JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Chowdhry, dated the 1st March, 1955, dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Appellant is a paper merchant who carries on business in Jhansi. In the year 1948 the Municipal Board of Jhansi decided to impose an octroi on stationery brought into the municipality for used therein and also to alter the rate at which octroi was then livied on certain other goods brought within municipal limits, and on the 22nd December, 1948, the Board passed a special resolution embodying its preposals. These proposals were in due course sanctioned by the Commissioner of the Division who was the prescribed authority under the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The proposals so sanctioned were published on the 24th September, 1949, in the form of a Notification which itself was dated the 12th September, 1949. This Notification referred to four classes of goods, namely Articles for food or drink, Articles for fuel, lighting and washing, Drugs and spices, and Piece goods etc. In the case of the first three classes the Notification was of an alteration in the rate at which octroi was levied on the articles enumerated under each heading; as regards the last class the Notification was of the imposition of octroi on articles, of stationery which had not previously been liable to this tax. 3. On the same day, the 24th September, 1949, the Municipal Board passed a further special resolution u/s 134(2) of the Act directing the imposition of the octroi with effect from the 1st October, 1949. A copy of this resolution was then, u/s 135(1) of the Act, sent to the Commissioner who appears to have taken no action on the matter until the 9th February, 1952, when he published the following Notification in the official Gazette: No. 2405/XXIII-582-50. It is hereby notified for general information u/s 135 of the U.P. Municipalities Act that the amendment in the rates of octroi of Jhansi Municipal Board sanctioned in Notification No. 6100/XXIII, dated 12th September, 1949, will come into force with effect from October 1, 1949. 4. It is hereby notified for general information u/s 135 of the U.P. Municipalities Act that the amendment in the rates of octroi of Jhansi Municipal Board sanctioned in Notification No. 6100/XXIII, dated 12th September, 1949, will come into force with effect from October 1, 1949. 4. We find it difficult to understand how the Commissioner could sanction an amendment of the rates of octroi from a past date, but the point is not material as we understand that the Municipal Board did not take any steps to collect octroi at the enhanced rates until the year 1952. 5. The contention of the Respondent was that as the Commissioner had by his Notification of the 9th February, 1952, notified an alteration only in the rates at which octroi was payable in respect of those goods already subject to that tax and had not notified the imposition of octroi on stationery, which was an entirely new class of goods not previously subject to that tax, the levy of octroi on stationery was invalid. This contention found favour with the learned Judge who directed the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing certain notices which had been served by the Municipal Board on the Respondent and the issue of a writ of mandamus restraining the Board from realising octroi on paper and stationery from the applicant on the basis of the Notification of the 9th February, 1952, and from initiating or prosecuting criminal proceedings against the applicant for non-payment of octroi on stationery. From this order the Municipal Board appeals. 6. Before us the Appellant has contended that the construction placed by the learned Judge upon the words "amendment in the rates of octroi" is too narrow. It is argued that the word 'amendment' includes 'addition' and that the expression "rates of octroi" does not mean the rate at which octroi is levied but the tax itself, and that therefore the phrase "amendment of the rates of octroi" means amendments and additions to the octroi schedule. 7. The Respondent's contention is that the proposals of the Municipal Board which were ultimately sanctioned by the Commissioner involve both the imposition of a new tax, namely the levying of octroi on stationery, and the alteration of the existing tax on certain other articles. This argument does not appear to be well founded. 7. The Respondent's contention is that the proposals of the Municipal Board which were ultimately sanctioned by the Commissioner involve both the imposition of a new tax, namely the levying of octroi on stationery, and the alteration of the existing tax on certain other articles. This argument does not appear to be well founded. Section 136 provided that the procedure to be followed when a tax is altered in respect of the matters specified in Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 131 shall, so far as may be, be the procedure prescribed for the imposition of a tax. Now Section 131 provides that when a Board desires to impose a tax it shall frame proposals specifying, inter alia, the tax which it desires to impose, (b) the persons to be made liable and the description of the property in respect of which they are to be made liable, and (c) the amount or rate leviable on such persons, Section 131 therefore distinguishes between the description of the property which is to be taxed and the rule at which such tax is to be levied, but Section 136 makes it clear that a change in either of these matters is for the purposes of the Act an alteration of a tax and not the imposition of a new one. 8. Section 136 read with Sub-section (2) of Section 135 provides that the alteration of a tax shall in all cases be subject to the condition that such alteration has been notified, and therefore, the question which has to be decided is whether the alteration of the octroi, in so far as it has been extended to stationery, has been notified. 9. Mr. Khare in his careful argument on behalf of the Board has submitted that the word 'rate' means no only a measure or scale but also a local tax, and from this he argues that the expression in the Notification "rates of octroi" means 'octroi tax'. In our opinion this conclusion does not follow from the premises, for octroi itself means a taxes--a tax on commodities--and we think that the word 'rates' when used in the expression 'rates of octroi' can mean only the measure of the octroi. A house tax means a tax on houses; rates of house tax can refer only to the scale at which that tax is leviable. A house tax means a tax on houses; rates of house tax can refer only to the scale at which that tax is leviable. The expression used by the Board in its special resolution of the 24th September, 1949,--"amendments to the Octroi Schedule"--is clear and accurate, and had that phrase been used in the subsequent Notification no difficulty in our opinion would have arisen. For some reason the words "amendment in the rates of octroi" were used instead, and as the Supreme Court said in Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 "Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself". We think this rule applies with no less force to public Notifications which are a condition precedent to the imposition or alteration of a tax. 10. For these reasons we have come to the conclusion, not without some reluctance, that the decision of the learned Judge was right. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.