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1956 DIGILAW 389 (MAD)

Ponnuswami Chettiar v. P. Vellaimuthu Chettiar

1956-12-07

PANCHAPAKESA AYYAR

body1956
Judgment This petition raises an interesting question of law not exactly covered by any ruling. It is a petition by one Ponnuswami Chettiar, the defendant in S.C.S. No. 8588 of 1953 on the file of the Court of Small Causes Madras for revising and setting aside the judgment and decree in N.T.A. No. 220 of 1954, which was filed against the decree and judgment of the learned Chief Justice in that suit. The main point of law is whether the absence of the name of the payee in a promissory note will make the note invalid, though the payee was known with certainty even at execution. The facts are briefly these: It was a suit brought against the petitioner by one Vellaimuthu Chettiar for the recovery of Rs. 1,177-8-0 the principal and interest due on a promissory note, Exhibit- P-1, dated 16th November, 1950, for Rs. 1,000. Two defences were raised by the petitioner in the lower Courts. One was that the promissory note was not supported by consideration The lower Courts found that the promissory note was fully supported by consideration, and Mr. B. V. Viswanatha Ayyar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, was not able to shake that finding which is, in my opinion, quite correct. The next plea was that the promissory note was not executed in favour of a known and certain person and, so, would be invalid. Mr. B. V. Viswanatha Ayyar urged vehemently before me that a promissory note in favour of a person without his name being mentioned in it should be held to be totally invalid and inoperative even though full consideration might have passed and the person lending was known with precision even at the time of execution by the person borrowing and though the description in the context, could refer only to him. The description of the payee in the suit promissory note was ‘son of a A. Palaniandi Chettiar’. He was certainly that. But there are also three other sons of Palaniandi Chettiar, according to the plaintiff, though they never lent a pie to the petitioner and had not come into the picture at all. I think the law is not so wooden as to allow this kind of quibbling by a debtor in a desparate attempt somehow to escape his just liability. If really the lender was not known, and if Rs. I think the law is not so wooden as to allow this kind of quibbling by a debtor in a desparate attempt somehow to escape his just liability. If really the lender was not known, and if Rs. 1,000 had been brought by a maid-servant or other servant from the house of Palaniandi Chettiar and handed over to the petitioner with the statement that a son of Palaniandi Chetti had lent him this Rs. 1,000, and the petitioner had honestly been ignorant as to who the lender was, and had executed a promissory note in favour of a soil of Palaniandi, then the case might be at least arguable that Palaniandi had four sons and that the petitioner had executed the suit note without knowing or seeing the particular son who lent him the Rs. 1,000, and so the promissory note would fail as the payee was not certain. But here, “ the son of Palaniandi” who lent the money was the plaintiff Vellaimuthu Chettiar, who swore to it, and it was not alleged by the borrower, the defendant, that any of the other three sons of Palaniandi had lent him a pie out of the amount in that pronote. The other three sons were far away, and had nothing to do with the petitioner or this promissory note. Though the name of the plaintiff was not mentioned (perhaps by sheer slip or accident), the lender and borrower knew it, and there was the description. To say that the name must always be mentioned to make a promissory note valid is, in my opinion, not sustainable, in any modern Court of justice, equity and good conscience, though such a plea might have been allowed in a Court, like the old Anglo-Saxon Courts, deciding on outworn formulae without reference to living facts. Many a Hindu woman will not name her husband but to say from that act that she has no husband will be absurd. Many a man is known by his caste or village or official name, or surname, like Mudaliar, Ayyar or Rao, Ambedkar, Gandhi, Nehru, Kirloskar, Prime Minister, Raja of Sandur, etc. and not by his personal name. To say that hundreds of Raos, Mudaliars, Ayyars, Gandhis, Nehrus, etc. Many a man is known by his caste or village or official name, or surname, like Mudaliar, Ayyar or Rao, Ambedkar, Gandhi, Nehru, Kirloskar, Prime Minister, Raja of Sandur, etc. and not by his personal name. To say that hundreds of Raos, Mudaliars, Ayyars, Gandhis, Nehrus, etc. might have been the persons who lent the money, when the particular man who has lent the money is known, even at that time, beyond all doubt, to the lender and the borrower is, in my opinion disingenuous and meaningless. The Hindu law-givers and Mimamsakas have said 2,000 years ago that ‘I ‘cannot be made into a ‘O ‘or ‘O ‘into ‘I ‘by any amount of quibbling, and that arguments will not avail to show that there is no gooseberry on the palm when it is there. So too, no amount of quibbling can change the fact that this particular promissory note was executed by the petitioner in favour of the plaintiff, that particular son or Palaniandi. This defence had been raised only because the defence of “ no consideration” collapsed. The plaintiff swore that he was the man who lent, and the defendant would not swear that the plaintiff was not the man who was mentioned in the promissory note as the lender. The description in the promissory note is, no doubt, a little defective because of the failure to mention the rank of the plaintiff among Palaniandi’s sons like ‘first son of Palaniandi ‘etc. But the evidence (which can be let in in such cases to clear the pretended, but not real, ambiguity) shows that the parties knew even then with certainty that the lender was the plaintiff, and no other son of Palaniandi. Section 92, Proviso 6 of the Indian Evidence Act will apply as held by the learned Judges at the New Trial and evidence regarding the name could be let in in such cases. The ruling in Abdul Hakim Ear Mahomed v. Ebrahim Solaiman Salahjee & Co1, shows this. In this view, the Civil Revision Petition has no merits, and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. P.R.N. ----- Petition dismissed.