Order The question arising for consideration in this Writ Petition is as regards the proper construction of section 56 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, (Madras Act XXVI of 1948). The petitioner herein and the first respondent were rival claimants to the grant of ryotwari patta in regard to certain lands in an estate notified and taken over by the Government. Section 56 (1) of the Act under which the application was filed by the petitioner enacts:- (1) “Where after an estate is notified a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer”. The next sub-section runs (2) “Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-section (1) may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal and its decision shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law.” No objection was raised by the first respondent to the jurisdiction of the Settlement officer to proceed with the enquiry and this officer after a full investigation of the evidence decided in favour of the petitioner. The first respondent, thereupon filed an appeal to the Tribunal under section 56 (2) of the Act and the Tribunal set aside the order of the Settlement Officer on the ground that he had. no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The reasons assigned by them for this conclusion may be stated in their own words: "In this case we are concerned only with section 56, clause (1) sub-clause (e) as the dispute is as. to who is the lawful ryot in respect of the holding in question. The conditions required to be satisfied under section 56, clause (1)(c) are (1) that the dispute should arise after the notification of the estate and (2) that the dispute should relate to a holding........ It is clear from the evidence that the dispute between the parties as to who is the lawful ryot of the land in question arises before the notification of the estate. It is clear from the evidence that the dispute between the parties as to who is the lawful ryot of the land in question arises before the notification of the estate. That being so the condition that the dispute should arise after the notification of the estate as required by section 56(1) of the Act is not satisfied." On this reasoning the Tribunal held that the proceedings before the Assistant Settlement Officer were without jurisdiction and therefore, set aside his order. It is the correctness of this construction of section 56 that is challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. The State of Madras has been impleaded as the third respondent in these writ proceedings and they, through the Special Government Pleader supports the writ petitioner and contends that the interpretation put upon the section by the Tribunal is wrong and has, therefore, to be set aside. As this is probably the first occasion when the construction of section 56 of the Act has come up before this Court, I think it is necessary to discuss the matter in some detail. The entire argument of the Tribunal is rested on the collocation of the words " dispute arising after an estate is notified." In the first place section 56 occurs in the chapter headed ‘Miscellaneous' . Its position is just after section 55 which deals with collection of arrears of rent by the landholder after the notified date. Sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 55(1) refer to disputes which might arise in connection with the liability of the ryot to pay rent or its quantum. A reference to section 55 would show that the liability for the rent or its quantum may be in respect of a period anterior to the notification. If section 56 were to be the machinery for deciding the disputes in relation to the rent payable for faslis 1356 and 1357 it would follow that the disputes referred to in the opening words of section 56(1) would not exclude disputes whose origin was earlier than the notified date but which have continued since then. If, therefore, a dispute in relation to matters mentioned in section 56(1)(a) and (b) would take in disputes originating earlier than the notified date but continuing even, afterwards, the nature of the dispute referred to in sub-clause (c) of section 56(1) would not be different. If, therefore, a dispute in relation to matters mentioned in section 56(1)(a) and (b) would take in disputes originating earlier than the notified date but continuing even, afterwards, the nature of the dispute referred to in sub-clause (c) of section 56(1) would not be different. In my opinion, the proper construction of that section is to hold that all disputes which are factually present after the notified date come within the jurisdiction of the settlement officer and within section 56(1). Disputes which are excluded are only those in regard to which there have been binding adjudications by the ordinary Courts before that date or matters pending before other authorities before the notified date. In regard to all others the dispute "arises" after the notified date within the meaning of section 56(1) if notwithstanding its having originated at an earlier date it continues thereafter, for the dispute is a difference which exists until it is settled and it is the existence of the dispute that is referred to in the section and not its origin. In this view the order of the Abolition Tribunal, Madurai in R.A. No. 373 of 1954 is set aside as erroneous. The Tribunal will consider the appeal before it on its merits and dispose of it in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs in this Writ Petition. P.R.N. ----- Petition allowed.Order set aside.