Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit on an oral loan. The defendant is alleged to have obtained an oral loan of Rs. 100 from the plaintiff on 19.12.1120 and not to have returned that amount as promised by him. To the plaintiff's notice of demand he sent a reply denying the oral loan. Including himself the plaintiff examined three witnesses in the trial court. The defendant also gave evidence on oath. The trial court disbelieved the defendant and accepting the evidence of the plaintiff and his two witnesses decreed the suit in terms of the plaint. The lower appellate court disbelieved the plaintiff and his witnesses and reversing the trial court's decree dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has therefore filed this second appeal. 2. At the time of hearing the appellant's counsel conceded that no second appeal lies in this case. But he prayed that the second appeal petition might be treated as a Civil Revision Petition and that the decree of the lower appellate court be vacated in revision. The ground on which revision is sought for is that the lower appellate court has acted erroneously in law in discarding the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses and in disbelieving the plaintiff's witnesses who had been believed by the trial court. In support of this contention the learned counsel relied upon the decisions in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshawari, AIR 1951 SC 120, Veeraswami v. Narayya, AIR 1949 PC 32, Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand AIR 1948 PC 108, Muttathiparambil v. Kuriakose AIR 1950 TC 55 and Cheryan v. Chandy AIR 1952 TC 445. 3. There is no express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure which takes away from an appellate court, in cases in which an appeal from an original decree is provided for by that Code the power to review and evaluate the evidence of the witnesses independently of the conclusion reached by the trial court regarding the credibility of their evidence. No doubt certain rules of practice are followed by courts in this matter, but they have always been recognised as only rules of practice - doubtless as wise rules of practice - and not as hard and fast rules of law. No doubt certain rules of practice are followed by courts in this matter, but they have always been recognised as only rules of practice - doubtless as wise rules of practice - and not as hard and fast rules of law. What the Supreme Court has said in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 is: "The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge. The rule is - and it is nothing more than a rule of practice that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial judge on a question of fact". Emphasis has thus been laid by the Supreme Court in Sarju Pershad v. Jwaleshwari, on the fact that the rule in question is nothing more than a rule of practice and the Supreme Court has also recognised in that case two important exceptions to the rule, namely (1) when some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the trial judge's notice, and (2) when there is a sufficient balance of improbability in cases of conflict of oral evidence to displace the trial judge's opinion as to the credibility of the evidence. The Privy Council decisions referred to by the appellant's counsel do not also say anything more than that the appellate court should attach great weight to the opinion of the trial judge as regards the credibility of the witnesses, who were examined and seen by him and that his opinion should not be lightly brushed aside. In Veerswami v. Narayya, AIR 1949 PC 32, the Privy Council has only quoted with approval the following passage from the statement of Viscount Simon in Watt v. Thomas (1947) A.C. 484 and accepted as a wise rule of practice the principle embodied in that passage: "But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived at the trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses the appellate court will bear in mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of the trial judge as to where credibility lies is entitled to great weight. This is not to say that the judge of first instance can be treated as infallible in determining which side is telling the truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given". In Pearey Lal v. Nanak Chand, AIR 1948 PC 108, Lord Normand has only said: "A finding that a witness is telling the truth is of the greatest value when it is made by a judge who saw all the witnesses or at least the important witnesses on each side. But such a finding by a judge who saw none of the witnesses on the other side is of small value, and it ought not to survive the criticisms to which the evidence of the appellant lies open". But such a finding by a judge who saw none of the witnesses on the other side is of small value, and it ought not to survive the criticisms to which the evidence of the appellant lies open". The dictum in Muttathiparambil v. Kuriakose AIR 1950 TC 55 is also only to the effect that an appellate court which has obviously not the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses while they were being examined will not lightly interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the trial judge who had that advantage. In Cheriyan v. Chandy AIR 1952 TC 445, this court has expressly recognised: "There are circumstances which would compel a court of appeal to interfere with a finding of fact based upon the testimony of the witnesses whom the trial judge had the advantage of seeing when they were giving their evidence in the witness box". The High Court sitting as a court of appeal in that case interfered with the finding of fact recorded by the trial judge based upon his opinion of the credibility of the witnesses. The position is thus clear that ordinarily weight should be attached to the opinion of the trial judge regarding the credibility of the witnesses and his opinion should not be lightly brushed aside by the appellate court. But when some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the trial judge's notice or when there is a sufficient balance of improbability in cases of conflicting oral evidence to displace the trial judge's opinion of the credibility of the witnesses the appellate court should not feel oppressed or weighed down by the opinion of the trial judge and should decide for itself what evidence could be believed or not. The opinion of the trial judge cannot be accepted as conclusion when important aspects in the evidence of the witnesses have escaped his notice and he has bestowed only a very superficial attention on their evidence. 4. Coming to the present case, it is seen from the judgment of the trial court that the learned Munsiff has only repeated what the plaintiff's witnesses have stated in their chief-examination regarding the alleged loan and has not cared to consider the important circumstances brought to light in the cross-examination. The learned appellate judge has very carefully considered all the circumstances of the case. The learned appellate judge has very carefully considered all the circumstances of the case. In a simple case of oral loan it is not very difficult to produce two witnesses to support the plaintiff's case and make one of them say that the plaintiff obtained the money from him and gave the loan to the defendant and the other to say that at the instance of the plaintiff he had asked the defendant to repay the amount. In his very considered judgment the learned appellate judge has pointed out the circumstances of the parties and how improbable is the case that the defendant had approached the plaintiff for the loan and the latter had given it. He has adverted to their relationship, to the fact that there is no entry in the plaintiff's account books regarding the alleged loan to the delay in sending the notice, and to numerous other circumstances all leading to the inference that the loan was improbable and the evidence of the witnesses interested and false. In these circumstances the learned appellate judge cannot be said to have acted erroneously or contrary to any law or rule of practice in discarding the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses which was believed by the trial court and finding against the plaintiff's case. There is therefore no ground for admitting a revision petition in this case. 5. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed as incompetent and the appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.