Judgment Rai, J. 1. These civil revision applications by the Patna Municipal Corporation arise out of the same number of small cause court suits, being small cause court suit No. 64 to 85 of 1951 filed by the petitioner for realisation of house and latrine taxes from the defendants opposite party. In all the small cause court suits Rai Brij Raj Krishna and his brother Rai Gopal Krishna were defendants 1st. party, and the defendants 2nd party were alleged to be the tenants in occupation of the premises at the relevant period. In the various suits arrears of taxes from the 1st April, 1946 to the 20th September, 1951, had been claimed. 2. The defendants appeared and contested the suits. The defendants 1st party pleaded, inter alia, that the lalrine tax imposed by Rai Saheb N.N. Gantuly. the then Special Officer of the Patna City Municipality, was ultra vires mid without jurisdiction, and as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to realise any latrine tax for the premises in suit. Defendants 1st party further pleaded in the alternative that the latrine tax was leviable against the occupiers alone and not against the owners of the premises. The defendants 2nd party pleaded, on the other hand, that they were not liable to pay any latrine tax. 3. The defendants 1st party filed an application in each of the suits for return of the plaint under Sec.23(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act for presentation on the regular side on the ground that complicated questions raised for decision in the suit cannot be properly decided, by a small cause court. The learned Small Cause Court Judge has, by his order dated the 29th of July, 1952, allowed this application and returned the plaint in each of the suits to be presented on the regular side for being tried as a money suit. The plaintiff has now moved this Court in revision against the said order of the learned Small Cause Court Judge. 4. Mr. Samaiyar who appeared for the petitioner contended before us that the learned Small Cause Court Judge has erred materially in the exercise of his jurisdiction by returning the plaints after wrongly assuming that the provisions of Sec.23(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act apply to the present case. 4. Mr. Samaiyar who appeared for the petitioner contended before us that the learned Small Cause Court Judge has erred materially in the exercise of his jurisdiction by returning the plaints after wrongly assuming that the provisions of Sec.23(1) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act apply to the present case. Sec.23(1) runs thus :- - "Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing portion of this Act, when the right of a plaintiff and the relief claimed by him in a Court of Small Causes depend upon the proof or disproof of a title to immoveable property or other title which such a Court cannot finally determine the Court may at any stage of the proceedings return the plaint to be presented to a Court having jurisdiction to determine the title." He urged that there is no dispute as to the ownership or any other title to the premises in respect of which the arrears of taxes have been claimed. According to him the plea raised by the defendants that the tax imposed by the Special Officer was ultra vires and without jurisdiction or the contest between the two sets cf defendants, inter se, regarding the liability to pay latrine tax can on no ground be said to depend on the proof or disproof of a "title to immoveable property or other title" which a small cause court cannot finally determine as contemplated by Sec.23(1) of the Act. In support of this contention he relied on the decision in the case of Sidheswar Ghosal V/s. Tarak Das Mukherjee : 62 Cal LJ 530 at p. 533 (A). He urged that the learned Small Cause Court Judge has, by returning the plaints, refused to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in him. under the law. 5. Mr. T. K. Prasad, who appeared for the defendants 1st. party, contended on the other hand, that this Court should not set aside the order under revision. According to him as the order of the learned Small Cause Court Judge returning the plaint does not amount to deciding the case, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code. Mr. T. K. Prasad further urged that under similar circumstances the plaint was ordered to be returned in the cases of Ganga Piasad V/s. Nandu Ram, 1 Pat. Mr. T. K. Prasad further urged that under similar circumstances the plaint was ordered to be returned in the cases of Ganga Piasad V/s. Nandu Ram, 1 Pat. L.J 465 : (AIR 1916 Pat 75) (B), Noola V. Chimman Lal, AIR 1935 All 148 (C), Ram Dayal V/s. Sukh Mangal, AIR 1937 All 676 (D), and Kisangopal Ganeriwala V/s. Rain Lal, AIR 1930 Pat 389 (E). 6. In my view, none of the esses cited by Mr. T. K. Prasad apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the first three cases the title to the premises in respect of which rent was claimed was disputed and in the last case the defendant had asserted that he was not the tenant in respect of the house for the rent of which he was sought to be made liable. In the present case, however, there is no such dispute regarding the ownership of the premises in question; nor is there any dispute between the defendants 1st. party and the defendants 2nd party as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between them. The controversy between the two sets of defendants inter se as to whether the latrine tax was payable by the owner or by the occupier of the holding does not, in my opinion, amount to any dispute of title to the premises concerned. The other point raised by Mr. T. K. Prasad that by passing the order under revision the learned Small Cause Court Judge will not be deemed to have decided any case is also without any force. The word case has not been defined anywhere. It has, in my opinion, a wider meaning than the word suit. Be that as it may, when the Small Cause Court Judge ordered the plaint to be returned to be presented before another court, he will be deemed to have decided the fate of that case so far as the Small Cause Court was concerned. Besides this, Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, has been held to be applicable whenever a subordinate court has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under the law; see Bala-krishna Udayar V/s. Vasudeva Ayyar, ILR 40 Mad 793 at p. 799 : (AIR 1917 PC 71 at p. 74) (F), last two paragraphs. Besides this, Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, has been held to be applicable whenever a subordinate court has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under the law; see Bala-krishna Udayar V/s. Vasudeva Ayyar, ILR 40 Mad 793 at p. 799 : (AIR 1917 PC 71 at p. 74) (F), last two paragraphs. It was admitted on behalf of the defendants that the suit was cognizable by the Small Cause Court, but they contended that as a complicated question regarding the jurisdiction of the Special Officer to assess the latrine tax had to be decided, the Small Cause Court judge was justified in returning the plaint. In my view, the validity or otherwise of the taxation made by the Special Officer does not amount to a proof or disproof of title to immoveable property within the meaning of Sec.23(1) of the Act. Such was also the view held in the case reported in 62 Cal. L.J. 530 at p. 533 (A). I agree with Mr. Samaiyar that the learned Small Cause Court Judge had by returning the plaint refused to exercise jurisdiction that was vested in him under the law, and his order is fit to be set aside under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code. 7. The result is that these applications succeed, the order dated the 29th of July, 1952, passed by the court below is set aside and the learned Small Cause Court Judge is directed to dispose of the suits in accordance with law. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of these applications payable by the defendants 1st party. The petitioner will be entitled to one consolidated hearing foe in respect of all the cases which I assess at Rs. 84/-. Kanhaiya Singh, J. 8 I agree.