ORDER : This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, by the Bhopal Sugar Industries Limited, Sehore, for the issue of directions, orders or a Writ in the nature of Mandamus to compel the Income-tax Officer, Bhopal, respondent, to ascertain the average transport charges per maund from the centres to the factory, while determining the market value of the sugarcane grown by the petitioner in its farms, in accordance with the directions of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, and to give to the petitioner the aforesaid relief by reducing the petitioner's total income as computed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, by Rs. 1,22,725/- or in the alternative Rs. 63,909/-, and return to the petitioner the excess income-tax paid. This petition was originally moved before the Nagpur High Court but after it was returned for presentation to the competent Court, it was presented in this Court. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute, except that the parties differ on the interpretation of the directions of the Tribunal and as to whether any manifest injustice was done to the petitioner as a result of any act or omission on the part of the respondent. These admitted facts are that the petitioner is a public limited company originally registered under the Bhopal Companies Act 1939 and would not be deemed to be registered under the Indian Companies Act. The business of the petitioner is to manufacture and sell sugar of various grades and qualities. Besides purchasing sugar-cane from cultivators in Bhopal State, the petitioner grows sugar-cane on its own farms and utilises the whole produce from these farms for its own business. During the accounting year ending with September 30, 1950, for the assessment year 1951-52, the petitioner purchased 7,72,217 maunds of sugar-cane from cultivators at purchasing centres situate at a distance varying from 8 to 22 miles from the petitioner's factory and transported to its factory. Under the rules of the Bhopal State the petitioner paid the price thereof at the purchasing centres at Rs. 1-4-6 per maund. The average cost of transporting this sugar-cane from the various centres to the factory came to -/4/9 pen maund. During the above period the petitioner produced on its own farms 6,78,490 maunds of sugar-cane and crushed the same along with the cultivator's sugarcane in its factory for producing sugar. 3. 1-4-6 per maund. The average cost of transporting this sugar-cane from the various centres to the factory came to -/4/9 pen maund. During the above period the petitioner produced on its own farms 6,78,490 maunds of sugar-cane and crushed the same along with the cultivator's sugarcane in its factory for producing sugar. 3. While submitting the income-tax returns the petitioner valued the sugarcane grown on its own farms at Re. 1/13/- per maund, Re 1/4/6 the rate fixed by the Bhopal State and -/4/9 being the average transport charges and -/3/9 on account of the difference in quality of sugarcane produced by the petitioner on its own farms and that purchased from the cultivators. 4. After deducting a sum of Rs. 9,77,772/-, the expenses and cost of harvesting, loading, etc., the petitioner fixed its agricultural profits at Rs. 2,51,991/- and claimed the said sum as a deduction in the computation of its total income liable to 'income-tax for the assessment year 1951-52. While making the assessment for the said year, the respondent accepted the above figure of the agricultural expenses incurred by the petitioner but computed the market value of the sugarcane grown by its own farms at Rs. 9,33,000/- at the rate o£ Re. 1/6/- per maund. By making calculations at this rate, there was a loss of Rs. 44,772/- on the agricultural operations of the petitioner and there remained no agricultural profit at all to be allowed as a deduction as claimed by the petitioner company. 5. The petitioner preferred an appeal against this order of the respondent to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Jabalpur, who revised the figure by determining the market value of the sugarcane grown on the petitioner's farms at Re. 1/7/9. In other words, as a result of the orders of the appellate authority, the deduction of Rs. 29,360/- was allowed from the total income towards the agricultural income. The petitioner preferred an appeal against his order to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, and the appeal was disposed of under the order dated 22-4-1954, Ex. P. 1. The Tribunal did not itself determine the deduction to be allowed to the petitioner but directed the Income-tax Officer to ascertain the transport charges pert maund from the centres to the factory and to allow further relief to the necessary extent, if the market value came to more than Re. 1/7/9 per maund. 6. P. 1. The Tribunal did not itself determine the deduction to be allowed to the petitioner but directed the Income-tax Officer to ascertain the transport charges pert maund from the centres to the factory and to allow further relief to the necessary extent, if the market value came to more than Re. 1/7/9 per maund. 6. According to the petitioner, the average transport charges in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal came to -/4/9 per maund and the petitioner was thus entitled to deduction referred to above from the total income while determining the amount on which the income-tax was1 payable. It is further mentioned that the agricultural expenses of Rs. 9,77,772/- included a sum of Rs. 59,166/-, which were incurred in transporting the sugarcane from the farms to the factory. The petitioner, therefore, claims that the agricultural expenses would in reality amount to Rs. 9,18,656/-. The petitioner has claimed a deduction in the alternative, claiming one amount if the agricultural expenses are fixed at Rs. 9,18,656/-, and at a lower amount if they are fixed at the original sum of Rs. 9,77,772/-. Briefly these calculations are : Value of 6,78,490 maunds of petitioner's sugarcane at Re. 1/4/6 per maund ......... Rs. 8,69,315/- Average transport charges at -/4/9 per maund ....... ......... ...... Rs. 2,01,426/- _____________ Rs. 10,70,741/- After deduction of the agricultural expenses the agricultural income came to Rs. 1,52,085/- or Rs. 92,965/-, depending upon what was treated as the figure for agricultural expenses. A deduction of Rs. 29,360/- was already allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and consequently the further deductions now claimed by the petitioner come to Rs. 1,22,725/- or Rs. 63,609/-, respectively. In view of the fact that the petitioner changed the amount of the agricultural expenses at a late stage, the relief was sought for in the alternative. 7. The contention, put forward on behalf of the respondent is that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could be interpreted to mean that the average transport charges from the centres to the factory were none other than the transport charges from the farms to the factory. 7. The contention, put forward on behalf of the respondent is that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal could be interpreted to mean that the average transport charges from the centres to the factory were none other than the transport charges from the farms to the factory. In the alternative it was further contended that the error, if committed by the Income-tax Officer, Bhopal, respondent was in the exercise of his jurisdiction and to the most could be said to be a mistake of law or one of the two views which could be taken of the order of the Tribunal. (sic) On its basis it was urged that the High Courts could not in the exercise of their extraordinary powers under Art. 226 interfere with the order of the respondent which was within his jurisdiction and could not be said to be without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction conferred on him under the orders of the Tribunal. Lastly, another objection was raised on the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that no manifest injustice had been done to the petitioner and, on the other hand, as a result of the order of the Appellate Assistant-Commissioner the petitioner had already got an advantage by being allowed a deduction of Rs. 29,360 towards the agricultural income, when, in fact, the agricultural operations resulted in a loss. The manner in which the calculations have now been made by the respondent will be given subsequently. 8. A few other preliminary objections were also raised against the maintainability of the petition, namely, that it was moved after considerable delay and that alternative remedies were available to the petitioner and consequently it was necessary for the petitioner company to seek such remedies before moving this court. In view of the fact that the petition is being dismissed on another ground, it is not necessary to comment upon these preliminary objections. 9. The Income-tax Officer has given his own interpretation to the order dated 22-4-1954 of the Tribunal which, in my opinion, is not at all justified. A perusal of this order will make it clear that what the Tribunal had meant was that the average transport charge per maund should be calculated not from the farms to the factory but from the purchasing centres to the factory. A perusal of this order will make it clear that what the Tribunal had meant was that the average transport charge per maund should be calculated not from the farms to the factory but from the purchasing centres to the factory. It cannot rightly be said that when the Tribunal used the word "centres", the Tribunal had in mind the farms on which the sugarcane was grown. In para 1 of the order it is clearly mentioned that the farms were at a distance of 4 to 5 miles from the factory while the distance of the centres from the factory is given in para 4 as 10 to 25 miles. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Tribunal was not alive to the difference between the purchasing centres and the farms, where the petitioner grew its sugar-cane. In these circumstances, when the Tribunal directed the Income-tax Officer to ascertain the average transport charges per maund from the centres to the factory, the direction can be given no other meaning except that the average transport charges were to be calculated from the 14 centres to the Factory and not from the farms to the factory. When Income-tax Officer gave a different interpretation to this order, may be after obtaining the approval of the higher income-tax authorities, it will have to be held that the Income-tax Officer acted arbitrarily and in clear violation of the jurisdiction which was conferred on him by the Tribunal. When the respondent committed an illegality in the exercise of his jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere, if necessary by issuing a writ of mandamus. 10. The question, however, is whether in the circumstances of the present case this Court should issue a writ of mandamus or not, considering that no manifest injustice has been done to the petitioner. When the respondent committed an illegality in the exercise of his jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere, if necessary by issuing a writ of mandamus. 10. The question, however, is whether in the circumstances of the present case this Court should issue a writ of mandamus or not, considering that no manifest injustice has been done to the petitioner. It has been strongly urged on behalf of the petitioner that the High Courts are not to assume the jurisdiction of a Court of appeal by going into the merits of the case while entertaining a petition under Art. 226 of, the Constitution and consequently this Court should not at all consider whether the order of the Tribunal was justified on law and facts or not, and, on the other hand, should accept the finding of the tribunal and should merely see if the order of Income-tax Officer is in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal or not. The case of the respondent, on the contrary, is that the above criterion would be applicable only where a writ of mandamus was being granted and not where an application for such a writ was being, dismissed. It is thus contended that this Court can. while rejecting the writ petition, go into the facts of the case with a view to determine if any injustice would be done to the petitioner or not. 11. Thus, two important questions require consideration firstly while dismissing a writ petition the High Courts can go into the merits of the case and thereby in one sense assume the jurisdiction of a Court of appeal, and secondly, if the order of the Income-tax Officer has caused a manifest injustice to the petitioner or not. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner have not been able to invite my attention to any case-law in which it was held that while dismissing a writ petition, the High Courts could not consider the propriety of an order passed by a Tribunal constituted under any law and whole orders are final. Reliance was, however, placed upon certain observations in - 'Verrappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.', AIR 1952 SC 192 (A) and - 'Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University v. S.K. Ghosh', AIR 1954 SC 217 (E). Reliance was, however, placed upon certain observations in - 'Verrappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.', AIR 1952 SC 192 (A) and - 'Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University v. S.K. Ghosh', AIR 1954 SC 217 (E). In both these cases the High Courts had granted a writ, after considering the facts of the case; in other words, by acting as a Court of appeal. In AIR 1952 SC 192 (A), it was observed as below at p. 196 : "However extensive the jurisdiction may be. It seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made." Similarly, in ' AIR 1954 SC 217 (B)', it was observed as below at page 219 : "The learned Judges rightly hold that in a mandamus petition the High Court cannot constitute itself into a Court of Appeal from the authority against which the appeal in sought..........," At another place (at page 220) it was observed : ".....but it is not the function of Courts of law to substitute their wisdom and discretion for that of the persons to whose judgment the matter in question is entrusted by the law." It is thus a well settled law that where a writ petition is moved against the order of a Tribunal or of an authority appointed under some law, whose orders are final and are not subject to appeal, the High Courts will not convert themselves into a Court of appeal and consider whether the Tribunal or the authority had correctly appreciated the facts and passed a correct order. In other words, the High Courts are merely-concerned whether the Tribunal or the authority had properly exercised its jurisdiction and, if there was not error or omission in the exercise of jurisdiction the order cannot be interfered with under Art 226. But these very principles cannot be applied when the point for consideration is whether manifest justice had been done to the petitioner or not. But these very principles cannot be applied when the point for consideration is whether manifest justice had been done to the petitioner or not. For determination of this point the High Courts will have to go into merits of the order, not with the intention to set it aside but to determine if the case is one in which the High Courts should exercise their discretionary powers under Art. 226 in favour of the petitioner. In case the High Courts are debarred from looking into the merits of the case, even when the order is incorrect and in one way causes injustice to the respondent and gives a right to the petitioner to which he may not be entitled, the High Courts would be furthering a cause for the spread of injustice. In my opinion, that would be a case where the High Courts should refuse a writ under Art 226, even though it is apparent that the respondent or the subordinate authority had disregarded the orders of a higher Tribunal. While rejecting the writ petition, the High Court will not approve of the attitude of the sub-ordinate authority. In fact, such an authority would be liable to censure to the extreme as the duly of the subordinate authority is not to sit in judgment over my decision, of the higher authority. He has to carry out the direction in the true spirit and if there is any doubt as1 to the interpretation of the order, the subordinate authority should make a reference for clarification of the order. However, this is a matter in which the higher minorities or the officers to whom the subordinate authority is subordinate should look into and take departmental action against the subordinate concerned. It will also be open to the petitioner to take such steps as may be permissible under the law or as he may be advised. la other words, the proper remedy of the petitioner in such cases would be not to go to the High Court for a writ out to approach the Higher Tribunal or the higher authorities for giving redress to the mischief being done by the subordinate authority. 13. la other words, the proper remedy of the petitioner in such cases would be not to go to the High Court for a writ out to approach the Higher Tribunal or the higher authorities for giving redress to the mischief being done by the subordinate authority. 13. In this connection a reference may be made in ' AIR 1952 SC 192 (A)', which lay down the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution and the circumstances in which the High Courts can issue writ, direction or order under this Article. These observations are at pp 195-196 and are as below : "Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles pf natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice." The words "in grave cases" and "has resulted in manifest injustice" are of very great significance and would show that no one can claim a writ under Art. 226 in each and every case. Even if there is any omission or error in the exercise of jurisdiction or the order being impugned is in excess of the jurisdiction vested in an authority or the officer, a writ can be refused if it appears that the cause of justice does not necessitate the grant of a writ and if such act, omission, error or excess has not resulted in manifest injustice. In other words, therefore, a writ can be granted only when both the conditions have been fulfilled, namely, that there is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction and there is also a manifest injustice to which the petitioner has been put to. In the present case it can to the most be said that there was an omission or error in the exercise of jurisdiction but it cannot be said that such omission or error has resulted in manifest injustice. When the second ingredient has not been fulfilled, the writ petition will have to be dismissed, even though the order of the Income-tax Officer was in complete disregard of the directions of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. When the second ingredient has not been fulfilled, the writ petition will have to be dismissed, even though the order of the Income-tax Officer was in complete disregard of the directions of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. 14. Three reported cases have been brought to my notice in which the writ was refused simply on the ground that the order sought to be enforced' by the issue of a writ was not in accordance with the law or the principles of natural justice. The facts of these cases are distinguishable but the principles enunciated therein can rightly be applied to the present case also. In - 'Bimal Chand v. Chairman Jaigunj Azimgunj Municipality', AIR 1954 Cal 285 (C), the High Court did not exercise its discretion in support of the action which sought to uphold an order of the District Magistrate passed without giving the persons being adversely affected thereby an opportunity of being heard. In other words, the Calcutta High Court did look into the merits of the case while taking a decision whether the writ should be granted or not.. Similarly, in - 'Gram Panchayat, Vidul of Vidul, v. Multi Purpose Co-operative Society of Vidul', AIR 1954 Nagpur 82 (D), the High Court did not interfere by setting aside the order of the Subdivisional Officer on the ground that that order, though against the law had rectified, though partially, the manifest injustice the Gram Panchayat had done to the Society. In - 'Senairam Doongarmall v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam', (S) AIR 1955 Assam 201 (E), also a writ of mandamus was not issued when the omission or the irregularity was not shown to have affected the jurisdiction or the merits of the case. It was observed that the granting of reliefs by way of extraordinary writs was discretionary and the Courts should not be oblivious to the facts, of the case. Sarju Prasad, C.J., further observed that that was not a fit case in which the ends of justice would call fort interference by a High prerogative writ. 15. From the above it is, therefore, clear that the High Courts can look into the merits of the order sought to be enforced by the issue of a writ, while rejecting an application under Art, 226 of the Constitution. There is no reason for me to depart from this rule. 15. From the above it is, therefore, clear that the High Courts can look into the merits of the order sought to be enforced by the issue of a writ, while rejecting an application under Art, 226 of the Constitution. There is no reason for me to depart from this rule. Consequently, if it is established that the petitioner did not suffer any injustice as a result of the arbitrary act of the Income-tax Officer respondent, this Court can refuse to issue a writ of mandamus, even though it appears that the respondents failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by virtue of the direction of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It may, however, be mentioned that if the facts of the case are complicated and do not clearly show that no injustice was caused to the petitioner, the Courts would not ordinarily differ from the decision of the Tribunal and in such cases, even though the decision may appear to be erroneous a writ of mandamus can be issued for the enforcement of such an order. 16. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal appear to have committed an error in not treating;, the centres as markets for the purpose of sale of sugarcane. In this connection they observed that these centres had been fixed both for the convenience of the assesses company and the producers of the sugarcane, and that if the producers of the sugarcane were to take their sugarcane in their bullock carts to the gate of the factory, they would take more time with the result that the sugarcane would deteriorate by the time it reaches the factory. The Tribunal consequently held that the 'market' within the meaning of Rule 23 was not the centres but the factory where the assessee company manufactured sugar. In my opinion, the Tribunal) has not given the ordinary meaning to the word "market". Market should have been taken to be the place where a commodity is ordinarily sold and where the purchaser is to make purchases and where after he is to transport the commodity at his own expenses. In case the price of the sugarcane had been fixed at the factory, in other words if the costs of transport, whether bullock-carts or in the tractors of the company were payable by the vendors the factory would without any doubt be the market. In case the price of the sugarcane had been fixed at the factory, in other words if the costs of transport, whether bullock-carts or in the tractors of the company were payable by the vendors the factory would without any doubt be the market. But when the producers of sugarcane have simply to bring the sugarcane to the centres and to sell it to the company at a fixed rate and have not to incur the transport charges from the centres to the factory, the market would always be the centres and not the factory. In these circumstances the cost of sugarcane produced by the petitioner company would be the price payable for such sugarcane at the farms or at the centres, if the sugarcane was brought to such centres before transhipment to the factory. In other words, therefore, the agricultural operations of the petitioner company would be complete at the farm itself or at the centre, if the sugarcane was brought to such centre before being taken to the factory. In the present case the farms are much nearer to the factory than the purchasing centres and consequently the agricultural operations would be deemed to be complete as soon as the sugarcane was harvested at the farms. The price of the sugarcane was fixed by the State of Bhopal irrespective of the quality of the sugarcane. If the sugarcane of the cultivators was of a better quality, the petitioner company could not be compelled to pay for it at a higher rate. Similarly, if their sugarcane was of an inferior quality, the company could not pay for such sugarcane at a lower rate. Thus the market value of the sugarcane, of whatever quality it may be was Re. 1/4/6. 16a. The total sugarcane produced by the petitioners at its own farms was 6,78,490 maunds and its value at the rate of Re. 1-4-6 per maund would come to Rs. 8,69,315/-. The agricultural expenses incurred by the petitioner were Rs. 9,77,772/- but it included a sum of Rs. 59166/- incurred in transporting the sugarcane from the farms to the factory. In case this sugarcane had been grown by the cultivators and not by the petitioner itself, the cost of transport would have been borne by the company. Consequently the actual agricultural expenses would be deemed to be minus the transport expenses, i.e. Rs. 9,18,656/-. 59166/- incurred in transporting the sugarcane from the farms to the factory. In case this sugarcane had been grown by the cultivators and not by the petitioner itself, the cost of transport would have been borne by the company. Consequently the actual agricultural expenses would be deemed to be minus the transport expenses, i.e. Rs. 9,18,656/-. The agricultural expenses exceed the value of the petitioner's sugarcane. Thus on the agricultural operations of the company there was a loss of Rs. 49,341/-. As a result of the order of the Appellate Asstt. Commr. the petitioners had already been allowed a deduction of Rs. 29,360/- in other words as a result of this order the petitioner has already avoided to pay income-tax on a sum of Rs. 29,360/-, or Rs. 73,701/- in case the income-tax was payable on the income on the manufacturing operation without deduction of the losses suffered on the agricultural operations. 17. In case the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is enforced, the result would be $hat the petitioner would be able to avoid payment of income-tax on a sum of Rs. 1,52,085/- or Rs. 92,969/- depending upon whether the agricultural expenses are regarded to be Rs. 9,18,655/- or 9,77,772/-. If income-tax was payable on the losses suffered on the agricultural operations, these figures would come to Rs. 2,01,426/- or Rs. 1,42,310/- respectively. 18. The above facts thus clearly show that as a result of the attitude adopted by the respondent or by his superior officers, the petitioner is not able to avail of an extra benefit to which he is not at all entitled. Though the respondent had not acted properly and his conduct can be subject to censure, yet the present is not a case where any injustice, has been done to the petitioner. On this ground alone this court can refuse to grant the writ prayed for. 19. The writ petition thus fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the present case it is further ordered that the parties would bear their own costs of the proceedings. Petition dismissed.