Judgement JUDGMENT: This is an appeal directed against the order and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram at Madurai in E. P. No. 20 of 1954 in O. S. No. 29 of 1948. 2. The facts are: The petitioner Seethalakshmi Ammal had obtained a maintenance decree in a partition suit O. S. No. 29 of 1948, in regard to which a charge was created on certain items of the plaint Aschedule. This Seethalakshmi Ammal is seeking to bring these properties to sale and the question to be decided is whether a separate suit should be filed or whether the right can be enforced in execution. The lower Court held that a separate suit should be filed. Hence this appeal. 3. There can be no doubt that a separate suit should have been filed if the charge created in this case falls under S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 100 defines "a charge" and states what provisions of the Act apply thereto and against whom it is enforceable. 4. A person according to this section is said to have a charge on the immovable property belonging to another when (1) such property is made security for the payment of money due by the latter, and (2) such transaction does not amount to a mortgage. A mortgage is defined in S. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. A charge under S. 100 may be created either by act of parties or by operation of law. 5. There is a difference of opinion on the question whether this section is exhaustive of all kinds of charges. One view is that it is exhaustive of all charges and drat a Court is not justified in introducing new conceptions of charges not supported by the statutes in India. 5. There is a difference of opinion on the question whether this section is exhaustive of all kinds of charges. One view is that it is exhaustive of all charges and drat a Court is not justified in introducing new conceptions of charges not supported by the statutes in India. The other view is that the section is not exhaustive and that there are certain kinds of charges like those created by decree of Court which are not included within the purview of S. 100; Kashi Chandra v. Priyanath, 83 Ind Cas 424: (AIR 1924 Cal 645) (A); Hari v. Tapai, 88 Ind Cas 923: (AIR 1926 Pat 31) (B); Braja Sunder v. Sarat Kumari, 38 Ind Cas 791: (AIR 1916 Pat 252) (C); Ambalal v. Narayan, 51 Ind Cas 929: (AIR 1919 Bom 56) (D); Shankar v. Ganpat, 119 Ind Cas 186: (AIR 1929 Bom 227) (E); Fatehchand v. Indian Cotton Co., 157 Ind Cas 292: (AIR 1935 Nag 129) (F); Mt. Kawtika Bai v. Bachraj, 150 Ind Cas 492: (AIR 1934 Nag 147) (G); Venkata Rao v. Zunkari Marwadi, 148 Ind Cas 196: (AIR 1934 Nag 83) (H); Mt. Prem Kuer v. Ram Lagan Rai, AIR 1948 Pat 199 (I); Debendra Nath v. Smt. Trinayani Das, AIR 1945 Pat 278 (J); Ghasi-ram v. Kundanbal, AIR 1940 Nag 163 (K); Durga Prasad v. Mt. Tulsa Kuer, AIR 1939 All 579 (L); Sashi Bushen v. Bhupendra, AIR 1936 Cal 112 (M); Maina v. Ashan, 169 Ind Cas 169 (Nag) (N). 6. Prem Kuer v. Ram Lagan Rai, AIR 1948 Pat 199 (I); Debendra Nath v. Smt. Trinayani Das, AIR 1945 Pat 278 (J); Ghasi-ram v. Kundanbal, AIR 1940 Nag 163 (K); Durga Prasad v. Mt. Tulsa Kuer, AIR 1939 All 579 (L); Sashi Bushen v. Bhupendra, AIR 1936 Cal 112 (M); Maina v. Ashan, 169 Ind Cas 169 (Nag) (N). 6. Though the judicial decisions are not unanimous on the question whether such a charge created by decree is a charge within the meaning of this section, one view being that a charge created by decree falls within S. 100 and another view being that a charge created by a decree is neither a charge created by act of parties nor a charge created by operation of law and is not included in this section because according to this view decrees stand on somewhat different footing and are governed by rules of their own, so that it may well be that the intention of the Legislature was to leave decrees out of this section, the latter view has been held in this Court in the following decisions: Sowbagia Ammal v. Manika Mudali, 22 Mad LT 386: 33 Mad LJ 601: (AIR 1918 Mad 668) (O); Venkataramanamurthi v. Sundararamiah 23 Mad LT 355: (AIR 1919 Mad 894) (P). It has been held in these cases that a charge created under a decree will not come under O. XXXIV, Rule 14, C. P. C, and hence could be enforced even in execution without filing a separate suit. In 23 Mad LT 355: (AIR 1919 Mad 894) (P) at p. 357 (of Mad LT): (at p. 896 of AIR), the learned Judges observe as follows: "The learned Judges who decided 22 Mad LT 386: 33 Mad LJ 601: (AIR 1918 Mad 668) (O) remarked that the position of a widow, who by virtue of her maintenance decree for the first time acquires a charge on specified immovable properties, is different from that of a holder of a charge under S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act (although S. 100 speaks of charges arising by operation of law as well as those created by act of parties) and that it does not fall within the scope of O. XXXIV, R. 14. We are not prepared to dissent from their opinion." The charge was enforced on the ground that it did not fall within the scope of O. XXXIV, R. 14. After this decision in April, 1930 O. XXXIV, R. 15 came into force. It was enacted that "all the provisions contained in this Order which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds within the meaning of S. 58 and to a charge within the meaning of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Mulla comments in his C. P. C. that this rule has no application where a charge is created by a decree. In 22 Mad LT 386: 33 Mad LJ 601: (AIR 1918 Mad 668) (O) it has been observed that unless the case can be brought within O. XXXIV, R. 14 there can be little doubt that a decree for further maintenance can be executed by proceeding in execution against the properties charged thereby with the payment of the amount decreed. The following decisions of other High Courts are also to the same effect. In AIR 1940 Nag 163 (K) and AIR 1945 Pat 278 (J) which are cases of maintenance decree creating a charge on certain properties of the judgment-debtor entitling the decree-holder to realise the same by taking out execution without the necessity for fresh suits after every default in the payment of the decree, it was held that the decree was in the nature of a composite decree which is not one single decree but comprised as many decrees for payment and realization of the properties charged as and when there were defaults and that the purchase by the decree-holder in any previous execution of one of the items of the properties charged could not attract the operation of S. 60 when a fresh execution was taken for realization of the further maintenance accrued due by the default of the judgment-debtor. It was further held that a charge created by a decree of the Court was neither a charge created by the Act of parties nor one created by operation of law and that therefore S. 100 could not apply. It was further held that a charge created by a decree of the Court was neither a charge created by the Act of parties nor one created by operation of law and that therefore S. 100 could not apply. In AIR 1948 Pat 199 (I), it was held that a charge created by a decree of the Court is neither a charge created by act of parties nor created by operation of law and that such a charge did not fall under S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. These decisions have been approved and followed in Thangavelu v. Thirumalswami, (1955) 2 Mad LJ 618: ( AIR 1956 Mad 67 ) (Q) wherein it was observed: "On a consideration of the conflicting decisions that we have referred to above, we do not think that we shall be justified in holding that the charge created by a decree is one that comes within the scope of S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act." 7. There are two single Judge decisions of this Court to the contrary effect. In Venkatachala Pillai v. Rajagopal Naidu, (1945) 2 Mad LJ 388: ( AIR 1946 Mad 51 ) (R), Bell J. has held the the words operation of law occurring in S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, included a charge brought into being by a decree of a competent Court. The Bench which decided (1955) 2 Mad LJ 618: ( AIR 1956 Mad 67 ) (Q) observed in regard to this decision : "We are not inclined to agree with the learned Judge that S. 100 included within its scope charges created by decrees of Court." The other decision is that of Somasundaram J., in S. A. Mohd. Ghouse v. Syed Noor Saheb, (1954) 2 Mad LJ 13 (SN) (S), wherein it is observed: In all cases where a decree provides for the payment of money and creates a charge over certain properties the only course open to the decree-holder, in default of the payment of the money is to file a suit in accordance with the provisions of O. 34, R. 14, C. P. C. The fact that the decree permits the plaintiff decree-holder to bring the properties thus charged to sale does not take away such a right, which is inherent in him, and which is otherwise incumbent but for the introduction of the aforesaid clause in the decree. I am bound by the Bench decision (1955) 2 Mad LJ 618 : ( AIR 1956 Mad 67 ) (Q) in preference to this decision wherein the decisions of this Court have not been referred to and the case seems to have been decided on other considerations. 8. To sum up, if the charge falls under S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, the property can be realised by a suit for sale under S. 100, as if it were a simple mortgage. But if the charge is created by a decree it may be realised in execution of the decree. 9. There is another distinction, however, even in case of charges created by decree, which has to be borne in mind with regard to the mode of enforceability. If the decree creating the charge is merely declaratory, the decree-holder is not entitled to sell the property in execution but must file a suit to enforce the charge: Gobinda v. Kailas, 41 Ind Cas 73: (AIR 1918 Cal 705) (T); Postimal v. Radhakishan, 138 Ind Cas 603: (AIR 1932 Cal 439) (U). But if the decree is executable, a charge created by it can be enforced in execution. No particular form of words is necessary to create an enforceable charge and all that is required is that there must be clear indication of the property being made security for the payment of money: Bhola Nath v. Sarba, AIR 1940 Cal 93 (V); Ganga Prasad v. Ratanchand, AIR 1939 Nag 118 (W). 10. Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the charge created by the decree in O. S. 29 of 1948 does not fall under S. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently the decree is executable. 11. In the result, the order of the lower Court is set aside and the petition is allowed and this appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Petition allowed.