JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - The Respondent as Plaintiff filed a suit No. 132 of 1949 for recovery of Rs. 3,000 from the Defendant-Appellant in the court of the Munsif of Dehradun. Arguments in that suit were heard on 8-12-1949 and judgment was pronounced on 22-12-1949. It is agreed before me that no date had been fixed by the learned Munsif for pronouncing the judgment and the counsel for the Defendant only came to know that judgment had been pronounced on 23-12-1949. It is argued that in view of the legal position it must be taken that the judgment in the suit was pronounced on 23-12-1949. The court of the learned Munsif was closed between 24-12-49 and 31-1-50 both days inclusive on account of the Winter Vacation. In Dehradun it is during winter that the Civil Courts close for one month's vacation. 2. The Defendant in the suit who is the Appellant before me made an application for a copy of the judgment and the decree of the learned Munsif to the District Judge of Saharanpur. The Saharanpur District Judgeship comprised within it Dehradun Munsifship. (Saharanpur Judgeship observes no holidays in winter). The application dated 28-12-49 was registered by the District Judge, office on 5-1-1950. Thereafter it was sent to the Munsif of Dehradun and was received by the Munsif on 1-2-50. The copy of the judgment was ready on 11-3-1950 but the copy of the decree was ready on 11-4-1950 and both copies were delivered to the Defendant on 11-4-1950. The Defendant filed an appeal to the District Judge on 18-4-50 annexing thereto the copies of the judgment and decree as he was required to do under the law. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the appeal was barred by time and rejected it. From the order of rejection this second appeal has been filed. The Defendant filed an appeal to the District Judge on 18-4-50 annexing thereto the copies of the judgment and decree as he was required to do under the law. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the appeal was barred by time and rejected it. From the order of rejection this second appeal has been filed. The learned District Judge has treated the application for copy as having been made on 1-2-1950 and as having been made within time, and has held that the Defendant could tack the period of 1-2-50 to 11-4-50 to the period of 30 days allowed to him for appeal and has held that the appeal should have been filed on 12-4-50 and since it was not filed upto 18-4-50 the appeal was beyond time, he having further come to the conclusion that there was no sufficient ground indicated by the Defendant in his petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. 3. The Defendant-Appellant argues before me that his appeal to the District Judge was within time. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant was that the period between 24-12-49 and 31-1-50 when the learned Munsif's court was closed must be taken into consideration in calculating the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree. If the period of the vacation is considered as a part of the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree, then the appeal would be within time. 4. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the period of the Winter Vacation must be included in determining the time requisite is supported by certain decisions, namely Samnatha Ayyar v. Venkatasubba Aiyyar ILR (1903) 27 Mad. 21 and Subramanyam v. Narasimhan ILR (1920) 43 Mad. 604. In these two cases an application for copy was made on the opening day after the holidays and the period of the holiday was taken into consideration in calculating the time requisite and was also excluded u/s 12(2) of the Limitation Act. 5. In Abdul Ghaffar v. Mt. Rasulunisa and Ors. AIR 1922 Oudh 39 and Rana Uma Shanker Singh v. Abdul Karim Khan ILR (1942) Luck 314 a similar view was taken. 5. In Abdul Ghaffar v. Mt. Rasulunisa and Ors. AIR 1922 Oudh 39 and Rana Uma Shanker Singh v. Abdul Karim Khan ILR (1942) Luck 314 a similar view was taken. In Patna the High Court went a little further and excluded the period of holidays u/s 12(2) of the Limitation Act even when the copy of the judgment and decree had been applied for not on the reopening day but on a subsequent day, vide Munshi Mahton v. Lachman Lal AIR 1929 Pat 615 and Debi Charan Lal v. Mahdi Hussain AIR 1916 Pat. 317. A view similar to the view of the Patna High Court has prevailed in the Nagpur High Court also in Kasbbai v. Kannoo and Ors. 1915 Nagpur 117. The weight of the authority of the High Court is, therefore, in favour of the Appellant. But my attention has been invited by learned Counsel for the Respondent to the case of Bechi v. Ahsanulaah Khan (sic) ILR 12 Alld. 461. In that case the judgment was pronounced by the Court of the first instance on 23-5-1887. The decree was, however, signed on the 31st of May. No application for copies was made on 23-5-1887, but was made on the 31st of May. The copies were delivered in that case on the 11th of June. On the 30th of June the Defendant filed their memorandum of appeal in the lower appellate court and there was an office report that the appeal was beyond time, and the appeal was dismissed. On a subsequent date the Defendant presented a petition to the District Judge in consequence of which he re-admitted the appeal and canceling his previous order of the 2nd August, directed that the appeal should be heard. The matter ultimately came up to this High Court and their Lordship held that in computing the time to be excluded u/s 12 of the Limitation Act the time requisite for obtaining a copy does not begin until an application for copy had been made. This Court held that if, therefore, the decree remains unsigned after the judgment such interval is not to be excluded from the period of limitation, unless an application for copy had previously been made. It was, therefore, held that the appeal to the learned District Judge was barred by time. This Court held that if, therefore, the decree remains unsigned after the judgment such interval is not to be excluded from the period of limitation, unless an application for copy had previously been made. It was, therefore, held that the appeal to the learned District Judge was barred by time. In the course of the judgment Mahmood, J. has at pages 471 an 472 dealt with the argument which was raised by Pandit Ajudhia Nath to the effect that if the judgment was delivered on the last working day before the vacations and limitation expired during the vacation then it would not be possible to file an appeal on the re-opening day for lack of copies of judgment and decree. The view which appealed to Mr. Justice Mahmood was that in a case where the judgment was delivered on the very last working day before the vacation and if the period of limitation was due to expire during the vacation, then the parties wishing to appeal should apply for a certified copy of the judgment and the decree immediately the judgment was delivered. It appears that Mr. Justice Mahmood was of the view that of the Appellant omits to take due steps to apply immediately for a copy when the period of limitation expires within the period of the holidays then it is the Appellant's fault and he must abide by the consequences. What would be the effect of applying on the re-opening day of the courts for copies in a case where the judgment had been delivered on the date proceeding the commencement of the Vacation was not directly before the Court in that case, but the observations of Mahood, J. certainly supports the view of the Respondent in this appeal that since the Appellant failed to apply for a copy of the judgment and decree on 23-12-1949, he lost the right of appeal because the thirty days allowed for the filing of the appeal expired within the period of winter Vacation and he did not file his appeal on the re-opening day but at best could only be said to have applied for copies for the purpose of filing an appeal later. 6. It seems to me that the view which has prevailed in the Patna, Oudh and Madras High Courts is a view that ought to (sic) in this Court also. 6. It seems to me that the view which has prevailed in the Patna, Oudh and Madras High Courts is a view that ought to (sic) in this Court also. It is too much to except that litigants will be prepared to make applications for copies of judgment and decree at-the very moment when judgment's delivered in a case where it is delivered on the day preceding the beginning of the period of Vacation. Learned Counsel has invited my attention to the case of Puttulal v. Bhagwan Das ILR 1938 All. 209. In that case, the trial court delivered judgment on the 2nd of June the last working day before the Vacation and the courts opened on the 4th July which was a Saturday after Vacation. No application for copy was made on that date by the Appellant and it was on the 7th July that he-made an application for copies of the judgment and decree. These were received on the 11th of July and the appeal was filed on the 18th of July. The period of limitation being 30 days for an appeal to the District Judge, this Court considered that it should not follow the view which was indicated in the Patna cases (cases cited above) because that view would lead to a very considerable extention of the period of limitation and because that view had not been followed in any ruling of the Allahabad High Court, and was also contrary to the view expressed in Bachi's case (sic) ILR 12 All. 461 and because the Madras rulings also took a contrary view. The Madras rulings did not, it is true, take exactly the same view as in the Patna cases but it did take the view which has been taken in the, Oudh Case that if an application for copy is made on the very re-opening day, the period, of vacation would be tacked on as a period requisite for the obtaining of copies. Therefore, I am not clear in my mind as to what the decision of this Court would have been in Puttulal's case ILR 1938 All 209 of the applications had been made on the re-opening day and not three days later because the Madras rulings were relied upon. I am myself inclined to the view that the observation of Mahmood, J. in Bechi's case (sic) ILR 12 All. I am myself inclined to the view that the observation of Mahmood, J. in Bechi's case (sic) ILR 12 All. 461 are obiter and Puttulal's case ILR 1938 All. 209 does not definitely reject the view taken in the Madras and Oudh cases already referred to. 7. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has invited my attention to the case Masilamani v. Arunga Mundali 1920 Mad. 1025. That was a case where judgment was pronounced at an early hour on the day preceding certain holidays and the application for copy thereof was made on the date on which the court re-opened and it was held that in computing the period of limitation for appeal the Appellant was not entitled to the deduction of holidays. From the order it appears that the Court was of the view that in that particular case the application for a copy could have been presented on the day on which the judgment was delivered. The head note shows that the judgment was delivered at an early hour of the morning. This case seems to be on its special facts. 8. Once it is conceded, as the learned lower court concedes, that the application could be made on 1-2-1950 and was competent, then the inevitable result must be that the period from 24-12-49 to 31-1-50 must be taken into consideration in determining the period to be excluded u/s 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Either the period of limitation had expired within the holidays and no copy having been applied for on the last working day, no appeal could be preferred later on the basis of a copy applied for after the period of limitation had expired, or if the application dated 1-2-1950 was a valid application, then this appeal was within time. 9. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the view is correct that where the judgment is delivered on the last working day and is followed by a Vacation during which the period of limitation would expire, then an application should be allowed to be made for copies on the re-opening day and the period of Vacation should be included as time requisite for the obtaining of copies and excluded u/s 12(2) of the Limitation Act. In this view of the matter, the appeal in the court below would be within time. 10. In this view of the matter, the appeal in the court below would be within time. 10. But in this case, the matter can be dealt with from another angle. 11. The court of the Munsif at Dehradun was closed between 24-12-1949 and 31-1-50. No application could, therefore, be directly made to that court. That court is subordinate to the District Judge of Saharanpur. Section 9 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (No. XII of 1887) says-- Subject to the superintendence of the High Court, the District Judge shall have administrative control over all the Civil Courts under this Act within the local limits of his jurisdiction. 12. In asmuch as an application for copies could hot have been made to the learned Munsif while the learned Munsifs court was closed, it seems to e that there was no bar in making the application to the court of the District Judge at Saharanpur which was open and which has superintendence over the Munsifship of Dehradun. It is true that according to our General Rules (Civil) the application for copies of judgments has to be made to the Munsarim of the court concerned. But in this case the court of the Munsif was closed because of the vacation, and a litigant ought not to be expected to do that which cannot be done. In this case he could not apply for copies of the judgment and decree during the vacation to the Munsif of Dehradun. 13. Chapter X of the Genral Rules (Civii) of this Court contains Rule 5 which relates to the obtaining of copies for a party to the suit. That rule runs as follows: Except as hereinafter provided, any party to a suit, appeal, motion or proceeding may at any time obtain, as of course, upon an application, an order for a copy or copies of the record in such suit, appeal, motion or proceeding, or of any decree, order, pleading, paper, exhibit or document in such record. 14. The granting of copies under this rule appears, therefore, to be automatic and does not seem to involve a judicial act. In this case in my view no question of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction arises in connection with the application which was made for grant of copies to the District Judge. 14. The granting of copies under this rule appears, therefore, to be automatic and does not seem to involve a judicial act. In this case in my view no question of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction arises in connection with the application which was made for grant of copies to the District Judge. In my view in a case where a court subordinate to the District Judge is closed for the vacation but the District Court is functioning then it is open to a party to apply to the District Judge for a copy of the judgment and decree of the Munsifs court during the period the Munsifs court is closed. Applying for a copy in this way at best would amount to a mere irregularity of a non-material character which ought not to make the application made to the District Judge ineffectual. 15. It is noteworthy that the application for copies made to the District Judge was not rejected or sent back but was duly registered on 5-1-50 and was transmitted to the court of the Munsif, Dehradun, Presumably, therefore, the office of the learned District Judge Saharanpur found nothing unusual in this procedure of making an application for copies of the judgment and decree of a court in Dahradun, while that court, was in vacation, at Saharanpur. In my view the application made to the learned District Judge (or to his Munsarim) on 28-12-1950 which was registered on 5-1-1950 was a proper application for a copy of the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif of Dehradun and the time between 28-12-50 and 11-4-51 when he copies were ready for delivery was the tin e requisite for obtaining of the copies, and had to be excluded u/s 12(2) of the Limitation Act. In this view also the appeal is within time. 16. I do not express myself on this matter, but it is urged by learned Counsel that the delay should have been condoned under the circumstances of this case u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. 17. The result is that this appeal is allowed. The decree of the court below is set aside and the Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1950 of the court of the District Judge, Saharanpur is directed to be restored to its original number by that Court and is remanded to that court for hearing on merits according to law. 17. The result is that this appeal is allowed. The decree of the court below is set aside and the Civil Appeal No. 166 of 1950 of the court of the District Judge, Saharanpur is directed to be restored to its original number by that Court and is remanded to that court for hearing on merits according to law. Costs here and hereto shall abide the result. 18. A certificate for the refund of the court fee paid in this Court will be issued to the Appellant u/s 13 of the Court Fees Act. 19. Leave for Special Appeal is asked for and is granted.