Judgment This appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections arise out of a decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage passed in suit O.S. No. 112 of 1954 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore. It raises for consideration the proper construction of certain provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938, to which I will immediately refer. The facts are not in controversy and the only question is the amount payable for redemption of the suit property and this turns on the construction of section 9-A(10) of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938. One Kandaswami Udayar was the original owner of the properties now in suit. On 26th April, 1927, he executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of the 1st defendant for Rs. 6,000 and this is the mortgage which is now sought to be redeemed. The mortgage contained a clause enabling the mortgagor to repay the money within three years and redeem the property. It is common ground that this usufructuary mortgage was followed by a lease back of the property to the mortgagor at a rental of 210 kalams of paddy per year from the date of the othi and that the mortgagor and his heirs have been in possession and enjoyment of the property since that date as lessees. The day after the usufructuary mortgage I have referred to, that is on 27th April, 1927, Kandaswami effected a simple mortgage of the same properties in favour of one Janaki, daughter of the 1st defendant. The amount due on this simple mortgage was not paid when due and this mortgagee brought O.S. No. 273 of 1941 on her mortgage, obtained a decree and brought the suit hypotheca to sale. The properties were sold and in the Court sale which was held on 24th April, 1945, the equity of redemption inhering in the mortgagor, was purchased by the plaintiff for Rs. 3,000, the purchase being subject to the usufructuary mortgage now sought to be redeemed. On 27th June, 1945, the sale was confirmed and a sale certificate was issued in favour of the plaintiff. Kandaswami died in or about 1946 and the present suit has been filed on 29th November, 1954, for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage, dated 26th April, 1927, the plaintiff claiming to be an agriculturist and seeking the benefit of the scaling down provisions of Madras Act IV of 1938. Kandaswami died in or about 1946 and the present suit has been filed on 29th November, 1954, for redemption of the usufructuary mortgage, dated 26th April, 1927, the plaintiff claiming to be an agriculturist and seeking the benefit of the scaling down provisions of Madras Act IV of 1938. I might at once mention that the claim of the plaintiff to be an agriculturist is not in controversy. To this suit eight persons were impleaded as defendants. The first defendant was the usufructuary mortgagee under the mortgage of 1927 and defendants 2 and 3 were the sons of Kandaswami born subsequent to 1927 who were said to be in possession of the suit property. The 4th defendant is a lessee from defendants 2 and 3. The 5th defendant is said to be a subsequent purchaser from the 2nd defendant but whose purchase was pendente lite the mortgage suit O. S. No. 273 of 1941. Defendants 6 and 7 are stated to claim certain rights in the property while the 8th defendant who was impleaded by order, dated 6th July, 1955, is a sub-mortgagee from the 1st defendant, the mortgage in his favour being simple. The learned Subordinate Judge has applying the scaling down provisions enacted by Madras Act IV of 1938 decreed to the plaintiff redemption of the suit usufructuary mortgage on condition of the plaintiff paying Rs. 400 towards the principal together with interest on Rs. 6,ooo at 5½ per cent. per annum for a period of three years prior to suit, viz., Rs. 990 and subsequent interest till the date of deposit. It will now be convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act by applying which the Subordinate Judge has arrived at these figures. In the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act as originally passed in 1938 usufructuary mortgages were outside its scope and not subject to any scaling down, since section 10(2) of the Act enacted: "Nothing contained in sections 8 and 9 (which scale down interest due on debts due by an agriculturist) shall affect-(i) any mortgage by virtue of which the mortgagee is in possession of the property mortgaged, where no rate of interest is stipulated as due to the mortgagee ". But this however was varied by the introduction of section 9-A by the Amending Act XXIII of 1948. But this however was varied by the introduction of section 9-A by the Amending Act XXIII of 1948. Section 9-A itself has undergone several modifications but it is unnecessary to refer to these and it is sufficient to notice the form in which the section stood on the date of the suit. The relevant portions of section 9-A which bear upon the matters in controversy in this appeal I shall now set out. "9-A (1). This section applies to all mortgages executed at any time before the 30th September, 1947 and by virtue of which the mortgagee is in possession of the property mortgaged to him or any portion thereof- (a) where no rate of interest is stipulated for as due to the mortgagee, or (b) where a rate of interest is stipulated for as due to the mortgagee in respect of the principal amount secured by the mortgage or any portion thereof, in addition to the usufruct from the property or in respect of any other sum payable to the mortgagee by the mortgagor in his capacity as such. Explanation.-A mortgagee shall be deemed to be in possession of the property mortgaged to him or any portion thereof, notwithstanding that he has leased it to the mortgagor or any other person. (2) The mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem the whole of the property mortgaged, notwithstanding that the time, if any, fixed in the mortgage deed for redeeming the mortgage has not arrived. (3) Where the mortgagee has been in possession of the whole of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of less than thirty years, the mortgagor shall not be entitled to redeem the mortgage, unless he pays to the mortgagee. (3) Where the mortgagee has been in possession of the whole of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of less than thirty years, the mortgagor shall not be entitled to redeem the mortgage, unless he pays to the mortgagee. (i) the difference between the principal amount secured by the mortgage and an amount bearing to the principal amount the same proportion as the period during which the mortgagee has been in possession bears to thirty years ; (ii) where any interest on the principal amount secured by the mortgage or any portion thereas has been stipulated for, in addition to the usufruct from the property, the arrears of such interest of scaled down under section 8 or 9 read with section 12, or under section 13, as the case may be ; and (iii) all other sums payable to the mortgagee by the mortgagor in his capacity as such, together with the interest, if any, due thereon. (4) ......... (5) Where the mortgagee has been in possession of the whole of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of thirty years or more, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sections 8, 9, 12 and 13, the mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been wholly discharged with effect from the expiry of the period of thirty years or where such period expired before the commencement of the Madras Agriculturists Relief (Amendment) Act, 1948, with effect from the commencement of that Act- (i) if no interest has been stipulated for on the principal amount secured by the mortgage or any portion thereof, in addition to the usufruct from the property; (ii) where such interest has been stipulated for, if no arrears of interest are due from the mortgagor; and (iii) if no other sums or interest thereon are due to the mortgagee by the mortgagor in his capacity as such. (b) Where the mortgagee has been in possession of the whole of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of thirty years or more, then, in cases not governed by clause (a) the mortgagor shall not be entitled to redeem the mortgage unless he pays to the mortgagee. (b) Where the mortgagee has been in possession of the whole of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of thirty years or more, then, in cases not governed by clause (a) the mortgagor shall not be entitled to redeem the mortgage unless he pays to the mortgagee. (i) the arrears of interest stipulated for in addition to the usufruct from the property, as scaled down under section £ or 9 read with section 12, or under section 13, as the case may be; and (ii) all other sums due to the mortgagee by the mortgagor in his capacity as such and referred to in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) together with any interest due thereon. (9) (a) (i).-Except in cases falling under sub-section 5(a) where the mortgaged property or, as the case may be, the portion thereof in the possession of the mortgagee has been leased back to the mortgagor by the mortgagee, the rent due to the mortgagee under the lease (after deducting from such rent any revenue tax or cess paid or payable by the mortgagee in respect of the property) shall be deemed to be the interest on the mortgage debt or the portion thereof attributable to the portion of the property aforesaid and the provisions of section 8’or 9 read with section 12, or of section 13, as the case may be, shall apply to the entire debt. (ii) Nothing contained in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) shall apply to any debt falling under sub-clause (i). (b) In cases falling under sub-section (5)(a), where the property has been leased back to the mortgagor by the mortgagee,nothing contained in that sub-section shall affect the right of the mortgagee to recover any rents due to him under the lease for any period before the date on which the mortgaged debt is deemed to have been wholly discharged by virtue of that sub-section, if such rents have not become barred by limitation under any law for the time being in force. Sub-section (10) of this section is the crucial provision whose construction is involved in this appeal. That sub-section is in the form of an exception to the main provision in section 9-A. It runs: (10) Nothing contained in this section, except sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply to any mortgage. Sub-section (10) of this section is the crucial provision whose construction is involved in this appeal. That sub-section is in the form of an exception to the main provision in section 9-A. It runs: (10) Nothing contained in this section, except sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply to any mortgage. (i) in respect of property situated in the South Kanara district or in the taluks of Chirakkal Kottayam, Kurumbranad and Wynaad in the Malabar district ; (ii) in respect of property situated in any other area in the cases mentioned below- (a) Where during the period after the 30th September, 1937 and before the 30th January, 1948, the equity of redemption in the property subject to the mortgage has devolved either wholly or in part on a person, by or through a transfer inter vivos either from the original mortgagor or from a person deriving title from or through such mortgagor otherwise than by a transfer inter vivos, then to the whole or such part, as the case may be. (b) Where, during the period aforesaid, the mortgagee or any of his successors-in-interest has transferred either wholly or in part mortgagee’s right in the property bona fide and for valuable consideration, then, to the whole or such part, as the case may be: Provided that the transferee of a mortgagee shall not be entitled to recover in respect of such mortgage, anything more than the value of the consideration for the transfer ; but nothing herein contained shall in cases where the property or portion thereof has been leased back to the mortgagor, affect the right of the transferee to recover the rents, if any, due under the lease, if such rents have not become barred by limitation under any law for the time being in force. (c) Where the mortgagee’s interest in the property subject to the mortgage or any part of such interest belonged to, or devolved on, two or more persons and during the period aforesaid, a partition has taken place among such persons, then, to the whole or such part of the interest as the case may be". The facts narrated above would in the light of the provisions of the enactment set out lead to the following results: (1) The mortgage in question was a usufructuary mortgage under which the mortgagee was deemed to be in possession by virtue of the Explanatian to section 9-A(1). The facts narrated above would in the light of the provisions of the enactment set out lead to the following results: (1) The mortgage in question was a usufructuary mortgage under which the mortgagee was deemed to be in possession by virtue of the Explanatian to section 9-A(1). (2) The mortgage was executed within the dates named in the sub-section (1) and was therefore subject to the principal amount being scaled down. Under sub-section (8) the usufructuary mortgage was less than 30 years old at the time when the mortgagor sought redemption, the mortgage having been executed in 1927. (3) If the provision for scaling the principal amount laid down by sub-section (3) applied, the mortgagor was bound to pay only 2/30 of Rs. 6,000 that it is Rs. 400 as the principal amount. (4) If there was any arrear of rent due to the mortgagee-lessor the amount due would be determined on the basis of sub-section (9-a) and in the present case having regard to the principal sum, 5½ per cent. per annum interest on Rs. 6,000 for the last three years, if arrears were due for that period would be the additional sum due on the mortgage. This is the basis, upon which the Court has proceeded and so far as the calculations are concerned, there is no dispute. There are, however, two points raised one by the appellant-mortgagee and the other by the mortgagor-1st respondent. This is the basis, upon which the Court has proceeded and so far as the calculations are concerned, there is no dispute. There are, however, two points raised one by the appellant-mortgagee and the other by the mortgagor-1st respondent. The point raised by the appellant is that the scaling down provisions under section 9-A are inapplicable to the present case by reason of (1) the equity of redemption belonging to the mortgagor having been purchased by the plaintiff in Court auction in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 273 of 1941, the contention being that this is a case where during the period after the 30th September, 1937 and before the 30th January, 1948, the equity of redemption in the property subject to the mortgage has devolved on a person “ by or through a transfer inter vivos from the original mortgagor” within sub-section (10)(ii)(a) of the Act and (2) 6f the alienation by way of sub-mortgage by the 1st defendant of her mortgage interest in favour of the 8th defendant constituting a transfer by the mortgagee of the mortgagee’s rights in the property “bona fide and for valuable consideration” within the period 30th September, 1937 and 30th January, 1948 and falling within the exception laid down in sub-section (10)(ii)(b). These are the two points raised by the mortgagee-appellant. The mortgagor-1st respondent has filed a memo. of crossobjections questioning the correctness of the addition of Rs. 900 in the amount payable for redemption as arrears of rent due to the mortgagee-lessor. I shall now deal with these points in that order. The question whether the purchase of the equity of redemption by the plaintiff in Court auction constitutes a transfer inter vivos within sub-section (10)(ii)(a) is the first point to be considered. This was debated in the Court below and the Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff was not within the exception on the ground that a purchase in Court auction was not a “ transfer inter vivos ” within the meaning of the provision. In reaching this conclusion, the Subordinate Judge relied on a decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in Benjamin v. Devadoss1. The point urged before me was that the decision in Benjamin v. Devadoss1, which construed the words “transfer bona fide and for valuable consideration” in sub-section (10)(ii)(b) had been mis-applied to construe the words “ transfer inter vivos ” within sub-section (10)(ii)(a). The point urged before me was that the decision in Benjamin v. Devadoss1, which construed the words “transfer bona fide and for valuable consideration” in sub-section (10)(ii)(b) had been mis-applied to construe the words “ transfer inter vivos ” within sub-section (10)(ii)(a). The relevant words of sub-section (10)(ii)(a) I shall quote again, viz., “where........ the equity of redemption in the property subject to the mortgage has devolved either wholly or in part on a person, by or through a transfer inter vivos either from the original mortgagor..” Learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar who appeared for the 8th defendant and supported the appellant laid great stress upon the use of the expression “ devolved” in the sub-section as having a wider import than the word “ transfer” and so capable of including a transfer in invitum. But I am however unable to agree that in the context the sub-section includes such a transfer. “ Devolution” might no doubt include “transfers by operation of law” but that depends upon the context. The “devolution” here spoken of is not one simpliciter but comprises only that which takes place “ by or through a transfer inter vivos.” Unless therefore a transfer involved in Court sale can be comprehended within the expression “transfer inter vivos” the devolution referred to earlier cannot include such a transfer. The decision of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in Benjamin v. Devadoss1, no doubt construed the words “transfer bona fide and for valuable consideration” in sub-section (10)(ii)(b). But in my judgment the reasoning of the learned Judge would equally apply to the construction of the expression “ transfer inter vivos” in sub-clause (a) of the sub-section. In fact the argument addressed to the learned Judge was that as sub-section (10) (ii) (b) did not use the words “ transfer inter vivos” but referred only to transfers generally, sub-section (b) should be held to comprehend sales in Court auction and it was this argument that he repelled. I respectfully agree with the conclusion reached by the learned Judge that the expression “transfer inter vivos” would exclude sales in Court auction. The argument, thereore, that the plaintiff was a person to whom the scaling down provisions in the main portions of section 9-A would be inapplicable by reason of the exclusion contained in sub-section (10)(ii)(a) was correctly rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge. The argument, thereore, that the plaintiff was a person to whom the scaling down provisions in the main portions of section 9-A would be inapplicable by reason of the exclusion contained in sub-section (10)(ii)(a) was correctly rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge. I shall next proceed to consider the applicability of sub-clause (b) of sub-section (10) (ii) by reason of the mortgagee effecting a sub-mortgage in favour of the 8th defendant by way of a simple mortgage of her usufructuary mortgage rights. This was not raised in the Court below either by the 1st defendant the usufructuary mortgagee or by the 8th defendant after he was impleaded. So far as these defendants were concerned-and they were the parties who were interested in this point-the suit proceeded merely on endorsements on the plaint made by the respective parties on 30th August, 1955. The endorsements of the plaintiff’s counsel was that the mortgagee had leased out the lands to the mortgagor from the date of the othi and that the mortgagor and after his death his sons had been enjoying the properties as lessees. The 1st defendant’s counsel stated by his endorsement that he had no objection to the amount determined as payable for the redemption of his client’s mortgage being paid over to the 8th defendant. Counsel for the 8th defendant supported this statement by an endorsement in which he stated that his client was entitled to the amount declared as payable to the 1st defendant. Even in her grounds of appeal to this Court, the 1st defendant did not specifically raise this point about the simple mortgage in favour of the 8th defendant excluding the applicability of section 9-A and it was only during the hearing of the appeal and particularly in the argument of Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar learned counsel for the 8th defendant, who supported the appellant, that this point was specifically urged. As I considered that the point raised was purely one of law, I directed the point to be argued. The argument however both by learned counsel for the 8th defendant as well as by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar learned counsel for the mortgagor-1st respondent proceeded upon the basis that the submortgage in favour of the 8th defendant was effected between 30th September, 1937 and 30th January, 1948. The argument however both by learned counsel for the 8th defendant as well as by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar learned counsel for the mortgagor-1st respondent proceeded upon the basis that the submortgage in favour of the 8th defendant was effected between 30th September, 1937 and 30th January, 1948. But after judgment was reserved I found that the written statement of the 8th defendant had not set out the date of this submortgage. This ran: “This defendant is a sub-mortgagee of the othi properties sought to be redeemed by the plaintiff. The amount due at present under the mortgage executed in his favour by the 1st defendant and her daughter exceeds Rs. 13,000. This defendant as a mortgagee of the 1st defendant’s othi right is entitled to be paid whatever sum is found by the Court to be payable by the plaintiff for redemption of the othi”. No evidence was recorded in the suit except a formal proof of the mortgage by the plaintiff which was necessitated by some of the defendants being ex parte. There was nothing therefore on the record on the basis of which it could be held that the alienation by way of sub-mortgage was between the dates mentioned in sub-section (10)(ii)(b). I, therefore posited the appeal for being mentioned and pointed out this lacuna to learned counsel appearing in the case. Thereupon Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar, learned counsel for the 8th defendant filed an application C.M.P.No. 5776 of 1956 for the reception of the simple mortgage by the 1st defendant, as additional evidence in the appeal. In the affidavit in support of this application for the reception of additional evidence the 8th defendant stated that he had originally been declared ex parte but that subsequently the order was set aside that when he filed the written statement it was done in a hurry and that the original mortgage deed which had been sent to the advocate at Tanjore had not been filed into Court since there was no controversy regarding the transaction. This original document dated 19th April, 1941 has now been filed into Court for being admitted in evidence. This original document dated 19th April, 1941 has now been filed into Court for being admitted in evidence. The plaintiff 1st respondent in the appeal has opposed this application but an examination of the affidavit filed by him would show that the objection is not so much to the reception of this document as to permitting the 8th defendant or the 1st defendant to raise the point that by reason of this simple mortgage executed by the 1st defendant, the terms of sub-section (10)(ii)(b) are attracted. In the circumstances stated by the 8th defendant in his affidavit, I consider that this is a proper case in which the document should be admitted in evidence as there has never been any dispute about the genuineness of the transaction. I cannot see any objection to the date of the simple mortgage being made clear by this evidence. Of course it would be open to the plaintiff 1st respondent to contend that even if the simple mortgage is proved-a matter which was never in doubt-it does not entitle the 1st defendant or 8th defendant to claim the benefit of the exclusion provided by sub-section (10)(ii)(b). C.M.P. No. 5776 of 1956 is allowed and the document filed therewith will be admitted as additional evidence in the appeal. The lacuna having been cleared I shall now proceed to consider whether the sub-mortgage by way of a simple mortgage by the mortgagee is a transfer by the mortgagee of her rights in the properties within sub-section (10)(ii)(b). Though at the time when this matter was originally argued before me the arguments proceeded upon the point raised being res Integra, learned counsel for the 1st respondent has now brought to my notice that this question was considered by a Bench of this Court consisting of Govinda Menon and Ramaswami, JJ., in S.A. No. 133 of 1952 (Rajagopal Naidu v. Sivakami Ammal), where the learned Judges have held that the words ‘transfer in part of the mortgagee’s rights’ within that sub-clause would cover only an absolute conveyance of the entirety of the mortgagee’s interests and not the creation of a subsidiary interest such as a sub-mortgage involves. In view of the decision of this Bench which affirmed the correctness of a judgment of Ramaswami, J.,sitting singly in Velu Mudaliar v. Rajaram Karayalar1, taking a similar view of this provision I do not consider it necessary or useful to go over the ground again: I have therefore to hold that the terms of neither sub-section (10)(ii)(a) or (10)(ii)(b) are attracted to the present case, and that the mortgage debt would have therefore to be scaled down in accordance with sub-section (3). There is no dispute that if the mortgage debt is scaled down in accordance with this provision, the amount due to the mortgagee would be Rs. 400. The correctness of the decision of the Subordinate Judge in allowing the mortgagee a sum of Rs. 900 towards the rent due for the last three years which is raised by the memo. of cross-objections filed by the mortgagor is the only remaining question to be considered. The 1st defendant in her written statement stated in paragraph 5: “This defendant submits that the rent from the properties has remained un-paid from 19th April 1945 till 1953-54 and in any event even if the debt is scaled down this defendant is entitled to claim the amount from the plaintiff before he is entitled to redeem” and repeated this allegation in paragraph 7. This statement was filed in January, 1955. The endorsements on the plaint to which I have already referred were made in August, 1955. At the time of the endorsements though the plaintiff admitted the lease-back there was no admission by him that any rent was in arrear ; nor did the 1st defendant’s advocate in the endorsement which he made on the plaint raise any point as regards any arrear of rent. As I have said earlier, the suit was tried only on the basis of the endorsements without any evidence being recorded except of a very formal nature. I am mentioning this for the purpose of emphasising that the 1st defendant did not lead any evidence or place any materials before the Court in support of her allegations in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the written statement to which I have adverted. Therefore the Court below had nothing before it on the basis of which it could hold that there was any arrear of rent due under the leaseback. Therefore the Court below had nothing before it on the basis of which it could hold that there was any arrear of rent due under the leaseback. There is no presumption in law that the rent due under a lease is in arrear. The Court below however passed a decree for the arrears due on grounds which do not appear to me very intelligible. The matter is dealt with in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment. The Subordinate Judge assumes in this discussion that the 1st defendant had established the case pleaded by her in her written statement in the paragraphs which I have extracted above,namely,that the rent under the lease-back had not been paid from 1944 to the date of the plaint. On this assumption the Court below proceeds to ascertain the period for which a claim could now be made and the quantum of the rent which could be claimed in the light of the provisions of the Agriculturists Relief Act. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent complains that the learned Subordinate Judge was not justified in basing his decision on an assumption that there were arrears without there being any evidence therefor. I consider this objection well-founded and learned counsel for the mortgagee-appellant has not been able to refer me to any evidence to support this assumption. I have already mentioned that the trial proceeded merely on the endorsements on the plaint, so far as the contesting defendants 1 and 8 were concerned and there was merely formal proof of the mortgage and the title of the plaintiff in the evidence of the plaintiff as P.W. 1. I will only add that when the plaintiff was in the witness-box the mortgagee did not seek to elicit from him that there were any arrears of rent due under the lease-back. The argument of learned counsel for the mortgagee-appellant however was that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as regards the existence of arrears of rent must have proceeded on some admission of counsel for the plaintiff before the lower Court. The argument of learned counsel for the mortgagee-appellant however was that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as regards the existence of arrears of rent must have proceeded on some admission of counsel for the plaintiff before the lower Court. I am unable to find any basis to support this theory nor to infer this from the mere fact that there was an argument before the Court as regards the period for which a decree for arrears of rent could be passed or as regards the basis of the computation of the sum, due, on that account. I am further reinforced in this conclusion by the circumstance that the trial of the suit was taken up on the 30th August, 1955 and concluded on the 1st September, 1955,having adjourned thereto from 30th on which latter date the only thing done was that P.W. 1 was examined ; and the endorsements were made on 30th August, 1956. It is therefore impossible that there could have been an admission at the trial by the parties or their advocates regarding matters not covered by the endorsements on 30th August, 1955 and the existence of the arrears of rent was not one such matter. The result is that the memo, of cross-objections has to be allowed and the addition of Rs. 990 in the amount to be paid for redemption deleted. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs of the plaintiff-1st respondent and the memorandum of objections allowed. There will however be no order as to costs in the memorandum of objections. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed and cross-objections allowed.