JUDGMENT : Rao, J. - Defendant-1 is the Appellant. The Plaintiff has filed a suit for partition of the schedules a, b, c and d properties, alleging that he is entitled to three and as share in the same. One Ghanashyam had four sons, Nilakantha, Ramchandra, Narayan and Shridhar. The Plaintiffs are Narayan and his sons, Nilakantha's representative are the 1st and the second Defendants. Defendant-3 is the son of Rama Chandra and Defendant-4 is the son of Sridhar. Defendant-1 is the Lambardar of the Village. 2. The Defendant-I contended that he acquired the property in his own right and that the suit is barred by adverse possession. The trial, court decreed the Plaintiff's suit with regard to schedules A and D properties, but disbursed the same with regard to schedules Band C properties. The Defendant-l appealed against the decree directing partition of schedules A and D properties and there was no appeal by the Plaintiff regarding schedules Band C properties. The appeal was dismissed. 3. The learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. G.K. Misra, contended that both the courts were wrong in decreeing partition of D schedule properties. With regard to schedule A properties which were held to be partible on the, ground that they were properties acquired by the first Defendant for the benefit of the co-shearers also they being properties purchased by him from defaulting tenants in execution of the decrees against them, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that they were not partible cannot be accepted and in my opinion, both the courts were right in decreeing partition of A schedule properties. 4. With regard to D schedule properties Mr. 4. With regard to D schedule properties Mr. Misra contends that even on the assumption that these properties were reclaimed in 1945 by the first Defendant and that he is not entitled to claim adverse possession to these properties, yet these properties cannot he made the subject matter of partition on account of the fact that the properties in schedule D, which are admittedly go char lands, vest in the Government and cannot be reclaimed by anyone without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner, and as such the first Defendant according' to his contention, is in possession of those properties wrongfully and the Government may at any time evict him from out of the land, and the properties which are in his possession by an unauthorised act of his cannot be made the subject-matter of a suit for partition by his other co-shearers. 5. In the Wazi-bul-arz for Gountia villages of Sambalpur District, clause (1) under sub-heading waste lands and forests, says that all waste land not forming part of existing holdings is the property of the Government. The following plots are reserved as grazing and forest land; they shall not be occupied by anyone without the special permission of the Deputy Commissioner: (2) The villagers may graze their cattle on all village taste and jungle except the area recorded as zabti and may take there from reasonable quantities of fire-wood, leaves, fencing thorns, thatching grass, timber for houses and agricultural implements for their own use as provided for in the Sambalpur protected Forest Rules. (3) An other waste lands are at the disposal of the Lambardar or his co-sharer for cultivation or granting them to new tenants. No Nazaran in cash or kind may be levied for occupation of waste lands. According to this provision it is clear that go char or grazing lands are the property of Government and cannot be occupied by anyone without the special permission of the Deputy Commissioner. The occupation by Defendant-1 of these lands can be questioned by the Government at any time. But I do not think that these are in the occupation of the Lambardar as a trustee for representing the other co-shearers. The other co-shearers, in my opinion, are not entitled to a share of these properties. 6. Mr. R.N. Das, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, copt. But I do not think that these are in the occupation of the Lambardar as a trustee for representing the other co-shearers. The other co-shearers, in my opinion, are not entitled to a share of these properties. 6. Mr. R.N. Das, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, copt. ended that according to the definition of the word 'Lambardar' in Section 4, c1ause (2) and according that the of the appointment u/s 138 of the Central Provinces Lana Revenue Article is a representative of the other coheres and as such the (sic) properties can be made particle cannot accept the contention. He next (sic) is that according to the findings of both the. Court lands were reclaimed in 1945 and therefore, there could be to (sic) possession of the 1st Defendant as arras these lands are concerned. As have (sic) stated, the learned Counsel for the Appellant did not contest this finding of the court below and argued the appeal be (sic) on the assumption that the finds were reclaimed in 1945. In the result the behave I allowed this appeal partly, set aside the decrees and judgment of the (sic) below with regard to schedule (sic) and hold that the Plaintiff's are not entitled to a sharer the Schedule properties. Each party will be his own costs. Leave to appeal is ranted. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed