Ramaswami, J.-This appeal is directed against the decree and judgment of Chandra Reddi, J. In S.A. No. 835 of 1948 (reported as Annamalai Ammal v. Sundarathammal1 ) reversing the decree and judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, in A.S. No. 89 of 1947, affirming the dismissal of O.S. No. 1 of 1946 on the file of the District Munsiff’s Court, Tenkasi. The suit properties, namely, three and odd acres of dry land and a house, belonged to the joint family of Mahalinga Nadar and his sons. This Mahalinga Nadar had married twice, namely, the first defendant’s sister as his first wife and the first defendant as his second wife. On account of disputes between the wives the first defendant was living separately. The first defendant had borne to Mahalinga Nadar the present plaintiff. On 3rd February, 1921, when the plaintiff was six years old Mahalinga Nadar executed a settlement-deed, Exhibit P-1, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: “You are my second wife. You have up till now a female child by name Annamalai Ammal aged six years. As according to my promise given at the time of your marriage in the presence of mediators that I should give you immoveable properties. I have by this deed given you the properties shown in the schedule hereto valued at Rs. 600 and now itself placed you in possession of the same. From this day onwards, you may enter into possession of the property and enjoy the same for your life-time without making any alienation. After your life-time the aforesaid property will go to your daughter the aforesaid Annamalai Ammal and she shall take it with absolute right to deal with the said property. It is assured that there are no other encumbrances over the schedule properties.” The items conveyed in the settlement deed are portion of S. No. 696 and a portion of S. No. 693 and a house in Kuthukkavalasi and 16 cents in S. No. 28. On 13th June, 1924, Mahalinga Nadar brought about a partition deed, Exhibit D-14 in which he mentioned that he had got two sons, defendants 3 and 4 and also Ganapathi by his second wife, the first defendant. Under this document he says that he and his second wife the first defendant and her son Ganapathi should take the first schedule property. Under this document he says that he and his second wife the first defendant and her son Ganapathi should take the first schedule property. The second schedule of properties is given to Sankaralinga and the third schedule of properties was to be taken by Palvanna Nadar, the fourth defendant and the fourth schedule of properties by his mother Avadaiammal. In this partition the 4th item, the tope and the house the 3rd item settled upon his second wife are not included. But the other two items are dealt with. The contention raised by the defendants was that Exhibit P-1 was not acted upon by Mahalinga Nadar himself but as pointed out by the Courts below, Mahalinga Nadar having settled the properties upon his second wife he could not go back upon it, but this point would have been of material importance if subsequently the first defendant had not released all her rights in favour of defendants 3 and 4 under Exhibit D-3, dated 15th November, 1929 and the only point now to be considered is whether the remainder given to the daughter of a portion of the joint family property as gift is valid as per Hindu Law, notwithstanding the fact that the gift has been held to be of a reasonable portion of the coparcenary property consisting of four houses, four vacant sites and 30 acres of land. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has filed the suit for a declaration that the release deed referred to above has been brought about fraudulently and cannot affect her rights and that the alienations which have been sought to be made of these properties by the second defendant, wife of Mahalinga and her stepbrothers, Sankaralinga (D-3) and Palvanna Nadar (D.4) and the wife of the third defendant, Punnavanathammal would not be binding on her. The principal contention of the defendants was that the settlement of a portion of the joint family properties by Mahalinga Nadar in favour of the first defendant is not valid and binding on the joint family. Both the Courts below upheld the contention of the defendants and dismissed the suit. The principal contention of the defendants was that the settlement of a portion of the joint family properties by Mahalinga Nadar in favour of the first defendant is not valid and binding on the joint family. Both the Courts below upheld the contention of the defendants and dismissed the suit. In appeal Chandra Reddi, J., came to the conclusion that it was competent for an undivided Hindu father governed by the Mitakshara system of law to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of joint family property as a future marriage portion of a daughter. On this finding he allowed the second appeal. This reversal of the decree and judgment of the lower Courts is attacked before us on two grounds, namely, that the document by itself does not purport to be a future marriage provision for the plaintiff and, secondly, even if it is assumed that the father has made such a future provision, it is not permissible under the Mitakshara Law and is beyond the powers of an undivided Hindu father governed by the Mitakshara system in regard to joint family properties. From the contents of the settlement deed which have been reproduced it is impossible to deduce that the remainder given to the daughter was by way of a future provision for her marriage. The plaintiff was then only six years old and the father could not legitimately have thought of making a provision for her marriage when his second wife was only 25 years of age and Mahalinga Nadar himself died 18 years before the filing of the suit. In fact, if Mahalinga Nadar had wanted to make such a future provision for his daughter, he could have said so in the settlement deed. The document shows that the settler has only chosen not to give an absolute estate to his wife and has given the remainder to the daughter born to her. We need not point out that a document purporting to settle even a portion of joint family properties on a second wife by way of gift as marriage portion is not valid . The special powers of a father do not extend beyond purposes warranted by special texts. We need not point out that a document purporting to settle even a portion of joint family properties on a second wife by way of gift as marriage portion is not valid . The special powers of a father do not extend beyond purposes warranted by special texts. It is settled law that a father has special powers over the moveable properties for indispensable acts of duty and over immoveable properties for pious purposes, Since indispensable acts of duty mean and include pious purposes, a father has no larger power over moveable properties than over immovable properties except in the matter of gifts through affection, inspite of the difference in the terminology used by the texts. (See Mayne, Tenth Edition page 464 Baba v. Timma1.) A gift to a daughter or any other relation is not for pious purposes; and though a gift through affection may be made of moveable property a gift of immovable property cannot be supported as one made through affection. But it has been held by this Court that a father can make a gift of a small portion of his immovable property to his daughter at or after marriage, such gift being customary in this presidency. Therefore, looked at as a gift of immovable property in favour of the second wife and as a marriage portion for her daughter the settlement is invalid. Turning to the settlement of the properties being construed as a gift of the joint family properties as a marriage portion, decided cases go to the extent of such provision being made either at the time of the marriage or subsequent to the marriage on the principle that the moral obligation of the father to make such a provision continues till it is discharged by fulfilment and that this can be fulfilled not only by the father at any point of time subsequent to the marriage, but also by his widow or son who takes over the estate from him and who is affected with this moral obligation. These propositions are concluded by authority and a compendious summary of the same is made in Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage (11th Edn.) in section 370 at page 472 as follows:- “Gifts to brides on occasions of marriage are very common and various Hindu Texts impose a moral obligation on the father or other relatives to make them. These propositions are concluded by authority and a compendious summary of the same is made in Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage (11th Edn.) in section 370 at page 472 as follows:- “Gifts to brides on occasions of marriage are very common and various Hindu Texts impose a moral obligation on the father or other relatives to make them. (Manu IX, 194, Narada XIII, 8; Yajn. II, 143, 144; Vishnu XVII, 18. Mit. II, XI, 4, 5).” These gifts usually take the form of jewels or other moveable property. It has been held that a gift, by a father to his daughter or to her husband for the benefit of both on the occasion of her marriage of a small portion of ancestral immovable property is valid. (Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vengidaswami Ayyar2; Kudutamma v. Narasimha3; A. Sundararamayya v. Seethamma4 for the judgment of Krishnaswamy Ayyar, J. in that case see page 701 ; Subba Naicker, In re,5Sitamahalakshmamma v. Kotayya6 (see also Ramalinga v. Narayana7, Ramakrishna v. Parameswara8 Palaniammal v. Kothandarama Gounder9. But this power cannot be exercised by a mother acting as guardian of her infant son who alone constituted the family and who is the owner of the properties at the time ; Palaniammal v. Kothandarama Gounder9. As Subramania Ayyar, J., says, a gift of small extent of land ‘bhudanam’) on such an occasion is a customary indispensable duty where the family can afford it. Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vengidaswami Ayyar2, Vettor Ammal v. Poochi Ammal10. Even after marriage a gift can be made to a daughter by way of marriage portion either by her father or after him by her brother Vettor Ammal v. Poochi Ammal10. (But such a gift of an unreasonable portion of the joint family property would be invalid; Kamakshi Ammal v. Chakrapani Chettiar11. In Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu12 the Calcutta High Court held that it would be competent to a managing member as it is to a widow, to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of immoveable property of the family to a daughter born in the family on the occasion of her Gowna ceremony. The Bombay High Court has held that a father cannot make a gift even of a small portion of joint family immoveable property to his daughter though she was looking after him in his old age (Jinnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmava13). The Bombay High Court has held that a father cannot make a gift even of a small portion of joint family immoveable property to his daughter though she was looking after him in his old age (Jinnappa Mahadevappa v. Chimmava13). This would be right if it merely rested on the view that a gift of affection (prasadadana) which is mentioned in the Mitakshara I, i. 27 could only be made of ancestral moveable property and not of ancestral immoveable property. But where the gift is in discharge of the moral obligation to provide a marriage portion as in the Madras cases, it would come under the Mitakshara I, i. 29, as gift in discharge of an indispensable duty. In Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayana1, the Judicial Committee evidently regarded the gift of small share of immoveable property to a daughter as within the authority of a karta. To sum up, though a father of an undivided Mitakshara joint family has full power of disposition over his self-acquired properties, he has no such power in respect of the joint family properties ; but he can make within reasonable limits by custom in this presidency gifts of immoveable properties of the joint family to his daughter on the occasion of her marriage and when she is departing from her parental home ; and this customary obligation can be fulfilled later if not fulfilled at the time of the marriage without point of time not only by the father but also by his widow or son taking over the estate from the father. These limits cannot be exceeded by purporting to make settlements for the fulfilment of an obligation which had not arisen and which obligation might not even arise to be fulfilled since the daughter may die unmarried or remain a spinster as it is probable that while a vast majority of women prefer a married life some of them either by choice or by necessity may lead a life of celibacy. In fact as pointed out in the “ Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals” by Sir P. S. Sivaswami Ayyar (Kamala Lectures) such spinsters have always existed in our society and those old spinsters were called Amajur or pithrushad We are unable to agree with the first impressions of Chandra Reddi, J. and we, therefore, set aside his decree and judgment and restore the decree and judgments of the Courts below but in the circumstances without costs, throughout. P.R.N. ----- Appeal allowed.