ORDER :- This revision petition, by a defendant, arises out of a suit for the recovery of Rs. 1,400/- on the basis of a compromise entered into by the parties before the District Judge of Mahasu on 11-8-1949. Under the term of that compromise, the plaintiff-respondent, Bhawanigir was entitled to get Rs. 40/- p.m. in lieu of maintenance from Purangir, petitioner. 2. The suit was resisted in the trial Court by the defendant-petitioner on various grounds. Inter alia, he contended that the compromise was without consideration and unenforceable. Secondly, that the compromise had been substituted by another agreement dated 16-11-1950, Ex D.A. Thirdly, the State of Himachal Pradesh was a necessary party, because under the terms of the compromise, the plaintiff was to receive the amount of the muafi direct from the Government treasury. Fourthly, that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue in respect of that muafi amount, which had to be received direct from the treasury. All these points were decided by the trial Court against the defendant and, accordingly, the plaintiff was granted a decree for Rs. 1,400/- with costs against the defendant. 3. The defendant (who is the petitioner in this Court) then went up in appeal to the learned District Judge. There, the defendant did not challenge the finding of the trial Court to the effect that the Himachal Pradesh Government was not a necessary party. Other findings were, however, vigorously assailed. In addition, a new point was taken, namely, that the compromise dated 11-8-1949 (which was the basis of the suit) had been entered into on behalf of Indargir, minor defendant, without the consent of his guardian and without the permission of the Court as required by O. 32, R. 7, Civil P. C. Consequently, it was contended that the compromise was null and void. 4. The learned District Judge repelled all the contentions raised by the defendant, Purangir, dismissed his appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Hence, this revision petition by Purangir, which was admitted by me on 27-6-1955 on the ground that some of the points, taken in the revision petition, deserved further consideration. 5. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard at considerable length on the 26th and 27th instant. I now proceed to deliver judgment. Hence, this revision petition by Purangir, which was admitted by me on 27-6-1955 on the ground that some of the points, taken in the revision petition, deserved further consideration. 5. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard at considerable length on the 26th and 27th instant. I now proceed to deliver judgment. For reasons to be stated shortly, I am of the opinion that there is no force in this revision petition. 6. I shall deal with the arguments, advanced by learned counsel, seriatim. 7. In the first place, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the compromise effected in the Court of the District Judge on 11-8-1949 was void and unenforceable, because the leave of the Court had not been obtained under O. 32, R. 7, Civil P. C., on behalf of the minor defendant, Indargir. I was, therefore, requested to hold that the compromise was void, not only as against the minor, but also as against all parties thereto. In support of his argument, Mr. Chawala cited the following rulings :- (1) Lumley v. Ravenscroft, (1895) 1 QB 683 (A). There, the facts were : "The defendants, an infant and his sister, agreed by their agent to grant the plaintiff a lease of premises in which they were jointly interested. The plaintiff brought an action for specific performance of the agreement, and applied for an injunction to restrain the defendants till after the trial of the action from leasing the premises to any other person." The Court of Appeal held that : "An injunction ought to be granted only where a case was made out for specific performance; one of the defendants, being an infant, the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance against both of them." The learned District Judge has also referred to this ruling. It is obvious that in an agreement of the above description, specific performance could not have been ordered as against the infants sister alone. This ruling, therefore, in my opinion, will not help the petitioner. (2) Ganganand Singh v. Rameshwar Singh Bahadur, 102 Ind Cas 499 : (AIR 1927 Pat 271) (B). There, their Lordships of the Patna High Court were considering the validity of a consent decree as against a minor. This ruling, therefore, in my opinion, will not help the petitioner. (2) Ganganand Singh v. Rameshwar Singh Bahadur, 102 Ind Cas 499 : (AIR 1927 Pat 271) (B). There, their Lordships of the Patna High Court were considering the validity of a consent decree as against a minor. Their Lordships observed that : "A consent decree does not stand on a higher footing than a contract between the parties and the Court has jurisdiction to set aside a consent decree upon any ground which would invalidate an agreement between the parties. The Contract Act makes it essential that all contracting parties should be competent to contract, and a person who, by reason of infancy, is incompetent to contract cannot make a contract within the meaning of the Act, and a decree based on a compromise with a minor is, therefore, void and cannot be given effect to in a Court of Law." Learned counsel for the respondent rightly pointed out that this ruling would not help the petitioner, because the decree that has been passed in favour of the plaintiff is against the petitioner alone, and the minor Indargir is not affected by it. (3) Partap Singh v. Sant Kaur, AIR 1938 PC 181 (C). There, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that : "Where there is no person who has authority either under the law of contract or under the personal law applicable to the minors to make a compromise on their behalf, a compromise entered into by minors settling dispute as regards inheritance between themselves and their fathers collaterals is not binding on them. Such transaction cannot be upheld even on the ground of family settlement because a party cannot by describing a contract as a family settlement claim for it an exemption from the law governing the capacity of a person to make a valid contract." Learned counsel for the respondent further pointed out that in the above case the interests of the parties were joint. (4) Pir Taj-ud-din v. Khambatta, 179 Ind Cas 146 : (AIR 1938 Lah 515) (D). (4) Pir Taj-ud-din v. Khambatta, 179 Ind Cas 146 : (AIR 1938 Lah 515) (D). There, a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that : "A decree obtained against an unrepresented minor is a nullity and if it is brought to the notice of an executing Court that the decree sought to be executed was obtained against a judgment-debtor, when he was a minor and was not represented by guardian ad litem, it is necessary for it, before it executes the decree, to determine whether there is a decree which can be executed." This ruling also does not help the petitioner, for reasons already stated, while discussing ruling no. 2. (5) Chhabba Lal v. Kallu Lal, AIR 1946 PC 72 (E). There, the guardian ad litem of a minor neither applied for nor obtained leave of the Court to refer a case to arbitration. Under those circumstances, their Lordships observed that the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 applied to agreements to refer matters in dispute to arbitration and that its terms should be strictly complied with. Learned counsel for the respondent suggested that no relief was sought from the minor. He further pointed out that the suit, out of which this revision petition has arisen, was against Purangir alone. (6) Durga Charan v. Akkari Das, AIR 1949 Cal 617 (F). There, a Division Bench of that High Court, while dealing with a partnership matter, held that a compromise decree would not affect defendant 5, a minor. A question further arose whether the compromise decree would bind the remaining parties. In holding that it would affect even the remaining parties, Chakravartti, J., observed as follows : "In my view, even so far as the adult parties are concerned, the compromise decree could not be regarded as binding or effective in the special facts of the present case. The compromise decree, as I have already stated, recites that all the parties were agreeing that the plaintiff was a partner to the extent of eight annas in the business concerned. They were also agreeing that the agreement of 1-12-1932 would be regarded as ineffective and that limitation would be saved for the plaintiff by eliminating the dissolution which was sought to be caused on that date. They were also agreeing that the agreement of 1-12-1932 would be regarded as ineffective and that limitation would be saved for the plaintiff by eliminating the dissolution which was sought to be caused on that date. It is impossible to see how a compromise of that character can remain effective or operative when one of the contracting parties drops out of it by reason of the fact that it is not binding upon him. In my view, the compromise decree not being binding on defendant 5, it ceased to be an effective and operative compromise decree even so far as the remaining parties were concerned." This ruling will not help the petitioner, because the compromise, in question, can be enforced against the petitioner, even if it be held that it would not affect the minor, Indargir. There would be no inconsistency. (7) Rambilas Singh v. Lokenath Chaudhuri, AIR 1949 Pat 405 (G). There, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court observed that : "Where a mother of a Hindu minor as mother and guardian enters into an agreement to sell some land to the plaintiff, but subsequently, the lands are sold to a third person by the mother, the contract with the plaintiff is void as against the minor and not binding on him and as such there is absence of mutuality of contract and no decree for specific performance of the contract can be passed." This again will not help the petitioner, because the exemption of the minor will not relieve him i.e. the petitioner of the liability cast upon him by the compromise. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent cited the following rulings in support of his case :- (a) Jamna Bai Saheb Mohitai Avergal v. Vasanta Rao Anand Rao Dhybar, AIR 1916 PC 2 (H). There, the facts were that a suit was instituted to enforce a promissory note executed by two persons, one of them being a minor, represented by his guardian. It appeared that the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 had not been complied with. Under the circumstances, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that while the minor executant could not be held liable under the promissory note, there would be no bar to the promisees claim against the other executant. (b) Daw Nyun and another v. Maung Nyi Pu, AIR 1938 Rang. 359 (I). Under the circumstances, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that while the minor executant could not be held liable under the promissory note, there would be no bar to the promisees claim against the other executant. (b) Daw Nyun and another v. Maung Nyi Pu, AIR 1938 Rang. 359 (I). This has been referred to by the learned District Judge. There, the facts were that a mother and her minor daughter entered into a contract to render certain services to a company. The daughter failed to carry out the contract. A Division Bench of the Rangoon High Court held that the minor daughter was not liable under the contract, but the mother was liable. (c) Sripad Baji v. Dattatraya Vithal, AIR 1939 Bom 296 (J). This has also been referred to by the District Judge. There, Broomfield, J., indicated that : "The effect of cl. 2 of R. 7 is that the minor or his next friend or guardian may repudiate an agreement including a reference to arbitration which has not been sanctioned by the Court as required by law. If the reference is repudiated, the result is that the award and the decree passed upon it fall to the ground, as far as the minor is concerned." (d) Sheonandan Gope v. Shahdeo Khatik, AIR 1940 Pat 671 (K). There, following AIR 1916 PC 2 (H), a learned Judge of the Patna High Court held that : "The mere fact that a joint bond executed as a part of a compromise is not enforceable against a minor executant of a bond, does not absolve the major executant from liability." 9. In the light of the aforesaid rulings, I concur with the view of the learned District Judge that it is not open to Purangir, petitioner, to avoid the compromise on the ground that the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 had not been complied with, i.e. with reference to the interests of Indargir, minor defendant. 10. I may also point out that this point was taken, for the first time, before the learned District Judge. Learned counsel for the respondent rightly pointed out that under the terms of the compromise, it was Purangir, who was made liable to pay maintenance to Bhawanigir. The learned District Judge has further pointed out that para. 10. I may also point out that this point was taken, for the first time, before the learned District Judge. Learned counsel for the respondent rightly pointed out that under the terms of the compromise, it was Purangir, who was made liable to pay maintenance to Bhawanigir. The learned District Judge has further pointed out that para. 1 of the compromise (which deals with the payment of maintenance to Bhawanigir) was not incorporated in the decree. It was entered in the schedule to the decree as consisting of matters beyond the subject-matter of that suit. Learned counsel for the respondent also pointed out that the suit, which has given rise to this revision petition, was based not only on para. 1 of the compromise but also on the statement of Purangir himself recorded immediately before the compromise was effected. 11. My attention was invited to the fact that para. 1 contains a recital that in case Purangir failed, during his life time to allot land to the plaintiff, then after the death of Purangir, plaintiff would be entitled to recover the maintenance from Indargir out of the income of the Mandir. This question will arise only after the death of Purangir and I do not consider it necessary to express an opinion, at this stage, whether Indargir would be liable in those circumstances. 12. Under all the circumstances, this plea fails. 13. In the second place, it was urged that the compromise of 11-8-1949 was superseded by a subsequent agreement dated 16-11-1950 and, therefore, the former agreement need not be performed, vide S. 62, Contract Act. Both the Courts below have repelled this contention pointing out that the subsequent agreement was not enforceable in law, because it was not registered. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the subsequent agreement did not require registration as it did not create any present demise and further it was a composition deed within the meaning of S. 17(2)(i), Registration Act. A similar argument was addressed to the learned District Judge and was repealed by him on the ground that the terms of the subsequent agreement intended to create a present demise, i.e. to transfer title in the property involved to Bhawanigir and since the value thereof exceeded Rs. 100/-, it was compulsorily registrable. I agree with the view of the District Judge. 100/-, it was compulsorily registrable. I agree with the view of the District Judge. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent cited (a) Chhajju v. Gokul, AIR 1923 All 338 (L), (b) Shankarlal Damodhar v. Ambalal Ajaipal, AIR 1946 Nag 260 (M) and (c) Dammulal Babulal v. Mohammad Bhai, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 306 (N). In the first named decision, Sulaiman, J., held that : "An unregistered compromise does not bind, if as a document, it purports or operates to create or extinguish any right or interest in immovable property worth Rs. 100/-, even though it records a family settlement, it being compulsorily registrable." The ratio in (b) and (c) was : "In order to constitute novation, there must be a new contract and not merely a new agreement, i.e., there must be a new enforceable agreement. If the new agreement is not enforceable, there is no novation. If by reason of any want of formality, such as registration, the document containing the new contract is inadmissible in evidence or otherwise unenforceable, the original contract will still be operative." At the risk of repetition, I may point out that the terms of para. 1 of the compromise dated 11-8-1949 could not be enforced in execution proceeding, because they did not form part of the resultant decree, i.e. they were added merely as a schedule to the decree. Consequently, I concur with the view of the District Judge that the mere fact that the agreement of 16-11-1950 was effected during execution proceedings of the decree relating to para. 2 of the compromise would not have the effect of making it a compromise entered into during execution proceedings and as such saved from registration. Therefore, this plea also fails. 14. In the third place, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the agreement was void under S. 20, Contract Act, because the parties thereto were under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement. He contended that the maufi had been forfeited by the State before the compromise was arrived at and parties were unaware of it. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, maintained that only a very small portion of the maufi had been resumed and the rest subsisted. In my opinion, the case is not covered by the provisions of S. 20, Contract Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, maintained that only a very small portion of the maufi had been resumed and the rest subsisted. In my opinion, the case is not covered by the provisions of S. 20, Contract Act. From a perusal of the terms of the compromise, dated 11-8-1949 it is clear that the reference to the maufi amount of Rs. 315/15/- was made merely to indicate the mode of payment. The existence or otherwise of the maufi was not a condition precedent to the execution of the compromise or otherwise essential to it. The rulings cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, including Barrow, Lane and Ballard Ltd. v. Phillip Phillips and Co. Ltd., (1929) 1 KB 574 (O), have, therefore, no application to the facts of the present case. 15. Lastly, it was contended that there has been a frustration of the contract under S. 56, Contract Act. Reliance was placed, in this connection, on Krell v. Henry, (1903) 2 KB 740 (P). There, the facts were that the coronation procession was due to take place on the 26th or 27th of June, 1902, and it was to pass along Pallmall street. A deposit was paid when the contract was entered into by the defendant to hire a flat from the plaintiff to witness the coronation processions. The processions were cancelled, and the defendant declined to pay the balance of the agreed rent. Under the circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the balance of the rent fixed by the contract, in view of the particular contingency, which subsequently happened. This ruling and the section of the law quoted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, have no application to the facts of the present case, because, as already shown, under the terms of para. 1 of the compromise dated 11-8-1949, Purangir took upon himself to hand over to Bhawanigir certain quantities of atta, dal, etc., or in lieu thereof Rs. 40/- a month. The reference to the maufi amount of Rs. 315/15/- merely indicated the mode of payment, as already shown. 16. In view of all that has been said above, I see no ground to interfere in revision with the decision of the Court below. 17. The revision petition is, accordingly, rejected with costs, assessed at Rs. 30/-. Petition rejected.