JUDGMENT Upadhya, J. - This is a 'judgment debtor's appeal. 2. A decree for ejectment from an accommodation was obtained by the decree holder on 26-10-1945. This was confirmed in appeal on 18-7-1946. On 10-12-1954 the decree-holder applied to the District Magistrate for the permission to execute the decree for eviction. The District Magistrate had conferred on the Town Rationing Officer the power to exercise the functions u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. Learned Counsel for the Appellant states that the other powers under the Act were given to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The decree-holder's application for permission was dealt with admittedly by the Town Rationing Officer under the authority given to him. The Town Rationing Officer granted the permission to the decree-holder. This was confirmed in revision by the Additional Commissioner and the decree-holder thereupon prayed that the execution proceedings which had been stated by an order on 23-11-1946 be continued. 3. One of the objections taken by the judgment-debtor which has survived and has now come up for consideration is that the authority of the Town Rationing Officer did not empower him to accord the permission sought by the decree-holder to execute the decree. The executing court took the view that the permission was not valid and allowed the objection. The lower appellate court held that the permission was valid and that the Town Rationing Officer was duly authorised by the District Magistrate to pass orders u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and as such the permission granted by him was fully effective in law. In this view of the matter the learned Civil Judge allowed the appeal and, dismissing the objection raised by the judgment-debtor, directed the execution of the decree to proceed. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has urged that Section 14 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act provides that 'no decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the commencement of this Act' ... 'be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3'.... The 'grounds' mentioned in Section 3 have been held to include a permission obtained from the District Magistrate, Learned Counsel referred to a Division Bench case of Sunder Lal and Another Vs. 'be executed against him as long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3'.... The 'grounds' mentioned in Section 3 have been held to include a permission obtained from the District Magistrate, Learned Counsel referred to a Division Bench case of Sunder Lal and Another Vs. Mohammad Ishaq, AIR 1954 All 111 in which it is held that, apart from the grounds enumerated as (a) to (f) in Section 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, the permission of the District Magistrate referred to in the first portion of Sub-section (1) itself is a 'ground' within the meaning of the expression as used in Sections 14 and 15 of the Act. This view has been upheld by a Full Bench of this Court in Bhagwan Dass Vs. L. Pyare Lal, AIR 1955 All 19 . The law therefore appears to be well-settled that the word 'grounds' in Section 14 includes all the grounds enumerated as such in Section 3 and also a permission granted by the District Magistrate for the purpose. 5. Learned Counsel has further argued that the provision of Section 3, 14 and 15, though analogous in character, provide for three different classes of litigation. Section 3 embodies the bar laid down by the statute against institution of suits by landlords for the eviction of tenants and provides that no suit may be instituted except either with the permission of the District Magistrate or on one of the grounds (a) to (g) enumerated in the section. Similarly, Section 14 provides that in case a decree for eviction of a tenant has been obtained prior to the commencement of the Act it shall not be executed except 'on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3'. All the grounds enumerated in Section 3 as (a) to (g) in Sub-section (1) of that section have not been repeated again in this section. For brevity of expression, a reference has been made to the grounds mentioned in Section 3. By this reference all the grounds embodied in Section 3 should be deemed to be embodied in Section 14 itself. Consequently the permission of the District Magistrate, which is one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3, should be taken to be one of the grounds for the purposes of Section 14. By this reference all the grounds embodied in Section 3 should be deemed to be embodied in Section 14 itself. Consequently the permission of the District Magistrate, which is one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3, should be taken to be one of the grounds for the purposes of Section 14. A similar construction appears to be reasonable relating to Section 15, though that section does not come up for consideration in the present case. 6. Learned Counsel has also referred me to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in. In that case at p. 625 an argument by learned Counsel has been considered, that Section 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act does not specifically confer on the District Magistrate any power to grant the permission mentioned in that section. The conferment of the necessary power follows as a corollary and has to be assumed because of the bar laid down in that section. The learned Judge delivering the judgment observed: Powers may be conferred upon an authority by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. When u/s 3 the permission of the District Magistrate is contemplated, it follows necessarily that the District Magistrate has the power to grant the permission. 7. An English case and Maxwell's book on The Interpretation of Statute's were referred in support of this view. 8. Learned Counsel has argued that though in the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act the permission of the District Magistrate is necessary in all the three cases, i.e. u/s 3, u/s 14 and u/s 15, yet the permission is not of the same kind. In the first case, the permission to be granted is the permission to institute a suit. In the second case, the permission necessary is the permission to proceed with the execution of a decree for eviction, and in the third case, i.e., u/s 15, the permission required is the permission to continue a pending suit. Of course, in all these three cases the eviction of a tenant is the main subject matter, yet slightly different considerations may arise. If a new suit for eviction has to be instituted, the District Magistrate may take certain facts and circumstances into consideration. Of course, in all these three cases the eviction of a tenant is the main subject matter, yet slightly different considerations may arise. If a new suit for eviction has to be instituted, the District Magistrate may take certain facts and circumstances into consideration. If a suit was instituted several years ago and in a harassing litigation the decree-holder has been put to great trouble and expense and the District Magistrate takes the view that the attitude adopted by the judgment-debtor does not call for any sympathetic consideration, some other considerations, not relevant to the first class of cases may arise. The permission therefore that is necessary u/s 14 cannot be said to be the same permission which is necessary for the purposes of Section 3. The mere fact that in Section 14 the permission is not specifically mentioned again does not seem to provide any justification for the view that the only provision in the statute under which the District Magistrate may grant permission is one u/s 3. As already mentioned above in the case of Ghanshyamdass Bhagat and Another Vs. L. Gulab Chand and Others, AIR 1952 All 624 , Section 3 does not specifically grant powers to the District Magistrate to grant any permission; the power to grant permission has been held to exist by necessary implication. For the same reason, the power to grant a permission necessary in the circumstances mentioned in Section 14 must be held by necessary implication to be vested in the District Magistrate. 9. In the present case, the authority granted by the District Magistrate has been read out in Court and is on record. It confers on the Town Rationing Officer by his name the power to exercise the functions u/s 3. This authority, I fear, cannot be taken to authorise the exercise of powers or performance of functions u/s 14 or any other section of the Act. 10. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has contended that the reference in Section 14 to Section 3 implies that the permission to be granted by the District Magistrate is always to be a permission u/s 3. The other grounds which are enumerated in that section may exist independently of Section 14 itself. 10. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has contended that the reference in Section 14 to Section 3 implies that the permission to be granted by the District Magistrate is always to be a permission u/s 3. The other grounds which are enumerated in that section may exist independently of Section 14 itself. The grounds mentioned include 'wilful default in paying arrears of rent.' That is a circumstance which must necessarily exist prior to the decree itself or perhaps prior to the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed. That circumstance may be available for permission u/s 3 to institute a suit. That circumstance may again be available for the purpose of executing the decree. Similarly, the other grounds such as the tenant's creating a nuisance or damaging the property or subletting the accommodation, may all be the same for obtaining a permission, or if no permission was obtained or no permission was required to be obtained according to the law then prevailing, each of these grounds might be considered to be a valid ground to justify the execution of a decree. Learned Counsel therefore argued that the permission of the District Magistrate which may be treated as a ground for the purposes of Section 14 should be considered to be the permission of the District Magistrate mentioned in Section 3 itself. 11. I fear this contention cannot be accepted. The permission of the District Magistrate cannot be considered as a permission in the abstract. It has to be a permission to do a certain thing and, as already observed above, it may be either to institute a suit or to evict a tenant in execution of a decree or to continue a suit that is pending. The permission therefore that the District Magistrate may grant must be a specific permission to do one or the other of these things. The permission contemplated by Section 3 is only a permission of one kind-the permission to institute a suit. The other two kinds of permission pertain only to Sections 14 and 15 and the permission therefore that the District Magistrate may accord to execute a decree obtained before the coming into force of this Act must be a permission granted u/s 14 of the Act. As the Town Rationing Officer was not authorised to grant such a permission the permission granted by him was of no legal effect. 12. As the Town Rationing Officer was not authorised to grant such a permission the permission granted by him was of no legal effect. 12. In the light of these observations, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. 13. Leave to appeal is asked for and is granted.