JUDGMENT 1. This a second appeal by the Defendant. A suit was brought against him by the Respondent for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,000 as principal and Rs. 23 as interest. His case was that the Appellant had taken a loan of Rs. 3,000 from, him on 17-1-1949, that he had made an entry in his account book then and there and that he had delivered a copy thereof to him (the Appellant). 2. The defence was a complete denial of the taking of the loan. It was further pleaded by the Appellant that he was an agriculturist, that the Respondent had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 39 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act and therefore, the suit was not maintainable. 3. The trial court hold that a sum of Rs. 3,000 was borrowed by the Appellant, that an entry was made in the Respondent's account book, that a copy thereof was prepared in the Appellant's presence, and that it was delivered to him. The suit was decreed for the principal amount only but not for the interest. 4. Dissatisfied with this decision, the Appellant went up in appeal. The learned District Judge upheld 'with some reluctance' the finding of the trial court about the borrowing of Rs. 3,000 by the Appellant. As regards his findings on other issues, there is a dispute between the parties about the interpretation of his judgment. The Appellant's contention is that he has not recorded any finding upholding the trial court's findings to the effect that a copy was prepared in the Appellant's presence and was delivered to him; while the learned Counsel for the Respondent maintains that such findings have been recorded by the learned District Judge. This is one of the questions which we shall have to determine. In the end, the learned District Judge upheld the decision of the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal with costs. 5. In this second appeal the Appellant's main contention is that the requirements of Section 39(1) have not been complied with and therefore the suit is not maintainable. But before taking up this question, it is necessary to determine whether or not the learned District Judge has upheld the learned Munsif's findings about the making of the copy and delivering it to the Appellant. 6. But before taking up this question, it is necessary to determine whether or not the learned District Judge has upheld the learned Munsif's findings about the making of the copy and delivering it to the Appellant. 6. The learned District Judge has at one stage expressed himself in these terms, viz.: In the present case the Plaintiff had led evidence to the effect that he made entry in his account books in the presence of the Defendant and furnished a copy of this entry to the Defendant. This appears to be sufficient compliance with Section 39(1) Agriculturists' Relief Act. 7. Had this passage stood by itself, there would have been no difficulty in holding that the learned District Judge agreed with the learned Munsif, but a little later the learned District Judge made the following observations, viz: In my opinion, assuming that the Plaintiffs story is true, there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 39(l) U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 8. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the learned District Judge simply assumed, but did not decide, that the provisions of Section 39(1) had been complied with. It may, however, be pointed out that the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal and decreed the Respondent's claim. Had he not approved of the trial court's two findings viz., that a copy was prepared and that it was delivered to the Appellant he would not have held that the provisions of Section 39(1) had been complied with. 9. It may also be pointed out that the cases of Ram Ghulam v. Kandhai Lal 1946 A.W.R. (H.C.) 66 and Naubat Rai v. Jugal Kiskore and Ors. 1949 A.W.R. (H.C.) 202 had been cited before the learned District Judge. In each of those two cases, the finding was that copy had not been delivered to the debtor and on that finding the Court had held that the provisions of Section 39(1) had not been complied with. The learned District Judge distinguished these rulings. He could not have distinguished them unless he intended to hold that the copy had been prepared and delivered. 10. Moreover, the 1earned District Judge has remarked towards the end of his judgment as follows: I accept the trial court's finding on issue No. 1. 11. The learned District Judge distinguished these rulings. He could not have distinguished them unless he intended to hold that the copy had been prepared and delivered. 10. Moreover, the 1earned District Judge has remarked towards the end of his judgment as follows: I accept the trial court's finding on issue No. 1. 11. The trial court's finding is to be found towards the conclusion of the discussion on that issue and is in the following terms: Keeping in view the entire evidence, facts and circumstances of the case, I have come to the conclusion that the Defendant did take Rs. 3,000 as loan from the Plaintiff on the basis of the bahi-khata entry whose copy was given to him. 12. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the proper interpretation of the judgment of the leaned District Judge is that he upheld the trial court's two findings viz., that the copy of the entry was prepared in the Appellant's presence and that it was delivered to him. 13. Next comes the question whether this was a sufficient compliance with the provision of Section 39(1). The relevant portion of this section runs as follows: Section 39(1). "Every loan given after the date on which this Act comes into force shall be evidenced by a written document of which a copy shall be given to the debtor. 14. The first essential of this section is that there should be a 'written document'. The term 'document' has been defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act as meaning ''any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which nay be used, for the purpose of recording that matter." The entry in the Plaintiff's account book is certainly a document and is in writing. The question is whether it satisfies the requirements of Section 39(1). 15. In the aforesaid two cases also the entry had been made by the creditor in his own account books, but no copy thereof had been delivered to the debtor. The question is whether it satisfies the requirements of Section 39(1). 15. In the aforesaid two cases also the entry had been made by the creditor in his own account books, but no copy thereof had been delivered to the debtor. The learned Judges held that such an entry was unreliable and did not amount to a "written document." They conceded that it was not required by law that the entry should be signed by the debtor, but they were anxious to lay down that the "written document" should be prepared in a manner so as to exclude all possibilities of fraud. The observations of Braund, J., in the first of those aforesaid two cases are as follows: I have some difficulty in thinking that an entry by a creditor entirely for his own domestic purposes, in his own private accounts of which he would not dream of sending a copy to his debtor can really be regarded as a written document which "evidence" the loan within the meaning of Section 39(1) of the Act. 16. Thereafter he went to say again: I think that Section 39 contemplates some document that is brought into existence for the purpose of constituting as between the debtor and the creditor the evidence of the transaction and of its terms, of which the debtor can be given a copy so that he may have a record of the full term of the liability to which he has engaged himself. 17. These observations of Braund, J., were quoted with approval in the second case cited above. It will thus appear that what weighed with the learned Judges who decided those cases was the circumstance that an entry could be made by the creditor in his books behind the back of the debtor and he could write anything that he liked for his own benefit. They refused to accept such a unilateral document prepared in circumstances which admitted of a fraud being practised upon the debtor, as a ''written document" within the meaning of the term as used in Section 39(1) of the Act. The present case, however, is distinguishable from both those cases. In the present case, the entry was made, according to the findings of the courts below, in the presence of the debtor and a copy thereof was delivered to him then and there. The present case, however, is distinguishable from both those cases. In the present case, the entry was made, according to the findings of the courts below, in the presence of the debtor and a copy thereof was delivered to him then and there. All possibilities of fraud are eliminated in the present case and this case stands on a footing entirely different from that of the two cases cited above. We are, therefore, of opinion that the entry which was made by the Respondent in his account book was in the circumstances of the present case, a ''written document" within the meaning of Section 39 (1) of the Act. 18. But this by itself is not a sufficient compliance with Section 39 (1). That section requires that the loan must be "evidenced" by a written document. We have, therefore, to see whether this document evidences the loan. The entry made by the Respondent in his account books runs as follows: Sri Sambat 2005 Miti Magh Badi 2, war Somwar Tarikh 17 Mihina January, San 1949 Rs. 3,000 Beni Madho Gupta Mathur Vaishya Sakin Katra Wale ke nam. Rs. 3,000 Rokar Nagad diya haste Beni Madho ke. 19. This entry indicates this much only that a sum of Rs. 3,000 was paid to Beni Madho Gupta (Appellant) on the aforesaid date. But what the reason for the payment was does not appear. In other words, this entry does not by itself indicate whether the payment was made by way of a loan to him or whether it was made in discharge of a pre-existing liability on the part of the person making the payment or as a price for certain purchases made or for any other account. As we read Section 39(1), not only a written document must be prepared, but the said document should also indicate that the payment was made by way of a loan. The document should not only contain recitals to the effect that the payment was made but that that payment was made as a debt advanced to the person to whom it was paid. The term 'laon' has been defined in Section 2(10) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The relevant portion of the definition runs as follows: 'Loan' means an advance to an agriculturist whether of money or in kind, and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan.... 20. The term 'laon' has been defined in Section 2(10) of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The relevant portion of the definition runs as follows: 'Loan' means an advance to an agriculturist whether of money or in kind, and shall include any transaction which is in substance a loan.... 20. In a transaction of loan the relation of debtor and creditor comes into existence between the parties. Therefore, the written document, in order to evidence a loan, must contain an indication to the effect that the payment made creates a relationship of creditor and debtor between the parties. Unfortunately the entry made by the creditor in the present case does not give any such indication. 21. Oral evidence was adduced by the Respondent on this point, but such evidence is inadmissible. Section 91 of the Evidence Act lays down that: When the terms of a contract...have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract,...or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions herein before contained. 22. Therefore, the circumstance that payment was being made as a debt should have appeared from the document itself and the oral evidence to prove that circumstance was inadmissible. 23. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on two decisions of the erstwhile Chief Court of Avadh in support of his contention viz. that it is not necessary that the "written document" should contain intrinsic evidence of the fact that relationship of creditor and debtor has sprung up. The first case is that of Brij Lal v. Surajman AIR 1941 Oud 420. In that case the suit was based on a promissory note and a receipt but the promissory note had to be excluded from evidence on account of being insufficiently stamped. The receipt was, however, treated as a "written document". It contained a recital to the effect that it had been executed in lieu of the consideration of a promissory note. This recital was sufficient to connect it with the promissory note, and to evidence the loan. The receipt was, however, treated as a "written document". It contained a recital to the effect that it had been executed in lieu of the consideration of a promissory note. This recital was sufficient to connect it with the promissory note, and to evidence the loan. This case is therefore clearly distinguishable and it does not support the conclusion sought to be drawn from it. 24. The other case is that of Sunder Lal v. Ram Dayal Singh AIR 1941 Oud 420. In that case three cheques were delivered to the debtor two of which were signed by the debtor himself and one by his transferee before payment was received in respect thereof from the Bank. Thus the cheques were bilateral documents signed both by the creditor and the debtor. In such cases the Court might presume that unless the Defendant gives some explanation for the receipt of the money the advance was made by way of loan. The present one is a case of a unilateral document and is clearly distinguishable from the above decision. But if the learned Judge who decided this case intended to hold that mere proof of payment without indicating the nature thereof was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 39(1). We are, with utmost respect, unable to agree with him. We are definitely of the opinion that unless there is intrinsic evidence in the written document itself that the payment was made by way of a debt, the document does not evidence the loan and fails to comply with the requirements of Section 39(1) of the Act. 25. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable by virtue, of the provisions of Section 39(1) of the Act. The appeal is allowed, the decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.