JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of an order of the State Government superseding the Municipal Board of Saharanpur. 2. The facts are these. The Municipal Board of Saharanpur was elected on 28-10-1953, and on the 14th November the President and members took their oaths of office. Differences arose between the President and the members and at a meeting held on 27-10-1955, a motion of non-confidence in the President was passed by the Board. Thereafter on 30-12-1955, the State Government served upon the Board particulars of a number of charges against its administration and called upon it to show cause why it should not be superseded. The Board showed cause, but the State Government by an order dated 21-2-1956, directed that the Board be superseded for a period of one year from the date. It is the validity of that order which is challenged by the present petition. 3. It is necessary to set out the terms of the order of supersession as the argument for the Petitioner, who is a resident of the Municipality and entitled to vote at municipal elections, is founded upon its terms. The order reads as follows: 4. Whereas steady deterioration in the administration of Saharanpur Municipal Board has been a matter of considerable concern to Government for some time past and several complaints of serious nature have been received by Government from the public which reveal that the Board has persistently made defaults in the performance of its statutory duties. 5. The order reads as follows: 4. Whereas steady deterioration in the administration of Saharanpur Municipal Board has been a matter of considerable concern to Government for some time past and several complaints of serious nature have been received by Government from the public which reveal that the Board has persistently made defaults in the performance of its statutory duties. 5. Whereas on account of acute party factions, the administration of the Board has been paralysed and has resulted in the Board's failure in the discharge of its obligations in the various spheres of civil life of the town: and whereas there have been frequent walkouts and adjournments of meetings; and there has been gross mismanagement of finances resulting in heavy liabilities on the Board, and also in the decrease of its income; and there hare also been cases of mismanagement of Board's property, and the Board failed to pass its revised budget 1953-54 as well as the budget of 1954-55 in time, and it irregularly increased the amount of grants in-aid to schools and colleges, and illegally allowed remission in house tax, and has been holding its meetings at night in contravention of its regulations, and whereas no action was taken against persons who made encroachments on the public ways. 6. Now, therefore, the Governor after taking into consideration the explanation furnished by the Board to the charges set forth against it in which it has tried to justify the deplorable state of affairs, and having found it most unsatisfactory, and having been satisfied that the Board has persisted in making default in the performance of the duties, and has exceeded and abused its powers, is pleased to order u/s 30 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 (U.P. Act No. II of 1916), that the Saharanpur Municipal Board shall be and is hereby superseded for a period of one year with effect from 21-2-1956 and accordingly the President and members of the Board shall u/s 31(a) of the said Act vacate their offices on the said date; and u/s 31(b) of the said Act to further appoint the District Magistrate of Saharanpur to exercise and perform the powers and duties of the Board with effect from the said date." 7. The contention of the Petitioner is that the Board was superseded because the State Government was satisfied that (a) it had persistently made default in the performance of its duties, (b) it had exceeded its powers and (c) it had abused its powers and while it is conceded that the statement of the shortcomings of the Board enumerated in the second and third paragraphs of the order justify the conclusion that the Board had persistently made default in the performance of its duties and exceeded its powers that statement provides no basis of fact for the further conclusion that the Board had abused its powers. It is therefore contended that the order cannot stand because it is by no means certain that such an order (which is discretionary) would have been made had the State Government appreciated that the only wrongful acts of the Board were that it had made default in the performance of its duties and had exceeded its powers. Stated in other words, the belief by the State Government that the Board had abused its powers, and not merely exceeded them, may have been the determining factor in the decision of the "State Government to supersede the Board. 8. Section 30 of the Municipalities Act, 1916, empowers the State Government to dissolve or supersede a Municipal Board if it is satisfied inter alia that the Board "is exceeding or abusing its powers" "To abuse" means to use wrongly, and a Municipal Board which exceeds its powers also, in a strict sense, abuses them. So also a Board which misuses its powers is not acting within the limits of its authority, and in that sense it exceeds its powers. The legislature has however made a distinction between the two acts, and in our judgment a Municipal Board abuses its powers if, while ostensibly keeping within the limits of its authority, it acts otherwise than in good faith. This is in substance the submission made by learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and we also think that he is right in asserting that none of the findings disclosed in the order of supersession can be said to amount to a finding that the Board had abused, and not merely exceeded, its powers. 9. This is in substance the submission made by learned Counsel for the Petitioner, and we also think that he is right in asserting that none of the findings disclosed in the order of supersession can be said to amount to a finding that the Board had abused, and not merely exceeded, its powers. 9. We are however unable to agree with the further contention of learned Counsel that in these circumstances the order must be held to be an order bad in law. Reliance has been placed for the Petitioner on certain cases decided under the Preventive Detention Act, and particularly upon Shibban Lal Saksena Vs. The State of Utter Pradesh and Others, AIR 1954 SC 179 . The principle upon which that case was decided was that if the detaining authority proceeded on two grounds to detain a man and one of them is admitted later to be non-existent or irrelevant, the whole order is vitiated as it is impossible to say to what extent the bad ground operated on the mind of the detaining authority. 10. We think however that this class of case is distinguishable from that which is now before us, for in our opinion the real grounds upon which the order of supersession was made are those grounds which are set out in the second and third paragraphs of the order It is not suggested that any of these grounds is irrelevant or without evidence to support it. It is no doubt the case that the State Government was advised that these grounds were sufficient to justify it in coming to the conclusion that the Board had not only persisted in making default in the performance of its duties and had exceeded its powers, but also that the Board had abused its powers. It is no doubt the case that the State Government was advised that these grounds were sufficient to justify it in coming to the conclusion that the Board had not only persisted in making default in the performance of its duties and had exceeded its powers, but also that the Board had abused its powers. It is of course also the case that no order of supersession could be made unless the State Government was satisfied that the Board had acted in such a manner as would in law justify the making of such an order; but it appears to us that the order of supersession was in fact based on the actual conduct (or misconduct) of the Board, and provided that that conduct in law justified (as is admitted) an Older of suspension being made, the further fact that the State Government erroneously concluded that in addition to exceeding its powers the Board had abused them is not material. The real basis of the order is the conduct of the Board, and as that conduct justified the making of the order of suspension we are of opinion that that order is not vitiated by the fact that the grounds stated in the order do not disclose an instance of the Board having abused its powers. 11. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs.