JUDGMENT :- This is a petition, purporting to be under Art. 133 of the Constitution, read with Ss. 109 and 110, Civil P. C., for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of this Court dated 8-6-1956*, whereby a petition for writ, made by the applicants, was rejected. It arises under the following circumstances :- * See 1957 Him. Pra. 1 (AIR V 44). 2. The petitioners purchased trees standing in lot No. V of Lower Bushahr Forest Division for a sum of Rs. 50,100/- at the public auction held at Himachal Dham, Simla, on 28-2-1952. A sum of Rs. 5,010/- was deposited by the petitioners, as earnest money, at the fall of the hammer. The petitioners were bound to execute an agreement and to deposit a security of 10% of the auction money on the auction being confirmed by the Chief Conservator of Forests, Himachal Pradesh. On 30-3-1952, the Chief Conservator of Forests notified to the petitioners that the auction in their favour had been confirmed and called upon them to execute an agreement within fifteen days and deposit the necessary security. The petitioners alleged that the dry fir trees revealed a very serious defect. Therefore, they requested the Conservator of Forests either to allot green fir trees instead of dry fir trees, or to refund the earnest money deposited by the petitioners. This request was not accepted by the Conservator. In their turn, the petitioners failed to execute the agreement, or to deposit the security money. Consequently, the trees, covered by the auction, were resold by the Conservator for a sum of Rs. 18,000/- and in respect of the balance of Rs. 27,090/-, a recovery certificate was sent by the Collector of Mahasu, on behalf of the Himachal Pradesh Government, to the Collector of Ambala for recovery proceedings under the Punjab Land Revenue Act and the Revenue Recovery Act. 2a. It was against this recovery proceeding that the petitioners filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, with the allegation that the recovery proceedings were illegal and unjustified. For reasons stated in this Courts order dated 8-6-1956, however, I held that there was nothing illegal in the recovery proceedings and provisions of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution were not attracted. For reasons stated in this Courts order dated 8-6-1956, however, I held that there was nothing illegal in the recovery proceedings and provisions of Art. 31(1) of the Constitution were not attracted. In rejecting the writ petition, I had observed that the proper course for the petitioners would be to pay the amount, sought to be recovered, under protest, in writing and then institute a suit in a civil Court for the recovery of that amount, or any part thereof, as provided in S. 78, Punjab Land Revenue Act, read with S. 4, Revenue Recovery Act, 1890. It is against this order that the petitioners want to go up in appeal to the Supreme Court 3. On notice being issued to the respondents, the learned Government Advocate appeared. The latter urged, vehemently, that the order of this Court dated 8-6-1956, rejecting the petition under Art. 226, is not a "judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court" within the meaning of Art. 133(1) of the Constitution. Arguments on this were heard in extenso on the 12th instant. For reasons to be stated shortly, I am of the opinion that the order of this Court dated 8-6-1956 is not a "judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding" within the meaning of Art. 133(1) and, consequently this petition must fail. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners (Mr. D.N. Awasthy) urged that the hearing of the petition under Art. 226 amounts to the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction of this Court and since this Court refused to issue a writ, the matter has been finally disposed of and, further, since the value of the subject-matter in dispute, i.e. the amount sought to be recovered as arrears of land revenue, exceeds Rs. 20,000/-, the petitioners are entitled to go up in appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution. He cited the following authorities :- (a) Ryots of Garabandha v. Zamindar of Parlakimidi, AIR 1938 Mad 722 (A). There, the facts were that the Board of Revenue at Madras took proceedings under Chapter 11, Madras Estates Land Act, and enhanced the rents of three villages by 37½ per cent. A prayer was made to the Madras High Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Board of Revenue, but the prayer was refused. There, the facts were that the Board of Revenue at Madras took proceedings under Chapter 11, Madras Estates Land Act, and enhanced the rents of three villages by 37½ per cent. A prayer was made to the Madras High Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Board of Revenue, but the prayer was refused. Thereupon, an application was made under S. 109, Civil P. C., for leave to appeal to His Majesty from the order of refusal. In granting that petition, Leach, C.J., observed as follows : "Under cl. (b) a litigant has the right of appeal to His Majesty from any decree or final order passed by a High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. It is conceded by the learned advocate for the respondent that the issue of a writ of certiorari means the exercise of original jurisdiction, but he says that it does not mean the exercise of original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the Clause. The distinction here is between civil and criminal". The order complained of referred to a civil matter as opposed to a criminal matter, namely a decision of a Revenue Court in a revenue case. It was admittedly passed in the exercise of original jurisdiction and in the circumstances, it could only have been passed in the exercise of civil jurisdiction. The order affects the applicants to the extent of Rs. 31,503/12/- and it is not disputed that it is the intention of the Board of Revenue to extend the enhancement to the other villages of the zamindari which when carried out will mean an annual increase in the rents of the tenants by over Rs. 1,50,000/- annually." The learned Government Advocate rightly pointed out that this decision was given several years before the present Constitution came into force. The proposed appeal, in the present case, arises out of an order, refusing to issue a writ under Art. 226. It is pointed out that writs are issued under Art. 226 for the enforcement of fundamental rights, conferred by Part 3 of the Constitution, and for any other purpose. It is, therefore, obvious that the situation is changed. (b) Ramayya v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 300 (B). It is pointed out that writs are issued under Art. 226 for the enforcement of fundamental rights, conferred by Part 3 of the Constitution, and for any other purpose. It is, therefore, obvious that the situation is changed. (b) Ramayya v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 300 (B). There, the facts were that, by an order dated 1-6-1951, the State of Madras set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted a stage coach permit to the second respondent for a particular route. A petition was made to the High Court of Madras for issue of a writ of certiorari, quashing the order of the State Government. A learned single Judge of that High Court dismissed that petition and it was sought to take an appeal to a Division Bench under Cl. 15, Letters Patent. Before the Division Bench, it was argued that the appeal was not competent, since the writ proceedings were not civil proceedings. It was held by the Division Bench that : "The matter involved in the proceeding for writ of certiorari under Art. 226 is a civil proceeding. It is not a criminal proceeding, nor is it in the nature of miscellaneous proceedings, such as matrimonial, testamentary, admiralty or other jurisdictions of the High Court. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is in the nature of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction." (c) Chairman Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mia, AIR 1953 Cal 433 (SB) (C). There, the majority opinion was that : "A judgment of a single Judge on an application under Art. 226, whether in a matter arising within the original jurisdiction or in the matter arising outside, is a judgment pursuant to S. 108, Government of India Act, 1915, and, therefore, is appealable under Cl. 15, Letters Patent. There is nothing in Art. 226 to exclude such an appeal if the rules of the High Court and the Letters Patent provide for it. 15, Letters Patent. There is nothing in Art. 226 to exclude such an appeal if the rules of the High Court and the Letters Patent provide for it. Article 225 defines the whole jurisdiction of the existing High Courts and its effect is to provide that such High Courts shall have all their existing jurisdictions, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and such further jurisdictions as are being conferred by the Constitution itself, or may be conferred in future, either by Parliament under the provisions of the Constitution, or by laws of the appropriate Legislature provided that by such laws the jurisdiction may also be curtailed. Hence, the jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 is a jurisdiction within Art. 225 and therefore, in so far as jurisdiction is concerned, a judgment given in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 is a judgment pursuant to Art. 225. All that Art. 226 does is to empower the High Courts to give relief in a new form and in accordance with a more direct procedure or, in other words, it puts the High Courts in possession of a new remedy for grievances which previously had to be redressed in other ways. In exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226, the High Court do not act as special tribunals. They still function as ordinary Courts and it is only the procedure in respect of matters lying within their ordinary jurisdiction and the form of relief that may be given which are changed. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts under Art. 226 is neither revisional as contemplated by S. 115, Civil P. C., nor does it appertain to the general power of superintendence conferred by S. 107 Government of India Act, now Art. 227. It is, however, not original, in the case of the Presidency High Courts in the limited and technical sense of the ordinary, original, civil jurisdiction of the Letters Patent, which carries certain territorial limits, but it is original as distinguished from appellate." S. R. Das Gupta, J., who wrote a separate dissenting judgment, expressed himself in the following terms : "In my opinion, Art. 226 conferred on High Courts a new jurisdiction...... It is a jurisdiction not only to issue writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them but also to issue to any person or authority, including Government any directions or order for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, or for any other purpose. Thus, in the first place, the jurisdiction conferred by Art. 226 is not limited only to issue writs. By the said Article, jurisdiction has been conferred upon the High Court to issue any direction or order and upon any person or authority. Even in the matter of issuing writs, High Courts have been empowered to issue new writs which is evidenced by the use of the expression writs including writs in the nature of. There has not been merely extension of power as contended by Mr. Advocate-General, but a new jurisdiction has been created in High Courts by Art. 226......If the Constitution itself which conferred such jurisdiction has not given any such right of appeal, how then is such a right created?" (d) Girja Prasad Sundar Lal v. Divisional Forest Officer Dudhi, (S) AIR 1955 All 589 (D). There, the facts were that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution had been dismissed and a special appeal against that order was also dismissed summarily. The petitioners then applied for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court and, at the same time, filed an application under O. 45, R. 13. The point for consideration before the Court was whether the respondents could be restrained from interfering with the petitioners rights, pending disposal of the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. A Division Bench of that High Court, in answering the question in the affirmative, remarked that : "There is no warrant for the view that O. 45, R. 13 does not apply to cases where the appeal, during the pendency of which the Court is asked to exercise powers under that rule, is an appeal from a decision under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A final order is a decree within the special definition of that term in R. 1, O. 45. A final order is a decree within the special definition of that term in R. 1, O. 45. That being so, the provisions of that order are applicable where the appeal contemplated is one from a decision under Art. 226 of the Constitution." (e) L. Lachman Das Nayar v. Income-tax Officer, Amritsar, AIR 1955 NUC (Punjab) 5983 (E). There, a Division Bench of that High Court, following AIR 1938 Mad 722 (A), remarked that : "The proceedings for the issuing of a writ of certiorari are original civil jurisdiction as opposed to criminal jurisdiction. Hence, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court can be granted under s. 109(b) and (c), Civil P. C., against an order dismissing an application under Art. 226 for a writ in the nature of certiorari against the Income tax Officer." (f) Naha Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (S) AIR 1955 Raj 56 (F). There, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, in disposing of an application under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution against an order rejecting a writ petition, observed as follows : "The question whether a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution is a civil proceeding or not depends upon the nature of the proceeding. While there may be doubt as to the valuation of the subject-matter of the dispute in the High Court, for the dispute was about the validity of the Act and it may not be possible to value the subject-matter of the dispute in money, there is no doubt that the judgment of the High Court involved, directly or indirectly, a question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and over. In this view of the matter, Art. 133 (1) (b) applied to the case." 5. The learned Government Advocate, on the other hand, cited the following decisions in support of his contention that the present application does not fall under Art. 133 of the Constitution : 1. Krishnaswami v. The Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, AIR 1953 Mad 79 (G). There, a Division Bench of that High Court held that an order passed by the High Court under S. 21 (2), Chartered Accountants Act was not an order passed in a civil proceeding and, consequently, was not open to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (c). 2. There, a Division Bench of that High Court held that an order passed by the High Court under S. 21 (2), Chartered Accountants Act was not an order passed in a civil proceeding and, consequently, was not open to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (c). 2. Ratan Lal v. Bairondan and others, AIR 1954 Raj 127 (H). There, the facts were that one Rattan Lal had applied to sue in forma pauperis. The petition was dismissed and the matter was taken in revision to the Rajasthan High Court. An order was passed in that revisional proceeding and Rattan Lal applied for grant of a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b). A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in dismissing that petition observed that : "The wording of Art. 133 is in one material respect different from S. 109, Civil P. C. Clauses (a) and (b) of S. 109 provide for appeals from any decree or final order, while cl. (c) provides an appeal from any decree or order. But Art. 133 of the Constitution uses the words judgment, decree or final order with respect to all the three clauses (a), (b) and (c). Therefore, before leave is granted under any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Art. 133, the Court has to see that the order from which leave to appeal is prayed for is final. The word judgment used in Art. 133 cannot be taken in its widest possible sense so as to include every order which terminates a proceeding pending in a High Court. The judgment must partake of the nature of finality attributed to a decree and a final order, when it is used in conjunction." 3. Messrs. Sriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue, (M.P.) Nagpur, AIR 1954 Nag 1 (FB) (I). There, the facts were that Messrs. Sriram Gulabdas applied under S. 23, C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, requesting the Board of Revenue to refer certain questions for decision by the Nagpur High Court. That application was rejected. The petitioners then moved the High Court and the Chief Justice directed the Board to refer those questions to the Court. The questions were, accordingly, referred and were disposed of by the Court. That application was rejected. The petitioners then moved the High Court and the Chief Justice directed the Board to refer those questions to the Court. The questions were, accordingly, referred and were disposed of by the Court. Sriram Gulabdas then applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the findings of the High Court. The question, therefore, arose as to whether the findings of the High Court amounted to a judgment, decree or final order within the meaning of Arts. 132 and 133. The matter was considered by a Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court. The majority view (per Deo and Sen, JJ.) was that : "The term judgment is used in Art. 132(1) in the wider sense to include any decision given by the High Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties to any proceeding, properly before the Court which finally determines the rights of parties so far as the Court is concerned. In this sense a decision under S. 23 (5), C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, or under S. 66(5), Income-tax Act, is clearly a judgment. It finally determines the rights of the parties so far as the High Court is concerned though the tribunal may have to reopen the assessment proceedings and make or order further inquiry to give effect to the decision of the High Court." Hidayatullah, J., who differed from the majority view, observed that : "The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, whether it be under the Income-tax Act or the Sales Tax Act, is merely advisory and consultative and the opinion given on the questions mooted neither ranks as a final order nor even as a judgment. The order does not decide the controversies but merely gives expression to an opinion for the guidance of the referring authority. The opinion, though binding on the Board of Revenue, is not on an issue and is not sufficient for the final disposal of the case. Such decisions did not fall either within the expression judgment, decree or final order as used in the Letters Patent of the High Courts or in the Constitution Act in force before the present Constitution. The use of the words civil, criminal or other proceeding does not make Art. 132 wider than S. 205, Government of India Act, 1935. Such decisions did not fall either within the expression judgment, decree or final order as used in the Letters Patent of the High Courts or in the Constitution Act in force before the present Constitution. The use of the words civil, criminal or other proceeding does not make Art. 132 wider than S. 205, Government of India Act, 1935. The use of the same expression, namely, judgment, decree or final order once again in Art. 132 clearly imports the decisions under S. 205 for the interpretation of that phrase. The addition of the words other proceeding does not enlarge the ambit of the section beyond what was included in S. 205 of the earlier Constitution and it is not open to the Courts to depart from the view so consistently taken." 4. Sriram Hanumanbux v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 257 (J). This, in my opinion, applies, on all fours, to the present case. Therein, Sinha, C.J., and Mudholkar, J., observed that : "Unless a decision finally disposes of the rights of the parties, it is not a judgment. The mere fact that the order has decided an important and even a vital issue is not by itself conclusive of the matter, unless the decision puts an end to the litigation. The decision or order, in order to be called a judgment, must affect the merits of the controversy between the parties by determining some right or liability. Ordinarily, the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Art. 226 is not meant to declare any rights. A writ under Art. 226 issues only to ensure that the law of the land was being properly administered and the refusal to issue the writ has only the effect of saying that the High Court does not see any irregularity in the administration of the relevant law. Such a decision is not covered either by the word judgment or the phrase final order in Art. 133(1). Hence, a certificate under Art. 133(1) cannot be granted against such an order." 6. In the present case, as the learned Government Advocate has rightly pointed out, this Courts order dated 8-6-1956, dismissing the writ petition has neither declared the rights of the parties, nor put an end to the litigation. It only held that there was nothing illegal in the recovery proceedings launched against the petitioners. In the present case, as the learned Government Advocate has rightly pointed out, this Courts order dated 8-6-1956, dismissing the writ petition has neither declared the rights of the parties, nor put an end to the litigation. It only held that there was nothing illegal in the recovery proceedings launched against the petitioners. It has clearly pointed out that the proper course for the petitioners was to deposit the amount, sought to be recovered, under protest in writing and then institute a suit in a civil Court for the recovery of the amount or any part thereof as provided in S. 78, Punjab Land Revenue Act, read with S. 4, Revenue Recovery Act. Section 2(9), Civil P. C., defines a judgment as a statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order, while S. 2(14) defines an order as the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court, which is not a decree. Decree is defined in S. 2(2) as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. 7. Judged by this criterion, this Courts order dated 8-6-1956, rejecting the writ petition does not, in my opinion, amount to a "judgment, decree or final order" within the meaning of Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution. 8. In view of what has been said above, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the proceeding, which culminated in this Courts order dated 8-6-1956, was a civil proceeding or not. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that it was a civil proceeding, still, in the light of the observations of the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court, reported in (S) AIR 1955 Nag 257 (J) (with which I respectfully agree), the order sought to be taken up in appeal to the Supreme Court, cannot be deemed to be a "judgment, decree or final order, "within the meaning of Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution. 9. 9. I may further point out that the three parts (a), (b) and (c) of Art. 133(1) are controlled by the opening sentence of Art. 133, which runs as follows :- "An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India, if the High Court certifies....." Since, as already shown, the order in question is not a "judgment, decree or final order," the petition must fail. 10. ORDER :- The petition is, accordingly, rejected. Since this appears to be the first case of its kind, which came up for decision before this Court, I leave parties to bear their respective costs of this petition. Petition dismissed.