JUDGMENT D.N. Roy, J. - This is a Plaintiff's application in civil revision arising out of an order passed Under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC It appears that Gorey the Defendant was personally served upon with summons. He was found absent when the case was called on for hearing on 17-3-1953, and the suit proceeded ex parte against him. Evidence was recorded on 22-4-1953, and ex parte decree followed on 30-4-1953. On 4-6-1953, Gorey applied Under Order IX, Rule 13 for setting aside the ex parte decree and for rehearing of the suit, and his allegation was that he came to know about the ex parte decree only on 4-6-1953. The application was shaped in a fashion as to indicate that the reckoning of time for purposes of limitation was to be made from 4-6-1953. In support of his application, Gorey however tried to prove that he had filed his written statement in the suit and that it was not placed before the court. The application for (sic) was not however founded upon any express allegation to that affect. Upon the evidence that was produced before him, the Munsif came to the conclusion that the written statement was never presented in the court. He further came to the conclusion that Gorey did come to court on 17-3-1953 and the written statement was prepared on his behalf by his counsel, but by mistake of the clerk of the counsel the written statement was not presented to the proper person, and was probably misplaced somewhere. He also came to the conclusion that the application Under Order IX, Rule 13, was within time inasmuch as Gorey got the 'knowledge' of the ex parte decree on (sic)-6-1953, although there was utter carelessness on the part of Gorey inasmuch as he did not try to know as to how further proceedings subsequent to 17-3-1953 were held. 2. It has been contended in revision by the Plaintiffs-applicants that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree as the application was barred by Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act, having been filed beyond thirty days of the ex parte decree; and it has been urged that the Munsif acted in excess of jurisdiction, and illegally or with material irregularity. 3. Objection has been raised by Mr. 3. Objection has been raised by Mr. Brij Lal Gupta on behalf of Gorey opposite-party to the effect that the order setting aside the ex parte decree is not revisable. Under Order 43, Rule 1(d) of the CPC an appeal lies from an order rejecting an application Under Order IX, Rule 13. There is however no appeal from an order setting aside an ex parte decree, nor can any objection be taker to the order u/s 105 of the CPC in the appeal from a subsequent decree in the suit. 4. A full bench of this Court in Radha Mohan (sic) v. Abbas Ali Biswas and Ors. 1931 A.L.J. 377 held that where the order setting aside a decree has been passed by a court in defiance of the provisions of Order 9, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, the matter is a 'case decided' u/s 115 CPC and the High Court is entitled to interfere in revision. 5. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Basantilata Dhar v. Amarnath Haldar 54 C.W.N. 431 held that a decision on a question of limitation based on a wrong construction of the rule of computation laid down in statute is within the mischief of Section 115 of the CPC and is liable to be set aside and in such a case the judge must be deemed to have exercised a jurisdiction under misconception of law or, in other words, to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law. 6. A single Judge of the Patna High Court in Deonandan Thakur v. Mt. Hanso Kuer AIR 193 Pat. 104 held that where the Court by a misinterpretation of a statute assumed jurisdiction in respect of a matter over which it would not have had jurisdiction if the statute had been rightly interpreted, the High Court can interfere u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure 7. In Thakur Das v. Sant Ram AIR 1949 E. Punjab (sic), the question was whether an endorsement on a promissory note extended limitation for the suit which was prima facie time barred within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The Court did not apply its mind to that aspect of the case and held that the suit was time-barred. The Court did not apply its mind to that aspect of the case and held that the suit was time-barred. In revision, the learned Judge of the E-Punjab High Court held that the Court by not applying his mind to that aspect of the question must be deemed to have acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction and the order was revisable. 8. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is set out in the 115th Section of the CPC in these terms: The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto and if such subordinate court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or, (b) to have failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or, (c) to have acted in the exercise of this jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. 9. The limits of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 115 of the Code have been the subject of a number of judicial decisions. As long ago as 1894, the Privy Council in Rajah Amir Hassen Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh 11 I.A. 237. made the following observations: The question then is, did the Judges of the lower courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity. It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the case, and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 10. In 1917 again in Balkrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar L.R. 44 IndAp 261 the Board observed: It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. 11. The section is not directed against conclusion of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. 11. In 1949 in Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras L.R. 76 IndAp 67 the Privy Council again examined the scope of Section 115 and observed that they could see no justification for the view that the section was intended to authorise the High Court to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate courts so as to prevent grave injustice in non-appealable cases and that it would be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate courts could be measured. In examining Section 115 of the Code, the Board said that the section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. The Board further observed that if the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordinate court on question of fact or law. 12. Later in the same year, in Joy Chand Lal v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury L.R. 76 IndAp 131, their Lordships had again adverted to this matter and reiterated what they said in their earlier decision. 13. The Supreme Court in Keshardeo Chamaria v. Radha Kissen Chamaria 1953 ALJ 101 approved of the view expressed by the Privy Council in the cases cited above in determining a matter in which the facts were these. On the request of the decree-holder the execution case was adjourned to a certain date. On the adjourned date of hearing, the decree-holder again applied for adjournment. The adjournment application was dismissed by the executing court, without informing the decree-holder's counsel that the request for adjournment had been refused. The execution case was also dismissed by the very same order without calling upon the decree-holder's counsel to state what he wanted to be done in the matter in these circumstances. The adjournment application was dismissed by the executing court, without informing the decree-holder's counsel that the request for adjournment had been refused. The execution case was also dismissed by the very same order without calling upon the decree-holder's counsel to state what he wanted to be done in the matter in these circumstances. When the decree-holder was apprised of this order, he made an application u/s 151 CPC for restoration of the execution and for setting aside the order of dismissal. Thereupon, the court restored the execution case u/s 151 CPC on the sole ground that it had committed a mistake in dismissing the execution case at the same time when it dismissed the adjournment application without informing the decree-holder's counsel that the request for adjournment had been refused. An appeal and a revision were preferred in the High Court against that order. The High Court held that no appeal lay. On the revision application the High Court took the view that the subordinate judge was in error in restoring the execution case without taking into consideration the point whether the decree-holder's counsel could really take any steps in aid of the execution if he had been apprised of the order of the court dismissing the adjournment application The High Court allowed the revisional application and remanded the case to the subordinate judge for reconsideration and disposal in accordance with the observations made in the order. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that the order of the subordinate judge was one that he had jurisdiction to make, that in making that order he neither acted in excess of his jurisdiction nor did he assume jurisdiction which he did not possess and that it could not be said that in the exercise of it he acted with material irregularity or committed any breach of the procedure laid down for reaching the result. The Supreme Court further held that in reversing the order of the executing court which had jurisdiction to correct its own error, the High Court exercised jurisdiction not conferred upon it by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is upon this decision that Mr. The Supreme Court further held that in reversing the order of the executing court which had jurisdiction to correct its own error, the High Court exercised jurisdiction not conferred upon it by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is upon this decision that Mr. Brij Lal Gupta has mainly relied in support of his argument that the revision application does not lie and particular emphasis has been placed by him on the following passage at page 108 of the Report: Reference may also be made to the observations of (sic), J. in his order of reference in AIR 1948 258 (Nagpur) wherein it was said that the words 'illegally' and 'material irregularity' do not cover either errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with. 14. This decision and particularly the passage quoted above does not, in my opinion, help Gorey opposite party at all. On the contrary, it goes to support the Petitioners. The Munsif in applying the procedure laid down in the CPC committed meterial defect by entertaining the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code when that petition was ex-facie not entertainable. Order IX, Rule 13 lays down that in any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against the Defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order letting aside the decree against him upon such terms as to costs as it thinks fit and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. This rule of procedure is dependent upon, and unequivocally connected with, Article 164 of the Limitation Act. Article 164 provides that such an application must be made within thirty days reckoned from (a) the date of the decree or, (b) where summons was not duly served, when the applicant had the knowledge of the decree. This rule of procedure is dependent upon, and unequivocally connected with, Article 164 of the Limitation Act. Article 164 provides that such an application must be made within thirty days reckoned from (a) the date of the decree or, (b) where summons was not duly served, when the applicant had the knowledge of the decree. In the present case, the restoration application was governed by the first part of this article and not by the second part. Limitation in the present case could be reckoned from the date of the decree and not from the date of the knowledge of the decree. In the present case, the Defendant Gorey was personally served upon with summons and he did not enter appearance in court on 17-3-1953 when he was required to be present. The decree was passed ex parte against him on 30-4-1953. His application for restoration not having been made within thirty days of the date of the decree--(the restoration application having been made by him on 4-6-1953)--it was not in accordance with the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read along with Article 164 of the Limitation Act. There is abundant authority to come to the conclusion that the application for revision is riot improper because the Munsif in exercising jurisdiction acted illegally, that is in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it affected the ultimate decision. The order setting aside the decree was passed by the Munsif in defiance of the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13. The decision was taken by him on the question of limitation under wrong construction of the rule of computation laid down in the Statute and was certainly within the mischief of Section 115 of the Code. The Munsif must be deemed to have exercised the jurisdiction under misconception of law or, in other words, to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law. By misinterpretation of the Statute he assumed jurisdiction in respect of a matter over which he would not have had jurisdiction if the Statute had been rightly interpreted by him. 15. The Munsif must be deemed to have exercised the jurisdiction under misconception of law or, in other words, to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law. By misinterpretation of the Statute he assumed jurisdiction in respect of a matter over which he would not have had jurisdiction if the Statute had been rightly interpreted by him. 15. It has been urged that the powers exercised by the Munsif must be deemed to have been exercised u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code was admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor as the Defendant had satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. This argument has an obvious fallacy. In the first place, Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not in terms attracted by the Defendant or applied by the court. In the second place, this section applies only to those proceedings which are specifically mentioned in the section, or to which the section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force. The section has not been made applicable by any enactment to an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC to set aside an ex parte decree and the court has no inherent jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation u/s 5. 16. For reasons stated above, I allow the application with costs and direct that the order dated 4-1-1954, passed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code be vacated and the ex parte decree passed by the Munsif of Mahaban at Mathura on 30-4-1933 in original suit No. 25 of 1953 be restored.