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1956 DIGILAW 271 (RAJ)

Amir Bux v. State

1956-11-27

S.L.AHUJA, SHYAMLAL

body1956
This is a revision against an order of the Tehsildar, Sanganer, dated 10.10.56 in a case under sec. 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. (Hereinafter to be referred as the Act) 2. A Preliminary objection was raised as to the maintainability of this revision in the Board on the ground that as the matter is a non-judicial one, the revisional jurisdiction vests in the Government under sec. 83 of the Act and is not covered by sec. 84 of the Act. Therefore we have to examine these provisions carefully. Sec. 83 of the Act authorises the State Government to call for the record of any non-judicial proceeding. Sec. 84 confers upon the Board the power to call for the record of any case of a judicial nature or connected with settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board. The word judicial matter has been defined in sec 23 of Act and means a proceeding in which a revenue court or officer has to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto and the proceedings and orders as well as appeals, revisions and references in the cases specified in the First Schedule shall be deemed to be judicial matters for the purposes of this Act. Item 12 of the First Schedule relates to imposition of fines, penalties, forfeitures and confiscations under this Act. The order of the learned Tehsildar, dated 10.10.56 is to the effect that the building in question be forfeited under sec 91 of the Act. Obviously this is a forfeiture under the Act and is covered by item 12 of the First Schedule of the Act and a proceeding in which it has arisen would thus be a judicial matter. The Board would have revisional jurisdiction in case no appeal lies thereto. Sec. 75 of the Act deals with first appeals against the orders passed by the Tehsildar and such appeals are to lie to the Collector. As provided in sec. 76 (2) of the Act, no appeal can lie from an order passed in appeal. Thus no second appeal lies to the Board. 3. It was also argued before us that the applicant had a right of appeal which was not deliberately availed of by him and hence the Board should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction in the matter. 76 (2) of the Act, no appeal can lie from an order passed in appeal. Thus no second appeal lies to the Board. 3. It was also argued before us that the applicant had a right of appeal which was not deliberately availed of by him and hence the Board should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction in the matter. It is no doubt true as a general rule that where a party has another remedy by way of appeal and omits to avail himself of the same revisional jurisdiction should not be exercised. But nevertheless this is not an inflexible rule of law and the question as to whether interference would be justifiable or not would depend upon an examination of the circumstances of each case. Looking to the circumstances of the present case, we find that refusal to interfere would amount to upholding a gross and material irregularity in compliance with the prescribed procedure, and would be condoning a violation of the elementary principles of natural justice. The learned Tehsildar by his order, dated 24.9.56 directed the issue of a notice upon the applicant to show cause on 8.10.56 as to why he should not be ejected from the land in dispute. The notice does not appear to have been served upon the applicant personally. On the reverse of this notice one Chhotia signed under a Hindi writing to the effect that his father had gone out to Dausa and that he would produce him on return. There is nothing on the record to show as to how and on what grounds this service was considered sufficient. On 8th October, 1956, the learned Tehsildar passed an order as follows : "The case called out. The applicant is absent. Let the case be put up tomorrow for decision. The order dated 9.10.56 shows that the presiding officer was away and hence the case was fixed for 10-10.56. From a perusal of the body of the file, it however, transpires that on 9.10.56 Amira appeared in the court of the Tehsildar and put up an application mentioning therein that he was unavoidably detained by circumstances from attending the court on 8.10.56 and could attend it only on that date i.e., 9.10.56. He, therefore, wanted to know the progress that was made in the case along with an opportunity to lead his evidence. He, therefore, wanted to know the progress that was made in the case along with an opportunity to lead his evidence. There is an order in the margin of this application to the effect that the applicant be made conversant with the order, dated 8.10.56. it appears that this order was never pointed out to the applicant and on 10.10.56 the learned Tehsildar passed the order which forms the subject matter of this revision. 4. We refrain from expressing any opinion as to the validly or otherwise of this order in view of the action that we are taking in the case. We would however point out that it was extremely improper that the applicant even when he appeared before the Tehsildar and wanted to know the progress of his case was somehow or other kept in ignorance and the order was passed at his back. It is difficult to conceive of any more flagrant violation of the elementary principles of justice than this that the man appeared in the court and was denied an opportunity of being heard and the case was decided without hearing him. We would, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the learned Tehsildar and remand the case back to him with the direction that it be tried and determined afresh in accordance with law. We would further direct that till the case is decided the applicant shall refrain from any further constructions upon the land in dispute and shall put up his objections under sec. 91 (4) of the Act before the Tehsildar on 10th December, 1956 on which date the case shall be taken up for hearing by the Tehsildar for which no further notice shall be given to the applicant..