JUDGMENT The suit which has given rise to this appeal was brought by the plaintiff-respondent for declaration of his title to the land in patta No. 42/546-I.W.T. on the allegation that he had perfected his title thereto by long and adverse possession for over 12 years. The appellants father late N. Tomba Singh was alleged to have sold this land to the plaintiff-respondent at Rs. 50/-by means of an unregistered sale deed dated 27-10-1938, Ex. 1 and the vendor was alleged to have given peaceful possession of the plaintiff, who claimed to have remained in peaceful possession as of right and exclusively and as this possession is said to have been adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent against the vendor and the defendant, the plaintiff claimed to have matured his title to this land by adverse possession. As the plaintiffs mutation application No. 369 of 1953-54 was rejected by the Additional S. D. O., on 17-2-1954 and the plaintiff was directed to establish his title in Civil Court on the defendants objection, the suit No. 13 of 1954 had to be instituted in the Sub-Judges Court, Manipur. This suit was later on transferred to the Court of the learned District Judge, as the plaintiff was the cousin of the learned Sub-Judge. 2. The defendant contended that his father late N. Tomba Singh never sold the land in question to the plaintiff nor was possession ever delivered by him to the plaintiff. The defendant contended that his father remained in possession throughout and he paid land revenue and after his death the defendant himself has been paying the land revenue and has been in actual possession over the land in suit. According to the defendant, his father N. Tomba Singh died in the year 1945-46 but as the house of this ingkhol collapsed in the last month of 1941, he and his family shifted to the Mamang Sangoi of late Nambol Hanjabi and stayed there for a few months. Then on the bombing of Imphal, in May 1942, late N. Tomba Singh and his family evacuated Imphal to take resort in the distant villages. On re-occupation in about 1944 A.D. after the bombing of Imphal, he had to stay at Thangmeiband at his son-in-laws house as his own house in the disputed ingkhol had already collapsed, but the plaintiff never remained in possession over the land in question. On re-occupation in about 1944 A.D. after the bombing of Imphal, he had to stay at Thangmeiband at his son-in-laws house as his own house in the disputed ingkhol had already collapsed, but the plaintiff never remained in possession over the land in question. It was further contended that the suit was barred by S. 42, Specific Relief Act and no sale could take place in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 50/- only as the disputed ingkhol is admittedly worth Rs. 1,500/- and the plaintiff valued his own suit at that amount. The learned District Judge, who tried the suit decreed it on 6-9-1955 and so the defendant has come to this Court in appeal. 3. The main question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether the plaintiff-respondent ever matured his title to the land in question referred to above by adverse possession for over 12 years. The plaintiff relied on the sale deed dated 27-10-1938, Ex. 1 even though the sale deed is unregistered and no reliance had been placed on it in the mutation case, vide the judgment Ex. A/1 and the statement of Sri R.K. Birendra Singh (D. W. 2). The contention of the plaintiff was that even though he entered into possession on the basis of this legally inadmissible document of title, he continued to hold the land actually and exclusively and also openly within the knowledge of the defendants father as well as the defendant and so he matured his title to the land in question by adverse possession. Thus the plaintiff claims to have commenced his possession in wrong and he maintained it against the right. There is no doubt that where an intended conveyance is void from the commencement, for whatever cause, but possession is taken by the transferee under the intended conveyance, such possession is adverse to the transferor and ripens into a good title after the expiry of the statutory period, vide Mt. Kasturi v. Baliram, 79 Ind Cas 117 : (AIR 1924 Nag 222) (A) and Baldeo Singh v. Muhammad Akhtar, AIR 1939 Pat 488 (B). But these rulings cannot help the respondent because it is admitted by Mayengbam Ibungohal Singh, the plaintiff himself that N. Tomba Singh was his near relative and so the mere fact that an unregistered deed was written out for grossly inadequate price of Rs. But these rulings cannot help the respondent because it is admitted by Mayengbam Ibungohal Singh, the plaintiff himself that N. Tomba Singh was his near relative and so the mere fact that an unregistered deed was written out for grossly inadequate price of Rs. 50/- only (the plaintiff and his witnesses have all admitted that the land in question was worth Rs. 50/- to Rs. 200/-) in favour of a relation without giving delivery of possession would not lead to the inference that the plaintiff ever remained in exclusive or adverse possession. It may also be mentioned in this connection that the plaintiff valued the present suit regarding the land in question at Rs. 1,500/- and so there cannot be any doubt on the question that the deed Ex. 1 which was for Rs. 50/- only was never intended to operate as a sale deed. If the plaintiff really purchased this property in 1938 and he did not get the deed Ex. 1 registered, because the vendor was related to him, he would surely have filed a mutation application after getting the signature of the vendor thereon in the year 1938 A.D., but this was not done and no good reason has been shown why this was not done. The plaintiff tried to show that N. Tomba Singh, actually gave possession over the land in question to the purchaser and he demolished his house and took away the old materials when he left the land, but this version has not been corroborated by any of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff. 4. The plaintiff tried to show that he paid land revenue regarding the land in question after obtaining the sale deed Ex. 1 but this version is also not correct as the three revenue receipts Exs. 3 to 5 merely go to show that the plaintiff paid revenue from 1942-45 A.D. and the appellants father continued to pay the land revenue during the years 1938 to 1942. Later on, the house collapsed and the defendants father had to leave this place on account of the bombing of Imphal. The defendant has been paying the land revenue after 1945 A.D. and the plaintiff has alleged in this case that this revenue has been paid by the defendant surreptitiously. Later on, the house collapsed and the defendants father had to leave this place on account of the bombing of Imphal. The defendant has been paying the land revenue after 1945 A.D. and the plaintiff has alleged in this case that this revenue has been paid by the defendant surreptitiously. It has been contended that mere payment of land revenue is not sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs title if the plaintiff actually remained in adverse possession and reliance has been placed in this connection on Jalpa Din v. Kalka Baksh Singh, 49 Ind Cas 61 : (AIR 1919 Oudh 177) (C), in which it has been held that a man paid land revenue for a share in which a certain plot was situated and it was held that this payment could not be considered to preclude a successful title by adverse possession being established against him. This ruling cannot apply to the present case as the defendant has categorically denied the plaintiffs entering into possession over the land in question and it is established from the evidence on the record that N. Tomba Singh continued to pay revenue from 1938-1942 and the plaintiff paid revenue for three years only when the defendant was a minor and later on the defendant has been paying the land revenue regarding the property in question. If the plaintiff deposited revenue for the defendants father whose name continued in the revenue papers, the plaintiff cannot take any advantage of his paying revenue during a short period and the defendants continuously paying the land revenue throughout will be a material circumstance in his favour. 5. The land is proved to have become vacant and the house which existed thereon collapsed and later on, owing to bombing of Imphal, the defendants father had to seek shelter in another village along with his minor son, the present defendant. The plaintiff claims to have remained in adverse possession by raising certain plants, but this sort of possession cannot legally be deemed sufficient and exclusive for maturing title by adverse possession, vide Mansa v. Khushali Ram, 69 Ind Cas 4 : (AIR 1923 Lah 25) (D), in which it has been laid down that storing fodder and tethering and grazing cattle on a piece of waste land does not amount to adverse possession. User of this sort being common excites no particular attention. User of this sort being common excites no particular attention. It is neither intended to denote, or understood as denoting, on the one side or the other, a claim to the ownership of the land, vide also Abdul Rahim v. Wazir Ali, AIR 1930 Oudh 304 (E). 6. In Nawab Khan v. Abdulla Khan, 134 Ind Cas 294 : (AIR 1931 Lah 489) (F), it was laid down that the erection of a khurli (a mud trough for feeding cattle) upon anothers land cannot give rise to a claim by adverse possession. User of such sort is neither intended to denote a claim of ownership of the land under it nor understood as denoting this; vide also Asa Ram v. Ram Chander, AIR 1939 All 161 (G) and Babu v. Thakur Deen, 131 Ind Cas 400 : (AIR 1931 Oudh 144 (1)) (H), where in a suit for declaration of title by adverse possession there was no reliable evidence to prove that the plaintiff physically dispossessed the defendants or that they ever asserted a hostile title. All that was made out by the evidence was that the plaintiffs had been in possession for many years, that they had never paid any rents in respect of it and that in the village papers they had been recorded as bila faisla tenants whereas the defendants had been recorded as proprietors, it was held that these facts were not sufficient to establish title by adverse possession. In the present case the plaintiffs name was never entered on the disputed property in the revenue papers and the appellant and his father have continued paying the revenue except for a short period of three years. The plaintiff has stated that along with the sale deed the delivery of possession of the ingkhol was given to him, but Elangbam Gourgopal Singh (P. W. 1) has stated that the vendor remained in possession for five or six months after the execution of the unregistered sale deed, Ex. 1. The plaintiffs evidence regarding his getting possession through the sale deed, Ex. 1 - thus stands rebutted by the evidence of his first witness. 7. 1. The plaintiffs evidence regarding his getting possession through the sale deed, Ex. 1 - thus stands rebutted by the evidence of his first witness. 7. The plaintiff had tried to show by means of the evidence of Oinam Yaima Singh (P. W. 4) and Nongmaithem Mani Singh (P. W. 6) that N. Tomba Singh had admitted before these witnesses that he would sell the suit land to the plaintiff to meet the Sradha expenses of his wife. If the statements of these witnesses are examined carefully it becomes clear that the version sought to be established by the plaintiff in this connection is not correct. Oinam Yaima Singh (P. W. 4) has admitted in the cross-examination that N. Tomba Singh, had told him that he would sell the ingkhol in question to meet the expenses of his wifes Sradha and so he fully knew about the sale in question, but it is curious that he went to Thangmeiband subsequently to ask Tomba Singh to sell bamboos and trees growing in the suit land to him. If this witness already knew that the land had been sold to the plaintiff, there would be no occasion for him to go to N. Tomba Singh for purchasing bamboos and trees of the land in question and the latter would not have any occasion to tell this witness that he had sold away the land to the plaintiff. Similarly, Nongmaithem Mani Singh (P. W. 6) came to know of the sale in favour of the plaintiff before the execution of the sale deed, Ex. 1, but he does not know who was in actual possession over this land. This witness claims to be related to N. Tomba Singh and it is stated that the deceased had told him about the sale, but he never enquired about the price nor about the other conditions regarding the land in question. Nameirakpam Angou Singh (P. W. 5), village chowkidar has clearly stated that he knows the suit ingkhol but he does not know who is in actual possession over it. Similarly, Nongmaithem Mani Singh (P. W. 6) is also unable to depose that the plaintiff has been in possession over the land in question. Nameirakpam Angou Singh (P. W. 5), village chowkidar has clearly stated that he knows the suit ingkhol but he does not know who is in actual possession over it. Similarly, Nongmaithem Mani Singh (P. W. 6) is also unable to depose that the plaintiff has been in possession over the land in question. Elangbam Gourgopal Singh (P. W. 1) has tried to support the plaintiffs case on this point, but the plaintiffs statement shows that he is not an impartial witness as he carries on a dyeing business in the plaintiffs Mandop and he has always been present there. 8. N. Gourmani Singh (defendant) has stated that his father remained in possession over the land in question till his death and later on the land became vacant but the defendant continued to visit it and he used to clear the grass. His statement on this point is supported by E. Nipamacha Singh (D. W. 3) and R. K. Sekhor Singh (D. W. 4) who have stated that the defendant has been visiting the land in question and he has been clearing the jungle in this ingkhol. These witnesses appear to me to be impartial and I think, the learned District Judge was not justified in discarding their evidence on insufficient grounds. As it is proved in this case that the defendant visited the suit ingkhol and remained in possession on a number of occasions after his fathers death in 1945 A.D. though for short periods only the plaintiff could not complete his possession for over 12 years, as limitation would run against the defendant from 1945 A.D. onwards, vide Mt. Dharichhna Kuari v. Ramyad Kuar, 154 Ind Cas 1032 : (AIR 1934 Pat 485) (I); Bir Bikram Kishore v. Dasharath Rishi, 109 Ind Cas 296 : (AIR 1928 Cal 563) (J). 9. The plaintiff-respondent could not legally be deemed to have remained in adverse possession simply on the ground that he planted some trees in the form of a garden on the land in question. I have already referred to the ruling AIR 1930 Oudh 304 (E), in which it has been laid down that the mere planting of trees on another persons land does not amount to dispossession. In such cases a person who plants trees has either right of ownership or no right at all. I have already referred to the ruling AIR 1930 Oudh 304 (E), in which it has been laid down that the mere planting of trees on another persons land does not amount to dispossession. In such cases a person who plants trees has either right of ownership or no right at all. Where therefore a person had planted trees on the landlords land without permission and after doing so had asserted no possession either by using the trees or by using the land and he had no right to continue to enjoy the trees after the landlord had asserted his ownership over the land on which the trees were situated, the landlord was entitled to the possession of the land. In the present case there is no reliable evidence on this record to show that the plaintiff continued to retain possession or he used the trees planted on this land and so his occasional planting of some trees in the absence of the defendant and his father would not confer any title on him by adverse possession. By adverse possession is meant possession which is hostile, under a claim or colour of title, actual, open, uninterrupted, notorious, exclusive and continuous. Adverse possession is made out by the co-existence of two distinct ingredients : first, such a title as will afford colour, and second, such possession under it as will be adverse to the right of the true owner and title by adverse possession becomes complete only when the possession of the trespasser continues uninterruptedly for the full statutory period. The plaintiff has not been able to prove in this case that he entered into possession after the execution of the unregistered sale deed, Ex. 1 and the mere fact that the patta Ex. 2 somehow came in his possession will not help him in any way under the abovementioned circumstances. In fact, unregistered sale deed, Ex. 1 should not have been admitted in evidence, when it was proved that the plaintiff did not get possession over the land in question through it. It has been laid down in James R.R. Skinner v. Robert Hercules Skinner, 33 Cal WN 1150 : (AIR 1929 PC 269) (K) that an unregistered document which comes within S. 17, Registration Act cannot be used in any legal proceeding to bring out indirectly the effect which it would have, if registered. It has been laid down in James R.R. Skinner v. Robert Hercules Skinner, 33 Cal WN 1150 : (AIR 1929 PC 269) (K) that an unregistered document which comes within S. 17, Registration Act cannot be used in any legal proceeding to bring out indirectly the effect which it would have, if registered. It was observed at page 1155 (of Cal WN) : (at page 271 of AIR) by Sir George Lowndes : If an instrument which comes within S. 17 as purporting to create by transfer an interest in immovable property is not registered, it cannot be used in any legal proceeding to bring out indirectly the effect which it would have had, if registered. It is not to affect the property, and it is not to be received as evidence of any transaction affecting the property." The plaintiff could not, therefore, be granted any decree on the basis of the unregistered sale deed, Ex. 1 when he had clearly failed to prove his adverse possession over the land in question for more than 12 years. 10. The plaintiff has sued for mere declaration of his title in this case and as he has failed to prove his actual possession over the disputed property, I think, the contention of the appellant that the suit was barred by S. 42, Specific Relief Act has also considerable force. The appellant raised a similar objection earlier in the plaintiffs mutation case No. 369 of 1953-54 and this contention was upheld by the Court, vide Ex. 7 and the statement of Sri R.K. Birendra Singh, S. D. O., who has deposed that no sale deed was produced before him and so I am of opinion that the plaintiffs suit was barred by S. 42, Specific Relief Act, also. 11. The appeal therefore succeeds and it is allowed with costs in both the Courts against the respondent whose Suit No. 13 of 1954 shall now stand dismissed. Appeal allowed.