JUDGMENT M.L. Chaturvedi, J. - These are two connected revisions against a common, judgment of the Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge of Budaun disposing of two appeals filed before him u/s 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the opposite party Munna Lal brought two suits against the applicant Suraj Prasad. In one of these he prayed for the closure of certain spouts and in the other for the closure of a door. The parties then agreed to refer the matter to the arbitration of one Pt. Sriniwas, but Pt. Sriniwas returned the papers and he did not enter into the arbitration. Subsequently, on 4-8-1951, the parties referred their disputes in the two suits to Sri Raghunandan Sarup. The court appointed Sri Raghunandan Sarup as arbitrator and directed him to make his awards by 10-9-1951. Sometimes the arbitrator and sometimes the parties got extensions of time from the court for making the awards, and ultimately on 14-3-1952 the trial court passed an order directing the arbitrator to file his awards within two days. The two days were to expire on the 10th of March which was a Sunday and the awards were filed in court on the next reopening day, namely, 17-3-1952. Objections were filed to these awards and one of the grounds taken was that the awards had been made beyond the time, allowed by the court and were thus liable to be set-aside. On 20-5-1952, Munna Lal opposite party filed applications u/s 28 of the Arbitration Act for extension of time for making the awards till the date that they were filed in court. The learned Munsif appears to have got sick of granting these applications for extension of time, and he dismissed even this application which, on the face of it, appeared to be the application which deserved a more favourable consideration. The learned Munsif then considered the objections to the awards and he come to the conclusion that the awards should be set aside as they were made after the time allowed by the court. 3. The opposite party Munna Lal then filed two appeals against the orders setting aside the awards. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the learned Munsif did not exercise his discretion properly and he should have granted the applications made for extension of time on 20-5-1952. 3. The opposite party Munna Lal then filed two appeals against the orders setting aside the awards. The lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the learned Munsif did not exercise his discretion properly and he should have granted the applications made for extension of time on 20-5-1952. A reading of the judgment shows that the lower appellate court itself extended the time and, as the only reason for setting aside the awards was that they were filed beyond time, it allowed the appeals and directed that the awards be made rules of court and decrees be passed in terms of the awards. The Defendant applicant Suraj Prasad has filed these Two revisions, and the learned Counsel appearing for him has urged that the order of the lower Appellate court is without jurisdiction as that court had no right to extend the time fixed by the trial court for making the; awards. 4. Sub-section (1)of Section 28 of the Arbitration Act authorises the court to extend time for making the awards whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not. The power given by this section is very wide, and there can be no doubt that the trial court had the jurisdiction to extend the time as prayed for by the Respondent in his applications dated 20-5-1952. It, however, refused to extend the time, and the question is whether the lower appellate court had any authority to interfere With that order of the trial court refusing to Extend the time. 5. Section 39 of the Arbitration Act says that an appeal shall lie from the orders passed (under the Arbitration Act), enumerated in the section, and that an appeal shall not lie from any other order. The order passed u/s 28 is not an order made appealable u/s 39; but the question is whether the appellate court could have interfered with that order while detailing with the appeal against the final order setting aside the awards. In order to determine this question reference with have to be made to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, because Clause (a) of Section 41 of the Arbitration Act makes the provisions of the CPC applicable to the proceedings before the trial court as well as to proceedings before the appellate Court in an appeal under the Act. 6. 6. Section 104 of the CPC corresponds to Section 39 of the Arbitration Act and both the sections mention the orders against which appeals lie. Section 39 further lays down that appeals shall not lie against any other order. Section 105, Code of Civil Procedure, is then important, and Sub-section (1) of that section provides that no appeals shall lie save as otherwise expressly provided "but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection, in the memorandum of appeal." 7. According to the rule of law laid down in the above quotation, the correctness of orders affecting the decision of the case may be challenged in an appeal against the decree finally passed in the suit. When the appellate court is hearing an appeal against the decree, it is open to it to consider the legality and propriety of other orders passed by the trial court, which themselves had not been made appealable by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It would be noted that the relevant portion of Section 105, is confined to an appeal from a decree, and the appeals before the lower appellate court in these proceedings were not appeals against decrees but they were appeals against orders. But this does not affect the law laid down in Section 105 because Section 108, CPC says that the provisions of Part VII relating to appeals from original decrees shall, as far as may be, apply to appeals from orders made under the CPC or under any special or local law for which a different procedure is not provided. There can be no doubt that the Arbitration Act is a special law and it does not provide for any different procedure for the hearing of appeals against orders. On the other hand, Section 41(a) or the Arbitration Act provides that provisions of the CPC shall apply to all appeals filed under the Arbitration Act. 8. It thus appears to be open to the appellate court, hearing an appeal from an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, to consider the legality, propriety and correctness of non-appealable orders passed by the trial court, which affect the decision of the case. 8. It thus appears to be open to the appellate court, hearing an appeal from an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, to consider the legality, propriety and correctness of non-appealable orders passed by the trial court, which affect the decision of the case. The orders passed by the learned Munsif refusing to extend the time till the date the awards Were filed in court were clearly orders affecting the decision of the case because the awards were set aside only on the ground that they were filed beyond the time allowed by the court.. The lower appellate court was thus entitled to consider the correctness of the order passed by the trial court refusing to extend the time, and I find no difficulty in agreeing with the opinion of the lower appellate court that the better exercise of discretion was to have extended the time for making the awards till the date that they were filed in court. The learned Munsif had granted two day's time on1-1-3-1952 for filing the awards, and these two days expired on the 16th of March, which happened to be a Sunday. If the learned Munsif had taken care to find out on which day of the week the two days would expire, he would have discovered that by allowing two days he was really allowing one day because the second day would be a Sunday. It was his own act of granting two days time which had complicated the issue and, under the circumstances the would have been better advised to have extended the time further till 17-3-1952. 9. In any case, what I have to see is whether the lower appellate court had jurisdiction to pass the order that it did and I have come to the conclusion, as indicated above, that it had this jurisdiction. 10. These revisions, therefore, fail and are dismissed With costs.