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1956 DIGILAW 394 (MAD)

Untitled judgment

1956-12-12

RAMASWAMI GOUNDER

body1956
Judgment This is a Civil Revision Petition sought to be filed against the revisory order of the learned District Judge of Coimbatore in Civil Revision Petition No. 80 of 1956, under section 12-B of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949), which empowers the High Court to call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceeding taken under the said Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding. This is a revision of a revision. The facts are: Sivakamu Ammal is the owner of a dwelling house in Erode town. This Sivakamu Ammal let out his house to a doctor byname N.C. Kuppuswami Ayyangar. From 1953 this Sivakamu Ammal who is found to require this house bona fide for her own occupation has been requesting the tenant to vacate the house. The tenant has been putting off with evasive promises to do so. In the money order coupon Exhibit P-5 dated 12th October, 1953, the tenant writes: “I am extremely sorry I cannot vacate the house now. I shall, do so as soon as I get a building”. In Exhibit P-6 letter dated 23rd June, 1953, he writes: “As suggested in your letter I am unable to vacate the house”. In his letter, dated 30th July, 1953, the tenant has written “Regarding vacating the house I shall do it at an early date”. This Sivakamu Ammal applied to the Rent Controller for eviction on four grounds viz., (a) that there has been wilful default in the payment of rent; (b) that the tenant had damaged the house; (c) that the owner wanted the house for her own occupation and (d) that the tenant who took the house on rent as a dwelling house is using it also as a business premises for carrying on a dispensary there. The Rent Controller found that the tenant has been irregular in his payment of rent and in fact in his letter Exhibit P-7 dated 14th December, 1953, the tenant has stated “I am a defaulter for the last month ....” but that this default was not wilful and that after the petition was filed the tenant has been depositing the rent regularly and there was no arrear at the time of the enquiry. In regard to point (b) he held that the tenant was keeping the house in a dirty condition but had not caused any wilful damage. In regard to ground (c) he came to the conclusion that the landlady required bona fide the house for her own occupation and that she was entitled to the relief asked for as she was not occupying any other residential building of her own in that city, and fulfilling all the considerations determining reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlord. For an exhaustive discussion of this topic see Chapter XVI, page 250 and following of Andhyarjuna’s Principles of Rent Control (Bombay New Book Company). In regard to ground (d) he came to the conclusion that though on inspection he found the building to be suitable more for dwelling purposes than for non-residential purposes, the test for deciding whether a premises is a house is its suitability as a place of residence (Vide Malhar Rao v. Vinayak1and though it was situated in the heart of residential quarters in Erode town, it had not been proved before him that it was leased for residential purposes alone but that this would not prevent the owner from applying for eviction, following the Full Bench decision in Dakshinamoorthy v. Thulia Bai2, where it was held that if the letting was equally for residential and non-residential purposes and not mainly for the one or the other kind of purpose, the application of the landlord will stand whether filed under section 7(3)(a)(i) or section 7(3)(a) (ii) of the Act. The Rent Controller therefore ordered eviction. The tenant has taken the matter both by way of appeal to the learned Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, in C.M.A. No. 2 of 1955 and in Revision to the learned District Judge of Coimbatore, in Civil Revision Petition No. 80 of 1956. Both of them unhesitatingly confirmed the order of the Rent Controller. The point that has been urged in all these Courts is that this house was let out as business premises and that it was being used only as a business premises. This is not supported by the evidence on record. First of all, the tenancy does not expressly provide for use of this house for the particular purpose of carrying on only a dispensary. This is not supported by the evidence on record. First of all, the tenancy does not expressly provide for use of this house for the particular purpose of carrying on only a dispensary. When the dwelling place is not found to be let on one basis it cannot assumed without evidence of a new contract or a variation of the existing contract or without its being made out by the circumstance of the letting: Specific agreement with the landlord should be shown: William v. Perry3, Oker v. Perraton4, Vyman v. Steward5. If the change had been agreed to by the landlord the status of the house will be determined as at the time of the expiry of the notice to quit: Shooter v. Gaitley1, Court v. Robinson2, Hasell v. Maldermi3. See discussion in Lloyd and Montgomerie Rent Control, Second Edition, pages 10-11. There must be landlord’s affirmative consent to the change Wolfe v. Hogan4. Secondly, acceptance of the rent by the landlord after knowledge of user by the tenant will not convert a dwelling house into a non-residential premises. Thirdly, the premises will not be treated as non-residential building if they are substantially unsuitable for use as business premises, which is found to be the case here: Challanghan v. Bristowe5: see discussion in Lloyd and Montgomerie Rent Control, Second Edition, page 8. Fourthly, the mere fact that residential premises are also used for carrying on business in a part will not convert it into a non-residential building. It has been held, for example, that appalam industry carried on in a room will not make the building non-residential Lakshman v. Balakrishna6, Krishna Nair v. Valliammal7, Broder v. Signal8, Curl v. Angelo9, Wimbush v. Cibulia10, Wright v. Howell11. Fifthly, whether a building in residential or non-residential is a question of fact having regard to certain considerations laid down by Courts in deciding the question: Ramachandrudu v. Bekraj Gulabchnd Firm 12 ; Premjee Harjee v. Nathamal13; see discussions in R. Mathurbutham and R. Srinivasan’s The Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, pages 38 and 42; In the matter of The Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd.14; Lakshman v. Balkrishna15, See Das Gupta Rent Control Acts and Orders in India and Pakistan, page 103: Wright v. Holwell16, Railway Assessment v. Great Western Railway17, Macmillan & Co. v. Rees18, Vickery v. Martin19 Kicks v. Snooks20, Cohen v. Benjamin21, Whitly v. Wilson22, (For a useful collection of English cases on business premises and dwelling house corresponding to our non-residential and residential buildings consult Blundells Rent Restriction Cases (1948) Second Edition and cumulative supplements). In this case the Rent Controller who inspected the premises, the Appellate Court who heard the appeal and the Revisional Court which looked into the matter to see whether there was any ground to interfere on a point of law, have all come to the conclusion that the premises do not constitute a non-residential building taken out of the scope of the application of section 7 (3) (a) (1) of the Act. I am bound by this finding of fact. The next result of this analysis is that there are no grounds to interfere under section 12-B of the Act and this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. V.S. ------ Petition dismissed.