Ramaswami, J.-This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the Decree and Judgment of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., in A.S. No. 331 of 1949, reversing the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam in O.S. No. 66 of 1946. The facts are: The plaintiff Kuttappa Nair and defendants 2 to 12 were members of a common tarwad composed of several tavazhis, owning immoveable properties in Cheraya Amsam and Desam of Palghat Taluk. The plaintiff Kuttappa Nair left his native place in 1927 and returned only in October, 1946. The case for the plaintiff is that after travelling over several parts of Northern India, he settled in Jeypore in Rajaputana and there took the name and style of Anandamurthi and Shaddarasana Chariar and founded Satsanghbhavan and that he was keeping contact with his family in Malabar by postal correspondence. The case for the opposite party is that the whereabouts of this Kuttappa Nair were not known to his family in Malabar from 1927 till his return in 1946 and that little reliance can be placed on the fabricated correspondence produced by the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the members of the tarwad consisting of several tavazhis entered into a partition under Exhibit A-1, dated 23rd September, 1938, reciting that they were doing so because it appeared to them that it would be very conductive to their future welfare and also to their individual conveniences and that the partition had been arranged as a result of discussion between the members of the tarwad and on the intervention of mediators. In this partition deed the tavazhi of this plaintiff is set out as the fifth tavazhi. In this partition deed the tavazhi of this plaintiff is set out as the fifth tavazhi. The relevant passage relating to this tavazhi is as follows: “As Kuttappa Nair, No. 16, herein, of the fifth tavazhi has been abroad since very long, and has not returned home, and as there is also no information whatsoever as to his whereabouts, his share of the property has been set apart along with the properties of the fifth tavazhi and in the event of the said person returning within 3 years from this date, the members of the fifth tavazhi shall either give to him his share securing a deed of surrender of his claim or take a document executed by him consenting to this partition deed, but provided the said person does not return within 3 years from this date, the property proportionate to his share shall lapse to the fifth tavazhi itself, and the rest of the members of the fifth tavazhi shall have the specific right and claim both to borrow all the amounts needed by the fifth tavazhi charging the said amounts on the properties in the E Schedule and also to effect alienations of the said properties.” In other words, on account of the whereabouts of the eldest male adult member not being known and the karnavanship being abandoned, the eldest female member, viz., the mother of this plaintiff, viz., Devaki Amma, was constituted the karnavastri of this tavazhi and she took the share of the tavazhi properties as and on behalf of the fifth tavazhi. This Devaki Amma along with other members of the tavazhi executed the promissory notes Exhibits B-4 to B-10 in 1938, evidently for equalisation of the shares under the partition deed Exhibit A-1. In order to discharge these promissory note debts, Exhibits B-4 to B-8 and some other binding debts of the tavazhi like renewal fee, rent and arrears to Tirumandhankunnu Devaswom, the mortgage deed Exhibit B-3, dated 31st January, 1939, was executed. It has been found by the learned Subordinate Judge and confirmed by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., that Exhibit B-3 is fully supported by consideration and that the items of consideraion are really binding on the tavazhi. These findings were not challenged before us. It has been found by the learned Subordinate Judge and confirmed by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., that Exhibit B-3 is fully supported by consideration and that the items of consideraion are really binding on the tavazhi. These findings were not challenged before us. On account of the pressure of the creditors and as the tavazhi had no other means to pay the mortgage debt, an assignment deed Exhibit B-1, dated 19th December, 1940, was executed in favour of the first defendant in respect of four items of properties and with the consideration for Exhibit B-1, the debts were all discharged. It is also further evident that if the mortgagee had filed a suit on the strength of Exhibit B-3, all the properties of the tavazhi would have been sold and lost. It is this Exhibit B-1 which is the subject-matter of the suit. The tavazhi has also entered into other transactions. But the plaintiff does not challenge those transactions or seek to disturb the partition, He states in reexamination as P.W.1: “I accept Exhibit A-20 as valid because consideration for it was for tavazhi purpose and to protect tavazhi property”. In regard to the partition the plaint states in paragraph 4: “Although for the aforesaid and various other reasons, the above mentioned partition deed is itself as a matter of fact unlawful, invalid and objectionable, yet the plaintiff gives up his claim to relief in respect thereof and accepts the partition deed as otherwise it would lead to serious dissension and great loss and hardship to members of the tarwad and others.” In other words, the plaintiff affirms the partition and the other transactions by the tavazhi alienating the properties and impeaches only this transaction covered by Exhibit B-1. The case for the plaintiff is that Exhibit B-1 is an invalid transaction, that he should be put in possession of the properties on the strength of his title with relief for mesne profits, etc., in that it is a well settled principle of Malabar law that a Karnavan alone is competent to represent the tarwad and that it is only the karnavan who could alienate tarwad properties and that while his whereabouts were known and he was in correspondence with the family, his mother should not have been constituted the karnavastri and she could not validly alienate the tarwad properties ; and secondly, that Exhibits B-1 and B-3 were brought about by fraud and compulsion vitiating the transactions and that these transactions are not supported by any consideration valid and binding on the tavazhi. The contention of the first defendant who is the purchaser of the properties is that these transactions are fully supported by consideration, valid and binding on this tarwad, that they were not brought about by compulsion or fraud, that inasmuch as the whereabouts of this plaintiff were not known between 1927 and 1938, Devaki Amma was constituted as the karnavastri and she could validly alienate the properties, that in any event, he, the first defendant, is a bona fide transferee for valuable consideration, acting on representations, which he had no reason to disbelieve when Devaki Amma and the others were alienating the properties. The only point which is urged now and which has been considered by the learned Subordinate Judge and Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., is that it is only the karnavan that can alienate the tarwad properties and that in this case no one else was or could have been the karnavan excepting the plaintiff and that therefore the alienation made by Devaki Amma and others is not a valid transaction. The other contentions were found on scrutiny to be baseless. We have already referred to the clear findings of both the trial Court and the appellate Court that Exhibit B-3 is fully supported by consideration and that the items of consideration are really binding on the tavazhi and that the first defendant is a transferee for valuable consideration. The suggestion that the properties were sold for an inadequate price was not pursued and there is no evidence even to probabilise the same. The properties seem to have been conveyed for an adequate price. The suggestion that the properties were sold for an inadequate price was not pursued and there is no evidence even to probabilise the same. The properties seem to have been conveyed for an adequate price. In regard to fraud and compulsion alleged, beyond the reckless general allegations which are usually made in cases of this nature, all that the plaintiff was able to state in his evidence was: “My parents told me that Exhibits B-1 and B-3 were executed due to the compulsion of defendant 1.......Defendant 2 was in my house when I came to Court yesterday. In casual conversation my parents said that Exhibits B-1 and B-3 were executed due to compulsion. They told me on the night of my coming here. Only persons in my house have heard it.” The mother has not been examined though available. In fact the plaintiff has also categorically stated: “Defendant 2 (mother) loves me.....My parents would not do anything harmful to me deliberately. I do not know if they would do harm to the tavazhi. I do not know if defendant 3 and 4 would do anything harmful to tavazhi. They are incapable of injuring me. .... If documents were executed by defendant 2 in my absence really for tavazhi purpose I accept them as valid and binding on tavazhi.” Therefore, the only point in controversy, as stated, is whether Exhibit N-1 is an invalid transaction by reason of its not being executed by the plaintiff? The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that Exhibit B-1 was an invalid transaction by reason of its not being executed by the plaintiff and Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., came to a diametrically opposite conclusion, Hence this Letters Patent Appeal by the defeated plaintiff. The term “karnavan” has been defined in the Madras Marumakkathayam Act as “the oldest male member of a tarwad or tavazhi, as the case may be, in whom the right to management of its properties vests, or, in the absence of a male member, the oldest female member or where by custom or family usage (e.g., Kovilagam) the right to such management vests in the oldest female member, such female member”. Karnavan is the natural head of the family. Karnavanship is a natural right he gets by birth in the family and it is not competent for any one to deprive him of it. Karnavan is the natural head of the family. Karnavanship is a natural right he gets by birth in the family and it is not competent for any one to deprive him of it. He is not in his office by the sufferance of the other members. It cannot be created by contract and it is not analogous to that of a mere trustee or officer of the Corporation or the like. So long as the karnavan is capable of acting and has not abandoned the office or renounced the position, either directly or by implication, he alone can represent the family and bind it by his acts: Krishnan Chettiar v. Ammalu Amma1. In the words of Holloway, J., “A Malabar family speaks through its head, the karnavan, and in Courts of justice, except in antagonism to that head, can speak in no other way”. A karnavan has two capacities, a temporal and a spiritual one ; in the latter capacity, he officiates at family ceremonies. In fact it has been held that even if the tarwad has no property, these spiritual duties still remain vested in the karnavan. The position of a karnavan has sometimes been compared to a trustee or agent. Though in one sense be holds a fiduciary position and acts as the agent of the family, the analogy is misleading, for unlike the trustee and agent he is personally interested in the family property which he gets by birth. The comparison of a Marumakkatthayam family to a Corporation and of the karnavan to the head of a Corporation is equally misleading. The rights and duties of a karnavan are not regulated as in a Corporation by the votes of the members, and law clothes him with powers of management free from the control of the members of the family as incidental to the natural right which he gets by birth. The nearest approximation of the karnavasthanam is that of the manager of a joint Hindu family. It is now a well settled principle in Malabar law that the karnavan alone is competent to represent the tarwad and that it is only the karnavan who can alienate the tarwad properties. This position is so well-recognized that it needs no buttressing by citations. It is now a well settled principle in Malabar law that the karnavan alone is competent to represent the tarwad and that it is only the karnavan who can alienate the tarwad properties. This position is so well-recognized that it needs no buttressing by citations. This was so even before the Madras Marumakkathayam Act became law (see Puthisseri Maniyanoor v. Pullaniyil2, and this is emphasised in Chapter V of that Act dealing with the tarwad and its management. Throughout that Chapter the karnavan alone is contemplated as the manager of the tarwad. Section 33 of the Act sets out the position that a karnavan alone can alienate tarwad properties and imposes a restriction that except with the written consent of the majority of the major members of the tarwad, no karnavan can sell immoveable properties or mortgage with possession such properties. Therefore, this karnavasthanam can get terminated only in three ways. The karnavan may abandon his karnavanship either by going away from the tarwad and having no contact thereafter with the tarwad or entering into holy orders and dying a civil death or involuntarily can do so by becoming a lunatic or by any supervening incapacitating cause. Where the de jure karnavan or ejaman abandons his position and which will not be in any particular or formal manner the junior members can assume management and in such capacity execute mortgages, etc. (Kunhanna Rai v. Manku Chetty3. He can also affirmatively and formally relinquish or renounce his karnavasthanam and that too even before the right to succeed as karnavan had actually accrued (Kenath Puthan Vittil Tavazhi v. Narayanan4.) This effacement, of the connection by the karnavan with the karnavasthanam might be brought about by delegation in which case, unless it amounts to a family arrangement, the karnavan has the power of revocation. In a family arrangement to which he is a party the karnavan may renounce once for all his connection with the office and then it will not be competent for him to revoke the renunciation. On such renunciation the next senior in age succeeds to the office unless as part of the family arrangement the next senior also renounces his office. On such renunciation the next senior in age succeeds to the office unless as part of the family arrangement the next senior also renounces his office. Before the passing of the Marumakkathayam Act the karars which used to be entered into, with the intention to put an end to the dissentions in the family or to get rid of an incompetent or unscrupulous manager and to prevent costly litigation for the removal of a karnavan could be in writing and need not be registered. Now, section 36 of the Marumakkathayam Act states that a karnavan may, by a registered document, give up his rights as karnavan. This does not necessarily mean that a karnavan can efface himself only by a registered instrument because it will lead to illogical absurdities. Suppose the karnavan of a tarwad goes away from the tarwad and abandons his karnavanship but does not execute a registered document or if he wilfully refuses to manage, can it be said that such a person still continues in the karnavasthanam by reason of his not having executed a registered deed of renouncement? The third method for the detaching of the karnavan from the karnavasthanam is by filing a suit by the anandravans for his removal. (For a discussion of the office of karnavan and the modes by which the karnavasthanam can be terminated see Cuddalore Ramachandra Iyer: Manual of Malabar Law, (1883) Ch. II, pages 11 to 42 ; Subramania Sastri: The Domestic Law of Kerala, (1921) pages 34-36; P.R. Sundara Iyer: Malabar and Aiyasanthana Law, (1922), pages 100-131; Mayne’s Hindu Law and Usage (1953), Eleventh Edition, pages 981-988.) Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the alienation under Exhibit B-1 can be upheld on two grounds which have been established, viz., either on the ground that this plaintiff has abandoned the karnavanship and therefore it was open to the members of the tarwad by agreement amongst themselves to constitute the eldest female member as the karnavastri and for her to alienate the tarwad properties for family benefit or necessity, within the limits of the well-known Privy Council decision of Hunoomanpersaud 1or on the ground of estoppel by conduct personal to this plaintiff. Point 1.-The facts of this case clearly show that this plaintiff had abandoned the karnavanship by leaving for the Northern parts of India and settling in Jeypore, Rajaputana, from 1927. The plaintiff wants to make out that he did not abandon the karnavanship and that he was in contact with his family and for this purpose he relied upon a small photo Exhibits A-8 and the letters, Exhibit A-10, dated 6th November, 1931; Exhibit A-12, dated November, 1931; Exhibit A-13, dated 6th November 1931 and Exhibit A-14, dated 14th September, 1931 and another photo of the plaintiff Exhibit A-15. This alleged correspondence with the mother and P.W. 2, Govindan Nair, has been subjected to careful scrutiny by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., and for the reasons set out by him in his judgment, and which need not be repeated, the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that he had grave doubts about the genuineness of these documents. In any event, there is no further correspondence exhibited in Court after 1931. The mother to whom, all these letters are stated to have been written is alive and in fact the plaintiff has admitted that he was in his house with his mother before he attended Court to give evidence but she was not examined. The deposition of P.W.2 has not been printed or typed, apparently because no reliance has been placed upon it by the plaintiff. In addition, there is the other significant circumstance to which a reference will be made later, that whereas these few postcards and letters without envelopes, which can come into existence at any time, have been produced, the letters written by the mother or P.W.2 to the plaintiff have not been filed. It is not the case for the plaintiff that his mother and P.W.2 were indifferent towards him and did not write to him. On the other hand, his own case was that the last letter which he got from his mother was in 1944, that he had written for moneys to be sent to him that he got many letters asking him to return and that he could not say if any letter produced in Court would show that it was sent as a reply to any letter received. It is clear therefore that from at least 1931 onwards this plaintiff had abandoned his karnavanship and had no contact with his family and in fact his whereabouts were not known to the family. That is why in the family partition which was between close relatives who would be in the know of what happened, allegations are made about Kuttappa Nair being abroad for a very long time and there being no information whatsoever as to his whereabouts. Therefore a share of the property was set apart for him and it was provided that if Kuttappa Nair did not return within three years from the date of the partition deed, the property proportionate to his share shall lapse to the fifth tavazhi of this Kuttappa Nair. There is no reason whatsoever why false allegations should be made in such a solemn document as the partition deed. This abandonment receives further corroboration from the fact that till his return this plaintiff, though he did not become a Sanyasi and die a civil death, had given up worldly affairs and founded an Ashramam and took the name and style of Anandamurthi and Shaddarasana Chariar. He has written in his letter Exhibit A-13 that he had a Virakthi for Grihasthasramam. It is clear therefore that giving up participation in all mundane affairs this plaintiff had abandoned the karnavanship and was living the life of a Viraktha and it was only about 1946 that his thoughts have returned towards Malabar and to the impeaching of this transaction Exhibit B-1 by his mother on the ground that he had never ceased to be the karnavan and that his mother could not ergo alienate the immovable properties albeit for family benefit and necessity. On this conclusion the decree and judgment of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., dismissing the suit have got to be upheld. Point 2.-But even assuming the version of the plaintiff to be true, it carries with it the implication that he must have known full well about the partition and the constituting of the mother as the karnavastri of the fifth tavazhi and the execution of the promissory notes, mortgage deed and the assignment deed. The plaintiff cannot have it both ways. The plaintiff cannot have it both ways. He cannot ask us to believe that he was in contact with his mother and P.W.2 and was corresponding with them and receiving letters from them and yet profess that he had no knowledge of the partition, the constituting of the mother as the karnavastri, the execution of the promissory notes, mortgage deed and the assignment deed. In this family there could not have been two events of greater importance than partition and alienation by the mother, karnavastri, under Exhibit B-1. Would, in any correspondence between the mother and the son of P.W.2 and the plaintiff, these persons have not informed him of these most important events in the life of that family? Gould the plaintiff have honestly believed that everything stood stock still in the status of this family from 1927 when he left till 1946 when he returned? That is why the plaintiff has deliberately suppressed the correspondence of his parents to him. Is it believable that only these postcards and letters without envelopes alone would have. been preserved and the other correspondence between this plaintiff and his mother would not have been preserved, and especially so when he had a fixed address and was occupying a position of some responsibility and was not a mere wanderer. This also explains why the mother has been kept behind and has not been examined in order to prevent her from making damaging admissions in cross-examination about her informing the plaintiff of the partition and the allied transactions resulting in the execution of the assignment deed Exhibit B-1. The irresistible inference to be drawn from these facts is that the plaintiff, if his version were true, must have known full well about the partition in the tarwad and of his mother being constituted as the karnavastri of the fifth tavazhi and her executing along with others promissory notes, mortgage deed and the assignment deed. If that were so, the equitable doctrine of estoppel would apply. One of the general principles of the law of transfer of property is enunciated by the maxim that no man can transfer to another a right or title greater than what he himself possesses and he gives not who hath not. If that were so, the equitable doctrine of estoppel would apply. One of the general principles of the law of transfer of property is enunciated by the maxim that no man can transfer to another a right or title greater than what he himself possesses and he gives not who hath not. But to this general principle there is a well recognised exception that if the true owner of the property permits another to hold herself out as the real owner, as by entrusting her with the documents of title or in some other way, a third person who bona fide deals with that other may acquire a good title to the property as against the true owner; vide Broom’s Selection of Legal Maxims, 10th Edition, pages 305 and 547. The ground of this exception was stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramcoomar v. Mcqueen1, as follows:- “It is a principle of natural equity, which must be universally applicable, that where one man allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate, and a third person purchases it, for value, from the apparent owner in the belief that he is the real owner, the man who so allows the other to hold himself out shall not be permitted to recover upon his secret title, unless he can overthrow that of the purchaser by showing, either that he had direct notice, or something which amounts to constructive notice, of the real title, or that there existed circumstances which ought to have put him upon an enquiry, which, if prosecuted, would have led to a discovery of it” . This principle which is really a form of the equitable doctrine of estoppel is embodied in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down: “When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing”. Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act requires in order that that section may apply that (1) the transferor must be an ostensible owner of the property transferred, with the consent of the persons interested ; (2) the transfer must be for consideration; and (3) the transferee must have acted in good faith after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer the same. If all these conditions exist in any particular case, the transferee will be protected The distinction between section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act which enact different aspects of the same principle underlying the equitable doctrine of estoppel is that under section 115 of the Evidence Act it is necessary that the party sought to be estopped should have intended that the party pleading the estoppel should act on his representation; while under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act it is not necessary that the real owner should have intended that the transferee should take a transfer of the property. The law, in these two sections, has made a distinction between an intentional inducement and an unintentional inducement. There may, however, be cases in which a person may be estopped both under section 115 of the Evidence Act and under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, where A has, with his consent, allowed his property to stand in the name of B, and intentionally induces C to take a transfer from B and C takes such a transfer after taking reasonable care to ascertain that B has power to transfer the same, section 115 of the Evidence Act and section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act will both operate to estop A from asserting against C that the property is his own. In this case on the evidence on record it cannot be stated that the impeached transaction would not fall under section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act or under both section 115 of the Evidence Act and section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The facts make it evident that the requirements of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act have been complied with. The facts make it evident that the requirements of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act have been complied with. On the date of the assignment deed the transferor Devaki Amma was the ostensible manager of the family entitled to alienate for necessity, because this plaintiff had left his home for the northern parts of India in 1927 and though, even if his version was true, he must have known all about the partition and his mother being constituted as the karnavastri, he did not put himself forward as the karnavan at any time, but allowed his mother in her capacity as karnavastri to put herself forward as the ostensible manager entitled to deal with the tavazhi property. With the consent of other persons interested she has executed the assignment deed. Though the plaintiff attempted to do so, he has not shown either that the assignment deed was brought about by fraud, undue influence or compulsion or other vitiating circumstances or that the transfer was not fully supported by consideration. The transfer was for good consideration. The transferee acted in good faith and the reasonable care he has taken to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer the same has not also been seriously impeached. The partition deed itself between all the members of the family contains recitals reproduced above and the transferee has certainly after making reasonable enquiries and acting upon these representations in the family partition deed has assured himself in good faith that the transferor had power to transfer. Therefore, all the requirements of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act have been fulfilled in this case. On this conclusion also the impugned transaction has got to be upheld as has been done by Krishnaswami Nayudu, J. Therefore, looked at from any point of view, the conclusion of Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., is irreproachable and this Letters Patent Appeal, devoid of merits, is dismissed with costs. P.R.N. ----- Appeal dismissed.