SARTOO PROSAD C. J. : This is a reference made by the Board of Sales Tax Assam, under S. 32 (3), Assam Sales Tax Act (Act 17 of 1947), hereinafter called the Act. (2) The reference has been made at the instance of the petitioners assessees whose head office is situated in Calcutta. The petitioners are dealers in motor vehicles and their spare parts of various kinds. They opened a branch at Gauhati on 1-4-49. Until the opening of this branch, it appears that M/S. Nagarmal Gaurishankar, Fancy Bazar,. Gauhati, were acting as agents of the petitioners and sold goods on their behalf. But, on the opening of their office at Gauhati, M/S. Nagarmal Gaurishankar ceased to be their selling agent. On receipt of information about the-petitioners' business, the Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati, entered upon their place of business and seized certain books of account on 21-1-50. The petitioners thereafter filed an application on 24-1-50 for registration under the Act, and they duly obtained a certificate of registration from the Su­perintendent of Taxes, Gauhati. The application appears to have originally con­tained the words "with Head Office at Dibrugarh". But these words have been penned through, and it is said in the statement of case submitted by the Board that this was done with the consent of the petitioners because of the fact that their Dibrugarh Office was started long after the opening of their office at Gauhati. It is also stated by the Board that this Dibrugarh office existed only for a short period and it does not appear that the petitioners had at any stage thereafter objected to their being registered at Gauhati. It appears that later on they, in fact, got themselves registered separately for their business at, Ditarugarh. It is admitted on all hands that there was no written requisition by the Superin­tendent of Taxes requiring the petitioners to get themselves registered. After registration, the Su­perintendent of Taxes, Gauhati, issued a notice on 31-1-50 under S. 16(2) of the Act, directing the peti­tioners to submit returns of their total turnover for the return period ending with September, 1949. Pur­suant to that notice, the petitioners filed their re­turn on 7-2-50 for the period ending with Septem­ber, 1949. They also submitted two other returns on 30-6-50--one for 1-10-49 to 30-12-49 and another for 1-1-50 to 31-3-50. Pur­suant to that notice, the petitioners filed their re­turn on 7-2-50 for the period ending with Septem­ber, 1949. They also submitted two other returns on 30-6-50--one for 1-10-49 to 30-12-49 and another for 1-1-50 to 31-3-50. All these returns covered a period beginning from April, 1949, when the business admittedly commenced at Gauhati, and ending with 31-3-1950; and there is no doubt, on these returns, that the gross turnover of the petitioners during each of these periods was much beyond the taxable quan­tum. Later, it appears that the petitioners sub­mitted revised returns on 14-10-50, - one for the period ending on 30-9-49 and another for the period ending on 31-3-1950. (3) It is perhaps necessary .to point out here that, in the application for registration certificate, the petitioners stated that they maintained accounts in the English language, and the year observed by them for this purpose was the calendar year begin­ning from the 1st of January and ending with the 31st of December. In the returns also, which they originally filed, they showed their turnovers during the relevant periods, treating the calendar year as the year for the purpose of accounting. The revised returns were, however, submitted by the petitioners on the footing that their system of accounting was on the basis of the financial year. These returns referred to two periods-one from April, 1949 to September, 1949, and another from October, 1949, to March, 1950. The Superintendent of Taxes, by his order, dated 8-4-1953, assessed the petitioners for the revised return periods at certain rates. In making the assessment, the officer was of opinion that the books of account produced by the dealers did not represent the correct and true position of certain transactions made by them. He, therefore, partially rejected the books of account produced and made assessment on the basis of the turnover shown in the original bills and the sales of vehicles to M/S. Nagarmal Gaurishankar. (4) The petitioners appealed to the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes against the order of assess­ment, and this officer disposed of the appeals by his order, dated 6-9-53. He substantially rejected the objections of the petitioners against the assess­ments, but directed the Superintendent of Taxes to give a further opportunity to the petitioners to esta­blish their claim for deduction under S. 15(1)(b) of the Act for the assessment period ending with 31-3-1950. He substantially rejected the objections of the petitioners against the assess­ments, but directed the Superintendent of Taxes to give a further opportunity to the petitioners to esta­blish their claim for deduction under S. 15(1)(b) of the Act for the assessment period ending with 31-3-1950. For the earlier period ending with 30-9-1949, the Assistant Commissioner was of opinion that, in view of the fact that the books of the petitioners had been virtually accepted, they should be accepted in respect of the turnover for other goods also, and a fresh assessment should be made for that period after ascertaining the turnover of other goods during the period as per account-books of the peti­tioners. The questions substantially raised by the petitioners in appeal before that officer were : 1. that the Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati, had no jurisdiction to assess the petitioners; and 2. that the petitioners having started business only in April, 1949, and their taxable turnover having reached the taxable quantum only in 1949-50, they were liable to pay tax under S. 3(2) of the Act with effect from 1-7-1950, and not earlier. These grounds did not appeal to the Assistant Com­missioner. The petitioners then applied for revi­sion of the order, under S. 31 of the Act, by the Commissioner of Taxes, but without any success. Their application was rejected by an order, dated 8-2-1955. The grounds taken before the Assistant Commissioner were, in substance, repeated before him, but the Commissioner of Taxes decided all the points against the petitioners. It was then that the petitioners applied to the Board, leading to the present reference. (5) They appear to have formulated a number of points for reference to this Court, but the Board rightly observed that the questions required to be referred had been framed in a rather diffused man­ner, and most of them were essentially questions of fact, on which no reference could be made. The Board has to be circumspect in making references to this Court and not unduly encumber the legiti­mate issues at the desire of parties. The points which the Board has formulated for reference and which we have to answer in the present case, are as follows: 1. Whether S. 29, Assam Sales Tax Act is ultra vires? 2. The Board has to be circumspect in making references to this Court and not unduly encumber the legiti­mate issues at the desire of parties. The points which the Board has formulated for reference and which we have to answer in the present case, are as follows: 1. Whether S. 29, Assam Sales Tax Act is ultra vires? 2. If S. 29 of the said Act is intra vires, whether the dealer is liable to be assessed to sales tax in respect of his turnover prior to 1-1-1950, the calendar year in which he was registered, that is to say, in respect of his turnover from 1-4-1949 to 31-12-1949? 3. Whether, for the purpose of making a dealer liable to assessment under S. 29 of the Act, it is in­cumbent on the Commissioner or the Superintendent of Taxes to make a requisition in writing requiring the dealer to register when the dealer himself ap­plies for registration either suo motu or on verbal requisition? 4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the dealer could be validly assessed-(1) by the Superintendent of Taxes at Gauhati in ge­neral, and (2) by Shri N. G. Das Purkayastha, in particular? 5. Whether S. 52 (2) (i), Assam Sales Tax Act and R. 74 of the Sales Tax Rules made thereunder, are ultra vires? 6. If these are intra vires, whether the appli­cation for revision filed before the Commissioner and arising out of the appellate orders passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, was liable to be assessed to fee under sub-cl. (a) or sub-cl. (d) of R. 74 of the Assam Sales Tax Rules? (6) In fact, the first question is the most im­portant question of law which arises for considera­tion on this reference. The Board concedes that in the case of a special statute like the Sales Tax Act, where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is express­ly excluded, the question of the vires of any parti­cular provision bearing on the assessment, must be decided by the machinery constituted by the sta­tute itself. This position cannot be doubted in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Raleigh In­vestment Co. Ltd. v. The Governor General in Council, AIR 1947 PC 78 (A). This position cannot be doubted in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Raleigh In­vestment Co. Ltd. v. The Governor General in Council, AIR 1947 PC 78 (A). Lord Uthwatt there observed: "Jurisdiction to question the assessment other­wise than by use of the machinery expressly pro­vided by the Act, would appear to be inconsistent with the statutory obligation to pay arising by vir­tue of the assessment." Therefore, where the scheme of the Act is to set up a particular machinery, by the use of which alone, the total income assessable to tax is to be ascer­tained, it is that particular machinery which should also consider whether the assessment is founded upon some ultra vires provision of the Act, or is otherwise valid. There was thus nothing to pre­vent the taxing officers or the Sales Tax Board, who are creatures of the Act, from deciding the question now before us, namely, whether B. 29 of the Act is ultra vires. The Board, however, has decided the point against the petitioners, for rea­sons which I shall presently discuss. (7) The contention of the assessee is that S. 29 of the Act is ultra vires, being inconsistent with S. 297(l)(b), Government of India Act, and Art. 304 (a) of the present Constitution of India, it is also inconsistent with Art. 14 of the Constitution as being discriminatory in its character and incon­sistent with the right of equal protection of law to dealers who import goods from outside. (8) The Sales Tax Act is an Act of 1947, and if it is held that the impugned section contravenes or is in violation of S. 297, Government of India Act, 1935, it must be held that the legislation is to that extent unauthorised and invalid, and could not be sustained. The relevant portion of S. 297 runs thus: "No Provincial Legislature or Government shall- * * (b) by virtue of anything m this Act, have power to impose any tax, cess, toll, or due which, as between goods manufactured or produced in the Province and similar goods not so manufactured or produced, discriminates in favour of the former, or which, in the case of goods manufactured or pro­duced outside the Province, discriminates between goods manufactured or produced in one locality and similar goods manufactured or produced in another locality. (2) Any law passed in contravention of this sec­tion shall, to the extent of the contravention, be invalid." We have, therefore, to see whether, as an effect of enacting S. 29, the Provincial Legislature has im­posed any tax which, as between goods manufac­tured or produced in the Province and similar goods not so manufactured or produced, discriminates in favour of the former. Article 304 of the present Constitution also provides for a similar safeguard in the Constitution. It says: "Notwithstanding anything in Art. 301 or Art. 303, the Legislature of a State may, by law- (a) impose on goods imported from other States any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced...." It is unnecessary to quote the other parts of the Article. The contention of the petitioners is that S. 29 of the Act does violate the principles under­lying these constitutional safeguards. Section 29 may be fully reproduced here: "Where a dealer not ordinarily liable to regis­tration under the provisions of this Act, sells goods which he has obtained from outside the Province, he shall, when so required by the Commissioner, b3 liable to registration, and, after such registration, he shall also be liable to be taxed on all sales as if he were a registered dealer; Provided that such dealer shall not be liable to be taxed on sales which occurred prior to the year during which he becomes liable to registration." It is clear that this provision enables the Commis­sioner to require a dealer not ordinarily liable to registration under the Act, who sells goods which he has obtained from outside the State, to get him­self registered, and after such registration, to pay tax on sales as any registered dealer. It applies, therefore, to dealers-(i) who sell goods obtained from outside the State, and (ii) who are not ordi­narily liable to registration under the Act. Let us, therefore, examine in what cases a dealer is ordinarily liable to registration or payment of tax under the Act. The liability to tax arises under S. 3 of the Act. It applies, therefore, to dealers-(i) who sell goods obtained from outside the State, and (ii) who are not ordi­narily liable to registration under the Act. Let us, therefore, examine in what cases a dealer is ordinarily liable to registration or payment of tax under the Act. The liability to tax arises under S. 3 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act, it should be stated at the outset, was amended in 1954, but the assessment orders in these cases relate to periods long prior to the amendment and, there­fore, we shall discuss S. 3 as it stood at the rele­vant time, and not as it stands at present. Sub-section (1) of S. 3 refers to a class of dealers whose total gross turnover during the year immediately preceding the commencement of the Act amounted to or exceeded the sum of Bs. 10,0007- (taxable quantum). Such dealers, accord­ing to this sub-section, are liable to pay tax under the Act on all sales effected after the date notified by the Government. The exceptions provided therein are with reference to sales" outside the State of Assam or in course of export and import or in course of inter-State trade or commerce. Sub-section (2) of that section refers to another class of dealers to which sub-s. (1) does not speci­fically apply. These dealers are made liable to pay tax under the Act with effect from three months after the commencement of the year immediately following that during which their total gross turn­over first amounts to or exceeds the taxable quan­tum. It is somewhat curious that the exceptions incorporated in sub-s. (1) have not been incorporat­ed in sub-s. (2). Except for the change in the configuration of the sub-sections, the anomaly persists in the sec­tion even as it now stands. Sub-section (2) may now be read as sub-s. (3), & the taxable quantum has been raised to Rs. 12,000/-. But those excep­tions, being constitutional exceptions, and having been already indicated in sub-s. (1), it is probably to be presumed that the exceptions were meant to apply even to the case of dealers governed by sub-s. (2). Non-liability to tax in respect of sales re­ferred to in those exceptions is imposed by the Con­stitution itself, and the State Legislature has no power to tax such sales. Non-liability to tax in respect of sales re­ferred to in those exceptions is imposed by the Con­stitution itself, and the State Legislature has no power to tax such sales. For the present, therefore, we may assume that subject to those exceptions, the dealers mentioned in the above two sub-sections refer to two distinct classes: (1) dealers whose total gross turnover amounted to or exceeded the taxable quantum during the year immediately preceding the date of Government notification, and (2) dealers who are liable to pay tax with effect from three months after the commencement of the year immediately following that during which their total gross turn­over amounts to or exceeds the taxable quantum. The petitioners who commenced their business admittedly in April, 1949, would ordinarily fall un­der the class of dealers contemplated by sub-s. (2) of S. 3; and if they were liable to be taxed at all, their liability to taxation would arise three months after the commencement of the year 1950-51, fol­lowing immediately the year 1949-50, during which their gross turnover admittedly amounted to or ex­ceeded the taxable quantum. In other words, if the year preceding is taken as the calendar year, then their liability to taxation under sub-s. (2) of S. 3 would arise only from 1-4-1950. But if it is taken to be the financial year, as the Department contends, or as it has been found by the Board, then their liability to taxation would arise, under this provision, from July, 1950. That is to say, under S. 3(2) of the Act, they would not be liable for any assessment during the periods for which they have been assessed. The Depart­ment, therefore, falls back upon S. 29 of the Act to support the orders of assessment made against the petitioners. It is not disputed that the petitioners sell goods which they obtain from outside the State, and, as such, S. 29 of the Act would govern dealers of this class. But the petitioners point out that the dis­crimination made by this section as against such dealers, taxing the goods which they obtain for sale from outside the State, when otherwise they would not have been liable to tax for sale of similar goods, if manufactured or produced in the State, is dis­criminatory, and not permissible under the Consti­tution,-whether under S. 297, Government of India Act, 1935, or under Art. 304 (a) of the present Con­stitution. In construing the section, it is not necessary, to think of any particular commodity, because the section, in general terms, covers all classes of goods or commodities which may be obtained from out-} side the State. The dealer who obtains from out-' side any such goods, is liable to be taxed under S. 29, whereas if he sells these things manufac­tured or produced in the State, he would not be liable under the section, unless he is otherwise ordi­narily liable to be taxed under the provisions of the Act. It thus clearly makes a discrimination as against the dealer in respect of goods obtained from outside the State and creates a situation to his detriment; and is obviously hit by the constitu­tional bans referred to above. (9) The Board appears to think that the dif­ference in treatment is based upon a reasonable classification and is intended to protect the in­terest of smaller non-importing dealers, as it calls them, who have to buy their requirements locally on payment of sales tax are & thus likely to be un­dersold by importing dealers to the extent of the tax; and S. 297(1), Government of India Act only prohibits discrimination in favour of goods manu­factured or produced in the Province as against goods not so manufactured or produced. This observation loses sight of the distinction which I have pointed out earlier, namely: where-as a dealer who sells goods manufactured or produced in the Province, is not liable to pay sales-tax un­less his liability arises under S. 3 of the Act; a dealer who obtains such goods from outside the State, is made liable, by virtue of this section, to the payment of tax, merely on that account, even though he may not have been ordinarily liable un­der S. 3 of the Act. The supposed hardship of the "small non-im­porting dealers", to which reference has been made by the Board, does not, in substance, exist, because the ordinary liability to payment of tax under S. 3 of the Act is a liability which is common to all dealers-dealers who obtain goods for sale from out­side or dealers who obtain goorls for sale produced or manufactured within the State, and the law in that respect has placed them all on the same foot­ing. But even if such a hardship exists, it was not for the Provincial Legislature to usurp the func­tion of taxing goods brought for sale from outside the State, by incorporating the offending and dis­criminatory provision of the Act, but to leave the matter to the discretion of the Parliament or of the President, as provided by Art. 304 of the Con­stitution. S. B. Das C. J. when dealing with a si­milar contention in Bengal Immunity Co., Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (S) AIR 1955 SC 661 (B), scuttled the argument thus: "If there is any real hardship of the kind re­ferred to, there is Parliament which is expressly invested with the power of lifting the ban under Cl. (2), either wholly or to the extent it thinks fit to do. Why should the Court be called upon to dis­card the cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigat­ing a hardship, which after all, may be entirely fanciful, when the Constitution itself has expressly provided for another authority more competent to evaluate the correct position to do the needfull?" He also observed that the argument failed to take into account the benefit which the consuming pub­lic derives from the free flow of goods from one State to another resulting in lower prices. (10) The Board further opines that a sales-tax is essentially a tax on sales, and not a tax on goods manufactured or produced, and for that reason also, S. 29 of the Act is not hit by S. 297(1), Government of India Act. This reasoning, again, in my opinion, appears to be fallacious, and is calculated to by­pass the inhibition contained in S. 297. Sales-tax levied on dealers is not tax merely on sales, but in substance, a tax on the goods. One has to look to the substance of the matter, and not merely the form. Though the tax is formally laid on sales, its incidence is aimed at the consumers in the State, and is actually a tax on the goods sold. Sales-tax levied on dealers is not tax merely on sales, but in substance, a tax on the goods. One has to look to the substance of the matter, and not merely the form. Though the tax is formally laid on sales, its incidence is aimed at the consumers in the State, and is actually a tax on the goods sold. Discussing the true nature of a duty of excise and a tax on the sale of goods, Gwyer C. J., observed in the mat­ter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, AIR 1939 FC 1 at p. 7 (C): ".....it is common ground that the Courts are entitled to look at the real substance of the Act im­posing it, at what it does and not merely at what it says, in order to ascertain the true nature of the tax. Since writers on political economy are agreed that taxes on the sale of commodities are simply taxes on the commodities themselves, it is possible to regard a tax on the retail sale of motor spirit and lubricants as a tax on those commodi­ties......" It follows, therefore, that a sales-tax is a tax on the commodities. It is thus a tax on the goods ob­tained for sale from outside the State. Again in M. M. Weiton v. State of Missouri, (1876) 23 Law-Ed 347: 91 US 275 (D), it was held that- "A license tax required for the sale of goods is, in effect a tax upon the goods themselves". The case in question has an instructive value, as the facts show. A statute of Missouri, which re­quired the payment of a license tax from persons who dealt in the sale of goods, wares and merchan­dise which were not the growth, produce or manu­facture of the State, by going from place to place to sell the same in the State, and required no such license tax from persons selling in a similar way goods which were the growth, produce or manufacture of the State, was held to be in conflict with the power vested in Congress to regulate com­merce with foreign nations and among the several States. The learned Judges observed that the power was vested in Congress to insure uniformity of commercial regulation against discriminating State legislation. The learned Judges observed that the power was vested in Congress to insure uniformity of commercial regulation against discriminating State legislation. It covered property which was trans­ported, as an article of commerce, from foreign countries or amongst the States, from hostile or in­terfering State legislation until it has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the country, and protected it, even after it had entered a State, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin. The inaction of Congress in pre­scribing rules to govern inter-State commerce, is equivalent to its declaration that such commerce shall be free from any restriction. The above ob­servations appear to be quite apposite in their application to the present case. The tax. therefore,) which purports to be levied on the dealer who sells goods obtained from outside the State, under S. 29 of the Act, is, in substance, a tax on those goods, and directly attracts the inhibitions prescribed by S. 297, Government of India Act, 1935 or Art. 304 of the present Constitution, because of its discri­minatory character in favour of goods produced or manufactured in the State. I am, therefore, con-trained to hold that S. 29 of the Act is ultra vires. (11) It may be pointed out that the learned Senior Government Advocate has not been able to show that any such provision exists in any of the other Sales Tax Acts in India. In order to avoid the apparent discrimination contemplated by S. 29 of the Act,, the learned Advocate suggests that even under S. 29, the dealer is not liable to the payment of tax unless he fulfils the requirements of S. 3 of the Act. This argument unfortunately overlooks the plain language of S. 29 itself which opens with the words "Where a dealer not ordinarily liable to registration under the provisions of this Act....." Besides, if the ordinary liability was there, then S. 3 of the Act was comprehensive enough in its application to all classes of dealers,-whether sell­ing goods obtained from outside the State or goods manufactured and produced in the State. That be­ing so, there was no necessity for the existence of S. 29 on the statute at all. Mr. That be­ing so, there was no necessity for the existence of S. 29 on the statute at all. Mr. Medhi, therefore, unfortunately had to face the horns of a dilemma in assuming that there was no discrimination in­tended by S. 29 of the Act because the liability for tax had as well to be established under S. 3 of the Act. (12) It is contended that S. 29 of the Act is also repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution, and denies equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws to dealers of the class to which the peti­tioners belong. It not only marks out dealers who sell goods "obtained from outside the State1' for purposes of registration and taxation under the law, though not ordinarily so liable, but even in that class of dealers, it gives a wide, unrestricted and arbitrary discretion to the Commissioner of Taxes to select any dealer he likes calling upon him to be registered and to pay tax. It is irrespective of the nature of the commodity in which he deals and ir­respective of any taxable quantum. As between the dealers in the same class of com­modity or goods, the officer can pick out, at his dis­cretion, any one for registration and taxation, leav­ing others free to carry on their business without any such obligation. The section arms the officer indeed with such naked and arbitrary power that he can, by the exercise of an unjust discrimination, act to the serious prejudice of one dealer in pre­ference to another. There is no principle or policy indicated in the body of the section, or indeed anywhere else in the law, on which the Commissioner is to act. All that it says is that a dealer of the class indicated above, who is not ordinarily liable to registration under the Act, can, within the provisions of the section, be made so liable, if required by the Commissioner to get himself registered, and, after registration, to be taxed on all sales as a dealer. The only safeguard is the proviso to the section, but even the proviso does not affect the situation In regard to an arbitrary victimisation by the officer of an individual dealer for purposes of registration and taxation. The only safeguard is the proviso to the section, but even the proviso does not affect the situation In regard to an arbitrary victimisation by the officer of an individual dealer for purposes of registration and taxation. It has been often recognised that the Legislature can confer upon a person or body of persons large powers for the purpose of adminis­tering an Act; but it must prescribe the principles according to which these powers are to be exercised. If there is complete absence of rules guiding and controlling the exercise of discretion by the person or body of persons, then the power confer­red must be declared to be arbitrary and unreason­able. Therefore, the power conferred upon the Commissioner, by virtue of S. 29 of the Act, has the potency of being exercised with unjust discri­mination, and whatever might have been the vali­dity of such authority before the Constitution of India, such power, which is capable of being user} with discrimination in favour of or against parti­cular individuals, would be void and inoperative under Art. 14 of the Constitution: See Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1956 SC 479 (E) and P. S. Joseph v. Assist. Excise Commr. Ernakulam, AIR 1953 Trav-C 146 (P). I must, therefore, hold, on this ground as well, that S. 29 of the Act is ultra vires. (13) In view of my decision on the first ques­tion, it may be perhaps unnecessary to answer the other questions raised on this reference. But some of the questions appertain to the interpretation of S. 29 itself, and since we had ample opportunity of examining elaborately all the questions formulated by the Board, I think it right, in order to save fur­ther trouble and expense to parties, present or future, to deal with those questions as well, as com­pendiously as I can. But some of the questions appertain to the interpretation of S. 29 itself, and since we had ample opportunity of examining elaborately all the questions formulated by the Board, I think it right, in order to save fur­ther trouble and expense to parties, present or future, to deal with those questions as well, as com­pendiously as I can. (14) It will be convenient to dispose of the third question here, which is in this form: "Whether, for the purpose of making a dealer liable to assessment under S. 29 of the Act, it is incumbent on the Commissioner or the Superin­tendent of Taxes to make a requisition in writing, requiring the dealer to register when the dealer him­self applies for registration either suo motu or on verbal requisition?" The Board observes that S. 29 of the Act does not provide for any written requisition to be made by the Commissioner when he requires a dealer to be registered under this section. It points out that the Superintendent who acted on powers delegated by the Commissioner, made an oral requisition for such registration on 21-1-50, when he inspected the office of the petitioners and seized some of their documents. The Board states that the fact of this oral re­quisition finds support from the circumstance that three days later, that is, on 24-1-50, the dealer him­self made a formal application for registration. Therefore, where the dealer applies suo motu for registration, there is no need for further requisition by the Commissioner under S. 29 of the Act. Even if it be assumed that there was a verbal re­quisition by the Commissioner, it is for us to con­sider whether that would meet the requirements of S. 29. On the clear words of S. 29 itself, it is not possi­ble for the dealer to assume when or how he be­comes liable to registration; for obvious reasons, he cannot make any such assumption because the sec­tion gives a wide discretion to the. Commissioner to call upon any such dealer to be registered. Why the Commissioner calls upon him to do so, is not for the dealer to determine or to anticipate be ore-hand. Therefore, there could be no question of any dealer voluntarily seeking registration within the meaning of S. 29 of the Act. Commissioner to call upon any such dealer to be registered. Why the Commissioner calls upon him to do so, is not for the dealer to determine or to anticipate be ore-hand. Therefore, there could be no question of any dealer voluntarily seeking registration within the meaning of S. 29 of the Act. There is provision for voluntary registration under S. 11 of the Act, but I am unable to see how a dealer can assume, for himself, that, though he is not ordinarily liable for registration under the provisions of the Act, yet he should apply for registration. In fact, under S. 29, the Commissioner may call upon a dealer to be registered and pay tax even though his gross turnover is below the taxable quantum. That being so, voluntary registration or application for registration suo motu by the dealer, as suggested by the Board, is ruled out by the very i language of S. 29. I also do not think that an oral requisition, in the circumstances, can be adequate in law. The assessee contends that there was not even an oral requisition in the case. But even if that conten­tion is not accepted in view of the statement in the letter of reference, I still think that the words "when so required by the Commissioner" clearly contemplate a case of written requisition stating I under what circumstances the Commissioner required the dealer to be registered. The assessment or order of registration is open to question by the dealer in appeal or revision. Be­sides, the dealer would be deprived of any oppor­tunity to show cause against his liability for regis­tration or payment of tax unless he knew the rea­sons for the proposed requisition by the Commis­sioner. The assessment contemplated by S. 29 is of an extraordinary character, and that is all the, more reason why in such a case, the Commissioner should definitely state the reasons in writing for calling upon the dealer to get himself registered. In the present case, there was no such requisition. The word "required" as used in S. 29, therefore, con­templates a written requisition. In the present case, there was no such requisition. The word "required" as used in S. 29, therefore, con­templates a written requisition. We find the same expression used in S. 10 of the Act, where it is said: "The Commissioner may, in addition to taking any other action under the provisions of this Act, require any dealer who, in his opinion, is liable to registration but has not made an application in this behalf, to apply for registration......" Besides the words "when so required by the Com­missioner" in S. 29, are followed by the words "be liable to registration", and it would be presently seen that these words "liable to registration" are significant for the purposes of the proviso which is added to S. 29, as the dealer's liability to tax arises only from the date when he becomes liable to re­gistration. These reasons inevitably lead one to think that a requisition for registration by the Com­missioner must be in writing, and not an oral re­quisition, as suggested by the Board. (15) It is still a moot question whether the omis­sion to serve a written requisition, is a mere ir­regularly or an illegality which affects the validity of the registration itself and the liability of the dealer to payment of tax. As at present advised, it appears to me in view of the proviso to the section, that the liability to tax under the section depends upon the year during which he "becomes liable to registration"; and when he "becomes liable to re­gistration" again, in its turn, depends upon the stage "when he is so required by the Commissioner". The written requisition, therefore, is the sine qua non of his liability for taxation, as otherwise, he has no such liability ordinarily under the Act. The omission, therefore, to serve a written requisition i under the law, would amount to an illegality affecting both registration and taxation. (16) In the present case, although the Board ap­pears to imply that the registration of the dealer was under s. 29 of the Act and that he suo motu applied for registration under the said section, yet we find nothing, either in the registration applica­tion or in the registration certificate, to support that finding. The petitioners, on the contrary, assert that they applied for registration under S. 3(2) of the Act, and they were ordered to be so registered. The petitioners, on the contrary, assert that they applied for registration under S. 3(2) of the Act, and they were ordered to be so registered. The Board also suggests that "a notice under S. 16(2) was redundant" as there was no necessity for such a notice. But the fact that such a notice was issued by the Superintendent of Taxes and that the orders of assessment made by him nowhere showed that the assessment was under S. 29 of the Act, amply supports the contention of the petitioners that at the stage of assessment, the proceedings started against him were not even contemplated as proceedings under S. 29 of the Act; and it was only when legal objections were raised to the assessment order that the Assistant Commissioner, as the ap­pellate stage, sought to fortify the assessments un­der S. 29 of the Act. The relevant observation of the learned Assistant Commissioner, in his judg­ment, runs thus: "As to liability, the appellants contended that they having started business in 1949-50 and their turnover having reached the taxable quantum only during that year, was liable to pay tax only with effect from 1-7-1950, under S. 3(2). The case of the appellants being a case covered by S. 29, & not by 'S. 3(2), I do not see how can the appellants claim exemption under that section. Further, the notice under S. 16(2) having been served within the year in which the appellants were made liable, there was no irregularity in the assessment in that di­rection also." As it will presently appear, the learned officer lost sight of the proviso in summarily introducing the section for the purpose of upholding the assess­ment. He also opined that notice under S. 16(2) was, in some sense, essential to justify the assess­ment,-a position which is now abandoned by the Board, apparently for the reason that such a notice, for the application of S. 29, was irrelevant. The notice under S. 16(2) has a serious and positive implication, just as a notice under S. 23(2), Indian Income-tax Act: see (S) AIR 1956 SC 479 rat p. 483 (E). The notice under S. 16(2) of the I Act presupposes that the total turnover of a dealer is, in the opinion of the Commissioner, of such amount as to render him liable to pay tax under the Act. The notice under S. 16(2) of the I Act presupposes that the total turnover of a dealer is, in the opinion of the Commissioner, of such amount as to render him liable to pay tax under the Act. Such a notice evidently has no applica­tion to a case arising under S. 29 where the turn­over of the dealer is of no particular consequence. (17) I shall now turn to examine the second question, which proceeds upon the alternative as­sumption that S. 29 of the Act is held to be intra vires, - whether, even in that case, the petitioners were liable to be assessed to tax, and, if so, for what period? In this context, several subsidiary ques­tions emerge: (i) whether the dealers are protected under the proviso to S. 29 of the Act; if so, to what extent? (ii) whether they follow the calendar year for purposes of accounting, or they follow the financial year, and (iii) whether their case falls under S. 3(2) of the Act, and therefore, is beyond the purview of S. 29? All these points require careful examination, and I propose to deal with them in their order. The second point is incidentally involved in the other two, and must, of necessity, be dealt with them. (18) I may here reproduce the proviso to S. 29, which runs thus: "Provided that such dealer shall not be liable to be taxed on sales which occurred prior to the year during which he becomes liable to registra­tion." The dealer's liability to tax, therefore, arises only from the year during which he becomes liable to registration. As discussed earlier, the dealer be­comes "liable to registration" only when so required by the Commissioner under the earlier part of S. 29. In the instant case, it is admitted on all hands that the dealers were registered in January, 1950. Still it is important to find what is the year of account­ing followed by them. The Board says that the returns submitted by the dealers and the assessment proceedings have all proceeded throughout on the basis of the finan­cial year. This finding again has been seriously disputed on behalf of the petitioners as being ille­gal and baseless. Still it is important to find what is the year of account­ing followed by them. The Board says that the returns submitted by the dealers and the assessment proceedings have all proceeded throughout on the basis of the finan­cial year. This finding again has been seriously disputed on behalf of the petitioners as being ille­gal and baseless. If we assume it to be correct, in that event, the year during which the dealers be­come liable to registration extends from April, 1949, when they commenced business, to March 1950", and, on the authority of the proviso to S. 29 of the Act, they may be liable to taxation for sales during the period. The dealers, however, submit that they follow the calendar year for purposes of accounting, and under the law, it is their option to choose the calen­dar year or the financial year. This is borne out by their application for registration wherein they specifically say that their accounts are maintained in the English language, and that the year observed by them is from the 1st January to the 31st of De­cember. Their business actually commenced in April, 1949. Therefore, the accounting year, ac­cording to them, terminated on 31-12-1949. The returns which they originally filed, are also on the basis of the same accounting year, namely, for the periods ending 30-9-1949, then from 1-10-1949 to 31-12-1949, and lastly, from 1-1-1950 to 31-3-1950. But the revised returns were filed by them on the basis of the financial year. These re­turns were filed in October 1950. The peti­tioners explain that they filed these returns on the basis of the financial year because they were misled by a wrong note in the rules which referred to the financial year. The definition of the word "year" has been substituted in S. 2(12) of the Act by amending Act 12 of 1952, to mean the financial year; but as it was, the petitioners had originally the option to choose their year, which, as shown in their registration certificate, was the calendar year. This is conceded by the Board when it says that "under Sales Tax Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1952, a dealer had the option to choose a year other than the financial year as his accounting year. This is conceded by the Board when it says that "under Sales Tax Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1952, a dealer had the option to choose a year other than the financial year as his accounting year. It has been contended before me that the dealer, in fact, stated in his application for registration, that, for purposes of accounting, his year ran from 1st January to 31st December". The Board, however, erroneously assumed that the liability to assessment and liability to registra­tion were practically co-extensive and, therefore, the dealers must be deemed to have been liable for re­gistration under S. 29 from that date, which it takes to be the date on which the dealers started business. This assumption was clearly unfounded, and completely ignored the effect and import of the proviso to S. 29. If, therefore, the choice lay with the dealers to choose the accounting year other than the financial year prior to 1952, I see no reason why, under the law the statement in their registra­tion certificate should not have been adopted as conclusive on the point. It has not been shown or stated that the ac­counts actually showed a different basis of account­ing, namely, the financial, and not the calendar year. Judged on that basis, under the said proviso to S. 29, the dealers were not liable to be taxed on sales which occurred prior to January, 1950, but could be assessed only on sales subsequent thereto. (18a) The petitioners, however, contend that their case does not fall under S. 29 of the Act at all, even if that section is held valid. Section 29 ap­plies only to "a dealer not ordinarily liable to re­gistration under the provisions of this Act". The returns filed by the petitioners from April, 1949 to March 1950 clearly show that during all this period, their total turnover was far in excess of the taxabls quantum. Their case, therefore, came definitely under S. 3(2) of the Act. The application for registration voluntarily filed by them, and the notice issued under S. 16(2) of the Act, all lead to the same inference. Section 3(2), as admitted by the learned counsel for the Department, applies to all classes of dealers, whe­ther they deal in goods procured from outside the State or sell goods produced in the State. Indeed any other assertion is impossible. Section 3(2), as admitted by the learned counsel for the Department, applies to all classes of dealers, whe­ther they deal in goods procured from outside the State or sell goods produced in the State. Indeed any other assertion is impossible. Under S. 3(2), therefore, the dealers became liable to pay tax "with effect from three months after the commence­ment of the year immediately following that during which their total gross turnover first amounts to or exceeds the taxable quantum." In other words, if the preceding year is the ac­counting calendar year beginning from April 1949, when the dealers commenced business, and ending with 31-12-1949, the dealers' gross turn­over, even at the start, during the period being much in excess of the taxable quan­tum under sub-section (2) of S. 3, their liabi­lity to tax arose from April 1950. If, on the other hand, the financial year is taken into account, as asserted by the Department, their liability to tax does not arise before July 1950. Therefore, in any event, the assessment orders are bad and without any warrant in law. (19) The fourth question relates to the jurisdic­tion of the Superintendent of Taxes, Gauhati, to assess the petitioners. The question, in my opinion, has been correctly answered by the Board. Rule 78 of the Assam Sales Tax Rules, of course, provides that when a dealer has more than one place of busi­ness, he should be assessed by the Superintendent within whose jurisdiction his head office or his chief place of business in Assam is situated. The object of the rule evidently is to avoid multiplicity of assessment proceedings and conse­quent anomalies that may arise with reference to 1 the same dealer. As the first part of the Rule itself shows, it does not completely take away the | jurisdiction, under the law, of those Superinten­dents within whose jurisdiction he has his place or places of business. The Board appears to be right in observing that the rule is directory and not mandatory, and was framed for the convenience of both the taxing officer and the assessees. Section 49 of the Act, on which the petitioners rely for their contention, does not help them. The relevant facts on this point have been clearly set out in the judgment of the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes. Section 49 of the Act, on which the petitioners rely for their contention, does not help them. The relevant facts on this point have been clearly set out in the judgment of the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes. When the petitioners objected to assess­ment proceedings being started by the Sales Tax Superintendent at Gauhati on the ground that their Head Office was situated at Dibrugarh, the Superin­tendent of Taxes, Gauhati, directed the petitioners on 20-10-1950, to submit returns etc., to the Super­intendent of Taxes, Ditarugarti. The officer also requisitioned back the certifi­cate of registration issued from his office, for can­cellation, and asked the petitioners to obtain a cer­tificate of registration from Dibrugarh in respect of their branch there. But on 24-10-1952, the peti­tioners informed the Superintendent at Gauhati that their Ditarugarh office had been closed, and the registration certificate in respect of their Dibrugarh business had been surrendered on 22-9-1952. The petitioners further submitted that under the circumstances, any question of submission of their returns at Dibrugarh did not arise. The po­sition then is that during the pendency of the ass­essment proceedings, the Dibrugarh office had been closed and the only office of the petitioners then existing was at Gauhati. Therefore, the Superin­tendent of Taxes, Gauhati, was the only officer having jurisdiction to assess them. That Mr. Purkayastha was one such Superintendent appointed to assist the Commissioner under S. 8(1) of the Act, is not disputed. That being so he had complete jurisdiction to assess the petitioners, if otherwise the assessment was not illegal; and the point must, therefore, "be answered against them. It has been already held by this Court that the Commissioner may have more than one Assistant to assist him under the law, functioning simultaneously in the same area with concurrent jurisdiction. This would obviously de­pend upon the extent and volume of the work in a particular local area; and which of his Assistants, having jurisdiction in that area, deals with which particular case, is not of any consequence in the eye of law. (20) I entirely agree with the Board that s. 52 (2) (i) of the Act and R. 74 framed thereunder, are not ultra vires. The Act is otherwise a self-contained Act, and it is only for certain auxiliary purposes that it has relegated powers to adminis­trative authorities. The delegation of power is neither unregulated, nor, in my opinion, a delega­tion of essential legislative functions. The Act is otherwise a self-contained Act, and it is only for certain auxiliary purposes that it has relegated powers to adminis­trative authorities. The delegation of power is neither unregulated, nor, in my opinion, a delega­tion of essential legislative functions. The Legislature has determined the forum of] assessment, appeal and revision, and has delegated to the administrative authorities only the power to fix fees payable on petitioners' certificates and other matters. The dictum of Patanjali Shastri C. J., in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, 1952 SCR 435: ( AIR 1952 SC 123 ) (G), to which re­ference has been made by the Board, bears out the contentions of the Department. It is unnecessary for me, in this reference, to go into the nice distinc­tion of tax and fees. (21) The revision petition filed before the Com­missioner in these cases was directed against the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner, which did not affirm the orders of assessment pass­ed by the Superintendent of Taxes. The Assistant Commissioner had, in fact, directed that the peti­tioners should be assessed afresh in the light of the orders passed by him. Therefore, the orders of assessment had not become final, and the petition for revision before the Commissioner was, in sub­stance, against an order of remand. Such an order does not fall strictly under Cl. (a) of R. 74. The * clause refers specifically to "a petition for revision of an order of assessment". There being no order of assessment passed by the appellate Assistant Commissioner in this case,, the petitioner for revision before the Commissioner, in my opinion, fell under the residuary Cl. (d) of| the Rule which refers to "a petition for revision of any other order....", and the fee should have been levied accordingly. Even if two interpretations were 1 possible, in the context, the one in favour of the-assessee should be adopted. The Board is, there­fore, not justified in holding that the case was rightly assessed to fee under cl. (a) of R. 74, even if it is right in assuming that cl. (a) of the Rule must be deemed to include both original and appel­late assessment orders. The Board is, there­fore, not justified in holding that the case was rightly assessed to fee under cl. (a) of R. 74, even if it is right in assuming that cl. (a) of the Rule must be deemed to include both original and appel­late assessment orders. (22) The net result, therefore, is that questions 1, 2, 3 and 6 are answered in favour of the assessees, while questions 4 and 5 formulated by the Board in its letter of reference, are answered against them; but, in effect, the assessment proceedings in these-cases are held unwarranted and unauthorised by law. (23) The petitioners are entitled to their costs; hearing fee Rs. 100, and also to a refund of the amount of fees paid in excess of the required amount on their revision petition before the Commissioner, in addition to any other refund to which they may be entitled under the law. RAM LABHAYA J. : (24) I agree to the answers proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. I shall add a few words. (25) The first question is crucial. The assessee has challenged the vires of S. 29, Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. Section 29 reads as follows: "Where a dealer not ordinarily liable to regis­tration under the provisions of this Act sells goods which he has obtained from outside the Province, he shall, when so required by the Commissioner, be liable to registration, and, after such registration, he shall also be liable to be taxed on all sides as if he were a registered dealer: "Provided that such dealer shall not be liable to be taxed on sales which occurred prior to the year during which he becomes liable to registration." It is only dealers not ordinarily liable to registra­tion under the provisions of the Act who may be­come liable to tax under S. 29. Dealers who are ordinarily liable are excluded from its operation in express terms. (26) Dealers who are ordinarily liable to regis­tration under the provisions of the Act are those who fall within the purview of S. 3 of the Act. This is the only charging section. It creates the liabi­lity to tax under the Act and specifies conditions of liability. Two classes of dealers are dealt with by it. (26) Dealers who are ordinarily liable to regis­tration under the provisions of the Act are those who fall within the purview of S. 3 of the Act. This is the only charging section. It creates the liabi­lity to tax under the Act and specifies conditions of liability. Two classes of dealers are dealt with by it. (27) Section 3 as it stood before its amendment laid down that every dealer whose total gross turn­over during the year immediately preceding the commencement of the Act amounted to or exceeded the sum of Rs. 10,0007- would be liable to pay tax on all sales effected after the date notified in con­formity with the provisions of S. 3(1). Clause (2) of the section provided that a dealer to whom sub-s. (1) did not apply shall be liable to pay tax under the Act with effect from three months after the commencement of the year immediately following that during which his total gross turn­over first amounts to or exceeds the taxable quantum. It would appear that for purposes of determining liability to tax dealers were divided into two afore­said classes. (28) Clause (I.A.) was added by amending Act 4 of 1951. This clause has no bearing on the ques­tion before us. In 1954 S. 3 was amended by Assam Sales Tax (Amendment) Act 1954. Under S. 3(1) every dealer whose gross turnover from sales which have taken place either wholly in Assam or both in and outside Assam during the twelve months im­mediately preceding the date of the commencement of the Amending Act exceeded Rs. 12,000/- shall be liable to pay tax on sales which have taken place or deemed to have taken place in Assam on and from the date of such commencement. Clause which we are concerned. Clause (3) deals with the (1A) was renumbered as cl. (2) of the section with secondary category of dealers. 12,000/- shall be liable to pay tax on sales which have taken place or deemed to have taken place in Assam on and from the date of such commencement. Clause which we are concerned. Clause (3) deals with the (1A) was renumbered as cl. (2) of the section with secondary category of dealers. It lays down that "every dealer to whom sub-s. (1) does not apply shall be liable to pay tax under this Act with effect from the first of April of the year during which his gross turnover from sales which have taken place either wholly in Assam or both in and out­side Assam first amounts to or exceeds the 'taxable quantum': Provided that such dealer shall not be liable to pay the tax under this Act during such year in respect of his gross turnover upto the 'tax­able quantum' specified in sub-s. (1)." It is clear that under the amended provision the original basis of classification of dealers made lia­ble to tax has been adhered to. Under cl. (1) of S. 3 tax is leviable on sales which take place on and from the date of the commencement of the Act, though the liability is determined by the gross turn­over of the year immediately preceding the com­mencement of the Act. Under cl. (3) liability arises if the taxable quan­tum is reached within a particular year after the commencement of the Act, and though the dealer may be assessed to tax in that year, his sales in that year upto the taxable quantum are exempt from taxation. The exemption upto the taxable quantum during the year places dealers of the second category more or less on a level with dealers whose cases may fall under S. 3(1). (29) A dealer whose case does not fall under any of the two categories dealt with by S. 3 would be a dealer not ordinarily liable to registration under the provisions of the Act. The word 'dealer' occurs, in S. 3 as well as in S. 29. Its meaning in both the sections would be the same. Dealers would be persons who carry on the business of supplying goods in the State whether for commission, remu­neration or otherwise, etc., according to the defini­tion given in S. 2(3). The word 'dealer' occurs, in S. 3 as well as in S. 29. Its meaning in both the sections would be the same. Dealers would be persons who carry on the business of supplying goods in the State whether for commission, remu­neration or otherwise, etc., according to the defini­tion given in S. 2(3). (30) If a dealer not ordinarily liable to regis­tration under any part of S. 3 sells goods which he had obtained from outside the State, he shall when so required by the Commissioner be liable to re­gistration. Sale of goods obtained from outside is a necessary condition for a requisition for registra­tion under S. 29. But dealers even under S. 3 may and actually do sell goods obtained from outside-the State. There would be a large number of dealers who sell goods obtained exclusively from out­side the province. Dealers falling under S. 3 are not persons who sell only goods manufactured or produced in the State. This condition thus does not provide a test for distinguishing dealers falling under S. 3 from dealers who may be made liable under S. 29. The only distinguishing feature of dealers who may fall under S. 29, it appears, is that they are dealers who incur no liability to taxation under S. 3. By limit­ing the applicability of S. 29 to dealers who sell goods obtained from outside the province, exemption has been conferred on dealers who purchase goods inside the State but are otherwise not subject to tax under S. 3. (31) Both S. 3 and S. 29 deal with dealers who deal in goods which are liable to tax under the Act. They make no distinction between goods manufac­tured or produced inside the State and those pro­duced or manufactured outside the State. (32) The liability to registration under S. 29 arises when a dealer is required by the Commis­sioner to get himself registered. The liability to tax arises after he gets himself registered. (33) The language of the section does not im­pose any obligation on the Commissioner to re­quire every dealer who sells goods received from outside to get himself registered. He may create the liability to registration which leads to liability to taxation by requiring anyone or some of the dealers who sell goods obtained from outside the province. In picking and choosing some he would not be contravening the provisions of the section. He may create the liability to registration which leads to liability to taxation by requiring anyone or some of the dealers who sell goods obtained from outside the province. In picking and choosing some he would not be contravening the provisions of the section. His acts would be in conformity with it. The pro­vision therefore gives him unrestricted power to discriminate between one dealer and another even though both are dealers who are not liable to tax under S. 3 and are selling goods obtained from out­side the province. If selling goods obtained from outside the State, in cases not falling under S. 3 would have been enough to create liability under the section, all dealers in that class would become liable. There would then be no possibility of discriminating amongst them. But the section is so worded that liability to registration arises only when a dealer is required by the Commissioner to get himself re­gistered. Before such a requisition issues, there is no liability to taxation. The Commissioner is left untrammelled in the exercise of his discretion or power so far as requisitions for registration are concerned. (34) The section provides no test or standard for determining which out of the dealers who are selling imported goods may be required to register. No objective standard is laid down for the guidance of the Commissioner. The power left to the Com­missioner is not only large, it is unrestricted and is capable of arbitrary and capricious exercise. It is capable of use which may involve discrimination. It therefore fails to provide equal protection of the laws which is guaranteed to the citizen by Art. 14 of the Constitution. Equal protection of the laws means the right to equal treatment in similar circumstances both in regard to privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. The statute may not be in itself discri­minatory but if it gives to an officer a power which is naked and arbitrary to require or not to require any person to do a thing, e.g., to get registered for purposes of S. 29 or not, the section would be void as involving a denial of equal protection. In Balakrishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 565 (H) it was held that "if this discretion is completely unfettered it can be said that the pro­vision conflicts with the right of equal protection conferred by Art. 14". Mr. In Balakrishnan v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 565 (H) it was held that "if this discretion is completely unfettered it can be said that the pro­vision conflicts with the right of equal protection conferred by Art. 14". Mr. Medhi however argued that the Commissioner under the Act is a respon­sible office) and it may not be presumed that he will make a discriminatory use of his discretion. But as observed by Rajamannar C. J. in the case re­ferred to above "it would be unreasonable to gamble on the reasonableness of the Textile Commissioner. If the yardstick is only the personal opinion of the Officer concerned, it is plainly a case of a naked and arbi­trary power." These observations aptly apply to the case of the Commissioner under S. 29 of the Act. It is there­fore both desirable and necessary that some objec­tive standard or test should be laid down which should govern the exercise of discretion vested in the Commissioner. In AIR 1953 Trav-C 146 (P) the decision in AIR 1952 Mad 565 (H) was followed and it was held that where power given to the officer Is naked and arbitrary and has the potentiality of being exercised with unjust discrimination in the absence of any principle or standard guiding or re­gulating its exercise, the power or authority would be void and inoperative by reason, of its repugnance to Art. 14. (35) As indicated above dealers whose cases fall under S. 3 are not all persons who sell goods ob­tained from inside the State. Most of them sell goods obtained from outside. Certain privileges are given to dealers under that section even though they are selling goods obtained from outride. The dealers under S. 29 do not get any of those rights or privileges. There is an element of discrimina­tion so far as treatment of dealers similarly cir. cumstanced is concerned. The law itself discri­minates between dealers who sell goods obtained from outside. Reasonable classification for purposes of legis­lation is permitted but it is necessary that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration vide (S) AIR 1956 SC 479 (E). Such a nexus has not been shown to exist. Section 29 therefore is hit by Art. 14 and therefore must be held to be void and of no effect. (36) Mr. Such a nexus has not been shown to exist. Section 29 therefore is hit by Art. 14 and therefore must be held to be void and of no effect. (36) Mr. Medhi has tried to read the privileges allowed to dealers under S. 3 in S. 29. He urged that even under S. 29 the liability would arise if conditions of S. 3(3) were fulfilled. The language of S. 29 affords a complete answer to this conten­tion. Besides if the conditions of liability under S. 3 are to be read in S. 29, there would be no need for the provision. This contention does not de­serve any serious notice. (37) The next important question is whether it is necessary that the Commissioner should send a written requisition to a dealer to get himself re­gistered. The Commissioner performs a judicial function under S. 29, when he requires the dealer to get himself registered. The order is subject to revision under S. 31. Other remedies also may be available to a dealer who is asked to register him­self under S. 29. Not only its terms, the very fact that there was a verbal requisition may be disputed as in this case. The decision to require a person to get himself registered' under S. 29 must therefore appear in writing; otherwise it would not be possible for the dealer to question its validity by any proceeding. It therefore may be treated as implicit in the sec­tion that the decision to require a dealer to get him­self registered and its communication to the dealer both may not be oral. Even for the purposes of taxing authorities the record of the decision would be necessary in order to proceed further if the dealer does not comply with the requisition made under S. 29. A mere statement that a dealer was verbally asked to register would not satisfy the requirements of S. 29. The dealer must know under what section of the Act he is being asked to register himself. It does not appear that he was so told. Assessment in the circumstances of the case is vitiated by an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. (38) The validity of S. 52 (2) (i) and R. 74 has also been challenged. The learned Chief Justice has found these provisions constitutionally valid. It does not appear that he was so told. Assessment in the circumstances of the case is vitiated by an illegal exercise of jurisdiction. (38) The validity of S. 52 (2) (i) and R. 74 has also been challenged. The learned Chief Justice has found these provisions constitutionally valid. The same conclusion was reached in Banwarilal v. State of Assam, AIR 1955 Assam 195 (I) when this contention was first raised in this Court. I was a party to that decision. The view then taken re­ceives support from the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice. V.S.B. Answer accordingly.