JUDGMENT D.N. Roy, J. - This is an application by Goswami Manohar Lal u/s 115 of the CPC for the revision of the order dated 24-4-1951, passed by the District Judge of Farrukhabad on an application made before him u/s 7 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act (No. XIV of 1920) by which the District Judge approved of the appointment of Shyam Sunder Lal Agarwal, the opposite party, as Sarbarahkar of the trust. The contention of the applicant is that having regard to the provisions of Section 9(c) of the Act the District Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the other side to the effect that no petition for revision is competent and reference is made to Section 11 of the Act which makes certain provisions of the CPC applicable to proceedings under the Act and also to Section 12 of the Act which operates with regard to appeals. 3. It is not disputed that one Dwarka Das endowed his property to Behari Ji Maharaj installed in a temple at Bhogaon and to Sri Thakur Ram Chandra Ji Maharaj and Sri Murli Manohar Ji Maharaj installed in temples at Farrukhabad. No deed of trust was, however, executed. Dwarka Das's grandson Narain Das, who was the surviving member of the family and was the Sarbarahkar, submitted a scheme of management in the year 1923 to the District Judge and for the appointment of Sarbarahkar, nominating thereby a large number of trustees of some respectability inclusive of certain Government servants. The scheme was u/s 34 of the Indian Trusts Act and Section 5 of the Charitable Endowments Act. The District Judge, after issuing notices to all the trustees and to the Commissioners and Collectors of the district, sanctioned the scheme. Narain Das subsequently executed a deed of will on 4-4-1924, endowing some more property to these institutions and this had also the sanction of the District Judge. The trust is admittedly a trust for charitable and religious purposes. On the death of Narain Das his wife Smt. Lalita Devi became the Sarbarahkar. After the lady's death the Trust Committee appointed one Dharam Narain as the Sarbarahkar. On the resignation of Dharam Narain, one Gobind Lal was appointed the Sarbarahkar. After him Lala Moti Lal was appointed the Sarabarhkar by the Committee. On the death of Narain Das his wife Smt. Lalita Devi became the Sarbarahkar. After the lady's death the Trust Committee appointed one Dharam Narain as the Sarbarahkar. On the resignation of Dharam Narain, one Gobind Lal was appointed the Sarbarahkar. After him Lala Moti Lal was appointed the Sarabarhkar by the Committee. All these appointments had the sanction of the District Judge. By a resolution of the Managing Committee passed some time in the year 1950 Shyam Sunder Lal the opposite party was appointed as the Sarbarahkar. On 22-4-1950, all the trustees made an application to the District Judge seeking his direction for the approval of the appointment of Shyam Sunder Lal as Sarbarahkar. By the impugned order dated 24-4-1951, the District Judge approved of such an appointment and dismissed the objection of Manoher Lal who was the Pujari of the temple. 4. It is obvious from the facts found by the District Judge that in view of Section 9(c) of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act (No. XIV of 1920) no petition u/s 7 of the Act lay. Section 9(c) expressly provides that no petition u/s 7 of the Act in relation to any trust shall be entertained if a scheme for the administration of trust property has been settled or approved by the court of competent jurisdiction, or by any other authority acting under the provisions of any enactment. In the present case a scheme for the administration of the trust property had been settled or approved by the District Judge. Consequently the trust had no right to apply for directions u/s 7. 5. As regards the contention that no revision lies, I am clearly of opinion that the point has no force. The powers to interfere in revision have been granted to the High Court u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The conditions that must exist to enable the High Court to call for the record of any case are these: (1) there should be a case decided by a court; (2) that court should be subordinate to the High Court; and (3) there should be no appeal allowed by the law. 6. There can be no doubt that the powers which may be exercised by the District Judge and the acts that he may perform under Act XIV of 1920 are exercised and performed by the Judge as a Court. 6. There can be no doubt that the powers which may be exercised by the District Judge and the acts that he may perform under Act XIV of 1920 are exercised and performed by the Judge as a Court. The section with which we are immediately concerned is Section 7 of the Act. It says that where a trustee wants advice or direction, he might apply to the "Court". The word "Court" is defined in the Act itself (vide Section 2 as amended by Act XLI of 1923) as "the Court of the District Judge or any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government, and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction." Thus the officer whose order is complained of is a court subordinate to the High Court, and one of the conditions is thus complied with. 7. The second condition that is necessary is that there should be a case decided. The CPC does not define the word "case", nor does it say what is meant by the word "decided" in Section 115. In my opinion the words "a case decided by a court" mean a matter which has been disposed of effectually by the court and not merely for the time being. Thus a purely ad interim order or an order that does not effectually dispose of the matter before a court would not be a case decided. Having regard to the facts of the present case the order in question must be construed to be an order which decides a case. 8. As regards the third point, it is conceded that the law does not allow any appeal against an order made or advice given by the District Judge u/s 7 of Act No XIV of 1920. This is specifically mentioned in Section 12 of the Act. 9. Applying the law laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bala Krishna Uddayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar AIR 1917 PC 71 a Division Bench of this Court in Mohammad Abdul Wahid Khan Vs. This is specifically mentioned in Section 12 of the Act. 9. Applying the law laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bala Krishna Uddayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar AIR 1917 PC 71 a Division Bench of this Court in Mohammad Abdul Wahid Khan Vs. Radha Kishun and Another, AIR 1929 All 581 held that when a trustee makes an application to the District Judge u/s 7 of Act XIV of 1920 to obtain his opinion and advice, a case is presented before the District Judge for his decision; and it was further held that the acts of the District Judge under Act XIV of 1920 are open to correction by the High Court under its revisional jurisdiction exercisable u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has been contended on behalf of the opposite party that the Division Bench in the case cited above did not take account of the fact that Section 11 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act of 1920 provides that the provisions of the CPC relating to the proof of facts by affidavit, the enforcement of he attendance of any person and his examination on oath, the endorsement of the production of documents and the issuing of commissions have been made applicable to all proceedings under this Act, and the provisions relating to the service of summonses have also been made applicable to the service of notices thereunder and so also the provisions of the CPC relating to the execution of decrees as far as they are applicable to the execution of orders under the Act. It has been argued that Section 11 does not say that the provisions of Section 115 of the Code would also apply. It has further been stressed that Section 12 of the Act bars appeals from any order passed or against any opinion, advice or directions given under the Act and since that section does not refer to revision, the power of revision is not expressly conferred under the Act. It has further been stressed that Section 12 of the Act bars appeals from any order passed or against any opinion, advice or directions given under the Act and since that section does not refer to revision, the power of revision is not expressly conferred under the Act. This question came up for consideration before the Lahore High Court in the case of AIR 1936 695 (Lahore) where it was held that the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Act do not bar the jurisdiction of the Court to exercise its powers u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that an order of the District Judge under the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act is revisable. 10. In Ahmad Ullah Khan v. Ahsan Ali Khan 1935 AWR (H.C.) 46 an appeal was preferred by certain objectors to an application originally filed u/s 7 of Act XIV of 1920. It was held by this Court that although no appeal lay, the matter may be treated on the revisional side of this Court as there had been a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction and a case had certainly been decided. 11. There is nothing in Sections 11 and 12 of the Religious and Charitable Trusts Act of 1920 which, either expressly or impliedly, ousts the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The view that I take finds some support from the decisions cited above as also from the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bala Krishna Udayar's case referred to above. In that case it was held by their Lordships that the High Court has jurisdiction u/s 115 of the CPC to revise an order of the District Judge u/s 10 of the Religious Endowments Act, No. XX of 1863. It is conceded that by that Act exclusive original jurisdiction in the matters dealt with by the Act is conferred on a District Judge and there is no provisions in that Act, either conferring upon or ousting the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It is true that the point whether or not the absence of any express provision in the Religious Endowments Act conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court could be impliedly taken to oust the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was not argued before their Lordships. It is true that the point whether or not the absence of any express provision in the Religious Endowments Act conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court could be impliedly taken to oust the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was not argued before their Lordships. But the fact remains that their Lordships approved of the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court in a case that was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Judge and whose orders under the Act were not appealable. Similarly in the Full Bench decision of this Court in Makhan Lal v. Secretary of State 1934 AWR (H.C.) 1 this Court exercised revisional jurisdiction in a case decided by the District Judge under the Land Acquisition Act. That Act contains detailed provisions as regards the procedure to be followed by the Court (the District Judge; on a reference made by the Collector and Section 54 of the Act provides for appeals from the orders of the court, but there is no provision in that Act authorising this Court to revise the decision of the District Judge. Notwithstanding this omission in the Act, and notwithstanding the provision as to appeals contained in the Act, this Court held that it could revise the orders of the District Judge and that its jurisdiction was not impliedly ousted. This case in my judgment covers the present case. 12. Another example may be cited under the Indian Companies Act. The question was considered under that Act in British India Corporation v. Shanti Narain 1935 AWR (H.C.) 559. In that case it was held that there is nothing in the Companies Act either expressly or impliedly ousting the revisional jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of such a provision, the limits of the revisional jurisdiction must be ascertained by reference to Section 115 of the Code. The essence of an enactment is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law and the object of codification is that on any point specifically dealt with by it, such law should be sought for in the Act. The Act therefore binds all Courts so far as it goes and is exhaustive in regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. The Act therefore binds all Courts so far as it goes and is exhaustive in regard to matters specifically dealt with by it. The absence of a specific provision does not necessarily mean that the Court has no power to act in a way which is necessary for the ends of justice. As Peacock C.J. once said that "since laws are general rules, they cannot regulate for all time to come so as to make express provisions against all the cases that may possibly happen." Where there is no specific provision in the Act, Courts should be guided by equity, justice and good conscience. 13. In this connection reference may be made to Section 4 of the CPC as well. That section says that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for the time being in force. The meaning of this saying clause is that if anything in the Code is in conflict with the special or local law, the Court shall not refuse to override the inconsistent provision. It is not necessary that every procedural order of the Court should be supported by a specific statutory provision and when there is neither provision nor prohibition, it has to be guided, as I have already said, by ordinary principles of commonsense, justice, equity and good conscience. 14. In view of what I have stated above I am clearly of opinion that the preliminary objection has got no force and there is nothing in Act No. XIV of 1920 which either expressly or impliedly ousts the revisional jurisdiction of this Court in the present matter. In the present case the District Judge in view of Section 9(c) of that Act exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law in passing the impugned order and consequently that order which gave direction to the trustees must be set aside. The application in revision is accordingly allowed and the order of the District Judge is set aside. The applicant shall have his costs in both the Courts from the opposite-party.