Order The jurisdiction of an Estates Manager to pass an order correcting the land register maintained under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act) is canvassed in this Writ Petition. The petitioner is one Chidambaram Chettiar. The Government published a notification in 1950 under section 1(4) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1948, Act XXVI of 1948 taking over the Kumalur estate in Arantangi taluk, Tanjore District. At the time of this taking over, the petitioner, Chidambaram Chettiar was admittedly in possession of 1.50 cents wet and 5 cents of dry land which are the subject-matter of dispute between the petitioner and the first respondent in this writ petition. There was no dispute that this land is ryoti land and Chidambaram Chettiar’s name was accordingly entered in the land register as the person in possession of the land. On 31st July, 1954, the first respondent, Muhammad Aliar Rowther, purchased these and other items from one Muthuvairavan Servai. After his purchase the first respondent filed an application before the Estates Manager to register the lands mentioned in the petition in his name in the land register of Kumalur village. The jurisdiction of the Estates Manager was invoked under the powers stated to have been conferred on him by the rules made by the Government under the Act and published on 16th August, 1949. I shall be referring to the terms of the rules and to the scope of those rules in relation to the rest of the provisions of the Act a little later. The jurisdiction of the Estates Manager to conduct this enquiry to afford Muhammed Aliar Rowther the relief which he had prayed for was challenged by Chidambaram Chettiar. His objection was overruled and the matter was considered on its merits. This officer found after the enquiry that the person prima facie entitled to the grant of patta was not Chidambaram Chettiar but Muthuvairavan Servai and that as Muhammad Aliar Rowther had purchased the right of Muthuvairavan Servai he was entitled to have his name entered in the land register. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Pattukottai but that was dismissed and he has thereupon moved this Court by the present writ petition. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Pattukottai but that was dismissed and he has thereupon moved this Court by the present writ petition. The only point that is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and which is relevant for the disposal of this writ petition is as regards the jurisdiction of the Estates Manager to grant to the first respondent the relief which he claimed. In my judgment the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is well founded! The scheme of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 which I shall hereafter refer as the Abolition Act in relation to this matter is briefly this:- On the publication of a notification under section 1(4) with reference to any estate the consequences set out in section 3 came into operation and these are:- ............................. (b) the entire estate (including all communal land and porombokes other non-ryoti lands; waste lands; pasture lands, lanka lands, forests; mines and minerals; quarries rivers and streams. . . . . shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances..................................................... (d) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the estate, and all accounts registers, pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans’ and other documents relating to the estate which the Government may require for the administration thereof.” and then follows the proviso which is very important for the purpose of the present case: “Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. (i) if such person is a ryot pending the decision of the Settlement Officer as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta. (ii) if such person is a landholder, pending the decision of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it, as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta.” It will thus be seen that though under section 3(b) the entire estate which would include even ryoti lands in the estate would stand transferred to the Government and vest in them, still the Government are directed not to dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is primia facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. At this stage therefore, attention is directed to and concentrated upon the tenure of the land of which possession could be taken not so much regarding the identity of the person who is entitled to rights in the land. If, therefore, there were no rules devolving the power vested in the Government by this proviso the result would be that when once the Government consider the land is such that a person is entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta thereto, they would have to abstain from taking possession of it. On the terms of the proviso to section 3 (d) the Government would have no power to determine which among the competing claimants is entitled to remain in possession, for when once they decide that someone is entitled to remain in possession they are to desist from taking possession of the land. It is not as if the terms of the enactment did not contemplate disputes arising inter se between the persons claiming rights in regard to the same land. Section 56(1)(c) constitutes the Settlement Officer the authority to decide such disputes. Section 56(1) enacts, to quote only the material words: “Where after an estate is notified a dispute arises as to (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer”. and sub section (2) provides for appeals against the orders of the Settlement Officer. The position, therefore, is that while the proviso to section 3(d) enables the Government to determine whether any land is ryoti land in possession of a ryot section 56(1)(c) enables the decision of any dispute which arises as to who that ryot is. Thus understood the two provisions which relate to different states each enacted with a specific but different purpose dovetail into each other. The provisions of the rules devolving this power on the Officers of the Government have to be understood in the light of this basic feature. Thus understood the two provisions which relate to different states each enacted with a specific but different purpose dovetail into each other. The provisions of the rules devolving this power on the Officers of the Government have to be understood in the light of this basic feature. The rules published on 16th August, 1949 and under which the present application was filed provide: “The powers specified in column 2 of the Schedule below which are conferred on the Government by the sections of the Act specified in the corresponding entry in column (1) of the said Schedule may be exercised also by any of the authorities or officers specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof subject to such control as may be specified in the said column (3) and also subject to revision by the Government.” Section Power Authorities or officers by whom the powers should be exercised 3(d) proviso Power to decide whether a ryot or a landholder is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta or not. Manager of the estate but..... The question is whether this rule enables the Estates Manager to decide as to who among the persons the petitioner and the first respondent is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. I am clearly of the opinion that the Estates Manager had no power to so determine. In the first place the Estate had been notified and taken over as early as 1950 and it was not part of any matter in dispute in connection with the taking over. That the land in dispute was ryoti land in regard to which a person would be entitled to a ryotwari patta was not in controversy. The only question for determination was who among the rival claimants was entitled to the grant of a patta. The determination of this dispute was specifically entrusted by the provisions of the enactment to the Settlement Officer under section 56(1)(c) which necessarily means that the decision of such a dispute was excluded from the competence of other authorities for it would be most illogical to construe the enactment as clothing the Estates Manager with power to decide the same dispute and give a decision as to what prima facie the rights of the parties are, leaving it to the Settlement Officer to decide the same matter so as to be finally binding on the parties. In my opinion, the Act never intended this anomaly and it is, therefore incapable of that construction. In my judgment, therefore the Estatese Manager had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the first respondent or to decide it. Learned counsel for the first respondent, however urged that even if this were the real position it was not proper and, therefore, not necessary to interfere with the order of the Estates Manager since this officer had considered the evidence on the merits and it was only on the basis of a very strong case on the merits that the order had been passed. Counsel, further urged, that both the Estates Manager as well as the Revenue Divisional Officer on appeal had both expressly stated that the determination of the rights of the parties in these proceedings was tentative and was subject to the decision of the Settlement Officer in proceedings that would certainly be open to be initiated by the present petitioner. On this ground it was urged that no harm had been done to the petitioner and no advantage derived by the first respondent and there was, therefore, no necessity to set aside the order of the Estates Manager. I am wholly unable to agree with these contentions of the learned counsel. The very fact that the first respondent considered it necessary to file an application and obtained an order, resisted the appeal therefrom and is now defending the present writ petition furnished enough proof that the first respondent does consider that it is to his advantage to have this order in his favour. If so, it would follow that the order does prejudice the petitioner. Where the order which is impugned is one passed without jurisdiction and is complained of by a party as prejudicial to his interests and this complaint is not frivolous or without substance, I consider that it is the duty of this Court to set aside that order under Article 226 of the Constitution. No doubt the only effect of the impugned order might be to determine who among the petitioners and the first respondent should initiate proceedings before the Settlement Officer but even this I cannot consider as of no moment or significance. I therefore, consider that the objection urged as to why this Court should decline to interfere is not well founded. The writ petition is allowed. I therefore, consider that the objection urged as to why this Court should decline to interfere is not well founded. The writ petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute and the order of the Estates Manager confirmed by the Revenue Divisional Officer is set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs. V.S. ----- Petition allowed. Rule made absolute.