JUDGMENT : This is second appeal by Fida Hussain, plaintiff, against the order of the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Bhopal, allowing the appeal of Abdul Latif Khan, defendant 1, and thereby dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration that the grain in dispute belonged jointly to Abdul Latif Khan, defendant 1, and Dhunku, defendant 2, and not only to Abdul Latif Khan. 2. Fida Hussain had instituted a suit against both Dhunku and Abdul Latif Khan, defendants, against the former as the principal debtor and against Abdul Latif Khan as a surety for the recovery of a certain amount which he had advanced to Dhunku. This suit was decreed against Dhunku defendant, only and the suit, as far as Abdul Latif Khan was concerned was dismissed. Fida Hussain applied for the execution of the decree by attachment and sale of certain grain on the allegations that it belonged jointly to Abdul Latif Khan and Dhunku. Abdul Latif Khan preferred a claim against the attachment under O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C. claiming to be the sole owner of the grain. The claim was allowed summarily on 20-7-1950. Fida Hussain, decree-holder, then instituted the present suit on 8-8-1950 under O. 21, R. 63, Civil P.C. for the declaration referred to above. His case was that the share of Dhunku in the attached grain was to the extent of one-half. Both the defendants filed separate written-statement and their case in brief was that the grain belonged exclusively to Abdul Latif Khan. 3. The lower Court believed the plaintiff and decreed the suit, but this order was set aside in appeal on the ground that under S. 47, Civil P.C., no separate suit was maintainable and the only remedy open to the plaintiff was by way of an appeal against the order purporting to have been passed under O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C. 4. Fida Hussain has come up in appeal against the above order, whereby his suit was dismissed. Only Abdul Latif Khan is contesting the appeal. Dhunku was absent in spite of personal service, and the appeal was, therefore, heard ex parte against him. 5. The main point for consideration in this Second appeal is whether the present suit purporting to be under O. 21, R. 63, C.P.C. is maintainable or was barred by the provisions of S. 47, C.P.C. 6. Dhunku was absent in spite of personal service, and the appeal was, therefore, heard ex parte against him. 5. The main point for consideration in this Second appeal is whether the present suit purporting to be under O. 21, R. 63, C.P.C. is maintainable or was barred by the provisions of S. 47, C.P.C. 6. The learned Counsel for Abdul Latif Khan has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the second appeal on the ground that no appeal lay against the decree of the appellate Court and the only remedy which was available to the appellant was to move as civil revision against that order. This contention is apparently based upon the presumption that second appeals to the court of the Judicial Commissioner are governed by S. 31, Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh (Courts) Act, 1950 and not by Ss. 100 to 102, Civil P.C. This very point was raised and decided by me in Mulla Mukhtar Hussain v. Gulam Ali, Second Appeal No. 25 of 1955, Bhopal (A). The view there taken by me was that Ss. 100 to 102, C.P.C., were still applicable to Bhopal State, though by virtue of S. 31, Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh (Courts) Act, 1950, the points which could be raised in first appeals could be raised in Second appeals coming within the four corners of this Section. In other words, in suits falling within the categories enumerated in S. 31, the Judicial Commissioner could hear the second appeals like first appeals, that is, go into the merits of the case and in such cases second appeals were maintainable on grounds not only those contained in S. 100, Civil P.C., but also on grounds which could be raised in first appeals. There is no reason for me to depart from the decision in Second Appeal No. 25 of 1955 Bhopal (A). The present declaratory suit is not cognizable by Courts of Small Causes and consequently the present second appeal was not barred by S. 102, Civil P.C. and is maintainable. 7. I now come to the main question involved in this appeal. 8. The present declaratory suit is not cognizable by Courts of Small Causes and consequently the present second appeal was not barred by S. 102, Civil P.C. and is maintainable. 7. I now come to the main question involved in this appeal. 8. Section 47, Civil P.C. runs as below : "(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. "(2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under this Section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional Court-fees. "(3) Where a question arises as to whether any portion is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this Section, be determined by the Court. Explanation :- For the purposes of this Section a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed, are parties to the suit". Sub-Section (1) speaks of all questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed and not of such question arising between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor or the parties to the decree under execution. Consequently S. 47 would apply to all the parties to the suit irrespective of whether the decree was passed against them or not. Any doubt that may have existed in the interpretation of Sub-Section (1) has been set at rest by the explanation to this Section which clearly provides that for purposes of S. 47, both the plaintiffs whose suit had been dismissed and the defendant against whom the suit had been dismissed were parties to the suit. In the present case the plaintiff is the decree-holder and Dhunku the judgment-debtor while Abdul Latif Khan against whom the suit was dismissed would be a mere party to the suit. Such a defendant can, however, recover costs from the plaintiff, if costs of the suit were awarded to the former. For such a restricted purpose he can be regarded to be a decree-holder and the plaintiff a judgment-debtor. Such a defendant can, however, recover costs from the plaintiff, if costs of the suit were awarded to the former. For such a restricted purpose he can be regarded to be a decree-holder and the plaintiff a judgment-debtor. But this part of the case need not detain us, as the question now in controversy arose when Fida Hussain, dwree-holder, and not Abdul Latif Khan had put the decree under execution. Thus for the purposes of the present proceeding, Abdul Latif Khan would neither be a decree-holder nor a judgment-debtor but would merely be a party to the suit. In view of the general wordings of S. 47(1), any question arising between Fida Hussain and Abdul Latif Khan relating to the execution of the decree would be decided by the executing Court and by a separate suit. It is further laid down in Sub-S. (3) that any question arising as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a party shall also be determined by the executing Court, the idea underlying being that the litigation should be curtailed and any question decided by the executing Court on matters covered by S. 47 should be quickly disposed of during the executing proceedings as a suit and the parties be able to appeal against the order as if it was a decree as defined in S. 2(2), Civil P.C. 9. When the wordings of S. 47 are clear and unambiguous and can be given only one meaning, it will not be open for the Courts of law to give any other meaning to the simple words only on the grounds that in certain cases the strict interpretation of S. 47 may cause hardship to a party to whom no notice of the execution had been given or who could not have the knowledge of the steps taken in the execution proceedings. It is only when the wordings are not clear or the enactment is capable of two interpretations that a view which is less harsh or penal and is-more equitable can be adopted. In other words, therefore, if S. 47 above is taken into consideration. It is only when the wordings are not clear or the enactment is capable of two interpretations that a view which is less harsh or penal and is-more equitable can be adopted. In other words, therefore, if S. 47 above is taken into consideration. it would be clear that S. 47 would apply to all the parties to the suit who would be deemed to be parties to the execution proceeding, and the term, 'parties' would include the defendant against whom the suit had been dismissed, with the result that' if there was any question arising between the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor and the defendant against whom the suit had been dismissed, the question will have to be decided by the executing court and its decision will amount to a decree appealable under the ordinary provisions of the Code. In such cases neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor; nor the other parties to the suit would have the right to file a separate suit, may be under O. 21 R. 63, C.P.C.. and the only remedy: available to them would be by way of appeal and; not by a separate suit. However, a liberal interpretation can be given to S. 47 in those exceptional cases only where the fundamental rights of art individual have been infringed thereby, or in cases where S. 47 would or can be deemed to be repugnant to the Constitution of India. Though it has not been specifically provided in the Constitution, yet it is a well settled rule of law that a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India can be issued by the High Courts where there has been a violation, of the general principles of natural justice. One of these principles is that a person must not be condemned unheard, namely, that no order adverse to him can be passed unless he is given a-reasonable notice of the case he has to meet and an opportunity is given to him to state his case. No party can claim a writ, direction or order under Art. 226 as a matter of right, but if he was not a guilty of laches or negligence, he is generally granted the writ if there has been a violation of the general principles of natural justice. No party can claim a writ, direction or order under Art. 226 as a matter of right, but if he was not a guilty of laches or negligence, he is generally granted the writ if there has been a violation of the general principles of natural justice. Consequently if any order passed or purporting to have been passed under S. 47, Civil P.C. that violates the principles of natural justice, the aggrieved party can be granted a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution whereby the order would be ineffective as far as that party is concerned. A writ is generally refused if the party moved the High Court after an inordinate and unexplained delay. No period of limitation has been provided for the writs but the High Courts generally refuse to grant a writ where no steps were taken by a party within a period of 99 days and this period is counted from the date the party had knowledge or would be deemed to have knowledge of the proceedings or order being challenged. If these principles are kept in mind, it can be inferred that Section 47 would be inapplicable to a party to the suit who had no notice of the execution proceedings or who would have no knowledge of such proceeding but even then an order adversely, effecting his rights had been passed. When such a person wants to challenge the order under S. 47 even after the expiry of the period of limitation provided for the appeal or application to have the order set aside, he can either move the executing Court itself or the appellate Court after claiming the benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act or can move the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ, direction or order. If a more liberal and equitable interpretation is adopted, he can also be permitted to challenge the order by a separate suit treating the cause of action to have arisen on the date when he got the notice or, came to know of the adverse order passed in his absence or without any notice to him. 10. If a more liberal and equitable interpretation is adopted, he can also be permitted to challenge the order by a separate suit treating the cause of action to have arisen on the date when he got the notice or, came to know of the adverse order passed in his absence or without any notice to him. 10. To sum up, if S. 47 is strictly interpreted, it would mean that if the parties to a suit have any objection to, or prefer any claim in the execution proceeding, they must do so under S. 47, C.P.C. and even if such an objection or claim was purported to be under O. 21, R. 58, Civil P.C. it will, in the eye of law, be one under S. 47 of the Code, with the result that if the aggrieved party does not appeal against such an order, it would become final and cannot be re-agitated in a separate suit. But if an order passed under S. 47 infringes the fundamental rights of the person thereby adversely affected, or if the order violates the general principles of natural justice, the order will not be binding on that party and he can seek such remedy as may be available to him. One of these remedies would be by moving the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The other remedies open to him would be to have the order set aside by the executing court itself or by the high courts, by appealing against the order, seeking benefit of S. 5, Limitation Act, or to file a separate suit for the cancellation of the order as far as his interests were adversely affected. A similar view was taken in Surindar Nath v. Ramsarup, AIR 1944 Lah 294 (PB) (B), though it may be added that the Honourable Judge had departed from the strict interpretation of S. 47, C.P.C., and made an exception so that no injustice may be done to a party who could have no knowledge of the execution proceeding. Since the coming into force of the Constitution, the above would be the only correct view on taking into consideration not only R. 47 but also the provision of the Constitution. 11. In the present case Fida Hussain is the decree-holder, Dhunku the judgment-debtor and Abdul Latif Khan a co-defendant against whom Fida Hussain's suit had been dismissed. Since the coming into force of the Constitution, the above would be the only correct view on taking into consideration not only R. 47 but also the provision of the Constitution. 11. In the present case Fida Hussain is the decree-holder, Dhunku the judgment-debtor and Abdul Latif Khan a co-defendant against whom Fida Hussain's suit had been dismissed. All the three would be parties to the suit. Fida Hussain would have had the knowledge of execution proceedings taken by him and consequently he would in each and every case be a party to the suit bound by the provisions of S. 47. In other words, he would not be a person competent to re-agitate in a separate suit any matter decided by the executing Court and relating to the execution, satisfaction or discharge of the decree. If he is not satisfied by the order, the only remedy open to him would be to appeal against the order, treating it to be a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure. In case any claim or objection preferred or made by a party to the suit bears the heading or O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C., it will still continue to be one under S. 47 C.P.C. It is a well settled rule that an incorrect heading to a complaint or an application will not change its substance and the provision under which a suit had been filed or an application made will have to be determined on consideration of the facts of the case as admitted by the parties or as pleaded in the application. Thus even though the claim preferred by Abdul Latif Khan was purported to be under O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C.. it will in the eye of law, be a claim u/S. 47, C.P.C., against which an appeal would lie, and a separate suit, may be under O. 21, R. 63, C.P.C. would not be maintainable. 12. In the end reference may be made to two cases of the Madras High Court which have been brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that a separate declaratory suit with regard to the attached grain was maintainable. 12. In the end reference may be made to two cases of the Madras High Court which have been brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that a separate declaratory suit with regard to the attached grain was maintainable. Venkatakrishnayya v. Venkatanarayana Rao, AIR 1936 Mad 733 (C) simply lays down that if the party was impleaded in the suit in one capacity and claims are raised in execution objecting to the decree in another capacity, they are not matters falling under S. 47 and should be decided in a regular suit. In the present case Abdul Latif Khan opposed the suit and also the execution proceeding in the same personal capacity and consequently his claim, though purported to be under O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C. would, in the eye of law, be under S. 47, C.P.C. The other case Abdul Sai v. Sundara Mudaliar, 54 Mad 87 : (AIR 1930 Mad 817) (FB) (D), also relates to quite a different proposition of law. Therein a defendant had been wrongly impleaded and his objection regarding misjoinder of parties was allowed, but his name was not deleted from the array of the defendants. It was consequently urged on behalf of the decree-holder that the defendant continued to be a party to the suit within the meaning of S. 47, Civil Procedure Code. This contention was repealed by the reasons that after the decision of the issue of mis-joinder of parties, that defendant ceased to be a party to the suit, and it was obligatory for the court to proceed under O. 1, R. 10, C.P.C. by striking off his name from the record. In the present case no such issue appears to have been framed and decided by the Court, though the suit was dismissed as far as Abdul Latif Khan was concerned. Thus he was a co-defendant in the suit till its decision and would be deemed to be a proper party to the suit. 13. In the present case no such issue appears to have been framed and decided by the Court, though the suit was dismissed as far as Abdul Latif Khan was concerned. Thus he was a co-defendant in the suit till its decision and would be deemed to be a proper party to the suit. 13. To sum up, Abdul Latif Khan was a party to the parent suit and the claim preferred by him was, in the eye of law, one under S. 47, and not under O. 21, R. 58, Civil P.C. After the claim was allowed, the only remedy open to Fida Hussain was to appeal against that order and not to file a separate suit for declaration under O. 21, R. 63, Civil P.C., or under any other provisions of the law. The present suit was, therefore, barred by S. 47 of the Code and was not maintainable. 14. The second appeal has thus no force and it is hereby dismissed. Considering that the appellant had been misled by the heading given to the claim by the defendant-respondent 1 himself, and the executing court also treated it to be a claim under O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C. it is but proper that the parties should bear their own costs of all the Courts. Appeal dismissed.