ORDER : This is a petition under Art. 226, Constitution of India, by Mobin Ahmad, petitioner, for the grant of a writ in the nature of Mandamus, and Prohibition, or any other suitable writ, order or direction, to direct the State Transport Authority, Bhopal, respondent to allow the petitioner to ply his bus in accordance with the conditions of the permit and not to compel him to ply it on rotation or contrary to the conditions of the permit. 2. In the petition the petitioner did not give out the full facts of the case and he appears to have started from the facts as they occurred after the renewal of his permit. The detailed facts are contained in the written-statement of the respondent. These admitted facts are that the petitioner holds a permit to ply a stage-carriage on the Ahmadpur-Bhopal route for a very long period and under the directions of the State Transport Authority as originally given his bus was to leave Ahmadpur at 9-30 A.M., arriving at Bhopal at 11-30 A.M., and to leave Bhopal at 5 P.M. and return to Ahmadpur at 6-45 P.M., the same evening. According to the petitioner, the regulation of timing forms part of the conditions of a permit, while according to the respondent, it is not a condition of the permit and the Transport Authority has the power to regulate the timing from time to time as may be necessary. Upto February 1950 only one bus belonging to the petitioner was plying on this route but thereafter the Sindhi Bus Service Co-operative Society, Bairagarh, were also permitted to ply one bus on this very route. On the representations of the Society, the original timings were changed and it was ordered that in one month the bus of the petitioner would leave Ahmadpur in the morning and return to Ahmadpur the same evening and during this month the bus of the Society would leave Bhopal in the morning, returning to Bhopal the same evening and in the next month the petitioner's bus was to follow the timing of the Society's bus and vice versa. It is also the admitted case of the parties that the petitioner actually started plying his bus in accordance with the rotation order from the year, 1951, though he continued to make representations to the State Transport Authority and also to the Chief Minister of Bhopal as the appellate authority, which were all rejected. Originally the permit granted to the petitioner was for an unspecified period but under an order of the State Transport Authority, its period was renewed for a period of three years, from 10-11-1953 to 9-11-1956. It was in the month of February 1955 that the petitioner again made a representation to the State Transport Authority against the order of rotation passed previously but it was rejected. An appeal preferred against this order was also rejected on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The petitioner had now approached this court by moving the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 3. The case of the petitioner is that he is only bound by the conditions noted in the permit and consequently, unless the conditions are changed in accordance with the law, he is not bound to carry out any other direction of the State Transport Authority. It is also said that the changes in the timings were not made in accordance with the law and there has of course been thus an infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. 4. The respondent, on the other hand, contends that the timings of the plying of buses is not a condition of the permit and consequently, the State Transport Authority could separately order the change in timings. The respondent further contends that the changes were made in accordance with the law and that after the petitioner had submitted to the order for more than 3½ years, it was not open to him to move this court for a high prerogative writ. In other words, it is urged that the petition be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay in approaching the Court. In addition it was pleaded that the petition suffered from the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties due to not implead-ng the Sindhi Bus Service Co-Operative Society,. Bairagarh, which would be affected by an order, if passed by this court against the respondent. 5. In addition it was pleaded that the petition suffered from the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties due to not implead-ng the Sindhi Bus Service Co-Operative Society,. Bairagarh, which would be affected by an order, if passed by this court against the respondent. 5. The Sindhi Bus Service Co-operative Society Bairagarh moved an application on the last date of hearing for being impleaded as a co-respondent in the proceeding. A copy of the application was supplied to both the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner did not file any objection thereto and when asked if he would like to implead the Sindhi Bus Service Co-operative Society as a co-respondent, he clearly expressed before this Court that he would not be joining the Society in the present proceeding, and if the Society was regarded to be a necessary party, the petition could be dismissed. 6. Two preliminary objections as raised by the respondent, therefore, require consideration. firstly, if the Sindhi Bus Service Co-operative Society was a necessary party to the present proceeding, and secondly, if the present petition was moved after an inordinate delay. 7. If the facts are looked into from the view point of the parties to the proceeding only, it cannot be said that the Sindhi Bus Service Co-Operative Society is a necessary party to the present proceeding. But if at the same time the interest of the public generally is taken into consideration the Society will become a necessary party, so that if a writ is granted, the timings of the bus of the Society may also be suitably changed. In case the petitioner is allowed without impleading the Society, it would mean that in alternate month both the buses would leave Ahmadpur in the morning and return to Ahmadpur same evening and there would be no bus leaving Bhopal in the morning. This would cause a great inconvenience to the general public intending to leave Bhopal or going towards Ahmadpur in the morning and also to the public intending to leave Ahmadpur in the afternoon or to proceed towards Bhopal that time. The Motor Vehicles Act and the Motor Vehicles Rules have been specifically framed in the interest of the public generally and also to ensure that there is no loss to the owners of buses on account of the competition resulting from large number of persons plying their buses on the same route. The Motor Vehicles Act and the Motor Vehicles Rules have been specifically framed in the interest of the public generally and also to ensure that there is no loss to the owners of buses on account of the competition resulting from large number of persons plying their buses on the same route. If the High Courts are to pass an order contrary to the object and purpose of the Act, it will be in one way defeating the very principles of the law and thereby putting the public into inconvenience. In my opinion, therefore, the petition is not one which should be allowed, unless the Sindhi Bus Service Co-operative Society was also impleaded as a respondent in the proceeding. The refusal of the petitioner to implead the Society can be used against him, but in spite of the refusal I would have given him an opportunity to implead the Society in the proceeding if the petition was not being dismissed on other grounds. 3. For the purposes of the present proceeding it is not necessary for me to record a finding as to whether the regulation of timing is a condition of a permit or not. But it may be observed that in 'Kali Mudaliar v. A. Vedachala Mudaliar', AIR 1952 Mad 545 (A), it has been held that the change in bus timings is not variation in conditions of permit. Sub-Section (3) of S. 59, Motor Vehicles Act lay down what would be the conditions of every permit. Clauses (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) are not applicable to the present case and the only clause which can be applicable is clause (c) which runs as below : " (c) that any prohibition or restriction imposed and any maximum or minimum fares or freights fixed by notification made under S. 43 are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates." Assuming that the word "restriction" in S. 59(3)(c), Motor Vehicles Act, would include the regulation of timing under the timing so fixed or varied would be deemed to be a condition of every permit, irrespective of whether entered in the permit or not. In case only the conditions, but if as noted in the permit, were to be the conditions of the permit under S. 59, the section would have been differently worded and it would have been provided that the conditions of a permit shall be those as entered therein. In the alternative, it would have been provided that the conditions detailed in the Section shall be noted in the permit and when so entered shall be deemed to be the conditions of the permit. It can, therefore, be inferred that the conditions of the permit can be altered by the State Transport Authority after following the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and after a decision has been taken by the State Transport Authority and the persons affected informed the conditions of the permit would be deemed to have been suitably modified. To incorporate the modification in the permit would be a clerical work to be done in due course by the office of the Transport Authority. In other words, therefore, the condition regulating the timings of the bus would be deemed to have been modified as soon as a decision was taken by the State Transport Authority. Such a decision was taken as early as in 1951 but the petitioner submitted to this change in timings, though he made repeated representations to the State Transport Authority and to other higher authorities. In the resolution passed on 6-10-1951, which was in due course communicated to the petitioner, it was made clear that the application of the petitioner regarding change of rotation in timings was rejected again and no more applications would be invited. On receipt of information of this decision, the petitioner could not have any Justification in approaching the State Transport Authority over again, He should have appealed against that order, if any appeal was permissible under the law, or should have moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. He remained silent for more than 11 years and taking advantage of the renewal of the permit made a fresh representation followed by an appeal and the present writ petition. The petitioner would thus be guilty of inordinate delay in moving this Court. He remained silent for more than 11 years and taking advantage of the renewal of the permit made a fresh representation followed by an appeal and the present writ petition. The petitioner would thus be guilty of inordinate delay in moving this Court. 3-a. In the end it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that his fundamental rights were being-infringed day after day and consequently in a case of the present nature, the delay could be no ground for the refusal of a writ. In the case the legality of the imposition of a tax or any other taxation or any liability of such a nature was in question, the petitioner could be heard so that he may not have, in the future, to pay an illegal tax. But in the present case no such tax has been imposed. There is only the question of his personal inconvenience on account of his having to stay at Bhopal for six months in a year to ensure that the bus left Bhopal punctually in the morning. A matter of personal inconvenience is distinct from the Imposition of a tax. In case the petitioner was in reality put to inconvenience, he would have moved this court much earlier and not after he submitted in that order for more than 3½years. There is nothing on the record to submit to substantiate the assertion that he is suffering a financial loss on account of the enforcement of the rotation order by the respondent. The loss appears to me to be imaginary and not real. In case any real loss was suffered, he could have submitted his account books, or in any case, should hare given in the affidavit the figures of the income during the various years. A mere general assertion that he was suffering a loss is not enough. 9. For reasons given above, I am of opinion that the present petition has been moved after an inordinate delay of more than 3½ years and this delay has not been suitably explained. The petition is, therefore, liable to dismissal on this preliminary point. A similar view was taken by me in 'Abdul Hakim v. Regional Settlement Commissioner, Bhopal', Misc. Civil Case No. 37 of 1955 (Bhopal) (B). 10. The petition is hereby dismissed with costs, Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. The petition is, therefore, liable to dismissal on this preliminary point. A similar view was taken by me in 'Abdul Hakim v. Regional Settlement Commissioner, Bhopal', Misc. Civil Case No. 37 of 1955 (Bhopal) (B). 10. The petition is hereby dismissed with costs, Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 75/- if certified or, the amount shown in the certificate whichever is less. Petition dismissed.