JUDGMENT Randhir Singh, J. - This is an application in revision against an order passed by the 2nd Addl. Munsif, Allahabad, in execution proceedings. 2. A decree for possession u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act was passed in favour of the applicant and it was put into execution. Possession on the land which was the subject of dispute u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act was delivered to the decree-holder. After the possession had been delivered an application was made by the judgment debtor for the restoration of the land on which possession had been delivered to the decree-holder on two grounds. Firstly, it was contended that no formal decree had been framed by the time the application for execution was made or possession delivered and secondly it was urged that the decree-holder was not entitled to put his decree in to execution as it related to agricultural land and the application was made in the month of November, 1949. Reliance was placed on the provisions of Section 182 of the U.P. Tenancy Act in support of the second contention. The learned Munsif accepted the contention raised on behalf of the judgment-debtor and allowed the objection of the judgment-debtor. It is against this order of the learned Munsif that the applicant decree-holder has come up in revision. 3. The first point which has been raised in arguments on behalf of the opposite party is that Section 182 of the UP Tenancy Act applied to decrees passed by civil courts also in respect of agricultural land. Section 182(1) of the UP Tenancy Act is as follows: Delivery of possession in execution of a decree or order for ejectment of a civil or revenue court, shall not be made before the first day of April or after the thirtieth day of June in any year: Provided that the Provincial Government may by rule prescribe in respect of any local area other dates between which delivery of possession shall be made. 4. It has been argued on behalf of the opposite party that the provisions of Section 182(1) are enough to cover decrees passed by all civil courts provided they relate to agricultural land. Evidently there is no mention of the word "land" or "agricultural land" in the words used in Section 182. 4. It has been argued on behalf of the opposite party that the provisions of Section 182(1) are enough to cover decrees passed by all civil courts provided they relate to agricultural land. Evidently there is no mention of the word "land" or "agricultural land" in the words used in Section 182. Decrees passed under the U.P. Tenancy Act are passed both by the revenue courts and civil courts and evidently the reference to decrees by the civil court in Section 182 of the U.P. Tenancy Act is to decrees passed under the U.P. Tenancy Act and not to decrees passed under any other law. There is no warrant for reading the word "land" or "agricultural land" into the words of Section 182 and evidently if Section 182 does not refer to any particular kind of decrees the word would be wide enough to cover decrees passed in respect not only of land but of any other kind of property; it might even cover a decree for possession of a house passed by a civil court. Section 182 will therefore have to be interpreted with reference to a particular kind of decrees. The contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party is that it should be made applicable to all decrees passed in respect of land. There is also no good ground for extending the application of Section 182 to all decrees passed in respect of land. The only reasonable interpretation which can be put is that Section 182 refers to decrees passed under the U.P. Tenancy Act. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has not been able to cite any reported case in support of his contention and it appears that the point was not raised in any other case before the High Court which has been reported. The view taken by the learned Munsif does not, therefore, appear to be correct. A decree passed u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act does not have any reference to the title of the parties to the property and is passed solely on the ground that a person has been dispossessed without recourse having been taken to law and should, therefore, be put back in possession of that property. The decree passed u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act was therefore rightly executed and the learned Munsif was in error in reversing the order for delivery of possession. 5. The decree passed u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act was therefore rightly executed and the learned Munsif was in error in reversing the order for delivery of possession. 5. As regards the second point, it appears that a formal decree had not been prepared by the time the decree was put into execution. The suit was decided on 25-11-1949 and an application for execution was made on 28-11-1949 and possession was delivered on 7-12-1949. A decree has, it appears, been framed subsequently and that point does not now arise. 6. As a result the application for revision is allowed and the order passed by the lower court allowing application No. 4C of the opposite party is set aside. The applicant shall get his costs in this Court.