JUDGMENT R.N. Gurtu, J. - This is a Plaintiffs appeal and arises in the following way: One Roshan Lal executed a will in respect of a one-third portion of a house of which portion he was the absolute owner under a partition. The will was in favour of his widow Bhagwan Dei. After Roshan Lal's death Bhagwan Dei and Tara Chand, a brother of Roshan Lal, filed a suit against Ram Narain, another brother claiming possession of the one-third portion of the house willed to Bhagwan Dei. It appeared that Ram Narain was at the date of that suit in possession of the portion. That suit was compromised and according to the terms of the compromise Bhagwan Dei was to live in the willed portion for her life and after her death Ram Narain and Tara Chand were to divide up that portion. A decree was passed in the suit in terms of the compromise Subsequently it appears that Bhagwan Dei executed a will in favour of the Defendants purporting to gift to them the one-third portion of the house which she had received from her husband and in respect of which she had entered into a compromise earlier with her husband's two brothers. Tara Chand, one of the brothers, is the grandfather of the present Defendants and Ram Narain, the other brother, is the grandfather of the present Plaintiffs. 2. The grandsons of Ram Narain filed the present partition suit and sought possession of a half of Bhagwan Dei's portion of the house. The suit was contested by the Defendants. The learned Munsif upon construction of the will of Roshan Lal came to the conclusion that Bhagwan Dei had received an absolute interest, that she was competent to enter into a compromise in the course of the previous litigation started by herself and Tara Chand against Ram Narain and that that compromise was binding upon the parties to that litigation and their successors in interest in the present suit. It also hold that the subsequent will of Bhagwan Dei whereby she attempted to will the same property in respect of which she had entered into a compromise in favour of the Defendants was ineffective. In this view of the matter the suit of the Plaintiffs was decreed and a preliminary decree for partition was passed by the learned Munsif. It also hold that the subsequent will of Bhagwan Dei whereby she attempted to will the same property in respect of which she had entered into a compromise in favour of the Defendants was ineffective. In this view of the matter the suit of the Plaintiffs was decreed and a preliminary decree for partition was passed by the learned Munsif. There was an appeal to the court below and the court below reversed the order of the learned Munsif and allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of the learned Munsif and dismissed the Plaintiffs suit. 3. The Plaintiffs have come up in appeal and their contention is that upon the true construction of the will of Roshan Lal dated 18-2-1931, an absolute estate passed to Bhagwan Dei and that as an absolute owner of the property she was entitled in the course of the litigation by herself and Tara Chand against Ram Narain to enter into a compromise and that that compromise was binding on the heirs of Ram Narain and Tara Chand, and the decree which was in terms of the compromise determined the rights of the present Plaintiffs and the present Defendants. It is urged that the Court below was wrong in coming to contrary conclusions. 4. The main question that has been canvassed before me is in regard to the interpretation of the will of Roshan Lal. In that will Roshan Lal stated as follows: Bad wafat mere Must. Bhagwan Dei, zauja meri mazkura, tanha malik kamil was cabis dakhil mutsarrif hogi aur unko jumla haq intiqalat jaedad manqula wa ghairmanqula meri ke misl mere hasil honge. 5. After this the testator directed as follows: Aur bad wafat Must. Bhagwan Dei, zauja mere, ke musammiyan Onkar Singh wa Ram Singh, pisran Munna Lal, nabir-gan wa parwarishkarda mun muqir ke tanha misl mere honge aur unko jumla akhtyarat har qism malikana hasil honge. 6. Thereafter follow the following directions: Lekin musammiyan Onkar Singh wa Ram Singh mazkuran ko lazim hoga ki woh Must. Bhagwan Dei, zauja meri, ki bhi khidmat aur ataat aur khabargiran har tariq par ta hayat Bhagwan Dei, zauja munmuqir, ki misl mere karte rahen aur uski khidmat se juda wa alahda na hon. 6. Thereafter follow the following directions: Lekin musammiyan Onkar Singh wa Ram Singh mazkuran ko lazim hoga ki woh Must. Bhagwan Dei, zauja meri, ki bhi khidmat aur ataat aur khabargiran har tariq par ta hayat Bhagwan Dei, zauja munmuqir, ki misl mere karte rahen aur uski khidmat se juda wa alahda na hon. Agar Onkar Singh wa Ram Singh meri biwi ki khidmat wa ataat se alahda honge aur khabargiran na honge to meri biwi ko akhtyar kulliya hoga woh jis ko chahen meri khandan ke bhatijon men meri jaedad manqula wa ghairmanqula ko baakhtyar khud de den. 7. These are three clauses of the will. In an earlier part of the will the testator states that Onkar Singh and Ram Singh were living with him and had been brought up by him out of love and affection and that they had been serving him as no other member of the family had done. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has argued that under the will Bhagwan Dei got an absolute estate; on the other hand learned Counsel for the Respondents contends that she only got a life estate. His contention is that the will must be construed as a whole and inasmuch as there is a devise also in favour of the nephews' sons the will must be so construed as to make it possible for both devises to become effective. His contention is that the devise in favour of the nephews' sons has the result of cutting down the estate given to Bhagwan Dei to a life estate, and his contention is that in view of the fact that the testator had a special regard for his nephews' sons it must be held that he has created a life estate in favour of his widow and a subsequent state to take effect upon the demise of the widow in favour of the nephews' sons. 9. I am aware that in regard to the will executed round about 1930 it must not be too readily inferred that a Hindu testator has created an absolute estate in fav ur of his widow and that it must be kept in mind that the creation of an absolute estate in favour of a Hindu widow would not easily fit in with the then general approach of Hindus in regard to the rights to be conferred on females. In this case, however, the words of disposition are so clear that it is not possible to come to the conclusion that an absolute estate has not been granted to Bahgwan Dei. She is definitely given the rights of malik and express power is also granted to her to alienate property. She has been given the right to come into possession and to enjoy the property in the same way as the testator. It is true that there is subsequent bequest in favour of the sons of the nephews but if the prior estate is an absolute estate, the subsequent bequest will fail, The two bequests, the first and the subsequent one, are in no way interlinked. There is one other matter which weighs with me in coming to the conclusion (apart from the clear language of the devise in favour of the widow) that the estate created in favour of the widow was an absolute estate and it is this: the third clause of the will which I have quoted empowers the widow to deprive the nephew's sons of the property if they do not serve the widow. This seems to suggest that the testator was leaving it to the widow ultimately whether the named nephews' sons would get any thing and this would lead to the conclusion that he was not averse to conferring complete powers on the widow. Construing the will also as a whole, therefore, I agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the Appellants that Bhagwan Dei got an absolute estate. Upon this finding there ran be no doubt that she was entitled to enter into the previous compromise. Since the predecessors-in-interest of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants were parties to that compromise, the present parties must necessarily be bound by it. The compromise was in the course of a suit and concerned only the subject matter of the suit and, therefore, it did not need any registration. It is conceded before me that if the estate given to Bhagwan Dei was an absolute estate and if the compromise was binding and valid, the Plaintiffs' suit was bound to be decreed. Accordingly I set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and restore that of the learned Munsif. 10. It is conceded before me that if the estate given to Bhagwan Dei was an absolute estate and if the compromise was binding and valid, the Plaintiffs' suit was bound to be decreed. Accordingly I set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and restore that of the learned Munsif. 10. Since a question of the interpretation of a will was involved, I think that the parties should bear their own costs of this appeal. So far as the costs of the court below are concerned, the Plaintiffs will receive their costs. 11. Leave to file a special appeal is asked for. In my view the language of the will is so clear that no other conclusion is possible. I accordingly refuse to grant it.