JUDGMENT V.D. Bhargava, J. - This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against my order dated 7-3-1956 by which I had held that the Bareilly court had no jurisdiction so far as the proceedings under Sections. 406, 408 and 409 IPC were concerned. As regards the charge u/s 420 IPC I was of opinion that it would not be in the public interest to allow a prolonged criminal trial for a purely civil claim and, therefore, I had quashed the proceedings. 2. The facts giving rise to these proceedings, in brief were that there was a firm Messrs. Hira Lal Debi Pd. Ltd. having their head office at Calcutta of which opposite party No. 1 was the Managing Director and opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 were its Directors. The Indian Turpentine and Rosin Company, Bareilly (hereinafter called the Bareilly Company) which at present is being managed by the State were manufacturing turpentine and rosin. On 23-5-1919 Messrs. Hira Lal Debi Pd. (hereinafter called the Calcutta firm) were appointed the selling agents for a year by the Bareilly Company and this agreement was renewed by another agreement on 15-7-1950. The quantities were to be allotted and goods were to be despatched by the Bareilly Company in its own name and the railway receipts were endorsed for delivery at Calcutta in the name of the Calcutta firm. All payments in respect of goods sold by the Calcutta firm in retail from stocks or to dealers in wagon load lots had to be deposited by the Calcutta firm into the accounts of the Bareilly Company at Calcutta. This agency was terminated on 31-8-1951 by means of a registered notice dated 28-5-1951 and on the termination of the period of the notice charge was taken at Calcutta by the Secretary of the Bareilly Company. On 9-5-1954 Sri Mukandi Lal, Secretary of the Bareilly Company lodged an information with the Superintendent of Police Bareilly charging the opposite parties with various offences, and a challan was submitted by one Mr. Gupta Inspector, C.I.D., Bareilly. On 9-5-1954 Sri Mukandi Lal, Secretary of the Bareilly Company lodged an information with the Superintendent of Police Bareilly charging the opposite parties with various offences, and a challan was submitted by one Mr. Gupta Inspector, C.I.D., Bareilly. On 29-6-195 - the Calcutta firm lodged suit No. 1938 of 1954 in the Original side of the Calcutta High Court against the Bareilly Company for an enquiry into the accounts in respect of the dealings and transactions of the Plaintiff and the Defendants and prayed for a decree for such sums of money as may be found due an commission. On 4-7-1952 the Bareilly Company also filed a civil suit in the court at Bareilly and both the suits are pending. The Bareilly suit has been stayed as an application is pending in this Court arising out of Section 10 CPC proceedings. 3. A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of the criminal proceedings at Bareilly. But that did not find favour with the learned Magistrate. Thereupon an application was moved in this Court under Sections. 435, 439 and 561A, Code of Criminal Procedure as also under Article 227 of the Constitution and it was this application which was allowed by me which has given rise to this application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Learned Counsel for the Bareilly Company had taken a preliminary objection in that case that this Court had no jurisdiction to quash the proceedings u/s 561A or under Article 227 of the Constitution. That objection was overruled by me. 4. While disposing of that application I had held that this Court had jurisdiction both under its revisional jurisdiction as well as its power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings, and that this power could be exercised in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts Within the bounds of their authority. I had further held that this Court while deciding the question of jurisdiction could rely on the complaint as well as agreement which was the basis of the complaint and on such other facts which were not disputed in this Court. It may be mentioned here that in reply to the affidavit filed by the Petitioner no counter affidavit was filed and the main allegations made therein, have not been challenged. 5. It may be mentioned here that in reply to the affidavit filed by the Petitioner no counter affidavit was filed and the main allegations made therein, have not been challenged. 5. As regards the place where the case of criminal misappropriation could be started, I was of opinion that the case would be governed purely by Section 181 Sub-clause (2) and Section 179 will not apply unless it was not possible to ascertain where the offence was committed, and in this particular case from the allegations made in the complaint I came to the conclusion that he offence of criminal breach of trust had been completed at Calcutta, if at all, and since the place was known, Section 179 would not apply. It was further held that unless any act or omission was an ingredient of the offence or criminal breach of trust that act or omission could not give jurisdiction to a court within whose territorial jurisdiction that act or omission had been committed After discussing the facts of the case I came to the conclusion that in this case the goods were delivered to the Calcutta firm at Calcutta and they were never received or retained by the Calcutta firm at Bareilly and that the payments had to be made at Calcutta. So, if there was any criminal breach of trust in nor. making payment that was at Calcutta. According to the finding, the place where the accounts had to be rendered could not be a place where the case of criminal breach of trust could be started unless the place where the criminal breach of trust was committed was unknown. 6. On the question of the offence of cheating I was of opinion that the details of the supplies made on the basis of fake representation which constituted the offence of cheating had not been given in the complaint and, therefore, the complaint was vague. On particular facts of this case I was of opinion that this was a case of a purely civil nature and on the facts and circumstances of this case it was clear that the criminal proceedings have been taken for the purpose of coercing the opposite parties to come to some settlement in the civil claim. On particular facts of this case I was of opinion that this was a case of a purely civil nature and on the facts and circumstances of this case it was clear that the criminal proceedings have been taken for the purpose of coercing the opposite parties to come to some settlement in the civil claim. Since this criminal prosecution was a belated one and was filed when both the parties were going to file civil suits the criminal proceedings did not appear to be bona fide. 7. The grounds on which leave to appeal is sought are: 1. That my finding that the prosecution was not bona fide is erroneous and untenable. 2. That the question of jurisdiction should have been decided either on a perusal of the plaint itself alone or it should have been deferred till the entire evidence had been concluded and that this Court is relying on the agreement and on the affidavit filed in this Court had erred in law. 3. That cases of criminal breach of trust are not governed by Section 181 Sub-section 2 Code of Criminal Procedure alone but also by 3. 179 Code of Criminal Procedure and since as a consequence of the breach of trust the loss has resulted in Bareilly, the Bareilly Court had jurisdiction and this Court had erred in taking a contrary view. 4. That in any event, the place where the account is liable to be rend red is a place where cases of criminal breach of trust can be instituted and that is another error of law made by this Court. 5. That this Court was wrong in holding that as the details of the supply had not been disclosed in the complaint there was no clear case of cheating. 6. That the Calcutta firm had sent letters of inducement to the Bareilly Company and since those letters were received at Bareilly, the offence of cheating will be deemed to have been committed at Bareilly. 7. That this Court was wrong in holding that this case was primarily of a civil nature and that this criminal prosecution was not bona fide. 8. On the basis of the above grounds it was urged that this Court should grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 9. The first question that arises is the scope of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. 8. On the basis of the above grounds it was urged that this Court should grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 9. The first question that arises is the scope of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The power of the High Court under this Article is more limited than the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of the Supreme Court in the matter of granting" special leave. The Supreme Court ordinarily does not interfere in matters of fact. But in special circumstances it may interfere if in its discretion it finds that it is necessary for the ends of justice to interfere. But so far as this Court is concerned it has to be satisfied that the case is a fit one for leave to appeal. 10. There is a provision to Sub-clause (1) of Article 134 to the effect that the High Court shall be guided in certifying a case to be fit for appeal by such provisions as may be made under Clause (1) of Article 145 of the Constitution and such conditions as the High Court may establish or require. So far as this Court is concerned, there have been very few cases alter the coming into force of the Constitution which could establish any conditions. Nor has any provision been made so far under Article 145(1) by the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court has laid down in numerous cases the principles on which leave should be granted in criminal matters. In Pritam Singh Vs. The State, AIR 1950 SC 169 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down certain principles on which the Supreme Court will grant leave in criminal cases. It was laid down in the aforesaid case that: Generally speaking, the Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal in criminal cases, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the decision appealed against. 11. This principle has been reaffirmed by their lordships in many subsequent cases. Among others, this principle was reaffirmed in The The State Government, Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey and Others, AIR 1954 SC 20 , Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh Vs. The State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271 and Hem Raj Vs. 11. This principle has been reaffirmed by their lordships in many subsequent cases. Among others, this principle was reaffirmed in The The State Government, Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey and Others, AIR 1954 SC 20 , Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh Vs. The State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271 and Hem Raj Vs. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462 . In Sunder Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have said: The grant of a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) is not a matter of course, but the power has to be exercised after considering what difficult question of law or principle was involved in the case which should require the further consideration of the Supreme Court. 12. Under the Rules of this Court in matter of criminal appeal, leave to appeal has to be granted by the same Judge or the Bench who decided the original matter and, therefore out of the three conditions for the grant of special leave indicated in the dictum of the Supreme Court, I am of opinion that it is not possible for either the judge or the Bench concerned to grant the leave on the second and third grounds and they can have no place in consideration by the High Court when that particular Judge or Bench is invited to certify that the case decided by himself or the Bench as the case may be, is a fit one for leave to appeal. It is not possible to sat for that Judge or the Bench hat substantial and grave injustice had been done or that the question presented features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of his or its decision. Thus, to me it appears that this Court, while granting leave can only do so if there are any special or exceptional circumstances. 13. There is another case Mohinder Singh Vs. The State, AIR 1953 SC 415 in which their Lordships Lave kid down that: The Supreme Court will not entertain a criminal appeal except in special and exceptional cases where it is manifest that by-disregard of the forms of legal process or by violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been done. 14. These considerations also, to my mind, will be applicable in the case of leave being granted by the Supreme Court. 14. These considerations also, to my mind, will be applicable in the case of leave being granted by the Supreme Court. No Judge knowingly will pass an order in disregard of the forms of legal process or in violation of principles of natural justice so that his order may result in substantial and grave injustice. 15. Before I deal with the individual grounds on which leave is sought for, I may mention one fact, namely that in the present case eave to appeal is sought for on behalf of the State against the order which had quashed the criminal proceedings. Quashing of proceedings is in the nature of and analogous to an acquittal and for granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, in my opinion, the same principles will not apply which would apply to a case in which the accused were to ask for leave to appeal against his conviction, and I am further of opinion that the provisions of Article 134(1)(c) do not contemplate an appeal against an order of acquittal or an appeal by the complainant against the quashing of the proceedings. 16. In The The State Government, Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkrishna Ganpatrao Limsey and Others, AIR 1954 SC 20 it has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme-Court that: Art. 134 of the Constitution permits an appeal to this Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court has on appeal reversed the order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death. It does not provide for an appeal from a judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court if the High Court has on appeal reversed the order of conviction of an accused person and has ordered his acquittal In other words, there is no provision in the Constitution corresponding to Section 417 Code of Criminal Procedure and such an order is final, subject, however to the overriding powers vested in this Court by Article 136 of the Constitution. 17. The above observation of his Lordship Mahajan, J. clearly indicates that the State or a complainant cannot come forward and ask for leave to appeal under Article 134(1)(c). In The The State of Orissa Vs. 17. The above observation of his Lordship Mahajan, J. clearly indicates that the State or a complainant cannot come forward and ask for leave to appeal under Article 134(1)(c). In The The State of Orissa Vs. Minaketan Patnaik, AIR 1953 Ori 160 Jaganadha Das, C.J. (as he then was) held as follows: It would, however, be against the policy of legislature to construe Article 134(1)(c) as permitting High Court to grant leave to appeal as against judgment of acquittal confirmed by High Court. The mere fact that the case involves important questions of law on which there is difference of opinion between judges, but which do not ultimately affect decision of appeal on merits is not a sufficient ground for granting leave under Article 134(1)(c). The position with regard to Supreme Court is, however, different and, in exceptional cases, it is within prerogative of the Supreme Court to grant special leave under Article 136 even against an order of acquittal where circumstances amount to grave miscarriage of justice or obvious perversity or deceipt by fraud are made out. 18. Under these conditions I think that even if this case involves questions of law it would not be a fit case in which this Court should grant have to appeal against the order of quashing of the proceedings. 19. Even if I were of the view that leave could be granted against an order quashing criminal proceedings I do not consider that this is a fit case for the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 20. As already mentioned, in this case I have quashed the proceedings on a finding that it would be an abuse of the process of this Court to continue the criminal proceedings which do not appear to be bona fide, and after this finding no question of law arises, and on this finding I cannot hold that there exist any exceptional or special circumstances in which leave should be granted. My finding about the mala fide nature of the proceedings is based on the facts and circumstances of this particular case and does not involve any question of law or principle to justify the granting of the leave. 21. My finding about the mala fide nature of the proceedings is based on the facts and circumstances of this particular case and does not involve any question of law or principle to justify the granting of the leave. 21. As to the objection regarding reliance having been placed on the affidavit, I think it is always open to the Court to take into consideration all the facts alleged in the plaint as well as in the affidavit if they have not been controverted by any counter affidavit. In case any counter affidavit had been filed and the facts had been controverted, then it would have been a different matter and therefore, that cannot by any ground for making a case fit for appeal. 22. Regarding the question of jurisdiction of this Court to quash the proceedings, no authority was cited that this Court had no jurisdiction. On the other hand I have dealt in detail with the matter that this Court can quash proceedings in suitable cases. 23. Regarding the applicability of Section 181 Sub-clause (2), Code of Criminal Procedure to a case of criminal breach of trust, there are numerous authorities of the High Courts in India and they appear to be unanimous. Similarly, the point raised by the State that the place where the account is to be rendered is a place where proceedings for criminal breach of trust can be initiated seems also to have been settled and there seems to be no doubt on that matter. When there is no ambiguity about the law, rather it is uniform or well settled, there can be no ground for granting leave merely because a question of law was involved. 24. After giving my careful consideration to the arguments of the parties and considering the limitations of Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution I am of opinion that the State has not been able to establish that this is a fit case in which leave to appeal should be granted. I accordingly dismiss the application.