JUDGMENT Mootham, C.J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The facts are these: The Petitioner was employed as a khallasi by the Northern Railway, and in 1953 he had about eight years of service. In 1952 he was implicated in a murder case but was acquitted. On 10-12-1953, a charge-sheet was served upon him, the charges being the following: 1. For concealment of your antecedents at the time of appointment by declaring. (a) Your name as Bashir Khan on appointment to Railway service. (b) Your name as Irteza in the Court of Law when prosecuted u/s 302, IPC. (c) Your name Irteza alias Hira during the course of police enquiry at the latter date. 2. For giving the false name of your father as Nasir Khan on your appointment whereas the correct name as disclosed during the police enquiries is Shahzad. 3. For possessing undesirable and unsatisfactory character as reported by the police. 3. A departmental enquiry was held on the 26-5-1954, Tribunal's finding being as follows: We, the undersigned, having carefully considered all the evidence, do find, that Bashir Khan T.N.134/F. son of Nasir Khan concealed his antecedents at the time of employment in these works, and when his actual name was Irtiza alias Hira, son of Shabazad, he represented himself as Bashir Khan, son of Nasir Khan. He is guilty of changing both his name and parentage while obtaining employment in these works." It appears therefore that the Tribunal, in substance, found against the Petitioner only on the first and second charges. I am informed that no evidence was called to show that, the Petitioner had an undesirable and unsatisfactory character as reported by the police, and this presumably accounts for the Tribunal not recording a finding against the Petitioner on the third charge. The Tribunal, however, in the 'Reasons' which it amended to its finding said. The police report about his doubtful character and integrity is very clear and their recommendation that he is an undesirable person to be kept in Government employment requires consideration. 4. On 17-3-1954, the Petitioner was served with a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. The police report about his doubtful character and integrity is very clear and their recommendation that he is an undesirable person to be kept in Government employment requires consideration. 4. On 17-3-1954, the Petitioner was served with a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. In this notice it was stated that all the charges framed against the Petitioner had been found to have been proved, although the Tribunal in fact found against the Petitioner only on the first and second charges. The Petitioner showed cause, but his explanation was rejected, and on 1-4-1954, he was served with a notice informing him that he had been removed from service. The question was raised at one stage of the hearing as to whether this notice amounted to anything more than the termination of the Petitioner's service in accordance with the conditions of his contract of service, but learned Counsel for the Respondent, rightly I think, did not press this point and the case proceeded on the basis that the Petitioner had been removed from service as a punishment. Against his order of removal the Petitioner appealed to the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, but the latter dismissed his appeal on 19-8-1954. Thereafter the Petitioner submitted an application, presumably under Rule 1725 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, to the General Manager for the revision of the order which had been passed against him, but this application was rejected on 3-12-1954. Thereafter on 7-4-1955, the Petitioner filed the petition which is now before me and in which the principal relief sought is the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of 1-4-195 and 19-8-1954. 5. Now under Rule 1708 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code a railway servant may be removed from service for committing any offence for which he may be dismissed under Rule 1706, and Clause (V) of the latter rule provides that a railway servant shall be liable to dismissal for:"obtaining employment, by the concealment of his antecedents, which would have prevented his employment in railway service had they been made known before his appointment to the authority appointing him." 6. It is common around that it is for this offence that the Petitioner has been removed from service. 7. It is common around that it is for this offence that the Petitioner has been removed from service. 7. The Petitioner gave an explanation to the Tribunal as to how it came about that when he applied for employment with the railway administration in February, 1946 he gave the name of his step father as that of his father and his own name as Bashir Khan, and his contention is that not only was there no deliberate concealment of his original name and of his father's name but that the railway administration has neither alleged nor proved that had he then stated that his name was Irteza, son of Shahzad, this would have prevented his employment in the railway service. The second of these submissions must, in my opinion, be accepted. 8. Rule 1708, read with Rule 1706, Clause (V), does not make the mere concealment by a candidate for appointment of his antecedents a ground for his subsequent removal from service, in order to justify the removal the concealment must, in my opinion, have been such that had the true facts been known the applicant would not have been appointed. Now there is no evidence in the present case that would have been the consequence of the disclosure by the Petitioner in 1946 of his real name, and in the reasons given by the Tribunal for its finding the Tribunal says that it is unable to ascertain why the Petitioner did not state his name and that of his father correctly. In my opinion a necessary ingredient of the offence for which the Petitioner has been removed has not been established, and has indeed been ignored, and that consequently the order of removal is invalid. 9. Learned Counsel for the Respondent, has argued that the Petitioner should have pursued a remedy by way of a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal and that this petition should be rejected on the ground that it is belated. The Petitioner's case, is, however, that he has not in law been removed at all and that therefore the alternative remedy by way of suit would not be appropriate; and I think that he is right. The Petitioner's case, is, however, that he has not in law been removed at all and that therefore the alternative remedy by way of suit would not be appropriate; and I think that he is right. There has admittedly been some delay in the filing of the petition, but the Petitioner was pursuing remedies for which provision is made in the Establishment Code, and, although more than 90 days elapsed between the date upon which the Petitioner's memorial to the General Manager was rejected and the date upon which this petition was filed, it has to be borne in mind that the judgment of this Court in Mongey v. The Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad 1956 ALJ 334 in which the ninety days rule was laid down had not then been delivered. In the circumstances I am not prepared to dismiss this petition on the ground that there has been unreasonable delay. 10. In my opinion the petition succeeds, and a writ will accordingly issue quashing the notice of removal dated 1-4-1944, and the subsequent order of the Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer, dated 19-8-1954, dismissing the Petitioner's appeal. The Petitioner is entitled to his costs. Kidwai, J. 11. Judgment delivered by me on 23-11-1956 in the absence of the Hon'ble Chief Justice.