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Rajasthan High Court · body

1956 DIGILAW 22 (RAJ)

Teja Singh v. Janwata

1956-01-18

MODI

body1956
Modi, J.—This is a revision by Tejasingh against an order of the District Magistrate, Jalore, dated the 29th November, 1954, forfeiting his surety bound under sec. 514 Cr. P.C., and arises in the following circumstances. 2. A report was made by Teekma against one Janwta in connection with the theft of the formers camel at the police station Sanchore. During the course of investigation, the investigating officer made over the camel which had been recovered from the possession of Janwta to the petitioner Tejsingh on the latters executing a bound in favour of the police officer that he would produce the camel before the police or the court whenever called upon to do so and that in default he would pay a sum of Rs. 500/-. This bond was executed on the 18th November, 1952. Janwta was challaned in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sanchore, in due court and the case was thereafter transferred to the Court of the Extra First Class Magistrate, Sanchore. By his judgment dated the 31st January, 1954. Janwata was acquitted. Thereupon he applied to the Magistrate for restoration of the camel to him. The petitioner Tejasingh was called upon to produce the camel. The latter failed to comply with the order. Consequently the Magistrate forfeited his surety bond and directed him to pay the sum of Rs. 500/-stipulated in the bond. The petitioner raised the principal contention that the forfeiture of the bond was illegal as he had not executed any bond in favour of the court and therefore, he could not, in law,be called upon to pay the penalty under sec. 214 Cr.P.C. He also stated that the camel had been made over to the complainant Teekma and that it had been recently lost from his custody and efforts were being made to find it out. The First Class Extra Magistrate, Sanchore, held that Tejasingh was bound to produce the camel and that in default he must deposit the sum of Rs. 500/-. Then the petitioner went in appeal to the District Magistrate who maintained the order of the Magistrate. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner has come up in revision in this Court. 3. The main point for determination in this revision is whether the order of the forfeiture, passed by the courts below, of the surety bond, executed by the petitioner in this case, is correct. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner has come up in revision in this Court. 3. The main point for determination in this revision is whether the order of the forfeiture, passed by the courts below, of the surety bond, executed by the petitioner in this case, is correct. The contention is that the petitioner had never executed any bond in favour of the court and therefore, there was no bond which the court could forfeit within the meaning of sec. 514 Cr.P.C. The determination of this question depends upon sec. 514, the relevant petition of which reads as follows: — "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate of the first class. or, when the bond is for the appearance before a court to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof and may call upon any person bound by sush bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid." The language of the section clearly implies that before a bond can be forfeited, an essential condition is that the bond must have been one taken under the Code. The question, therefore, arises whether the bond which was taken by the investigating officer in the present case was a bound for which provision exists under the Code. It must be pointed out that learned Deputy Government Advocate has not been able to place his finger on any such provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 550 authorises that police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Then sec. Then sec. 516 A provides that when any property regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence, is produced before any criminal court during any inquiry or trial, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial and the section further provides that if the property is subject to speedy or natural decay, or if it is otherwise expedient so to do, the court may after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it should be sold or otherwise disposed of. Finally, sec. 517 makes provisions for final orders in conclusion with the disposal of such property at the conclusion of the inquiry or trial. Reference may also be made to sec. 523 which lays down that upon seizure by any police officer of property taken under sec 51 of the Code or alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence, such seizure shall be forthwith reported to a Magistrate, who shall make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof,or, if such person is unknown then the magistrate at required under sub-sec.(2) to issue a proclamation requiring any person who may have a claim thereto to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation. A review of these sections leads to the conclusion that the bond, like the one which was taken by the police officer in the present case, is not a bond for which any persons to be found in the Code of Criminal Procedure. As soon as the challan was presented in the court of the Magistrate the prosecuting inspector should have moved the Magistrate to proceed under sec. 516 A and a bond should have been then taken from the surety Tejasingh or any other persons for the proper custody of the camel pending the conclusion of the trial. But this was not done and the bond which had been executed by Tejsingh in favour of the police officer was supposed to have been enough. 516 A and a bond should have been then taken from the surety Tejasingh or any other persons for the proper custody of the camel pending the conclusion of the trial. But this was not done and the bond which had been executed by Tejsingh in favour of the police officer was supposed to have been enough. But that as it may, the crucial question is whether to such a bound the provisions of sec. 512 can be attracted. To may mind the answer to this question can only be in the negative because the bond cannot be said to be one taken under the Code? it being an essential condition for the application of sec 5!4that before a bound can be forfeited there under, it must be a bond taken under the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am strengthened in the conclusion at which I have arrived by an examination of the cases which I proceed to make reference. II In re Hubert Crawford (1), bonds were taken under secs. 106 and l07 of the City of Bombay Police Act from the accused and also from a surety, The accused absconded. The bonds of the accused as well as the surety were forfeited. The question was raised whether sec. 514 Cr. P.C. applied to such bonds. The Magistrate held that the section applied. On revision the High Court repelled this view and held that the bonds taken under the City of Bombay Police Act, for appearance before the police were not bonds taken under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct the forfeiture of these bonds and his order was set aside as having been made without jurisdiction. In Shangara Singh vs. Emperor (2), the police having seized certain goods handed them over to a "Supardar" on the latter executing a bond to produce them on demand before the court; but when he was called upon to produce them, he failed, and, thereafter, he executed another bond in favour of the court undertaking to produce them on demand. It was held that the latter bond was covered by the provisions of sec. 516 A, and it was not open to the petitioner to raise the objection that the bond . was not executed under the section merely because the goods were not actually produced in court. It was held that the latter bond was covered by the provisions of sec. 516 A, and it was not open to the petitioner to raise the objection that the bond . was not executed under the section merely because the goods were not actually produced in court. It will be observed that the facts of this case were peculiar and although the original bond had been executed in favour of the police officer, a further bond had been executed by the surety in favour of the court itself even though the goods were actually not produced in court at the time; but the actual production of the (goods was immaterial as the surety had admitted that he had received the custody of the bullocks on the date of the execution of the second bond. It these circumstances, the conclusion that the bond was covered by the provisions of sec. 516 A and that it was not open to the petitioner to raise the objection that the bond was not executed under the section merely because the bullocks were not actually produced in court was perfectly correct. This ruling cannot have any application to the facts of the present case, as no further bond had been executed by the surety in favour of the court at all. The last case to which reference may be made is Rameshwar Bhartia vs. State of Assam (3). The facts there were that a bond had been executed by the accused, in respect of paddy found in his possession without a licence in contravention of the provisions of the Food Grains Control Order, in favour of the procurement inspector whereupon the stock of paddy was allowed to remain in his possession. Subsequently he was unable to produce it when called upon by the court and, therefore, the accused was ordered to procure a similar quantity of paddy and make it over to the procurement department. The District Magistrate referred the case to the High Court, inter alia, with a recommendation that the zimmanama should have been forfeited. The High Court sent the case back to the trial court for action being taken under sec. 514 for its forfeiture. The District Magistrate referred the case to the High Court, inter alia, with a recommendation that the zimmanama should have been forfeited. The High Court sent the case back to the trial court for action being taken under sec. 514 for its forfeiture. When the matter went up to the Supreme Court, the contention was raised on behalf of the accused that the security bond had been taken from him not by the couet but by the procurement inspector, and, therefore, sec. 514 was inapplicable. It was held by their Lords ships that this contention was well-founded and that it was true that the bond contained the undertaking that the seized paddy would be produced before the court, still it was a promise made to particular official and not to the court and that action could be taken under sec. 524 Cr.P.C. only when the bond was taken by the court under the provisions of the Code and, therefore, the High Court was in error in thinking that the sec. 514 was applicable. Their Lordships also disposed of the argument which was not addressed to them, whether the High Court could pass an order for forfeiture in the exercise of its inherent powers under sec. 561 A, by saying that, in the first place, it did not exercise any such power in fact, and, secondly, that a further question must then arise whether when the Code contains an express provision on a particular subject, there could be any resort to inherent jurisdiction under a general provision, No such question can at all arise in the present case because the courts below have no such inherent jurisdiction. The above decision lends considerable support, to my mind, to the conclusion at which I have arrived. 4. It only remains for me to say that this conclusion is not, in any way, affected by the mere circumstance that the petitioner produced the camel in court on a number of hearings when called upon by the court to do so. The question that has to be determined is : what action could be taken against the petitioner if he failed to produce the camel on a subsequent occasion and whether any order of forfeiture could be made against him. The question that has to be determined is : what action could be taken against the petitioner if he failed to produce the camel on a subsequent occasion and whether any order of forfeiture could be made against him. I have no doubt that before any forfeiture could take place, there should have been a bond which could be forfeited and in any case there was no undertaking whatsoever which the petitioner gave to the court that in case he failed to produce the camel he would pay such and such penalty and even such bond as he gave to the police officer was not a bond which could be said to have been given under the Code and therefore sec. 514 is not called into play at all. This result is indeed to be regretted but this Court can only administer the law as it stands and not as it should be or might well have been. 5. Having regard to the conclusion at which I have arrived, I allow this revision, set aside the order of the courts below and hereby direct that the order of forfeiture passed against the petitioner shall be quashed. The penalty, if recovered, from the petitioner, shall be refunded. 6. Learned Deputy Government Advocate concedes that the provisions of sec. 514 could not be called in aid to enforce the bond executed by the petitioner in this case in favour of the Sub Inspector of Police, Sanchore, but prays in the last resort that the State would still have a right to enforce this bond against the petitioner under the general law of the land relating to contracts such as may be applicable to the case and that the order of this Court may be made without prejudice to any such rights or remedies as the State may have against Tejasingh. I wish to say nothing on this aspect of the matter beyond remarking that my order will not, in any way, prejudice the rights and remedies of the State in respect of the bond in question under the general law relating to contracts or any other law such as of the State pursuing any such remedy by a may be applicable to the circumstances of the suit or any other appropriate method accord-case and my order will not stand in the way ing to law.