JUDGMENT Beg, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for the cancellation of a decree dated 26-4-1944 passed u/s 175 of the UP Tenancy Act by the S.D.O. Mat and for possession over three agricultural plots Nos. 266, 267 and 268. 2. The Plaintiff's case as stated in the plaint was as follows. It was alleged that originally the Defendants were the occupancy tenants of the plots in suit, but subsequently they left the village and their tenancy land was taken possession of by the zamindar who admitted the Plaintiff as the tenant of the said land, that about four years before this suit the Defendants against the wrong entries made by the patwari who had recorded the Plaintiff as only a subtenant of the Defendants, brought a suit u/s 175 of the UP Tenancy Act against the Plaintiff for ejectment from the land in suit, that the suit ended in dismissal, that about the end of the year 1943 one Bikram Singh, the then S.D.O. Mat, was busy in recruiting men to the army that the said S.D.O. was bent upon giving facilities to the intending recruits, that taking advantage of this opportunity, the Defendants brought another suit u/s 175 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for possession over the said land, that the SDO Mat by exercising of undue influence, coercion and threat of dire consequences compelled the Plaintiff to sign a compromise under which the Defendants' suit u/s 165 of the Tenancy Act was decreed and the Defendants were put in possession of the said land. The decree on the basis of the compromise was alleged to have been passed on 26-4-1944. The Plaintiff prayed for setting aside the said compromise decree and for possession of the land in dispute. 3. The suit was resisted by the Defendants on the ground that the Plaintiff was a subtenant of the disputed land, that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that the compromise was entered into by the parties out of their own free will and consent. 4. The trial court came to the conclusion that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It further held that the compromise in question was vitiated by being the result of undue influence and coercion. It accordingly decreed the Plaintiff's suit. The Defendants went up in appeal. 4. The trial court came to the conclusion that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It further held that the compromise in question was vitiated by being the result of undue influence and coercion. It accordingly decreed the Plaintiff's suit. The Defendants went up in appeal. The main point that was argued in appeal was that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The lower appellate court upheld this contention. It accordingly, allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial court and ordered that the plaint should be returned to the Plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. 5. Before us the sole point argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the view of the lower appellate court that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit is erroneous. He contended that the present suit is governed by Section 242 of the UP Tenancy Act as it stood prior to the amendment by the amending Act No. 10 of 1947. Prior to the amendment, the said section stood as follows: Subject to the provisions of Section 286 all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court, and no court other than a revenue court, shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. 6. In the present case, it is to be noted that the Plaintiff claimed two reliefs. The first relief that he claimed related to the cancellation of the decree, and the second relief that he claimed related to the possession of the plots in dispute. There is no doubt that the second relief could be obtained by the Plaintiff through the revenue court. There is also no doubt that the first relief is not a relief which could properly be given by the revenue court. There is no doubt that the second relief could be obtained by the Plaintiff through the revenue court. There is also no doubt that the first relief is not a relief which could properly be given by the revenue court. In such cases courts have applied the well known principle of pith and substance, and have laid down that if the main relief claimed by the Plaintiff is one that is cognizable by the revenue court then the suit should be sent to the revenue court for decision. There can be no doubt about the correctness of this proposition as an abstract principle of law. The question, therefore, as to which of the reliefs claimed is the main relief will depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. The circumstances in the present case, according to the Plaintiff, are that in the previous suit he had obtained a decree against the Defendants. That decree, according to the Plaintiff, was res judicata. There was however, a hurdle in the way of his obtaining possession. That hurdle lay in the compromise decree which had been passed against him, and which, according to him, was vitiated by undue influence and coercion. He was himself a party to the said decree. The decree was, therefore, voidable. The cancellation of the said decree was, therefore, a condition precedent to any further relief that he could have obtained in the suit. It is significant that the relief for the cancellation of the said decree was set out in the plaint itself as initially filed. It did not come in by way of amendment. Considering these two features of the present case, we are clearly of opinion that the main relief in the present case was one of cancellation of the decree, and the relief of possession was merely a consequential relief that flowed from the granting of the main relief. 7. On behalf of the Respondents, our attention has been drawn to a case, Ram Sewak Lal v. Bashist and Ors. 1949 All. 419. 7. On behalf of the Respondents, our attention has been drawn to a case, Ram Sewak Lal v. Bashist and Ors. 1949 All. 419. In that case a Bench of this Court held that the Plaintiff's allegation in the plaint of that suit in substance amounted to a claim for declaration u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act, and hence the suit was maintainable in the revenue court, although in the plaint there was also a relief praying that the consent decree which was passed against the Plaintiff be declared to be null and void. It is significant that the second relief was not contained in the plaint as it was initially filed. It was brought in by means of an amendment application. This was one of the facts which the learned Bench that heard that case took into consideration. Further, in the present case it is argued that the matter was already decided by the court previously, and but for the compromise decree, the Plaintiff's title stood already adjudicated. Hence the question whether the said compromise decree, is valid is the main question to be decided. Further, in that case he. question as to which of the reliefs claimed in the plaint was the main one does not appear to have been raised. For the above reasons, we are of opinion that the present case stands on a footing of its own. In the above circumstances, we are of opinion, that this appeal should be allowed and the order of the lower appellate court directing the plaint to be returned to Plaintiff for presentation to the revenue court be set aside. 8. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the court below and send the case back to the lower court with a direction that the appeal be registered to its original number and be disposed of on merits. In the circumstances of the case the parties will bear their own costs of this appeal.