as follows : "(1) It shall be the duty of the Union and the State Public Service Commissions to conduct examination for appointments to the service of the Union and the services of the State respectively. (21) Article 320 of the Constitution is as follows : "(1) It shall be the duty of the Union and the State Public Service Commissions to conduct examination for appointments to the service of the Union and the services of the State respectively. (2) it shall also be the duty of the Union Public Service Commission, if requested by any two or more States so to do, to assist those States in framing and operating schemes of joint recruitment for any services for which candidates possessing special qualifications are required. (3) The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted : (a) on all matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and for civil posts; (b) on the principles to be followed in making appointment to civil services and posts and in making promotions and transfers from one service to another and on the suitability of candidates for such appointments, promotions or transfers; (c) on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State in a civil capacity, Including memorials or petitions relating to such matters. … … … … … … … … … … … Provided that the President as respects the all-India services and also as respects other services and post in connection with the affairs of the Union, and the Governor or Rajpramukh, as the case may be, as respects other services and posts in connection with the affairs of a State may make regulations specifying the matters in which either generally or in any particular class of case or in any particular circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a Public Service Commission to be consulted.......... (5) All regulations made under the proviso to Cl. (3) by the President or the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before each House of Parliament or the House or each House of the Legislature of the State, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made and shall be subject to such modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as both Houses of Parliament or the House or both Houses of the Legislature of the State may make during the session in which they are so laid." 12-13. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has relied on the Notification No. F. 322/11/35-Ests. dated 1-4-1937, as amended upto 1-7-1954 and it has been contended that as the respondent was not a Class I or Class II Officer, no consultation with the Commission was necessary under para 5 of the notification, which runs as follows : "5(1) It shall not be necessary to consult the Commission before an order is passed in any disciplinary case other than : (a) an original order by the President imposing any of the following penalties- (i) Censure; (ii) withholding of increments or promotion, including stoppage at efficiency bar; (iii) reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale; (iv) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders; (v) removal from service or (vi) dismissal; ............." 14. If the respondent, a Gazetted Government Servant of the Manipur State, was a class II officer, this provision may not be applicable, vide Mahadev Prasad Roy v. S. N. Chatterjee, AIR 1954 Pat 285 (D), in which Art. 320 was held to be applicable to a lino operator in Government Press, although it was held that the consultation with the Public Service Commission was not necessary; Shiv Nandan v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 Cal 60 (E), which was a case of Sub-Inspector of Police, where it was held that a failure to comply with the direction in Art. 320 (3) (c) does not render the disciplinary proceedings inoperative, Joseph John v. State of Trav-Co., AIR 1953 Trav-Co 130 (FB) (F), in which the petitioner was an Executive Engineer in the Electrical Department; and Banarsi Das v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 All 813 (G), in which Art. 320 was held inapplicable to Lekhpal. As the present respondent was a Gazetted Officer Jailor I think, the provision of this Article would be applicable to him. Again, at the time when the writ petition was heard, it was not shown that this notification had been duly laid before the Parliament as required by para 5 of Art. 320 of the Constitution. As the present respondent was a Gazetted Officer Jailor I think, the provision of this Article would be applicable to him. Again, at the time when the writ petition was heard, it was not shown that this notification had been duly laid before the Parliament as required by para 5 of Art. 320 of the Constitution. If the petitioners wanted to rely on the proviso and para 5 of Art. 320, it was necessary to establish fully that the provision of para 5 had already been strictly complied with, and so it cannot be said that there was no serious defect on this ground also. 15. As the writ petition No. 1 of 1956 was decided mainly on questions of fact which were involved in the case which gave rise to legal consequences and inferences, viz., whether the evidence and cross-examination of Dr. A.C. Kapoor, was essential and whether the departmental proceedings should have been conducted by the Inspector General of Prisons or not, it cannot be said that the present case involves any substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution. 16. I, therefore, find that the present case is not a fit one in which leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court should be granted and I, therefore, reject the present application. The parties will bear their own costs. Application rejected.