ORDER This is an application for obtaining leave to appeal to the Honble Supreme Court under Art. 132 of the Constitution of India against the order of this Court, dated 29-8-1955 passed in Civil Misc. (Writ) Petition No. 8 of 1955 by which a writ of certiorari was issued against the present petitioners and the orders dated 26-7-1954 and 8-10-1954 were quashed as these constituted an invasion upon the fundamental rights of respondents 1 to 464 as these orders were likely to cause utter destitution to these respondents leading to starvation of their cattle and also because these orders had been passed in breach of law and without jurisdiction. 2. It has been alleged in the present petition that a question of interpretation of Art. 226 of the Constitution would arise in this case as respondents 1 to 464 could not legally acquire any right of pasturage under S. 26, Indian Limitation Act, unless they first got that right established in the civil Court by means of a regular suit and as no suit had been filed there could be no infringement of their rights relating to property. The other contention which has been put forward on behalf of the present petitioner is that no writ of certiorari could be issued in favour of respondents 1 to 464 who form a fluctuating body. 3. On behalf of respondents 1 to 464 it has been contended that they had acquired a right of easement regarding pasturage on the land in question and so the present petitioners could not settle the land to respondents 465 and 466 under S. 6, Chapter 1 - Part 2 of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, 1886 and as they did so the fundamental rights regarding the property of respondents 1 to 464 were infringed and as certiorari is a writ of right it could properly be issued against the petitioners in order to save respondents 1 to 464 from devastation and utter ruin. It has further been contended that no question of interpretation of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India arises in this case and no such plea was taken by the petitioners at the time of the hearing of the original writ petition. It has further been contended that no question of interpretation of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India arises in this case and no such plea was taken by the petitioners at the time of the hearing of the original writ petition. The right of pasturage enjoyed by these respondents was, it is contended not categorically denied on behalf of the petitioners by any person competent to do so even though this matter was within the special knowledge of the petitioners and reliance has been placed on S. 106, Indian Evidence Act in this connection. Lastly, it was contended that the Assam Land Revenue Manual was introduced in Manipur State on 18-11-1946 and not in 1952 as stated in para 6 of the petition. 4. It has been admitted that out of 27 paris of land known as Lowangsangbam Grazing Grounds, 12 paris of land were dereserved and given settlement to the pro forma respondents 465 and 466 and 6 paris each were given to them for starting a brick-field. Respondents 1 to 464 appealed to the Chief Commissioner against the said settlement, representing that if 12 paris were given for starting brick-field, the area left for grazing ground would be inadequate. The Chief Commissioner petitioner 2 heard this matter in Revenue Appeal Case No. 46 of 1954 and reduced the area from 6 paris to 3 paris each, but no further. Respondents 1 to 464 then brought Writ Petition No. 8 of 1955 in this Court praying for a writ of certiorari or any other writ of like nature or order for quashing the order passed by the Chief Commissioner granting settlement of that land for brick-field on the allegation that they had been enjoying the said land as grazing ground for their cattle and had acquired right of easement of pasturage. They relied on the order of Mr. C Gimson, Political Agent, dated 6-1-1941, Ext. 1. Respondent 1 filed an affidavit also to prove the above mentioned allegation and as no gentleman having knowledge of the affairs of this locality filed any affidavit in rebuttal and the age of the person who filed the counter-affidavit on behalf of the present petitioner, was not given, it was held by this Court that the allegation made by respondents 1 to 464 regarding their right of pasturage was duly proved. Respondents 1 to 464, not only relied on Mr. Respondents 1 to 464, not only relied on Mr. Gimsons order but also on the order passed by the Chief Commissioner on 26-7-1954 in Revenue Appeal Case No. 46 of 1954 wherein it was clearly mentioned that - "The two respondents applied for land for brick-fields. They were given six paris each out of the Luwangsangbam Village Grazing Ground, the area of which is 27 paris (had been incorrectly described as 17 paris)." Similarly, the order dated 8-10-1954, passed by the Honble Chief Commissioner in this very case also disclosed that the authorities themselves had been admitting cleary that Lowangsangbam Grazing ground existed in 27 paris of land in question. Even, in the order issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Manipur dated 8-5-1954, Ex. A/1, it was clearly mentioned- "The Chief Commissioner has been pleased to sanction the dereservation of 12 paris of land from the Luwangsangbam village grazing ground marked A in the attached map for the opening of brick fields." All these documents and the affidavit filed by respondent 1, which was not rebutted by any person having information about the locality were deemed sufficient for establishing the right of respondents 1 to 464 to this property in view of the provisions of S. 106, Indian Evidence Act. It has been held in Lokesh Chandra v. Commr. Rohilkhand Division, Bareilly, AIR 1956 All 147 (A), that where no counter-affidavit is filed on behalf of the opposite parties, the facts alleged in the affidavit filed in support of the petition have to be accepted as true, vide also P. J. Joseph v. Asst. Excise Commr., Ernakulam, AIR 1953 Trav-C 146 (B). I, therefore, think that in this case the allegation of respondents 1 to 464 was rightly believed as besides their uncontradicted affidavit there was cogent documentary evidence on this record to show that their right of pasturage existed in this land from time immemorial and for more than 60 years. 5. Excise Commr., Ernakulam, AIR 1953 Trav-C 146 (B). I, therefore, think that in this case the allegation of respondents 1 to 464 was rightly believed as besides their uncontradicted affidavit there was cogent documentary evidence on this record to show that their right of pasturage existed in this land from time immemorial and for more than 60 years. 5. The learned Government Advocate has urged that a right of easement acquired under S. 26, Indian Limitation Act, remained inchoate and it does not become absolute or indefeasible right until it is brought in question in some suit and reliance has been placed on Siti Kanta Pal v. Radha Gobinda Sen, AIR 1929 Cal 542 (C) Machiparayan v. Narayana Goundan, AIR 1920 Mad 541 (D) and Traders and Miners, Ltd. v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1944 Pat 261 (E). These cases were decided before the promulgation of the Indian Constitution and all that they seek to lay down is that title to easement should not be deemed to be completed merely upon the effluxion of the period mentioned in the statute. It has however been held in AIR 1944 Pat 261 (E) already referred to above, that easement as defined in S. 2(5), Limitation Act includes rights known as profits a prendre. 6. Section 2(5), Indian Limitation Act defines easement as follows : "Easement includes a right not arising from contract, by which one person is entitled to remove and appropriate for his own profit any part of the soil belonging to another or anything growing in, or attached to or subsisting upon, the land of another." 7. The right of pasturage has been recognized as one of the rights which can be acquired as easement, vide Secy. of State v. Mathurabhai, 14 Bom 213 (F); P. C. Bhola Nath v. Midnapore Zamindari Co., 31 Cal 503 (PC) (G). 8. It has been held in Abdul Hosain v. Sadai Govinda, 42 Cal WN 1102 (H) that right to pasturage cannot be claimed by an indefinite body of persons on the basis of a lost grant, but such a right can be based on custom. 9. The question which now arises is whether such a right acquired by custom or under S. 26, Limitation Act can be deemed to be "property" . It has been clearly held by this Court in Rabindra Kumar v. Forest Officer, Govt. 9. The question which now arises is whether such a right acquired by custom or under S. 26, Limitation Act can be deemed to be "property" . It has been clearly held by this Court in Rabindra Kumar v. Forest Officer, Govt. of Manipur, AIR 1955 Manipur 49 (I), that the word property is the most comprehensive of all the terms that can be used, inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have, vide Jones v. Skinner (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87 at p. 90 (J). Respondents 1 to 464 had been grazing their cattle in the land in question from the time of their ancestors and this customary right of theirs, was a right to property and curtailment of that right would constitute an infringement of their fundamental rights guaranteed to them under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution. I am, therefore, of opinion that old rulings relied on by the learned Government Advocate are not any authority for the proposition that respondents 1 to 464 had no fundamental rights relating to property in the land in question, vide The Chairman, Howarh Municipality v. Khettra Kristo Mitter, 10 Cal WN 1044 (K), where it has been observed at page 1051 : "As pointed out by Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 (L) every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there, are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found." Respondents 1 to 464 acquired a right to property in the form of a customary easement, to graze their cattle in the land in question and they were entitled to a protection of this right under Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is thus no question of interpretation of the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution in this case as the Article is quite clear. It has been observed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 1953 edition at page 4 : "When the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It has been observed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 1953 edition at page 4 : "When the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable, says Vattel, to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Such language best declares, without more, the intention of the lawgiver, and is decisive of it.............Where by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced, even though it is absurd or mischievous." Article 226 of the Constitution clearly provides for issuing of writs including writs, in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part 3 and for any other purpose. Articles 19 and 31 are to be found in part 3 of the Constitution and so it cannot be accepted that any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution of India arises in the present case within the meaning of Art. 132. 10. Regarding the contention that no writ of certiorari could be issued in this case as the relief had been asked for on behalf of a fluctuating body. In my opinion, this contention also has no force for the right of pasturage was claimed by the residents of Luwangsangbam, Kontha Khabam and Matai villages and if the Kartas of the different families of these villages brought this petition, it could not properly be urged that the petition had been brought by a fluctuating body. I have already pointed above that a right of pasturage based on custom can be claimed by an indefinite body of persons, vide 42 Cal WN 1102 (H), and so this contention also has no force. 11. The affidavit filed by the opposite parties on 29-5-1956 in this Court shows that the Assam Land Revenue Manual was enforced in Manipur State in 1947 after the Manipur State Darbar passed a resolution on 18-11-1946 for its formal introduction and it was approved by H. E. the Governor of Assam. Under S. 6 Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Manual, such rights of easements as have been claimed by the respondents Nos. Under S. 6 Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Manual, such rights of easements as have been claimed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 464 have been expressly recognized and in any case no settlement could be made with the stranger without giving other lands to the petitioners appropriate to the area of the grazing ground, which was being taken away from them. 12. The present case does not involve any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India even though new points which have been raised in this leave petition are taken into consideration. In leave petition only those points should be urged which had been expressly raised during the hearing of the original writ petition and no new points ought to be allowed to be raised. I see no ground for granting the leave prayed for. 13. I, therefore, reject the present petition. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition rejected.