JUDGMENT : This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by one Kishanlal, the father of the present respondent Prem Chand for damages for the breach of a contract on the part of the defendant-appellant to purchase 275 bags of Bajra. The plaintiffs case was that on 18th July 1943, the appellant contracted to purchase 500 bags of Bajra at the rate of 5 seers and 14 Chataks of Bajra per rupee; that in pursuance of this contract the defendant purchased 225 bags of Bajra by 6th November 1943 and that thereafter the defendant failed to purchase and take delivery of 275 bags of Bajra in spite of a notice to that effect. The defendant admitted the contract, as also the purchase by him of 225 bags of Bajra. His main plea was that after the contract was concluded the Gwalior Government issued on 27th October 1943 a rationing order prohibiting inter alia the sale and purchase of Bajra in the Mandies of Lashkar, Morar and Gwalior by any person except on behalf of the Government and except when permitted by the Controller of Supplies and Prices; that on account of the promulgation of this order it became impossible for him to purchase the remaining quantity of Bajra. The defendant also took the plea that it was a term of the contract that it would be dissolved in the event of the Government putting any restriction on the sale and purchase of Bajra. The learned Civil Judge Second Class Morar who tried the suit held that the defendant-appellant had failed to prove that the contract was subject to the condition of its being dissolved in the event of the Government controlling transactions in Bajra or that he had applied for permission to purchase 275 bags of Bajra, and this permission was refused and that, therefore, it became impossible for him to perform the contract. On these findings the trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs claim for damages to the extent of Rs. 549-12-9. The plaintiff had also claimed Rs. 41-5-0 on account of expenses incurred by him and Rs. 139-5-6 by way of interest. But this claim was rejected by the trial Court. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Civil Judge First Class. The plaintiff also filed cross-objections. Both the appeal and the cross-objections were dismissed and the decision of the trial Judge was upheld. 41-5-0 on account of expenses incurred by him and Rs. 139-5-6 by way of interest. But this claim was rejected by the trial Court. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Civil Judge First Class. The plaintiff also filed cross-objections. Both the appeal and the cross-objections were dismissed and the decision of the trial Judge was upheld. The defendant has now filed this second appeal. 2. The only point urged by Mr. Hariharniwas learned counsel for the appellant is that the rationing order dated 27th October 1943 made it impossible and unlawful for the defendant to purchase the remaining 275 bags of Bajra and that the Courts below were wrong in thinking that the defendant could not be absolved from performing the contract without proving that he had applied to the Controller of Supplies and Prices for permission to purchase the Bajra and that this permission was not granted. It was said that it was the duty of the plaintiff to obtain the requisite permission for the purchase of Bajra and that the purchase of Bajra without a permission having been prohibited, it was for the plaintiff to prove that if the defendant was unable to perform the contract, it was his own fault. These contentions are, in my opinion, devoid of any substance. When the rationing order issued on 27th October 1943 made it necessary to obtain a permit for the sale and purchase of Bajra, it clearly cast the duty of obtaining a permit for the sale of goods on the seller and the duty of obtaining a permit for the purchase of goods on the purchaser. It did not make the seller or the purchaser responsible for obtaining the necessary permit for himself as well as for the other party, to the transaction. If, as I think, it was the duty of the appellant to obtain a permit for the purchase of Bajra, then in order to establish that the contract became impossible of performance, it was clearly necessary for him to show that he had applied for a permit but that it was not granted. The mere fact that under the rationing order a permit was necessary for the purchase of Bajra is by itself riot sufficient for holding that the contract became impossible of performance. The mere fact that under the rationing order a permit was necessary for the purchase of Bajra is by itself riot sufficient for holding that the contract became impossible of performance. The impossibility in the performance of the contract cannot be said to arise unless and until the requisite permit was asked for and refused. The rationing order did not prohibit absolutely the purchase of Bajra. Under that order a contract for the sale and purchase of Bajra could be performed after obtaining the necessary permits. Till the refusal of the permit on a prayer being made in that behalf, there remained the possibility of the contract being performed. It was, therefore, essential for the appellant to prove that he had applied for a permit for the purchase of 275 bags of Bajra and that as he did not get the permit, he could not perform the contract. The matter seems to be governed by the decision in Ratan Madanlal v. Motilal Nandram, 1949 Madh-B LR 244 (A), where it has been held that it is for the party who contends that the performance of the contract has become impossible to prove that it is impossible for him to perform the contract owing to the restrictions placed by the Government on the purchase of the contracted article. Learned counsel for the appellant said that Ratan Madanlals case (A) had no applicability here. He strongly relied on V.L. Narasu v. P.S.V. Iyer, AIR 1953 Mad 300 (B), in support of his contention that it was for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant could perform the contract. In my opinion the Madras decision is of no help to the appellant. That case does not lay down that the burden of establishing frustration is on the plaintiff claiming damages. It no doubt holds that the burden of establishing that the frustration is self-induced is on the plaintiff. This is quite different from saying that it is for the plaintiff to prove frustration. The question of proving frustration is quite distinct from proving that it was self-induced on the part of the defendant. The question whether the frustration was due to the defendants own default or neglect, cannot arise unless the defendant has first proved frustration. This is quite different from saying that it is for the plaintiff to prove frustration. The question of proving frustration is quite distinct from proving that it was self-induced on the part of the defendant. The question whether the frustration was due to the defendants own default or neglect, cannot arise unless the defendant has first proved frustration. When he has done this, then it would be for the plaintiff to prove that the frustration was brought about by the default or negligence of the defendant himself. This is clear from the decision in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd., 1942 AC 154 (C), which was relied on in Madras case for coming to the conclusion that the burden of establishing that the frustration was self-induced is on the plaintiff. In 1942 AC 154 (C), the point that was considered was whether the party who pleaded frustration had in law the burden cast on him of proving that it was without any default or neglect on his part. It was held that it was not for him to prove the negative and that when once he had established frustration, it would be for the other side to prove that it was brought about by the default or negligence of party who sought to rely on it. Here the refusal of a permit on an application being made itself constitutes frustration. The appellant was, therefore, required to prove the application for a permit and its refusal in order to establish the fact of frustration. If he had done that, then the question would have arisen whether the frustration was or was not self-induced and it would have been for the plaintiff to show that the defendant had no doubt applied but on account of some default of his, the application did not, reach the Controller or that the defendant did not get the permit or that manoeuvred to see that no permission was granted to him. For establishing the fact of frustration, the plaintiff cannot clearly prove the negative that the defendant had not applied for a permit or that a permit was not refused to him. In my opinion the rule laid down in AIR 1953 Mad 300 (B), that the burden of establishing that the frustration is self-induced is on the plaintiff is not relevant here. In my opinion the rule laid down in AIR 1953 Mad 300 (B), that the burden of establishing that the frustration is self-induced is on the plaintiff is not relevant here. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to S. 39 of the Sale of Goods Act. The provision has no bearing whatsoever in the present case. 3. Following the decision in Ratan Madanlals case (A), it must be held that it was for the appellant to prove that he had applied for a permit to purchase the Bajra and that he did not get it. As the appellant led no evidence whatever to prove this fact, it cannot be held that it became impossible for him to perform the contract. He is, therefore, clearly liable in damages for his failure to purchase and take delivery of 275 bags of Bajra. 4. In my opinion the Courts below were right in decreeing the plaintiffs claim. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.