JUDGMENT This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of certiorari or a writ of like nature quashing the orders of respondents 2 and 3 whereby the waste land in dispute belonging to Government and shown by letter D marked on the map filed in this case (situated at Imphal) was settled with respondent 1, and which the petitioner was ordered to vacate. 2. The facts are that the petitioner who had already taken possession of the land D and the adjoining land E applied to the Dy. Commissioner (respondent 3) for the settlement of the land on 18-2-53. He again filed an application for the same on 29-6-53. Respondent 1 had also put in an application for settlement on 25-11-52 but it was in respect of another plot near by and marked C on the map. On 7-7-54 respondent 1 put in a second application by which he asked for the settlement of the areas D and E. The D.C. inspected the spot and granted the lease of the portion D to respondent 1 by his order dated 30-4-55. The petitioner was asked to vacate the land and his appeal to the C.C. was dismissed as time barred. 3. The petitioners case is that he reclaimed the land (D and E) about four years ago, as according to the grow more food campaign of the Government of India, he was entitled to reclaim any waste land belonging to the Government without previous permission of the Government if the neighbours did not object. He also built a house on part D about 3 years ago. The petitioner challenges the orders whereby the area D was allowed to respondent 1 and he was asked to vacate it as illegal and ultra vires and that they have the effect of subjecting him to discrimination and infringing the fundamental rights that he has under the Constitution of India. 4. Respondent 1 did not file any affidavit, and according to respondents 2 and 3 the petitioner was a trespasser on the areas D and E, and there was nothing in the policy of grow more food campaign which permitted encroachment upon Government land, as has been done by the petitioner. The construction of the house, if any, or the improvements did not therefore give the petitioner any right to the land. The construction of the house, if any, or the improvements did not therefore give the petitioner any right to the land. The question of settling the land is within the discretion of the Deputy Commissioner and the Dy. Commissioner had decided the question after local inquiry and given the land to respondent 1 who was a bona fide landless person. Under the Assam Land Revenue Manual, the Dy. Commissioner also had the power to evict the petitioner who was a trespasser. There was thus no discrimination or infringement of fundamental rights, and the petitioner could not invoke Art. 226. 5. It was stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 that the settlement of the land E was granted to the petitioner. This is obviously wrong, as the Revenue Record only shows that there was nothing more than a recommendation for it made by the Revenue Assistant in his report dated 1-9-55. The learned Government Advocate himself drew my attention to it, and expressed his regret for the mistake stating that it was due to a misreading on his part. I accept the explanation and nothing more need be said about it. 6. It is admitted that the provisions of the Assam Land Revenue Manual have been made applicable to Manipur State. Under S. 12 of Chapter 11 Part 1 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 in the said Manual the Provincial Government (now State Government) is given the power to make rules regarding the disposal by way of grant, lease, etc. of and for ejecting any trespasser, land-holder or settlement-holder. These rules will be found in Part 11, Chapter 1, Ss. I, II and IV. Since it is admitted that the land under dispute is waste land in a town as defined in R. 64 (f) in S. IV, Chapter 1 in Part 11, the appropriate rule governing the matter will be R. 67 in that section. That rule runs as follows : "67. Leases of waste land in towns shall be obtained by formal application only. That rule runs as follows : "67. Leases of waste land in towns shall be obtained by formal application only. Applications for leases of waste land in towns shall be in writing and shall be presented to the Deputy Commissioner, who will have a map prepared of the land or have it indicated on an existing map, and after making such local inquiry as he thinks fit, either by himself or by a gazetted officer shall pass an order allowing the application in whole or in part or disallowing it altogether. "Provided that, except in the case of temporary leases granted in accordance with the proviso to R. 68 the lease may, if the Deputy Commissioner thinks fit, and shall, whenever the Provincial Government have by general or special order so directed, be put up to auction and granted to the highest bidder." 7. It is well settled that a writ of certiorari can issue only against judicial or quasi-judicial orders but not against purely executive or administrative orders, that is, the authority deciding the matter should be bound to approach it judicially or quasi-judicially. Therefore the main question that arises for determination in this case is whether R. 67 contemplates a judicial or quasi-judicial approach on the part of the Deputy Commissioner. The learned Government Advocate also laid stress on that point and argued that the order sought to be impugned was purely an executive or administrative order and therefore this petition was misconceived. 8. In Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222 (A) the observations of my Lord the Chief Justice of India were (para 7 page 225) : "Learned counsel for the respondent referred to several cases but in none of them the dicta of Atkin, L.J., or the four conditions analysed by Slesser, L.J., have been suggested much less stated, to be not the correct tests. The respondents argument that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, the decision is quasi-judicial, does not appear to be sound. The observations of May, C.J., when properly read, included the judicial aspect of the determination in the words used by him. The respondents argument that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, the decision is quasi-judicial, does not appear to be sound. The observations of May, C.J., when properly read, included the judicial aspect of the determination in the words used by him. I am led to that conclusion because after the test of judicial duty of the body making the decision was expressly stated and emphasized by Atkin and Slesser, L. JJ., in no subsequent decision it is even suggested that the dictum of May C.J., was different from the statement of law of the two Lord Justices or that the latter, in any way, required to be modified. The word quasi-judicial itself necessarily implies the existence of the judicial element in the process leading to the decision. Indeed in the judgment of the lower Court, while it is stated at one place that if the act done by the inferior body is a judicial act, as distinguished from a ministerial act, certiorari will lie, a little later the idea has got mixed up where it is broadly stated that when that decision affects rights of someone, the decision or act is quasi-judicial. This last statement overlooks the aspect that every decision of the executive generally is a decision of fact and in most cases affects the rights of someone or the other. Because an executive authority has to determine certain objective fact as a preliminary step to the discharge of an executive function, it does not follow that it must determine those facts judicially. When the executive authority has to form an opinion about an objective matter as a preliminary step to the exercise of a certain power conferred on it, the determination of the objective fact and the exercise of the power based thereon are alike matters of an administrative character and are not amenable to the writ of certiorari. Observations from different decisions of the English Courts were relied upon to find out whether a particular determination was quasi-judicial or ministerial. In some cases it was stated that you require a proposition and an opposition, or that a lis was necessary, or that it was necessary to have a right to examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses. Observations from different decisions of the English Courts were relied upon to find out whether a particular determination was quasi-judicial or ministerial. In some cases it was stated that you require a proposition and an opposition, or that a lis was necessary, or that it was necessary to have a right to examine, cross-examine and re-examine witnesses. As has often been stated, the observations in a case have to be read along with the facts thereof and the emphasis in the cases on these different aspects is not necessarily the complete or exhaustive statement of the requirements to make a decision quasi-judicial or otherwise. It seems to me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision, itself requires a judicial approach the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed. In my opinion, the conditions laid down by Slesser, L.J., in his judgment correctly bring out the distinction between a judicial or quasi-judicial decision on the one hand and a ministerial decision on the other." 9. Can it be therefore said, bearing the above observations in mind that an order of the D.C. under R. 67 amounts to Appellant judicial or quasi-judicial order? After paying due consideration to the pros and cons involved I am of the opinion that in no case the language of the rule is capable of the construction that it intends that there should be a judicial approach by the Deputy Commissioner. Thus the judicial element required to make the decision judicial or quasi-judicial is wanting, and orders passed under R. 67 will be purely executive or administrative. 10. The proviso to R. 67 also throws some light on the subject, and in my opinion, the provision for putting up the leases to auction, clearly indicates that it could not be the intention of the framers of that rule that the matter will be approached judicially or quasi-judicially. 11. Alarakhia Somijee v. Collector of Nasik, AIR 1951 Bom 131 (B) was a case which was decided on the basis of the observation in Khusaldas case (A), referred to by me above. 11. Alarakhia Somijee v. Collector of Nasik, AIR 1951 Bom 131 (B) was a case which was decided on the basis of the observation in Khusaldas case (A), referred to by me above. It was a case under the Bombay Land Requisition Act (33 of 1948) and the view taken was that the provision that the enquiry to be held by the Government shall be such as it deems fit clearly negatived the suggestion that the enquiry is to be a judicial one. The observations on the point were : "Therefore, again the learned Chief Justice emphasises the fact that the law itself must provide that in coming to a conclusion or a decision the authority making the order must approach the subject in a judicial manner further, that the recognised principles, which I again assume are the rules of natural justice, must be required to be followed by the statute itself. Now with these observations of the learned Chief Justice of India in mind let us approach S. 5(2) and decide whether an obligation has been cast upon Government to hold the inquiry contemplated by that sub-section in a judicial manner. In our opinion, the very expression used by the Legislature that the enquiry to be held by the Government shall be such as it deems fit clearly negatives the suggestion that the inquiry is to be a judicial inquiry. The nature, the extent, the scope of the inquiry is to be determined by Government. How can it then be said that there is a statutory requirement that Government should observe the rules of natural justice in holding such an inquiry? Mr. Taraporewalla points out, and rightly points out, the grave consequences of taking this view of S. 5(2). He says that a man might be deprived of his property without being heard and on an ex parte decision. We have had occasion in the past to point out what wide powers have been conferred by Government upon executive officers and we have also drawn the attention of Government to the necessity of supplying some judicial corrective to important and far reaching decisions given by executive officers. That is a matter of policy with which we are not concerned. We can only draw the attention of the Government to the hardship that is likely to be caused to those who have been deprived of their property. That is a matter of policy with which we are not concerned. We can only draw the attention of the Government to the hardship that is likely to be caused to those who have been deprived of their property. The result, therefore, is that in our opinion, the order made by the Collector of Nasik under S. 5(1) was an administrative order and, therefore, no writ of certiorari can lie to correct that order." And it appears to me that, that is what is meant and intended by the expression "and after making such local inquiry as he thinks fit either by himself or by a gazetted officer" used in R. 67. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Rule casts an obligation on the Deputy Commissioner to bring a judicial mind to bear upon the subject. I have therefore no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the order in question is a purely administrative or judicial order. 12. It was observed in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 (C) that in proceedings under Art. 226, however, extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made, and that under the Motor Vehicles Act which prescribed an elaborate procedure for the grant of permits, no one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions and the grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities, and the aggrieved party must have recourse generally to the remedies provided by the statute. In this view of the matter also, the present case cannot be amenable to a writ of certiorari. 13. As has already been stated one of the contentions of the petitioner is, that he reclaimed the land on the basis of the policy announced for grow food campaign by the Government, without any previous permission, if the neighbours had no objection. 13. As has already been stated one of the contentions of the petitioner is, that he reclaimed the land on the basis of the policy announced for grow food campaign by the Government, without any previous permission, if the neighbours had no objection. If that is so, then the petitioner would be certainly entitled under the civil law to hold the land, otherwise he is a trespasser and the fact that he has also built on the land will make no difference to the position and there can be no question of discrimination or infringement of a fundamental right. But it is not possible to take this plea of the petitioner into consideration, as these facts are not admitted by the opposite party. The learned counsel for the petitioner in the course of his arguments, stated that there was an announcement in the official gazette on the subject and promised to produce it, but it was not done. It is therefore not possible to consider that plea in this case, and the petitioner can pursue such other remedies that may be open to him. Maqbulunissa v. Union of India, AIR 1953 All 477 (FB) (D) and Nirmal Chakravarti v. Land Acquisition Collector, Alipur, AIR 1953 Cal 257 (E) also support the view that proceedings under Art. 226 are of a summary nature where issues are decided on affidavits, and are not appropriate for deciding disputed questions of fact or of title, and therefore in such cases, other remedies that may be open must be sought. In this view of the matter it is not open to the petitioner to draw support from S. 32 of the Regulation. 14. It will be thus clear that the order sought to be impugned is not amenable to a writ of certiorari. The result is that the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.