JUDGMENT This is a second appeal by the defendant from the reversing judgment and decree of the District Judge, Manipur, in Civil Appeal Case No. 117 of 1955, decreeing the plaintiffs claim for possession of the suit land. 2. The case of the plaintiff, as far as it is necessary to state for the purpose of this appeal was, that the land belonged to her father Maipak Singh and she inherited it, on his death in 1952. The defendant was cultivating the land as a tenant of her father, but his tenancy came to an end as he made default in the payment of rent (loushal) and possession was resumed in 1952. The defendant, thereupon, brought a suit under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act against Maipak Singh and others, in which he succeeded. Maipak Singh, died during the pendency of that suit and the plaintiff was joined as a party in his place. In the above circumstances, the defendant was not entitled to the possession of the land and was liable to be ejected as a trespasser. 3. The defendant on the other hand claimed to be the owner of the land having purchased it by an unregistered sale deed, dated 19-1-1944 (Ext. A/1), executed by Maipak Singh, the father of plaintiff and his brother Pashot Singh for a consideration of Rs. 500/-, and which sale was accompanied by delivery of possession. Though not specifically pleaded the benefit of the doctrine of part performance as embodied in S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was claimed. He also contended that in the suit under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, the mother of the plaintiff as her guardian-ad-litem had prepared a written statement (Ext. A/3), admitting the claim of the plaintiff which was handed over to him, and that admission operated as an estoppel against the plaintiff. 4. The learned District Judge, found that the land belonged to the father of the plaintiff, and that finding being a finding of fact has now become final. It was also not seriously challenged before me. Similarly, it was not disputed that the plaintiff was the heir of Maipak Singh and would be entitled to recover the land in case the pleas of the defendant stated above failed. 5. It was admitted before me that the sale deed (Ext. It was also not seriously challenged before me. Similarly, it was not disputed that the plaintiff was the heir of Maipak Singh and would be entitled to recover the land in case the pleas of the defendant stated above failed. 5. It was admitted before me that the sale deed (Ext. A/1) was compulsorily registrable under the law prevailing in this State in 1944 and in that connection reference was made to the Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur then in force. The relevant rule is reproduced below :- "Registration. 1. The following documents must be registered. :- (1) Mortgages and deeds of gift or sale of :- (a) Homestead lands. (b) Culturable lands or crops. (c) Cattle and ponies. (2) Deeds of a cash value of more than Rs. 15/-. (3) Transfers of all fisheries, ferries, salt-wells and grass mahals. (4) Agreements for hypothecation of crops of more than 12 pots of dhan. All existing documents under these categories must be registered within three months of the promulgation of these rules. After the expiry of this period no suits of the above nature will be entertained by any State court unless supported by a registered document. Every document must be registered within one month of its execution. The penalty for a breach of this rule is double registration fees for every month of delay. The Political Agent has issued similar instructions with regard to cases in his court." 6. It will be thus clear that the alleged sale could have been effected only by a registered sale deed and the intention of the provision "After the expiry of this period no suits of the above nature will be entertained by any State court unless supported by a registered document" in the rule mentioned above could not be anything else, but the exclusion of an unregistered sale deed from evidence. The sale deed in question is thus not admissible in evidence to prove the alleged sale and it must be found that the alleged sale has not been proved. 7. Though the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act have not been extended to Manipur State, it was admitted on all sides that the principles of that Act including the doctrine of part performance as embodied in S. 53-A of that Act have been followed and given effect to in this State even since before 1947. 7. Though the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act have not been extended to Manipur State, it was admitted on all sides that the principles of that Act including the doctrine of part performance as embodied in S. 53-A of that Act have been followed and given effect to in this State even since before 1947. The sale deed (Ext. A/1) will, thus be receivable as evidence of part performance and if it could be found that it was executed by Maipak Singh as avendor then the defendant would be entitled to retain possession of the suit land. 8. An examination of the recitals in the sale deed shows that it purported to be by Pashot Singh only and it was also mentioned therein that the land stood in the name of Maipak Singh and the vendor Pashot Singh would be responsible, if any objection was raised by his brother (Maipak Singh) or by any other relatives. It is, therefore, not possible to draw an inference that Maipak Singh gave his thumb mark on it as a vendor for the obvious reason that the recitals in the sale deed would have been quite different had Maipak Singh been a party to the sale. Even, the defendant (D. W. No. 1) admitted from the witness box that he purchased the land from Pashot Singh. There is no other evidence on the point and in the above circumstances it must be found that Maipak Singh was not a party to the sale and did not execute the sale deed (Ext. A/1) as a vendor. The result of this finding coupled with the finding that Maipak Singh was the owner of the land on the date of sale by Pashot Singh is, that the defendant is not entitled to invoke the doctrine of part performance against the plaintiff. 9. It was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in any case the presumption would be that Maipak Singh had given his thumb mark as an attesting witness and that should work as an estoppel against him and his successor the plaintiff. In my opinion, this contention is without force as the defendant was apprised of all the facts and as the recitals in the deed show, knew that there was even the possibility of a claim being made by Maipak Singh. In my opinion, this contention is without force as the defendant was apprised of all the facts and as the recitals in the deed show, knew that there was even the possibility of a claim being made by Maipak Singh. There was thus no declaration, act or omission on the part of Maipak Singh or even Pashot Singh, which can be said to have misled the defendant into buying the land and paying for it. Again, attestation by itself does not estop a man in any way except in the matter of having witnessed the execution of the deed, and if it is intended to import consent by attestation then it must be shown by independant evidence or circumstances present in the case that he was Appellant consenting party. In the present case, there was no attempt even to prove that Maipak Singh, knew the contents of the sale deed and the only witness on the subject, namely, the defendant (D. W. No. 1) does not say anything except that Maipak Singh, executed the deed, that is, gave his thumb mark on it. As already seen above, there is also an absence of circumstances which would justify the inference that Maipak Singh was a consenting party. 10. The only ground that now remains to be considered is the question of estoppel by the admissions contained in the written statement (Ext. A/3). It is said that this written statement was got prepared and signed by the mother of the plaintiff (respondent) for being filed in the suit brought by the present defendant (appellant) under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, in which the present plaintiff was one of the defendants with her mother as the guardian-ad-litem. The learned District Judge found that this written statement was not prepared during the pendency of that suit but was prepared later for the purpose of this suit. It being a finding on a question of fact is final and it is not open to the parties to question it in this appeal. But even if they could, I would be inclined to the view taken by the District Judge after taking into consideration the evidence adduced, circumstances present and the probabilities. 11. No satisfactory explanation has been given as to why this written statement was not filed in court and was handed over to the present defendant. But even if they could, I would be inclined to the view taken by the District Judge after taking into consideration the evidence adduced, circumstances present and the probabilities. 11. No satisfactory explanation has been given as to why this written statement was not filed in court and was handed over to the present defendant. The evidence of Yumnam Tombi Singh (D. W. No. 4) who scribed the written statement shows that after the written statement was made ready, the mother of the plaintiff took it to the court for filing. It is, therefore, most improbable that the written statement would not have been filed in court and would have been given to the defendant. In any case, one expects that had it been given to the defendant, he would have instead of suppressing it presented it to the court in support of his claim. This omission clearly indicates that this document was not available during the pendency of that suit, and was brought into existence later. In that case the plaintiff would not be bound by it, and the question of estoppel does not arise. 12..But even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that it was prepared during the pendency of the previous suit, I am of the opinion that the admissions made in that written statement would not be admissible in evidence against the plaintiff in the circumstances present in this case. There can be no doubt that the guardian-ad-litem has the power to make admissions provided they are made in good faith and for the benefit of the minor. As already seen above the plaintiff had a good title and therefore the admissions in question cannot be said to have been made for the benefit of the minor plaintiff. The conduct of the guardian-ad-litem, as brought out in the discussion above was also not free from suspicion and as such there was want of good faith on her part. 13. Again, before such an admission can operate as an estoppel it is necessary that it should have induced the other party to act to his prejudice. That was clearly not the case here and the defendant also did not make any pleadings on the point. Thus, in no case could these admissions operate as estoppel. 14. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.