Order The question raised by this writ petition is as regards the proper construction of certain provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949) and the validity of certain action taken by the Accommodation Controller in regard to the premises of the petitioner. The petitioner is the owner of two house Nos. 60 and 61, Gangathareeswarar Koil Street, Purasawalkam, Madras. House No. 60 has been occupied by an official of the Central Government and its only relevancy for the present proceedings is that it is not available for occupation by the petitioner. House No. 61 had been let out to tenants for the past several years. The last tenant, who occupied that property, died in 1955, and his heirs, who continued to remain in the premises for some time after the death of the tenant, vacated the premises on 14th April, 1955. On 20th April, 1955, the petitioner intimated the Accommodation Controller of the vacancy, but in this notice, which is purported to be one under section 3(1)(a) of the Act the petitioner did not furnish the particulars which he was required to furnish under section 3(1)(b) of the Act, a matter to which I shall refer in a little more detail later. The Accommodation Controller when he received this notice stated that it was not in proper form and directed the petitioner to submit a notice, which would conform to the rules. The petitioner did so and sent another notice on 27th April, 1955, which admittedly conformed to the requirements of the rules. In this he gave all the particulars, which a landlord, when giving notice under section 3 (1), had to furnish. In this communication, dated 20th April, 1955, the petitioner had stated that house No. 61 was required for his own occupation and that the Accommodation Controller might be pleased not to requisition the building. But notwithstanding the request contained in this communication, the Accommodation Controller who is the respondent here by his order, dated 3rd May, 1955, requisitioned the house bearing door No. 61 for the accommodation of an Officer of the Income-tax Department. The petitioner applied to the Secretary, Home Department for redress ; but not having obtained it, he has approached this Court with this writ petition. The petitioner applied to the Secretary, Home Department for redress ; but not having obtained it, he has approached this Court with this writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions: The first was that his client’s notice, dated 20th April, 1955, was substantially in compliance with the enactment and that as the Accommodation Controller had received this notice on 21st April, 1955, the ten days’ time within which a requisition could take place under section 3(3) of the Act expired by the end of the month and that the order, dated 3rd May, 1955, was out of time. As part of this argument he urged that the notice or the intimation, dated 27th April, 1955, in which the petitioner furnished the full particulars, which were demanded of him was despatched beyond the seven days’ time mentioned in section 3(1) and was not therefore a notice on which a requisition under section 3(3) could be founded. The second contention was that the Accommodation Controller had not considered the bona fide requirement of the petitioner of the premises No. 61 before directing the requisition and that, as this material matter has not been considered by the Accommodation Controller or by the Government, the order should be set aside. Lastly, he contended that as the petitioner still continued to remain in possession of the property, any attempt on the part of the Government to enforce the requisition would offend the guarantee contained in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. I shall consider these contentions in the order in which I have set them above. Section 3(1)(a) enacts: “Every landlord shall, within seven days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by release from requisition give notice of the vacancy in writing to the officer authorized in that behalf by the State Government (hereinafter in this section referred to as the ‘authorised officer”). Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to a building in respect of which the landlord has obtained an order for possession on any of the grounds specified in section 7, sub-section (3). Sub-clause (b) of this sub-section provides that every notice given under clause (a) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to a building in respect of which the landlord has obtained an order for possession on any of the grounds specified in section 7, sub-section (3). Sub-clause (b) of this sub-section provides that every notice given under clause (a) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Section 15 requires every landlord to furnish to the Controller or any person authorised by him in that behalf, such particulars in respect of the building as may be prescribed by rules made under the Act ; and under section 17(2) the State Government is empowered by rules to provide for all matters expressly required or allowed by the Act to be prescribed. In accordance with these provisions, rules have been made and under the rules published in G.O. No. 3850 Development, dated 10th October, 1946, the particulars to be furnished under section 15 to the Controller or any person authorised by him in that behalf are set out, and rule 4 prescribes that a notice under section 3(1) should contain the particulars prescribed in rule 3 ; the effect of which is that all the requirements of rule 3 have to be complied with before a notice could be said to conform to the requirements of section 3(1)(a) and (b). Among the matters to be set out in the notice or communication by the landlord on a vacancy occurring are: (1) details of the accommodation available together with particulars as regards the ground area, garden and out-houses if any, appurtenant to the building; (2) if the building is not occupied by the landlord, whether it is occupied by a single tenant or by more than one tenant ; (3) amenities available in regard to lighting, water, sanitation and the like; (4) monthly rent paid by the tenant. There cannot be any controversy that these matters are essential to be known before the Accommodation Controller could make up his mind as to whether the residential house in question is or is not fit for being occupied by a Government servant, and it is also -admitted that in the communication, dated 20th April, 1955, which the petitioner, addressed to the Accommodation Controller, these details were not set out. I cannot therefore, regard this notice, dated 20th April, 1955, as a notice conforming to the requirements of section 3(1)(a) or (b). I cannot therefore, regard this notice, dated 20th April, 1955, as a notice conforming to the requirements of section 3(1)(a) or (b). If this notice were any other way we have the fact that the petitioner did furnish these particulars on 27th April, 1955, in response to the requisition of the Accommodation Controller. Learned counsel did, as I have indicated, contend that as this notice was beyond the seven days’ time prescribed by section 3(1), it was not a notice upon which the Accommodation Controller could act. I do not see any force in this argument at all. The period of seven days is prescribed within which, without committing an offence, the landlord could furnish the information. If he does not do so, it might be open to the authorities to prosecute the landlord. But merely because the period prescribed by section 3(1) has expired, it does not mean that a notice purporting to be under section 3(1)(a) ceases to be a valid notice under that section. In my opinion the Accommodation Controller was justified in treating the notice, dated 27th April, 1955, as a valid notice and proceeding on that basis. The next question for consideration is whether the order of the Accommodation Controller requisitioning the premises is liable to be quashed, for the reason that he did not in his order give indications, that he has considered the request of the petitioner that the premises should not be requisitioned, as they were needed bona fide for his own accommodation. So far as the language of section 3(3) is concerned, it gives a right to the Accommodation Controller to requisition premises for the use of a Government servant as one entitled to priority. Even if the request of the petitioner had been considered, still, if the officer was of the opinion that the building was required for the occupation of an officer of the Central Government, he was bound to order the requisition, and he was not entitled to conform to the wishes of the petitioner. It is no doubt true that under the proviso to section 3(1)(a) when the landlord has obtained an order from a Rent Controller that the building is required bona fide for his own occupation, the Accommodation Controller has no jurisdiction to direct a requisition. It is no doubt true that under the proviso to section 3(1)(a) when the landlord has obtained an order from a Rent Controller that the building is required bona fide for his own occupation, the Accommodation Controller has no jurisdiction to direct a requisition. But from this it does not follow that in cases not covered by the proviso the Accommodation Controller is bound to consider the needs of the owner and postpone public requirements on that ground. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to a decision of Rajagopalan, J., reported in Premavathi Ammal v. State of Madras1. No doubt, there are some observations in it, which appear to favour the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner ; but I do not read that decision as meaning that, unless the conflicting or competing considerations of the requirement of the owner and the need of the officer of the State or the Central Government to occupy the premises are set out in the order, the order is liable to be quashed. As I have said before, section 3(3) lays down the need for accommodation of public officials as the paramount consideration in the matter of requisition. If, therefore, these have to be given that priority, it follows that the bona fide requirement of the landlord to occupy his own house has to be rejected. In this view I do not see any necessity to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller. The last point urged was that the order of the Rent Controller, which is sought to be quashed, was in contravention of the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f). Frankly speaking I am unable to appreciate the point at all. It is not suggested that the deprivation of the landlord of the right to hold the property, by the law granting to a tenant paying a reasonable rent a right to be in possession of the premises against the will of the landlord is an infraction of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution or an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of that right. If this were so, the act that it is a Government servant that comes to occupy the house does not in my opinion attract Article 19(1)( f) at all. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. P.R.N. ----- Petition dismissed.