JUDGMENT G. Mehrotra, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution by the owner of premises No. 13-A, Rajpur Road, Dehra Dun, praying that a writ of certiorari be issued to quash the District Magistrate's order dated 2-12-1954, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer's order dated 30-12-54 and the Addl. Commr's. order dated 6-7-55 and all proceedings for the ejectment of the applicant held in pursuance of these orders; and further that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to evict the opposite party No. 4, Sri Gangadhar Jayal, forthwith and to deliver the possession of the premises to the applicant. 2. The facts as set out in the affidavit filed in support of the petition briefly are that one Sri Nitya Nand Khanna was the tenant of the premises and used to carry on business of exhibiting films in the said premises under the name and style of "New Empire Talkies". He made habitual defaults in the payment of rent and a suit for his ejectment was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Dehra Dun, in the year 1944, which was ultimately decreed on 26-2-1946. The decree however in view of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act which came into force subsequently could not be executed except on the grounds mentioned u/s 3 of the Act. On 16-1-1951 after the decree the Petitioner applied for the release of the premises in his favour and that it should not be allotted to any other person than himself as he intended to carry on his own cinema business in the premises. According to the Petitioner the District Magistrate considered the need of the Petitioner as genuine and on 18-1-1951 he passed an order that after the tenants had been ejected the building in question was not to be allotted to anybody else and the landlord should be permitted to occupy it. As the Petitioner found it very difficult to get ejectment decree executed he entered into a compromise with Nitya Nand Khanna on 3-3-1951 which was filed before the Civil Judge in the course of the execution proceedings under which four years were allowed to the judgment-debtor to vacate the premises. As the Petitioner found it very difficult to get ejectment decree executed he entered into a compromise with Nitya Nand Khanna on 3-3-1951 which was filed before the Civil Judge in the course of the execution proceedings under which four years were allowed to the judgment-debtor to vacate the premises. He had also undertaken not to work the cinema in question in partnership with any other person during the aforesaid period of four years. The tenant however subsequently committed a default in the payment of the rent in spite of the service of notice. The decree was then executed for ejectment and possession was obtained by the Petitioner of the premises on 16-11-1954. The Petitioner further alleges that inspite of the agreement Nitya Nand Khanna took Sri Gangadhar Jayal, opposite party No. 4, as partner in the business who was also ejected in execution proceedings along with the tenant-in-chief Sri Nitya Nand Khanna. After the execution of the decree the Petitioner again applied on 17-11-1954 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the release of the accommodation in his own favour. Other people had also applied for the allotment of the premises. All the applicants, including the Petitioner, were called and after hearing the parties on 22-11-1954 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer fixed on 6-12-1954 for delivering the order in the case. It appears that the matter came up before the District Magistrate as the opposite party No. 4 was not satisfied with the proceedings before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the District Magistrate called for the record from the office of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and on 2-12-1954 passed an order allotting the premises in question to the opposite party No. 4. As the Petitioner had no knowledge of the fact that the District Magistrate had called for the record he could not represent his case properly before him. On 6-12-1954 the parties appeared before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but as the District Magistrate had already passed an order on 2-12-54 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed the following order: The case has been decided by the District Magistrate in his order dated 2-12-1954. Parties informed. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer in view of the order of allotment passed by the District Magistrate proceeded with the eviction of the Petitioner. Parties informed. 3. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer in view of the order of allotment passed by the District Magistrate proceeded with the eviction of the Petitioner. On 8-12-1954 a notice u/s 7-A(1) was issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to the Petitioner to show cause why he should not be evicted. The Petitioner gave his explanation that the allotment order itself is illegal and consequently subsequent proceedings u/s 7-A could not be taken against him. This objection was however rejected on 30-12-1954 by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On 10-1-1955 the Petitioner went up in revision against this order u/s 7-A(4) of the Act to the Commissioner and on 11-1-1955 the Commissioner stayed the enforcement of the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 30 12-1954 during the pendency of the revision. On 24-1-1J55 the opposite party No. 4 applied for vacating the stay order and on 25-1-1955 the Commissioner vacated the stay order without giving any notice to the applicant. On 1-2-1955 the Petitioner was dispossessed by the police force and the possession of the premises was delivered to the opposite party No. 4. The revision itself came up for hearing before the opposite party No. 3 on 6-7-1955 on which date it was dismissed. On these facts the present petition has been filed for the reliefs which I have mentioned above. 4. Notices were issued to the opposite parties, i.e., the District Magistrate, Dehra Dun, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehra Dun, the Addl. Commr., Meerut Division, Meerut, and Sri Gangadhar Jayal, the new allottee of the premises, and counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of the opposite parties. 5. The stand taken by the authorities in the counter-affidavit is that the order of 18-1-1951 was passed by the District Magistrate on the application of the Petitioner but it was only in the nature of an "administrative endorsement to the office." The order does not show that the District Magistrate applied his mind to the question as to whether the need of the landlord was genuine. Moreover, there was no vacancy existing at the time of the order and therefore no order of release in favour of the Petitioner could be passed at that stage. 6. Moreover, there was no vacancy existing at the time of the order and therefore no order of release in favour of the Petitioner could be passed at that stage. 6. As regards the order passed by the District Magistrate on 2-12-1954 the stand taken by the opposite parties is that the District Magistrate by delegating certain powers to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not cease to have that power and the order passed by the District Magistrate himself is not illegal. It has been pointed out in the counter affidavit that the file had been sent by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself to the District Magistrate for advice as the District Magistrate himself had called for a report on the application of the opposite party No. 4. The Petitioner had full knowledge of the fact that the District Magistrate had called for a report on the application of the opposite party No. 4. 7. As regards the subsequent proceedings for ejectment it is contended that they were disposed of on their own merits and as the order of the District Magistrate was a valid order the Petitioner had been rightly ordered to be ejected u/s 7A. 8. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite part) No. 4 certain facts have been given which may be referred to at this stage. According to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 4 Nitya Nand Khanna, the erstwhile tenant of the applicant, had fallen into arrears of rent which was payable at the rate of Rs. 300 per month in the earlier stages but which was enhanced to Rs. 577/8/- per month. In the year 1946 he applicant obtained a decree for ejectment and recovery of mesne profits against Nitya Nand Khanna, but the decree was however kept in abeyance as the parties entered into an agreement that the rate of rent would be Rs. 577/8/- per month. The tenant was permitted to remain in possession for four years; thereafter the landlord was entitled to get (sic) the possession. After the expiry of four years the Petitioner again entered into another agreement with the tenant in 1950 by which he was allowed to continue to remain (sic) possession for another five years on the condition that he would pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 877/8/- per month. After the expiry of four years the Petitioner again entered into another agreement with the tenant in 1950 by which he was allowed to continue to remain (sic) possession for another five years on the condition that he would pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 877/8/- per month. It is suggested that the real object of the landlord in keeping in abeyance the execution of the decree and in entering into a compromise was to get the rent enhanced and he had no desire to occupy the premises for his own personal use. The order of 18-1-1951 which was passed by the District Magistrate was not after considering the need of the applicant and it was only an administrative order passed by him and it cannot have the effect of determining the question of the genuine need of the applicant. 9. It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the opposite p arty No. 4 entered into a contract only with Nitya Nand Khanna on 31-3-1954 under which the opposite party No. 4 entered into possession of the machinery and equipment of the talkies. The consideration for it was that the opposite party No. 4 would pay Rs. 550 per month to Sri Nitya Nand Khanna on account of the hire of the cinema equipment as well as the monthly rent of the premises to the landlord at the rate of Rs. 877/8/-from the date of the agreement. Thus the opposite party No. 4 was to carry on the cinema business in his independent capacity. After the agreement the Petitioner accepted the rent from the opposite party No. 4 and thus specifically there was an agreement entered into between him and Sri Nitya Nand Khanna. 10. It is further asserted by the opposite party No. 4 in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit that he had applied for the allotment of the premises to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 23-10 1954 and also made an application to the District Magistrate for the same purpose on 17-11-1954. 10. It is further asserted by the opposite party No. 4 in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit that he had applied for the allotment of the premises to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 23-10 1954 and also made an application to the District Magistrate for the same purpose on 17-11-1954. These applications along with the application filed by the landlord himself were heard by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 22-11-1954 in the presence of the parties and their counsel and the District Magistrate On a reference by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself passed an administrative order on 2-12-1954 for the guidance of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It was not necessary for the District Magistrate to hear the parties as the order passed by the District Magistrate is only an executive or administrative order and it is not open to challenge it in these proceedings, and the subsequent proceedings were valid. The emphasis is laid on the fact that the opposite party No. 4 had already invested a large sum of money by way of security deposit and towards advance payments on account of booking of films, and further incurred an expenditure of another Rs. 40,000 in purchasing a new cinema machine and equipment and if the orders are passed setting aside the allotment order the opposite party No. 4 will be greatly prejudiced. 11. The Petitioner has argued three main points in the case. Firstly, he has contended that the order of 18-1-1951 whereby the District Magistrate ordered that the landlord would be put in possession as soon as the premises were vacated by the tenants was an order of release in favour of the landlord on the ground that his need was genuine and as such it was not open to the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to ignore that order and allot the premises to a third party. The effect of the order of 18-1-1951 was that as soon as the premises fell vacant the Petitioner would be entitled to take over possession of it. There was no vacancy then so as to give jurisdiction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot the premises to a third party. 12. The effect of the order of 18-1-1951 was that as soon as the premises fell vacant the Petitioner would be entitled to take over possession of it. There was no vacancy then so as to give jurisdiction to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to allot the premises to a third party. 12. Secondly, it was contended that the matter having been heard by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 22-11-1954 the District Magistrate had no right to pass an order of allotment on 2-12-1954. He had delegated his powers to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who heard the parties on merits and fixed 6-12-1954 for final decision and it was not open to the District Magistrate to pass any orders especially when he had not heard the parties. In this connection it was further contended that assuming that the ultimate order was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer allotting the premises to the opposite party No. 4 acting upon the advice of the District Magistrate as the order of 2-12-1954 was only an advice given by the District Magistrate on a reference being made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was illegal as he did not apply his own independent mind to the question of the genuine need of the applicant. The order of allotment therefore on the basis of which proceedings for ejectment were started is illegal, and there being no valid allotment order in favour of the opposite party No. 4 the possession of the applicant could not be regarded as one in contravention of the order passed u/s 7(1) and he was not liable to be ejected. 13. Thirdly, it was urged that u/s 7A proviso to Clause (1) the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall not proceed under this Sub-section if he considers otherwise inexpedient to do so. 13. Thirdly, it was urged that u/s 7A proviso to Clause (1) the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall not proceed under this Sub-section if he considers otherwise inexpedient to do so. In the present case the order of allotment had been passed by the District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not go into the question of the validity of that order and proceeded u/s 7A without regard to the circumstances that there had already been an order of the District Magistrate on 18-1-1951 releasing the premises in favour of the Petitioner and thus the Rent Control and Eviction Officer failed to apply his mind to the question whether it was otherwise inexpedient to take proceedings under this section against the Petitioner. 14. Regarding the first point raised by the Petitioner there is nothing in the order indicating that the District Magistrate had applied his mind the question of the genuine need of the Petitioner. It is true that no order of allotment need be passed in favour of the landlord Section 7(1) only gives power to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to direct the landlord to let or not to let any accommodation to any person either by a general or special order. The language of Section 7(1) thus signifies that no order of allotment can be passed in favour of the landlord himself under that section. This however does not mean that the order passed on 18-1-1951 was an order determining the needs of the Petitioner. This has to be determined on the interpretation of the order itself. The order has not been produced by any of the parties. The substance of the order which has been given in the affidavit filed by the Petitioner does not suggest that there was any indication in the order itself to the effect that the need of the Petitioner was found to be genuine by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and there was an application pending on behalf of the Petitioner for the release of the accommodation in his favour. Apart from this, subsequent to the order of 18-1-1951 the Petitioner entered into a compromise with a tenant and permitted him to remain in possession and in the year 1954 made another application for the release of the premises in his favour. Apart from this, subsequent to the order of 18-1-1951 the Petitioner entered into a compromise with a tenant and permitted him to remain in possession and in the year 1954 made another application for the release of the premises in his favour. In view of the conduct of the Petitioner it cannot be said that he regarded the order of 18-1-1951 as a subsisting order of release in his favour and had any intention to act on that order. That order, even assuming that it was an order of release, could only determine the need of the applicant at the time when the order had been passed. The question whether the need of the Petitioner was genuine in the year 1954 when he made the second application had to be determined on the facts and circumstances existing at that time and the authorities had to apply their mind afresh on that question. In my judgment therefore there is no substance in this contention of the Petitioner. 15. Coming now to the next question raised by the Petitioner, the facts have been set out clearly in the affidavits filed by the parties. It is admitted that in the year 1954 a petition had been filed by the opposite party No. 4 for the allotment of the premises in his favour both before the District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. There was also an application by the present Petitioner for the release of the premises in his favour. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer heard the parties on 22-11-1954 and had fixed 6-12-1954 for final decision. Meanwhile the District Magistrate called for a report on the application made by the opposite party No. 4 to him and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself referred the matter for advice to the District Magistrate. The file of the case therefore was before the District Magistrate and on a perusal and consideration of the applications and the entire record the District Magistrate passed an order on the 2nd of December 1954 for the allotment of the premises to the opposite party No. 4. Paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit filed by the opposite party No. 4 reads as follows: That as regards para 19 of the affidavit it is denied that the District Magistrate passed the allotment order on 2-12-1954. Paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit filed by the opposite party No. 4 reads as follows: That as regards para 19 of the affidavit it is denied that the District Magistrate passed the allotment order on 2-12-1954. The said order is merely administrative and was probably made for the guidance of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who had referred the matter to the District Magistrate for seeking administrative guidance. The order dated 2-12-1954 cannot be deemed to be an allotment order as contemplated by Section 7(2) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act. 16. This paragraph clearly shows that the stand taken by the opposite party No. 4 is that the allotment order was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The order of 2-12-1954 passed by the District Magistrate was nothing but an administrative advice given by him to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as he had referred the matter to him for his advice. The stand however taken by the authorities in their counter-affidavit appears to be different. Their stand is that the District Magistrate had concurrent jurisdiction to pass an allotment order and the delegation of power to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not mean that the District Magistrate had ceased to possess that power. Consequently the order of 2-12-1954 was an order of allotment validly passed by the District Magistrate. The subsequent order issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was only in execution of that order. Taking either view of the matter in my opinion the order of allotment in favour of the opposite party No. 4 cannot stand. The allotment and the proceedings u/s 7 against the Petitioner must therefore be quashed. If the order of the District Magistrate dated 2-12-1954 is treated to be only an administrative advice given by him to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as urged by the opposite party No. 4 the subsequent order of allotment passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on which proceedings u/s 7-A have been started is invalid inasmuch as it is not the result of the application of his independent mind. It was an order passed under the direction of the District Magistrate and as such it is illegal. 17. In the case of Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate Kanpur and Ors. It was an order passed under the direction of the District Magistrate and as such it is illegal. 17. In the case of Mahabir Prasad v. The District Magistrate Kanpur and Ors. 1955 A.W.R. (H.C.) 384 it was observed by a Bench of this Court.-- The mere fact that another officer has also been empowered under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act does not take away the District Magistrate's own rower. Both of them can exercise concurrent jurisdiction. If a Petitioner instead of applying to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer approaches the District Magistrate the latter has certainly jurisdiction to pass a suitable order thereon. But a power under concurrent jurisdiction can be exercised so long as it has not been exercised in respect of the same matter by another co-ordinate authority. To hold that the District Magistrate can interfere with an order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer even after that officer has passed an order will mean converting an authority of concurrent jurisdiction into a superior authority. Moreover anomalous results will follow from such a proposition. A District Magistrate who has authorised the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to act for him cannot rescind the order previously passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The District Magistrate cannot, do so even acting as a superior authority because a superior authority cannot, where a. power to that effect is not conferred on it by statute, set aside an order of a subordinate' authority passed in exercise of the statutory powers. A Rent Control and Eviction Officer cannot lawfully cancel his own order when that cancellation is not the result of the proper exercise of his own discretion but is brought about in pursuance of an order of a superior authority and such an order is liable to be set aside. 18. That was no doubt a case where a particular order of allotment passed by a Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been cancelled by him at the direction of the District Magistrate. The principle, to my mind, applies to the present case as well. 18. That was no doubt a case where a particular order of allotment passed by a Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been cancelled by him at the direction of the District Magistrate. The principle, to my mind, applies to the present case as well. The fact that the two authorities possess concurrent jurisdiction does not take away the powers of any of those officers to act independently but when the proceedings had been going on before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer it was the Rent Control and Eviction Officer alone who had power to exercise his independent mind on the question whether the allotment should or should not be made in favour of the opposite party No. 4. It was open to him to take into consideration the advice given by the superior officer but it was not open to him to abdicate his own authority in favour of the superior officer and substitute his own discretion by the discretion and judgment of the superior officer. An order passed by a competent officer without applying his own independent mind to the considerations relevant for the exercise of that power is no order at all passed by him. In the case of Shri Jagdishprasad v. The State of U.P. and Ors. 1955 A.W.R. (H.C.) 616 it was held that: The order of allotment is an administrative order and it is open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer himself to revise his previous order, so long as the order of cancellation can be said to be an order passed by himself. 19. If the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has applied his mind independently to the question it cannot be said because he had considered the matter afresh on the suggestion of the District Magistrate it is not an order passed by him. The criterion in my opinion in each case would be whether it can be said on a perusal of the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that it was his own order and that he had applied his mind independently to the question. It cannot be said that because he considered the matter afresh on the suggestion of the District Magistrate it was not an order passed by him. It cannot be said that because he considered the matter afresh on the suggestion of the District Magistrate it was not an order passed by him. But on the contrary if it appears from the perusal of the order itself and the surrounding circumstances that the order was passed not independently by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer but at the instance of the District Magistrate such an order cannot be regarded as an order passed by the officer himself. In the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 it was also held by the Supreme Court that an order passed cancelling a licence to run a cinema by the district authorities at the instance of the State Government was not permissible and must be set aside. Their Lordships interpreting the order came to the conclusion that the licensing authority had not applied its own independent mind to the question but had only communicated the direction of the State Government cancelling the licence. In the present case the stand taken by the opposite party No. 4 himself is that what the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had done was that he allotted the house on the advice of the District Magistrate and that the District Magistrate had not passed any order of allotment but had given his opinion in the matter. But from the perusal of the allotment order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer it is abundantly clear that in effect he had executed the order passed by the District Magistrate and had not applied his own mind to the question of genuine need of the landlord. 20. Next it was contended that from the perusal of the order of the District Magistrate it will appear that he had applied his mind to the question of the Petitioner's need and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in carrying out the advice of the District Magistrate accepted the finding of the District Magistrate that the need of the Petitioner was not genuine. As I have already observed it was for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who had to make allotment to pass orders after considering the application of the landlord Under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the Act and not to act under the direction of the District Magistrate. 21. As I have already observed it was for the Rent Control and Eviction Officer who had to make allotment to pass orders after considering the application of the landlord Under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the Act and not to act under the direction of the District Magistrate. 21. If the stand taken by the State Government is accepted that the District Magistrate himself passed the allotment order on 2-12-1954 which he had power to do and the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is only in effect carrying out the orders of the District Magistrate the result is that the proceedings u/s 7-A have been started on the orders of the District Magistrate but not on the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Section 7-A(1) provides: Where in pursuance of an order of the District Magistrate under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 the vacancy of any accommodation is required to be reported and is not so reported or where an order requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let has been duly passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 and the District Magistrate believes or has reason to believe that any person has, in contravention of the said order, occupied the accommodation or any part thereof, he may call upon the person in occupation to show cause within a time to be fixed by him why he should not be evicted therefrom. 22. This Sub-section authorises the Rent Control and Eviction Officer or the District Magistrate to take action only if there has been a valid order u/s 7(1) and the person is in occupation in contravention of such an order. Section 7(1) contemplates an order by the proper authority directing the land lord to let or not to let accommodation to any person. The order of the District Magistrate in the present case was only an order allotting the premises to Sri Gangadhar Jayal. The order directing the landlord to let or not to let was in fact passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Therefore there was no order u/s 7(1) by the District Magistrate which could be enforced u/s 7-A. The possession of the Petitioner therefore could not be treated to be one in contravention of an order passed by the District Magistrate on 2-12-1954 and the proceedings u/s 7-A against the Petitioner were illegal. 23. Therefore there was no order u/s 7(1) by the District Magistrate which could be enforced u/s 7-A. The possession of the Petitioner therefore could not be treated to be one in contravention of an order passed by the District Magistrate on 2-12-1954 and the proceedings u/s 7-A against the Petitioner were illegal. 23. The order passed by the Commissioner rejecting the revision is based on curious reasonings. He has rejected the revision not on the merits but on the ground that the order of the District Magistrate of 2-12-1954 did not contravene any specific provision of the law. It was not necessary for him to hear the parties in executive matters and as the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer u/s 7-A dated 30-12-1954 was passed after giving the hearing to the parties there has been no illegality or material irregularity in the order passed by him. Section 7A(4) provides that: No appeal shall lie from any order passed by the District Magistrate under this section, but the Commissioner may revise the said order, if he is satisfied that the District Magistrate has acted illegally or with material irregularity or has wrongly refused to act and may make such order as he thinks fit. 24. The question whether the order of allotment itself was a valid order was a matter which could have been considered by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and had been considered by him in the present case, and the Commissioner should have examined that decision on its own merits and should not have rejected the revision on the mere ground that as the hearing was given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer any provisions of the Act had not been contravened by him or by the District Magistrate. 25. As regards the joint urged by the opposite party No. 4 that the Petitioner had no genuine need but the whole object of the Petitioner for asking the ejectment of the tenant was to increase the rent as will be evidenced from the conduct of the Petitioner this point need not be gone into at this stage. It will be open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider this matter when dealing with the prayer of the Petitioner for the release of the premises in his favour in order to determine whether the need of the Petitioner is genuine or not. It will be open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to consider this matter when dealing with the prayer of the Petitioner for the release of the premises in his favour in order to determine whether the need of the Petitioner is genuine or not. This Court will not go in to the question of evidence at this stage and determine whether the need of the Petitioner is genuine or not. 26. In my opinion therefore the proceedings u/s 7A must be quashed as the order of allotment passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not passed by him but was passed at the instance and direction of the District Magistrate and he had not considered himself the question of the genuineness or otherwise of the need of the Petitioner and had not complied with the provisions of Rule 6. Further if the order of the District Magistrate dated 2-12-1954 itself is regarded as an order making an allotment it is not an order as contemplated by Section 7(1) directing the landlord to let or not to let and as such the possession of the Petitioner could not be regarded as being in contravention of any order passed u/s 7(1). 27. I therefore allow this petition to this extent that I set aside the order of the District Magistrate dated 2-12-1954 and the consequential order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 30-12-1954 and the Additional Commissioner's order dated 6-7-1955. The case will go back to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and it will be open to him to dispose of the matter after considering the Petitioner's application dated 17-11-1954 for the release of the property in his favour. As the Petitioner has not succeeded on all the points raised by him in my opinion the parties shall bear their own costs.