Judgment The petitioner seeks to revise the order passed by the learned District Judge of Madurai on an application made to him under section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, to revise the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Madurai on an appeal preferred to him under section 12 of the Act against an order passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Madurai. This revision petition arises out of a petition filed by the petitioner before me under section 7 of the Act to evict the respondent from a motor garage. The main ground on which the petitioner sought eviction was that he required the premises for his own occupation. The main plea of the respondent was that the petitioner’s car was being garaged in a shed belonging to one Kangani Peria Karuppa Thevar and therefore the petition for eviction was liable to be dismissed under section 7(3)(a)(ii) as the petitioner was occupying a non-residential building for the same purpose, i.e., for the purpose of keeping a vehicle. On an examination of the evidence adduced before him, the Additional Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the petitioner must have taken the shed referred to by the respondent on lease. Nevertheless he held, on an admittedly wrong view of the law, that the petitioner-landlord was entitled to evict the respondent. He accordingly directed the respondent to vacate the premises within two months from the date of his order. The tenant filed an appeal which was heard and disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge of Madurai. He dismissed the appeal but not on the ground on which the Rent Controller dismissed the application but because he came to a conclusion contrary to that of the Rent Controller on the main question, viz., whether the landlord was in occupation of a building, possession of which he was entitled to. He held that there was no evidence to prove that the petitioner had a lease of Door No. 135 belonging to Periakaruppa Thevar for parking his car, and as he required the suit premises for his own use, he was entitled to obtain possession from the respondent. The tenant thereupon filed a petition under section 12-B of the Act to the District Judge of Madurai. The learned District Judge allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of eviction and dismissed the landlord’s petition. The tenant thereupon filed a petition under section 12-B of the Act to the District Judge of Madurai. The learned District Judge allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of eviction and dismissed the landlord’s petition. It is against this order of the learned District Judge that the above revision petition has been filed. Mr. T.S. Kuppuswami Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the learned District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the finding of fact arrived at by the appellate Tribunal, i.e., the learned Subordinate Judge. Ordinarily, there is no doubt that a Judge or Tribunal exercising revisional jurisdiction is not competent to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by an inferior Tribunal. The powers of a revisional Court have always been understood to be more restricted than the powers of an appellate Court. In a recent case C.R.P. No. 1420 of 1954 arising out of similar proceedings under the Rent Control Act, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., laid down the circumstances in which a revisional authority would be entitled to interfere with findings of fact of a subordinate authority. The learned Judge said: “The only proper way of defining the relative jurisdiction of the appellate and revisional authorities constituted under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is to hold that while an appellate authority is entitled to examine every question of fact and law dealt with in, or arising out of, an order of the Rent Controller, a revisional authority, while undoubtedly can interfere with questions of law, where the Rent Control Act or any provision has been misconstrued, cannot normally interfere with findings of fact unless (a) there were no other materials on which such a finding could be based;or (6) the finding has been reached by a consideration of irrelevant or inadmissible matter, or (c) it is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion;or (d) the finding had been reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter. To hold that -a revisional authority could interfere with findings of fact of an appellate authority without regard to these limitations would be to convert a revision into a regular appeal and to obliterate the distinction between appeals and revisions which the Act has taken care to provide.” In my opinion, none of the four conditions which would justify interference by the revisional authority with a finding of fact of the subordinate authority enumerated by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., is satisfied in this case. It cannot be said that there was no material whatever on which the appellate Court, that is the Subordinate Judge, could have arrived at his finding. Nor can it be said that the finding was reached on a consideration of irrelevant and inadmissible matter. I find it impossible to hold that the Subordinate Judge’s finding is so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion. It is not even contended that the finding has been reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter. I shall now examine the order of the learned District Judge to discover the grounds on which he set aside the appellate Judge’s finding of fact. In his view a Court of revision could interfere in a case like the present where the appellate authority has without sufficient reasons, and due to a misconstruction of the pleadings, reversed a finding of fact given by the learned Additional Rent Controller. I may at once say that mere absence of sufficient reason would not fall within any of the four heads enumerated by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. As to a misconstruction of the pleadings, it must be established that the finding was entirely based on such a misconstruction. At the end of paragraph 9 of his judgment the learned Judge, after referring to the findings of the Rent Controller and the learned Subordinate Judge said: “Thus both the Rent Controller and appellate authority have expressed themselves very emphatically in favour of the respective conclusions reached by them on the same question of fact.” In paragraph 11 the learned District Judge has said that the appellate authority, i.e., the Subordinate Judge, had committed a mistake of fact when he stated that even in the additional counter of the tenant he had not stated that door No. 135 had been taken on lease by the respondent. According to the learned District Judge a perusal of the additional counter does not support this observation. It is obvious what the learned Subordinate Judge meant when he stated “it is not stated in the additional counteraffidavit that the garage had been taken on lease by the respondent.” In any event I am convinced that the ultimate decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was not influenced by this fact. Immediately after this comment on the alleged mistake committed by the learned Subordinate Judge the learned District Judge goes on to say in paragraph 13: “I am afraid that the above misapprehension on the part of appellate authority has been responsible to a great extent for its finding on the said question of fact. Further the very strong finding which the learned Rent Controller gave on this question after inspecting the premises could not be lightly differed from and without reason being given. I therefore find in the circumstances that the finding of fact of the learned Rent Controller alone has to be accepted and not that of the appellate authority”. It is obvious that one of the grounds on which alone a revisional authority can interfere with a finding of fact has been set out by the learned District Judge. Learned counsel for the respondent was unable to draw my attention to any other part of the learned District Judge’s judgment in which he has set out why he could legitimately interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the appellate authority, i.e., the learned Subordinate Judge. I am clearly of the opinion that the learned District Judge exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction in setting aside the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore allowed and the order of the learned District Judge is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge, the appellate authority is restored. The respondent will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner. The respondent (tenant) will have time till the 31st December, 1956, for vacating the premises. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.